99% Invisible - The Power Broker #07: Sec. Pete Buttigieg

Episode Date: July 19, 2024

NEWS: We've got 99PI Power Broker Breakdown merch! Visit 99pi.org/store.This is the seventh official episode, breaking down the 1974 Pulitzer Prize winning book, The Power Broker by our hero Robert Caro. This week, Roman and Elliott sit down with Pete Buttigieg, the US Secretary of Transportation. One of his major responsibilities as Secretary is overseeing the implementation of the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, which has contributed billions of dollars to infrastructure projects around the country.Secretary Buttigieg was also responsible for several major infrastructure projects when he was mayor of South Bend, Indiana. And he’s talked about the importance of acknowledging and dismantling the racism built into transportation systems around the country — somewhat paraphrasing The Power Broker — and has gotten a lot of pushback for it.On today’s show, Elliott Kalan and Roman Mars will cover the second half of Part 5 and the first section of Part 6 (Chapters 27 through Chapter 32), discussing the major story beats and themes.The Power Broker #07: Sec. Pete ButtigiegJoin the discussion on Discord and our Subreddit.

This is the 99% of visible breakdown of the power broker. I'm Roman Mars. And I'm Elliot Kalin. So today we're covering the final section of part 5, The Love of Power, and the beginning of part 6, The Lust for Power. That's chapters 27-32, pages 607-702. And later in this episode, our special guest is the Secretary of Transportation, Pete Budicic.

In addition to overseeing the federal dollars for infrastructure in this country, Secretary Budicic was also responsible for several major infrastructure projects when he was mayor of South Bend, Indiana. He's also talked about acknowledging the racism built into transportation systems around the country, something he has mentioned publicly, kind of paraphrasing the power broker, and gotten a lot of pushback for. So on the last episode, Robert Moses was showing what an amazing visionary he was, but also what a petty tyrant he could be. On one hand, he was brilliantly taken advantage of these like tax assessments and federal programs

and archival research to complete the funding of this massive West Side Manhattan construction project, which is this amazing chapter in just like how he works down 109 million dollars to something that the city can afford. On the other hand, he's destroying neighborhoods, these historic neighborhoods. He's destroying New York's last natural wilderness space without taking anyone else's need into account and harassing the Columbia Yacht Club just because he can, because he thought that they were rude to him. It's also becoming clear how much he is using race and class

when it comes to his park projects. Like he's deliberately underserving New York's poor people and people of color. And meanwhile, all these bridges and expressways that he's building that are meant to relieve New York's traffic problems are actually seeming to make traffic worse. And this is becoming this thing that is constant.

It's almost a universal truth when it comes to building bridges and more roads and more lanes. But he cannot see this. This is his only solution, no matter what the outcome actually proves itself to be. And then we've also learned in this horrible chapter, a good chapter, but a very sad chapter of Robert Moses' relationship with his own family, the decades he spent undermining the career and the success of his own brother and his disdain and sort of completely ignoring his sister

and just the completely undermining the vitality and the life force of Mary, his wife. So that was on the last episode, so check it out if you haven't heard it. Now we're up to chapter 27, also again called changing, and tell us what are we in store for? I'm excited because this changing chapter is a different changing chapter from the last one.

Remember from the last episode, that changing chapter was 75 pages long or so. And this one, this, this episode, we're going to be zooming through the zoom in through chapter. Some of the shortest chapters in the book are on this one and you can't judge a chapter by its size there's still valuable information concepts moments scenes uh it's amazing and i know last episode you probably had a lot of audience members saying something they never thought they would say before oh that poor yacht club and this this episode we're gonna have more shocks and twists like that one.

I didn't want to interrupt you, Roman, but I was thinking when you're talking about the bridges making traffic worse, I started thinking of the first line of Pride and Prejudice, and I was wishing Jane Austen could write her gloss on the book and be like, it's a truth universally acknowledged that the making of a bridge will lead to more cars on the bridge. will lead to more cars on the bridge. So this chapter, we'll start with chapter 27, changing. We're still in part five, the love of power. The love of power, that's the worst emotion you can feel for power, right? No, get ready for, we're going to get to part six and then it gets dirtier. But chapter 27 is about how Robert Moses is continuing to change from someone who, well, the previous change of Robert Moses was from someone who was an idealist to a realist,

someone who held so firm to their principles they could not get things done. And now they will do whatever it takes to get things done. And now Kara says, in the past, that Moses, even the realist Moses, it was because he cared about his dreams. It wasn't power that he wanted so much as he wanted to achieve these dreams.

And he would do anything to make it happen. But lying in his personality, laying in wait, was this susceptibility to an addiction to power. And now this further change is he'll do anything he wants or needs to, not just to get a thing made, but to maintain his power and to accumulate more power. By 1936, which was when this chapter begins, as we've jumped around in time quite a bit at different times, but now we're firmly in 1936, he is seeking power for its own sake. And in this case, he really wants to be part of the New York City Tunnel Authority, which is going to be the new authority

that will build a Queens Midtown Tunnel and a Brooklyn Battery Tunnel. They're big passageways for getting people between Manhattan and the other boroughs. And these are big things. Tunnels are big in New York. We're gonna talk a little bit about the Holland Tunnel connecting New York and New Jersey under the Hudson River. That's a big tunnel. It's super important. Tunnels are big. They're important. Let's, we don't think about tunnels much. They're holes in the ground, but they're important holes. And the thing is, Braum Moses says, LaGuardia, make me a part of this tunnel authority.

And LaGuardia has smartened up a little bit since the past and he knows I need federal funds for this tunnel. And if there's one guy, the president, president Roosevelt hates, it is Robert Moses. And that got me into a lot of trouble. And you know what? Robert Moses is the master of bridges, master of roads. He doesn't know anything about underwater tunnels. So LaGuardia

says, no, I'm not going to make you part of this authority. So Moses, what is he going to do? He's going to try to derail the legislation creating the authority because there's no post for him in it. And that doesn't work. And so then he tries to schmooze some cooperation from the head of the project, the engineer, Earl Singstad or, or Singstead, we had a lot of discussion before that recording, I had to pronounce it. I always thought it was old Singstead, like that's good old Singstead over there. But Olay Singstead was also thrown around. But Singstead, he's a he's someone who is not going to be pushed around quite as easily or smooth as quite easily. And I love Carol's description for him on page 607.

He says, There were engineers available outside most of this organization, most notably, Ulla Singsted, a cocky, hard-driving, table-pounding Norwegian, who had designed the then-novel ventilation system that had made the Holland Tunnel feasible, who, after tunnel designer Clifford M. Holland collapsed and died from overwork, had rammed the job through to completion, and who is regarded as the world's leading authority on underwater vehicular tunnels. And I love what a particular specialization that is, that if you're going to be the world's authority on anything, underwater vehicular tunnels is a great way to do it. But Roman,

before the episode, you were talking about how, worth taking a moment to talk about, Singstad, Carol just says he designed the ventilation system for the Holland tunnel, but you were saying that was a big thing, it was a big deal. It was, it's such a long tunnel, it's the very beginning of sort of car traffic being carried under these long tunnels, and figuring out a ventilation system so that people didn't suffocate on carbon monoxide was a huge deal, like they spent a ton of time on it, tons of tests, probably ethically questionable tests with young engineers and graduate students and stuff.

Can you hang out in this tunnel and we'll fill it with carbon monoxide until you don't feel good? Exactly. And he's the one who cracked this and the Holland Tunnel was a huge engineering feat. And I don't think you can overstate how important Ole Singstad is to tunnel development

as an engineering because of his ventilation systems. I mean, it's really, he's coming against someone who actually knows how to do something rather than just bully people. You know, like he knows engineering in a real sense. And Robert Moses, you were saying this before the recording, Robert Moses is thought of as a builder, but he's not an engineer. He doesn't really know the mechanics of these things. So he can BS people and he can snow them with his made up facts. And Singstead is like, well, no, I know this.

This is my science. I think that's it. Like if I were to sort of get to the heart of this, it's like he's a real engineer's engineer. And he might find the sort of bureaucratic phoniness of Moses and it's so like his kind of thing might not work on him. You know, like Moses' bravado might not work on Singstot. If I were to sort of cast them

and make this dramatic story, I would, that's what I would focus on, yeah. Giving notes to Robert Caro, that's hubristic in its way, you know, but you know. No, no, no, I mean like. Even a cat can look at a king. I way, you know, but you know, even a cat can look at a king. I mean, if I were to cast this as a movie and I would say, you know, to someone without

explaining, you know, the ventilation system of the Holland tunnel, I would say you're an engineer who really knows how to do this. And you see this guy as a bureaucrat pretending to be an engineer. That's the level which you should treat your like your disdain for him, uh, action. You know, that's, that's what I mean. That's really good insight. That's great insight is his character because he comes off, he's someone who we'll, we'll see later if we, if we mention it that, uh, Caro talked to him. He interviewed Sengstad before Sengstad died in 1969, I think. And he comes across as a very forceful figure who sees through Robert Moses. He does, he is not going to get fooled by any of this.

And I just want to give a tip of my hat to Singstad. I've crossed through the Holland tunnel thousands of times in my life. And I didn't die once. So that ventilation system, I assume they're using the same one. It still works really well. Um, so Moses can't smooth Singstad, as we said, it's not going to work. So next he tries using his allies in Albany to delay the project until it loses its federal funding, but that doesn't work either.

And he's basically saying, I will either control this or I will destroy it. I will sabotage it if I can't have it. And earlier we saw him have a project he desperately wanted to build and he accrued power to make it real. Now, when someone else has a project that he can't control, he's going to try to use that power to wreck it. And for no other reason than that, he wants to have control of as project that he can't control, he's gonna try to use that power to wreck it. And for no other reason than that, he wants to have control of as much as he can.

If there's some big transportation related project in the New York area, he wants it or he's gonna destroy it. He doesn't care what the effect is. He doesn't care who that hurts. And just to be clear, since we'd spent so much time talking about the Holland Tunnel, this is about the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel. Yes, the Holland Tunnel is built already.

That exists. Moses is late to the party. He can't do anything about that. This Tunnel. Yes, the Holland Tunnel is built already. That exists. Moses is late to the party. He can't do anything about that. This is about specifically the, well, the Queens Midtown Tunnel and the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel. We're going to talk about the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel a lot in this chapter. The Queens Midtown Tunnel,

I mean, even compared to the other tunnels in New York, it doesn't get a lot of attention. And in this book, it doesn't get a lot of attention. It's very much the neglected child of the New York Tunnels, but that's okay. So that's 1936 that's happening. Now we are moving a little forward. By 1938, the federal work relief money that Moses has been using to maintain that power, it's starting to dry up. The depression has been, they've been going through it and it feels like it's starting to end

a little bit. The war is going to start ramping things up. That's where the money is going to go. It is storm clouds over Europe. That's where the money is going to have to be directed rather than employment at home, just for employment sake. Uh, and so Moses needs money and there's a new source of federal funds that is coming up, public housing money. This is a subject Moses has never really been super interested in. He doesn't care about housing the poor. He doesn't care about doing much of anything for the poor, but now there are hundreds of millions of dollars available for public housing

and he wants that money for his projects. So as with the tunneling authority, he sets out to replace the city housing authority with a group he can control. And once again, he comes up against LaGuardia showing more backbone than before because LaGuardia, he does care about public housing. He has a very personal stake in it because he believes that his wife and his child who died of tuberculosis, that they died of that because of the tenement they lived in, that it was the ventilation, the sewage, everything about it was bad. And he blames that for their deaths. And while reading this, it was just like

imagining a mayor of New York whose family lived in a tenement, not when he was a child, but when he was a married man, and who later on we'll see has no money when he leaves office and when he dies. Well, that makes me think of is like how much we spent so much time praising Moses at the time for not taking graph, not being on the take. And this whole time, like, you know,

LaGuardia clearly isn't doing so well for himself either. You know, like it's kind of notable, I don't know. Like, you know. It shows you, I guess, sometimes that when you publicize a thing, you can get credit for it when you don't, when other people, there's a, there's a story about Heineken years ago.

I think their advert campaign was like, when back when bottles would be returned to the bottler and then reused again, they're like, we steam clean our bottles. And it was like, yeah, everybody does. But they made it sound like only they did it. Everyone else is using dirty bottles. You know? So if you publicize that you do a thing, it doesn't matter if other people do it.

You get it. So this is a personal issue for LaGuardia. And Moses knows, if I'm going to steal control of public housing away from the current authority, I can't do it directly through LaGuardia. I'm going to have to kind of build a groundswell of public opinion that demands I take it. So he secretly arranges for some reform organizations to rent the auditorium of the Museum of Natural History, my single greatest, most favorite place on earth that I love the most.

And any trip I take to New York that I don't go to that museum is a wasted trip as far as I'm concerned. Um, so he can present a speech titled housing and recreation. He convinced his WNYC to broadcast it over the radio and he hands out to the audience, the event, these pre printed brochures proposing this enormous slum clearance and a public housing program where rather than rehabilitate pre existing buildings, which is what LaGuardia wants to do, he wants to tear them all down and build all these blocks of new housing. And he's clearly trying to recreate the triumph he had back in episode four when he gave his

speech about his unified transportation plan and people loved it so much that there was no way to stop it. And the cost of his program, it's going to be $245 million. And he says he can do it without raising city real estate taxes. And his plan is clearly, I'm going to do $245 million. And he says he can do it without raising city real estate taxes. And his plan is clearly, I'm going to do what I did before. I'm going to present this plan. People are going to love it so much that it will be politically unfeasible to stand against it. Little does he know. This is the best.

This is so great. This is children's movie level kind of like planning and plotting to undermine Moses that in a good way that LaGuardia has gotten ahold of one of these brochures ahead of time earlier that day and has arranged with the WNYC station heads to pretend to broadcast Moses's speech, even to the point of having technicians there pretending they're operating machines and giving Moses the thumbs up to start talking because they're ready for him. While the station itself actually goes off the air for the extent of the

speech and Moses doesn't learn this until at he's finishing the speech. When I think one of his people go turns on a radio and there's nothing happen. There's nothing coming out of it. Uh, the, so he's this whole plan of his has been undermined and been basically wasted that, that he's announced the plan to the people in the auditorium, but that doesn't help him too much. This groundswell he's gonna get from the people of New York is not gonna happen.

And LaGuardia manages just to out-think Moses in this case. He builds his own housing projects without Moses' input. And that my favorite aspect of this is, Moses then submits a bill to the government to pay for the printing of the brochures, and LaGuardia tells the comptroller, don't do it, don't pay it. Like this is, Moses can cover that amount. And so LaGuardia sees really clearly now that Moses is trying to expand his power beyond parks, beyond park-related roads, beyond roads to any kind of construction that he can take,

that he can get the money and the power from. And he decides Moses needs to be curbed in some way. And he's seeing, as Carol presents it, he's seeing that Moses is also so focused on the upper classes to the exclusion of the people that LaGuardia, as with Al Smith before him, thought of as his real people, the kind of poor New Yorkers. He still respects Moses' abilities. He still wants Moses' abilities to be working for him.

But he wants to reorient Moses' goals and do that. He starts cutting the park budgets. He starts canceling projects. He feels like he's starting to get the upper hand on Moses, but what he doesn't realize, and as we'll see in the next chapter, Moses is leaving the era when it matters to him at all what the mirror of New York thinks or wants from him because he has discovered a new source of potential power that will take him to the point of his highest degree

of control and power that will make him kind of a mini emperor within the New York system. And that is the institution known as the public authority. I'm so excited about talking about public authorities. It's gonna be amazing. And this is chapter 28, the warp on the loom. public authority. I'm so excited about talking about public authorities. It's gonna be amazing. And this is chapter 28, the warp on the loom. That's all about the creation of the public authority.

And it goes to great lengths. I love this chapter. This is, I love this chapter. It's a great chapter. This is a, it is considering especially, this is a 20 or 21 page chapter about the functioning of public authorities bureaucratically and the legal openings it creates

for the abuse of that authority. And it is so exhilarating. Like it's a, it's a, it's a tour de force chapter. It's exciting to hear Caro unfolding this. And so first he's got to explain what a public authority is. I know I didn't, before I read this book, I didn't really understand the difference between it and the other thing.

They are semi-independent organizations. They're publicly funded through the sale of bonds and sometime, and through some government funding in the case of like the MTA, which didn't exist at this time. You know, we'll get to that later in the book, but they have specific goals to create a specific thing. They sell bonds to fund that thing. And then they operate like a private corporation for the duration of the construction of the thing. Their records are private. They're allowed to charge the public for the use of their things in order to pay back the bondholders.

And Moses, through the hidden provisions, as we'll talk about in a new set of laws he gets passed, basically allows himself the power to handle bonds differently than authorities have in the past and will turn the tribal authority into this immortal self-governing, personal fiefdom that he uses to basically push other people around in the thousands, if not millions. Public authorities, as Caro says, they go back to England, they go back centuries. He

does not go into as much detail in the centuries-long history of English public authorities as he could have, considering he went into such geologic detail about the creation of Long Island. And I think we all appreciate that. But authorities were relatively new in America. he could have considering he went into such geologic detail about the creation of Long Island. And I think we all appreciate that. But authorities were relatively new in America. The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey existed already. That was kind of sloppily put together.

It's kind of a mess, much as Port Authority bus terminal for anyone who's been there knows is also a mess. It's a gross place to be. It's not not a pleasant place to take a bus. Traditionally, as I was saying, public authorities were focused on a single project. They sold bonds to fund it. They collected revenue, they paid off the bonds. And then the authority just goes out of existence.

And this is really key to the public authority. They are limited term existence organizations. They don't last forever. And once they get paid, once they pay off their bills, the thing that created becomes public property, becomes the property of the city or, and they don't exist anymore. And Moses early authorities fit this mold too. And so he always led people to believe that the tolls on his projects would go away when the bonds were paid off. These were temporary tolls, but now his thinking is changing because his bridges are bringing in so much more money than anyone expected them to bring in. In the late thirties,

the Henry Hudson bridge is profiting $600,000 per year. The Trial Brower Bridge, it's bringing in $1.3 million in profit a year. In the thirties, back when a hamburger cost a nickel, you know, or whatever. So this is a lot of money. And the number of toll paying cars on those bridges, it's only going up.

It's only making more money each year. And under the law, this means the bonds on those bridges, they could be paid off in one decade rather than four decades, which was the plan. And then the law, this means the bonds of those bridges, they could be paid off in one decade, rather than four decades, which was the plan. And then the tolls would be removed. And that it would be a major success story of urban infrastructure financing, he built this enormous bridge, it was so much more successful in carrying cars, if not in

cutting down traffic, then it was supposed to be, and then you'd have 30 years of New Yorkers not having to pay tolls on this bridge that they thought they were going to have to. What does Moses care about that? Nothing. He can't get anything from amazing success stories of urban infrastructure financing. No, his power is not rooted in accomplishing goals and then relinquishing the tools to get those goals done. It's in the use of political power and ultimately it's in the use of money.

As they say in cabaret, money makes the world go round. And it's not just spending that particular money, as they say in cabaret, money makes the world go round. And it's not just spending that particular money, but the power that that money gives him to entice bankers, to purchase bonds, to fund, to allow him even more funding. And so by 1938, the total income annually of his authorities is $4.5 million. That's as large as his park department budget. But if he can change the law to allow him to hold on to that money as long as he can, he can use that $4.5 million to capitalize four-year bonds worth $81 million in genuine construction funding. And not only that, because the more bridges he builds, the more tolls he's

bringing in, the lower the interest rates on the bonds that he can afford to float, the more he can sell. So by his reckoning, according to Caro, for every dollar in toll revenue that he can afford to float, the more he can sell. So by his reckoning, according to Caro for every dollar in toll revenue that he gets, he can capitalize $18 for the building of more bridges. So it's 18 fold. He can, he can use that money for, and once you build more bridges, you can bring in more revenue to float, more bonds, to build more bridges. He just, he can do, he can, it's a self perpetuating money and building machine and his dreams are getting bigger and bigger because he's not happy.

Once you build an expressway, how can you be building happy building another expressway? You got to build a major system. Once you built one bridge, how can you be happy with that? You got to build more bridges. There's so much of the city that does not have expressways running through it. There's so much land that has not yet been turned into enormous ball fields and half filled stadiums, like that Fire Island Expressway he never got to build

because those two old ladies wouldn't sell their houses. Like he could still build that. The city does not have the money for this. The state does not want to spend any money on this. The federal government is soon going to have to turn its money towards destroying Nazi Germany. If Moses can hold onto the revenue of the authorities, he won't need money from the federal government,

the city government, the state government. He'll have his own money to play with. He will be his own funding machine, which is so totally not the way democratic politics is supposed to work, but that's never stopped him before. Right? Yeah. Cause a key part of this is like, he used to depend on public support. That was his thing. Like he had the support of the public behind him.

But as we learned last time with the sort of fall of Al Smith is that public support and public love is a slender read to lean on. And he's learning that a much more robust read to lean on is $81 million. Yeah, there's an old saying about how money talks and another thing walks. And for him now public support is that other thing.

Money is concrete, it's the thing that people will pay attention to. And with his own money, he can do things like ignore civil service regulations. Those same civil service regulations, he was such a big fan of as a young man, they are stymying him all the time. And the only power the Civil Service Commission has is that it can disapprove salary payments. It can cancel payments or block them. If he controls a little money, he doesn't care if the civil service commission's

not gonna allow him to pay somebody, he can do what he wants. He can hire whoever he wants. He can pay them whatever he wants. He can get them their own cars. He can get them in their own houses. He can assemble the loyal, dedicated staff of professionals he's always dreamed of.

And then he can use them to produce studies and blueprints. He can fund those studies and blueprints that he can then present to the governments as a fait accompli because what politician is gonna risk telling the public, they can't have this great new Moses thing that Moses has the money to build that will cost them nothing except having to deal with it

for the rest of their lives and for innumerable generations to come. Money can be his end run around the things that got in his way in the past. He has never been able to appropriate money in the ways he wanted for the techniques that he thinks are necessary to get things done. Making scale models to persuade people,

buying yachts and throwing parties on them, to woo the press, hiring bloodhounds, to dig up dirt on opponents. You can't go to the Civil Service Commission and be like, yeah, yeah, I need money for a detective to find out if this guy in the assembly is having an affair. But if you have your own money, you could just do that.

And if he can keep the authority revenue, he can do whatever he wants with it. And a public authority would give him the same, some of the same powers that a sovereign state has. An authority can issue bonds, which are a legal agreement between a buyer and a seller. That is a technically a contract between the floater of the bond and the buyer of the bond. And it'll settle law in the United States of America going back almost to the beginning of

the country that a contract, illegal contract cannot be changed, undone, canceled, interfered with by any government office whatsoever. It's like Moses has discovered a cheat code for the law, where it's like magic, where he's like, if I just write the powers of my authority into the bonds, into the wording of the bonds that I'm selling, then that becomes a contract and the legislature, they can repeal laws, but they can't cancel contracts. And so as long as the authority exists, and he's at the head of it, he has whatever power he can write into those bonds. Now I was wondering, and I'll wonder this again possibly

as it comes up again, what are the limits of this? Because it's not like he can write into the bonds, Robert Moses can murder people. Like there are certain laws that he can't get around, but Carroll kind of presents it as this kind of magic end run around everyone else. That if it's written in a contract, the government can't do anything about it.

And I wonder, Roman, you're a professional lawyer. What's the, what's the, what's the. What are the limits of that? Yeah, the, what's the, what's the. What are the limits of that? Yeah, yeah, what are the limits of that? I mean. For anyone listening, Roman is not a professional lawyer. Please do not take legal advice from Roman.

Yeah. Again, I'm really, really just making stuff up here, but mostly it's like, it's just like, you know, for fraud, for things that are mistakes, you know, like yesterday as we were recording this, like Berkshire Hathaway stock went down to like, dropped 99% by some sort of technical. That sounds very visible.

And people bought it at that level. And you know, you could say that's a contract, but it got voided by regulatory authorities that just said, hey, this is a mistake. This wasn't meant to be this way. And normally that would be a contract, but it's, you know, like people recognize that two sides of the party didn't have all the information to agree to

it properly and therefore it can be voided. You know, like I think there's all kinds of reasons, but I think like a bond measure because how carefully it has to be worded, it has to be written, it has to be, you know, bought and sold, it would be extraordinary for the U.S. government to come in and void it. I guess yet that you're saying, you're saying this bond is being purchased on the understanding as written into the bond that this authority is capable of doing these things.

And to take that power away, you, I guess you'd have a legal case that you are interfering with a private semi-private contract. Okay. That makes sense. I get it. But he can't write in like Robert Moses is the, is now the president of triberalsvania, you know, an independent sovereign nation, you know.

I think there's, yeah, there's limits in the, there's different texts in the creation that would limit its ability to do these things, but these are very basic things. You build a thing, you sell a bond for it, you get paid revenues for it to sell off that bond and interest and undermining that in a specific sense would make a sort of shaky foundation forever doing that. You know, like when you default on bonds, it's a very big deal to avoid them arbitrarily. It would just undermine a system that is extremely important that it stay in place and not be undermined.

Like people have to believe that they're buying bonds and will be paid back. They can fail by chance, they can fail by all kinds of reasons. Um, but we count on those being, um, uh, solid contracts. So Moses, that makes sense that Moses is taking advantage of the fact that we live within a world built on a fiction that money has a value and agreements are have, have concrete truth. Yeah. Okay.

And you can, and to, to undo his would be to undo that, to bring into question that basic fiction that our entire civilization basically rests on. That's right. That's right. Okay. That makes sense. So Carol says that in proposing doing this, Moses is effectively proposing a fourth branch of government independent of the usual three branches. And he knows that the people who make up those three branches, the legislature, the mayor, you know, the city council, the governor, say nothing of the courts who don't really come into it at this moment. They would not be okay with that.

So if he's going to put through a law that allows him to hold onto that revenue, he's going to have to keep his true purpose a secret from them. He'd have to write a law that eliminates some of the safeguards without seeming to eliminate them. To do that, why, you'd need the best bill drafter in Albany. You would. And luckily he didn't have to look very far to find him. Just looked the man in the mirror.

That's what we saw. But this is the real key. Coming up with the idea to capitalize on your, to turn $4 million into $80 million is one thing. Probably that innovation could have, other people could have come up with that. But what he really has figured out here, which is really quite genius and quite evil,

is this idea of the self-imposed lifespan of a public authority and how to subvert that. And so instead of accepting that you build a thing, you sell bonds for it to pay for it, they make revenue, you pay off the bonds and those happen in 40 years, he writes into the bill, very far into the bill that people don't notice or read.

In section nine, you gotta believe most people are stopping by section three. That's right. That the authority can issue new bonds to refund the original bonds and start the clock again on these new bonds. So effectively, you can just like keep the authority going by using new bonds to pay off the old bonds, starting the clock again and just like having to go and go and go. And that's what he figures out. And it's really something else.

The authority is supposed to go out of commission when it's paid off. But if it never fully pays. The authority is supposed to go out of, out of commission when it's paid off, but if it never fully pays off, it never has to go out of commission. And now he can basically treat the limit of the amount of bonds that he's allowed to issue, not as a ceiling that he can't fund beyond, but as a credit line, essentially that he can always issue new debt to bring himself back up to that and pay off the old bonds and do new bonds and toll revenues keep coming in. And so people want to buy those bonds. They're very attractive because it's, it's incredibly stable.

You know, you're going to get your return eventually. Right. Right. It's really something else. And it's sort of amazing that he figured this out and actually made it so that he could get away with it, but it is just, it is really anathema to actual democracy. Yes. To get the, there's, you know, there's two, people talk about people.

I've read that about how Congress has kind of the Fed, US Congress has kind of two powers that it controls. There's the power of the purse and the power of the gun, essentially, you know, it can declare war, it can control what gets paid. And if you take away the need to go to the legislature for money, then they lose most of their power over you. I mean, Moses never tested the proposition that he could declare war on another. I mean, he kind of does declare war on the tunnel agency, but you know,

it's war by other means, but he's, it really is. Yeah. It's undermining the basic idea of democracy, which is that the people have a say in what's going on in this case, one person will have a say, Robert Moses, because also not only does he slip into that law, the bit about being able to issue new bonds to pay off the old ones and keep things self-repetuating, he puts in a thing that Triborough can handle, you know, any roads that connected to parks, any roads connected to roads connected to parts and quote facilities for the public not inconsistent with the use of the project, which just is anything. Which means anything like as Carol's like what things are inconsistent with the use of a project? Would a

house, would it, would a parking building be consistent with the use of a road? Like, and he inserts provision taking the power to release the authority's money away from the city comptroller and giving it to the chairman of the authority. And this is all stuff that individually doesn't look like much. If you're a legislator who's working during the day, you've been out drinking all night with your Albany buddies. I don't know if it's the same as it was when Al Smith was there at this point in the thirties, but you have other things going on in your life. Just as somebody who, speaking for myself, I have a family.

It's sometimes hard to keep on top of my work that I can't, you know, and my work is not affecting the lives of millions. Uh, you can understand that they are not, they don't are not seeing the full power of this and like we said, there's something really like exhilarating about this chapter, seeing it unfold. You can't help but get kind of caught up in it and just how exciting this implication leads to this implication, which leads to it's like watching, you know, watching the, the, the Lotus flower at the heart of creation unfold or watching a movie where a scientist

makes a big discovery and suddenly they're realizing the implications of that discovery. Like it's really, it's an exciting chapter about municipal bonds and the laws governing the creation of authorities. Or any of these sort of modern movies, like the Blackberry movie or the error movie, where it's like, it's's like it's about a genius sort of business move that's figuring something out that has wide ranging implications. I mean I think the main difference here and what should kind of blunt your sense of this is just a person like figuring something out and being his best self and actualizing his

dreams is that public authorities are very specific and they have tons of power that we give them. And that power to really destroy people's lives, it has the power for eminent domain, it can really, really affect people's lives in these ways that a normal corporation can't do. And the checks on these powers are this lifespan and this ability to control the money that goes to them.

And it's super important. And this becomes this just mutated monster of a public authority under the guidance of Robert Moses and the laws that he is able to pass. It can do so many things that it is not intended really to do. Like they have power of eminent domain. They can create their own rules on their property and hire police to enforce those rules.

They can do things the state can't, like just sign contracts without having any competitive bidding, which allows Moses to direct specifically where money goes and that helps him shore up his power. And all of this is encoded in the covenant between him and the bond holders. And so once he has this set up, he doesn't need the executive support. He always felt he needed in the past. Doesn't matter. He doesn't need the public support that he would rally before.

The only thing he needs to do is never stop building. Because as long as he keeps building, he can keep issuing new bonds. And that works out great for him because he doesn't want to stop building because as long as he keeps building, he can keep issuing new bonds. And that works out great for him because he doesn't want to stop building anyway. Like when your goal and the evil thing you need to do to keep your power to achieve that goal are the same thing, that's a beautiful synchronicity. You know, that it's like Robert Moses, you can do this, but you have to always keep building bridges and roads.

It's like, great. That's why I'm doing this. Exactly. Exactly. And it, Carol points out this structure, it matches Moses' preferred style, which is you don't have public hearings because it's all private records and it still appears to the public as this is a public authority working for the good of the people without a salaried head.

You know, it's independent from partisan politics. It's free of a lot of the red tape. He's weaponizing the things that have always been kind of what people admired about him and turning them into aspects of the authority that he can do a lot of damage with. And Robert Carroll quotes Emerson. He says, an institution is the length and shadow of one man. And he's making the case that the way the tribal authority is set up is basically if Robert Moses was a government organization, you know, rather than a human being.

And the title of the chapter, The Warp on the Loom, which I can't help it, it always sounds kind of science fiction-y to me because that's where my mind goes for the word warp. But it comes from something Moses writes in a 1941 brochure about how he's always wanted to weave together what he saw as the loose strands of the metropolitan tapestry. And he's saying that the Triborough Bridge Authority has provided the warp in the Metropolitan loom, the heavier threads across which the lighter ones are woven. And that's the way he sees it. He is going to be creating basically the shape that New York is going to have to accommodate

itself to. You know, he is the warp on the loom and he puts all his eggs in the authority basket. He's all the revenue from his parks that he controls. It's going into the authority and he builds himself a new fifth office. I don't even have one office room. I, I have to work out of my bedroom and he has five offices and this one's going to be his main headquarters. It's everyone understands. This is where the RM is going to be. It's on Randall's Island, right underneath the Triborough bridge.

It's only accessible to people who have paid a toll to use the bridge. So even when the mayor comes over to see him, he has to pay a toll to go see Robert Moses, which is so amazingly symbolic. And Triborough's laws are enforced there, not the city's. And the building is under the Triborough toll plaza, basically. And it's positioned in a way that if you're driving on the bridge, you can't see it. Like you don't know it's there. There's, it's like Robert Moses is going so far out of his way to make the physical, to make the symbolic physical and concrete. He's taking metaphors for his own shadow use of power. And he's like,

let's build things that really represent that in a way that would seem very on the nose. If this was a novel, but it's going to do it. And he gets the law passed and set. Finally, there's a disagreement between Moses and LaGuardia about hiring somebody. And LaGuardia is like, I'll have my legal advisors look at the law. I want to assure the governor, Governor Layman, that we didn't give Moses too much power. And he discovers, as the reformers discover, as poor Truby Davison discovered, that they have inadvertently helped Moses

to gain way more power than they intended. And he can do whatever he wants now. And LaGuardia can fire him as city park commissioner, but Moses could retaliate by having the legislature basically cut state funds to city projects because of his allies there that he has financial relationships with. And LaGuardia doesn't want to try doing what Roosevelt failed to do, which was pitting himself against the people's desire to have a champion who is free from government interference to get things done.

Moses is at this point, he is just too powerful and too popular for LaGuardia to try to remove him or even risk pissing him off. And Caro says, the powers that the mayor possessed over Moses' authorities, in theory, he did not possess in practice. Political realities gave him no choice but to allow Moses to remain at their head." Moses is essentially the mayor of Triborough who is equally sovereign, in some ways more sovereign than the mayor of New York, which is terrifying. And it's only going to get

more so as we get into the next part. What's the title of the next part, Roman? It's called part six, The Lust for Power, which is even worse than the love of power, I guess. I don't know. Lust seems okay to me sometimes. But we'll get to that after the break. Okay, we're on to Part six, the lust for power. The first chapter in this section is chapter 29. And when the last law was down, dot, dot, dot. So.

Roman, I'd love to try to spend some time on your surprising but stirring defense of lust as a feeling, but we got to move on. We still got lots of material. I'm just saying it has its place and it shouldn't be just treated as horrible all the time. That's fair. That's fair. That's fair. But the lust, the lust for, for, you know, for, for a lover, for a partner, but the lust for power, maybe that's not so amazing. Yeah, that's exactly.

Yes. Uh, and the chapter here, it opens with a quote, uh, from the diary of former New York mayor Philip Hone from 1835 about how beautiful the Manhattan battery is, uh, for, for non New Yorkers, anyone who's listening. The battery is, it's the maritime Southern tip of Manhattan. This is, I'm sure I knew at some point the reason it's called the battery. I could have looked it up. I don't remember. I don't know either.

But it's essentially, if you go as far South as you can possibly get in Manhattan, as far downtown as you can go until it's just water, that's the battery. And in the 1830s, he's talking about what a beautiful site it is. And the battery is going to be the central point of battle for this chapter. It's a chapter of the public battle for Moses' plans for the battery. And it's ironic because the last chapter is talking about what an unstoppable colossus Moses has built himself to be.

And this chapter, right after it, the chapter is about him being stopped from doing something. Spoiler alert, he gets stopped in his plans, but the ultimate point is just how much power it now takes to stop this guy So it's 1938. I think 1938 again war clouds looming over Europe. Everybody's dancing the Charleston still probably I know there's more of a 20s dance the big hit in the theaters is a 38 so Hollywood's greatest year 1939 hasn't happened yet. I'll have to look that up, what was going on. Anyway, LaGuardia, that was, so my attempt to set the scene of 1938 has failed miserably. There's maybe the Charleston, which is 10 years out of date.

Maybe the- People still maybe dancing it. People still do like the robot, you know? So LaGuardia, he wants to build Moses's circumferential bypass route, the big road around the city. It's gonna cost $105 million. And the city, guess what? It has no money. It never has money.

I'm starting to think New York has never had money in the history of the city. And he tries to get funding for the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel part of this circumferential bypass route, but he can't raise it anywhere. And Moses's, Tribor authority, it can raise the money for the tunnel.

But in exchange, he says, I want control of the tunnel authority. I want control of all crossings into and out of Manhattan, like a super villain with demand. Like, why would who but a villain would be like, I need to control all routes into and out of the busy, the most densely populated part of the United States of America, I control it. And LaGuardia doesn't like this. He actually writes lousy exclamation point across a memo from Moses about this. But in the end, he has to agree to the deal because he can't get the money anywhere else. So Moses, he's going to be in charge of the building the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel. He tried so hard to get involved in this last chapter. He couldn't do it, but money talks, you know, the other thing walks, like we said.

So he decides, you know what? I don't like tunnels. The Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, it should be a Brooklyn Battery Bridge. I like bridges. They're more appealing to investors. They're more impressive. When you say you built a bridge, that's way more impressive than to say you built a tunnel. As shown by the fact that there's a huge book about Robert Moses. I don't know how many huge books there are about Orville Singstad, you know, the master tunneler. You talk about, is there a bridge in Marvel comics? Yes, it's the Rainbow Bridge from Earth to Asgard. Is there a tunneler in Marvel comics? Yes, the Mole Man. Nobody likes him. So bridges, people just like them more. And Moses, he says, a bridge is the finest architecture made by man, while a tunnel, he says, is merely a tiled vehicular

bathroom smelling faintly of monoxide. And I love the condescension towards tunnels in that. It's like, yeah, it's like a bathroom where cars are being pooped out of the city. Like, I don't want to build that. And, comptroller Joseph D. McGoldrick, he points out, if they pay for Moses Bridge, their portion of it, the city will literally have no money for any other construction or maintenance

of the physical infrastructure through at least 1940. They will not be building any schools. They will not be building any schools. They will not be building any hospitals. They will not be maintaining the subways. And New York's been building great roads and bridges of a sort, thanks to Moses, but its schools and its hospitals are crumbling. They're ancient.

The subways are inadequate and also crumbling. This is the other long running thread of New York history is that the subways are always falling apart. I experienced it. My parents experienced it. It's a generations long tradition that everybody loves. The whole thing comes to a head at a board of estimate meeting where Moses implies that McGoldrick is corrupt. And he says, if you stop this bridge, it will never be possible to build this bridge ever again. The money will never be available. The project will be dead forever. You will never have a crossing

between the battery and Brooklyn. And behind closed doors, LaGuardia is like, Comptroller McGoldrick, you've got, if you don't support this project, there will be a rift between you and me for the rest of my administration. And the Comptroller is like, we've got so much work to do. I can't allow a feud to exist between me and the mayor. So they get, so they approve it. And on January 22nd, 1939, Moses announces they're gonna be building a Brooklyn Battery Bridge crossing, which is going to plant enormous piers through Battery Park

to support a causeway that would connect the bridge to an extension of the West Side Highway. And then Caro says, and then on January 25th, the storm broke. And this big outcry comes from the powerful New York gentry who are the core of the good government and fusion groups, the goo-goos, the old fashioned goo-goos who used to be on Moses'

side. They didn't stand up before for Inwood Hill. They didn't know about it. They didn't, weren't familiar with it, but these people, they work near the battery. They know lower Manhattan. They know Brooklyn Heights where the bridge is going to stomp its foot on the other side.

And Moses announces the bridge with this artist rendering that really minimizes the size of it. But the actual board of estimate plans, they show this will seriously change lower Manhattan. This will change it in a big way. And Manhattan borough president Stanley M. Isaacs is really familiar with this. And he shows these things to the press.

And I wanted to read a little bit of a, before we get into the history of the area, which I know Roman has some very controversial thoughts about, stay tuned for that. I want to read this here. So, the public might be interested to know Isaac said that the proposed bridge anchorage in Battery Park, barely visible on Moses's rendering,

would be a solid mass of stone and concrete, equal in size to a 10 story office building. The approach ramp linking the bridge to the West Side Highway, a ramp depicted on the rendering as a narrow path through Battery Park, would actually be a road wider than Fifth Avenue, a road supported on immense concrete piers.

It would cross the entire park, the entire lower tip of Manhattan Island, and curve around the west side of the island almost to Rector Street, at heights ranging up to 100 feet in the air. Not only would Anchorage and piers obliterate a considerable portion of Battery Park, they and the approach road would block off much of the light not only from what was

left of the park, but also from the lower floors of every large office building they passed. Because the approach ramp was really an elevated highway that would dominate the entire tip of Manhattan, it would depress real estate values throughout the entire area. Many good government leaders owned some of that real estate, and they saw Isaac's prophecy confirmed almost immediately when a corporation broke off negotiations for leasing an entire floor at 21 West Street, when it suddenly realized that the view from the windows would no longer be of the harbor,

but of the underside of a highway. This is some of the most valuable real estate in the United States of America. And Moses is planning to cover it with a road and block out the sun for it. And this will massively depress New York's real estate tax revenue. And Ol Singstead, who we'll hear more from, he calculates that over the next 20 years, it would cost the city more than $29 million in lost real estate taxes.

And I'll mention again, New York does not have money. So they need to, they don't want to lose this. And here's where Caro takes, take a specific tack. He goes into this kind of four page reverie about the beauty of the waterfront. This is where Caro, the poet comes in. This is not just about money. This is not just about facts and statistics. This is about the importance almost spiritually for the city that the waterfront is for the city that is so crowded. It's so built up.

And I'm going to read a little bit of that says the buildings in which 12 million persons lived and worked in 1939 seemed to stretch out endlessly to the horizon. But from such vantage points, it could be seen that they were not only stretching out, but closing in, building up, pressing inward, crowding closer and closer together until, as if the concentrating inward surge of humanity constituted a geologic force. In the epicenter of that surge, the buildings of Manhattan were thrust upward and toward the sky. And it was near the island's southern tip, the tip jutting into the harbor, that the colossal upthrust had been greatest. In the upper part of Manhattan, the masses of concrete were mostly 60 feet high, or 70. In the center of the island, they were 150 or 200. But as

the island narrowed toward its southern tip, they were 400 feet high, 500, cramming closer and closer together, bulking up higher and higher as they loomed southward, pressing inexorably toward the island's tip. Until at that very tip, at the very end of the most crowded island in the world, at the very spot in the entire world in which buildings should have been crowded most closely together, there was suddenly, with the exception of a tiny old fort converted into an aquarium, no buildings at all. At a point at which a single square foot of land was worth thousands of dollars, at which the value of an acre was computed not in the millions of dollars, but in the tens of millions.

There sat 967,032 square feet of land, 22.2 acres, vacant except for grass and trees, pathways between them, benches, and a broad, breezy waterfront promenade." And this is something that if you live in New York, this strikes you so hard in the heart because the experience of living in New York, it's exciting. It's wonderful. I love it there, but you feel like you live in a termite hill. There's people just constantly crawling all over each other. You are stacked on top of other people. The only way to get around is to go underground under all the people, I mean,

a can with a lot of other people. And these spaces that are open, that are not built on are so incredibly valuable. And you'll hear this so much about, you know, the people in Mena can with a lot of other people. And these spaces that are open, that are not built on, are so incredibly valuable. And you'll hear this so much about Central Park. And Moses should know this because he's the man who rebuilt Central Park, essentially, that people say the greatest decision that the early founders of the city ever made was blocking off all this land so that it couldn't be built on. So you'd have this open space. Open space is so valuable. And this is where he goes into the history of that spot in the city and what it was

like in colonial days and revolutionary days, the early American Republic. And then he talks about specifically this one building in Battery Park, that fort that he mentioned, which by the late 1930s was the New York aquarium. But the fort itself dates back to 1812. And then it became a entertainment spot where Marquis de Lafayette returned to the United States from France in 1824, and Caro takes us back to that day, and he talks about other historic people who appeared at the battery.

In 1855, it was one of the disembarkation points for immigrants to America. So much history is packed into this building, and now it's beloved as the aquarium, and I can see Roman getting so mad that history is being used to stop progress. Roman, tell him why he's wrong. Tell me why he's wrong.

I think he's right. In this case, I do not want this bridge approach. I do not want Battery Park to be annihilated. I do think that- Why are you anti-Parks, Roman? Yeah, why are you? I do think that some of this reverie about like George Washington once walked here and

Lafayette had a brownstone nearby is often used to stop cities working for people of the modern day. When you have so much reverence for history, it just nothing can move forward and cities also need to function for the people who live today. And so that's always a balance. And so like, so when I read this, I can totally hear that in this case, it is the right argument for stopping the wrong project. But often, this is the wrong argument used to stop the right project. And so I hear that when I read this, a little bit of that just like, oh my God,

you just have to let some of this stuff go because people need to live in this city too. And I do actually believe that like, it as a park and open space is much more relevant to me than George Washington walked here once. It's so much more relevant to me than George Washington walked here once. It's so much more important to me. I think it hurts me to admit it because I love history and I love his old things and I hate new things

and I hate modern worlds in a lot of ways, even though it's subjectively the best time to live in the history of the world. But I still, you know, I'm nostalgic for the times before I was born, which is again, is my entitled right as a straight white man that I can do those things. But I get what you're saying. You have to prioritize ideally the people who are alive over people who lived and died. And the memory of something is very valuable. It's very valuable, but it's not as valuable as the

life of a person today. Yeah. And there's a way to balance both things. It's just that it's not as valuable as the life of a person today. And there's a way to balance both things. It's just that it's often a cudgel against a type of progress that I think is important to the better men of people's lives. And so I hear it and a little bit of my guard is put up when I read this type of stuff. But in this case, what, you know, what Caro is demonstrating is that, you know,

despite all of Robert Moses' power, he's running into all of these oppositional forces, like the weight of history, the value of open space, the wealth of these people who own buildings all around this thing. Maybe that's the most important one of all. And Caro's putting the best possible spin on that, which is not that they just have a financial interest in it, but that they know this area. Now they are finally recognizing

what Moses is doing because it's happening in their backyard. It's happening in the space that they know as opposed to these spaces that they haven't been to. He has not yet built the cross Bronx, but when he's doing that, the same strata of spaces that they haven't been, you know, he has not yet built the cross Bronx, but when, when he's doing that, the same strata of people, they don't spend time in the Bronx. So they're not really thinking about that, but they spend a lot of time in lower Manhattan. That's where the financial district is.

That's where a lot of the, the businesses at the time were especially located because New York's history is a history of starting at the Southern tip of Manhattan and moving up and outward. And so that's where the old families and the old money, they know that area. Exactly. They find this to be particularly galling

because this is where they're from. Yes, and in that way it almost, it's like the yacht club again. It feels so weird to be like, yeah, well, he's gotta protect the ancestral heritage of the richest people in New York, but it's history, you know, politics is a weird thing, strange bedfellows, you know, and basically, but I

agree with you that here it's, Caro's bringing this historical argument into it. And it's more, I think, because the survival of the fort itself is going to be such a major part of this, but he essentially boils it down to saying, Moses wants to take a quiet park and make it the ground underneath a highway. And that's, and that is a bad deal for, especially when we know that he's already told us how the highways and the bridges, they don't really help with the traffic. They just bring more cars in. And if you're having a hard time picturing this, like what these type of concrete pillars

to hold up this type of approach onto the bridge, they're not just pillars, like columns in front of a building. These are 10 story tall, gigantic structures like the size of a city block. I mean, they are gigantic. They just eradicate everything that's around them. You know, if, you know, there's a neighborhood right by the Brooklyn approach of the Brooklyn Bridge,

there's, you know, there's a, and there's Dumbo, which is under the Manhattan Bridge. It's right there in the name, but like right where the pillars are that hold up the bridges, you can't build a thing there. Like it's nothing, you know, it takes up a lot of space and you don't want to be there. It's just, yeah, anyway, it's, yeah, this would obliterate this park. And so now Carol, he gives us kind of mini bios as he likes to do of two of the reformers who are particularly opposed. There's George McEnany, longtime respected reformer, activist, current president of the Regional Plan Association, and Stanley Meyer Isaacs,

Manhattan borough president in 1937, a longtime public housing reformer. And he's been mentioned earlier. He's the guy that Moses threatened to punch in the nose. I think that was in the last episode. And Carole paints Isaacs as someone who, Isaacs is another very respected beloved figure in kind of New York civic history, and Carol paints him as someone who's going after the same goals as Moses, but using more principled techniques, not making the compromise of morals that Moses was prone to. And Carol says, George McEnany was a man whom Robert Moses had once admired. Stanley Isaacs was the man whom Robert Moses had once been. And they once thought of Moses as their champion. But now, because he's playing in their backyard, they see that his values and theirs don't really align anymore. And they're finally going to get a close

look at his methods, because now he's going to use those methods on them. And they can't turn a blind eye to it. First, the reformers, as I think we've mentioned in the past, they have that beautiful liberal dream that never works out. If I just sit down and talk to him, if I just explain to him, you know, the truth of it, then I'll change his mind. Never works. That's not how humans are. They try to get a meeting with him. He won't even reply to them.

And they study the numbers that he's released. They see he's underestimating the cost of the bridge. He's overestimating the cost of the tunnel. He's underselling how much the battery will be changed. And the reformers, again, they make the same, again, the liberal mistake. They go, well, let's trust in the official approval process. That'll give us a chance to make our case. Guys, what are you doing?

It's that it never works that way. Um, then they see in the papers, the newspapers that Moses has requested Albany pass a law taking the authorization to build a battery crossing from the tunnel authority and give it to the Triborough Bridge Authority, something that he would only do if he that he would only do if he assumed he would get that approval, which is exactly what happens. And the planning of commission gives their approval, not because a bridge is better than a tunnel, but because as Carol says, no one was offering to

finance a tunnel, someone was offering to finance a bridge. Only Moses has the money to build whatever this crossing is going to be. So if Moses wants it to be a bridge, it's going to be a bridge. That's there. They are, they're, they're're gonna take the thing they can get rather than get a nothing, because the thing they can get is not exactly what they want.

Yeah. And this is another example of Moses just acting sort of like anti-fact, anti-imperialism. Like he just wants a bridge, and he must know the numbers are being cooked in a certain way to give his result that he wants. This is the guy who on Yellow Pads was able to figure out exactly how much money he needed

for the West Side improvement and how he could chip away from it. So the idea that he's like, he's not doing the math to the decimal point. Yeah, it's impossible. He knows exactly what he's doing and he doesn't care. And it's just, he likes bridges. He doesn't like tunnels.

Carol was, you know, earlier he compared him to an artist. This is the way artists work where they're like, I'm not going to do it that way. Cause it doesn't ring right to me. I just don't like it. You know, they operate on creative whims and you can do that when you're an artist, but you shouldn't really do that when you're building, when you're building a massive piece of construction running between two parts of a city, you know, I used to, I've had a, I, you know, when I've, I've written for television shows

and oftentimes if there's a joke that the boss doesn't like, they'll try to give you a reason why it doesn't work. And I always want to say to them, just tell me you don't like it. That's fine. I understand. Like you can just tell me you don't like this joke. We'll write another one. Uh, so I guess that would work pretty well with Moses.

Yeah. Anyway, I've been on the work pretty well with Moses. Yeah. Anyway, I've been on the other side of that conversation. Yeah. You're like, I can't just tell them. I don't like this thing. I have to tell them why it doesn't work. And the person on the other side is like, it's always, it's always much more insulting to be told you don't understand the work you're doing as opposed to, I

just don't like this thing, you know? Um, anyway, so that's, that's a management tip to anyone, anyone who's listening. Um, so there are a number of reasons the reformers think they have a shot against Moses. They think they found a clause in the authorization bill that would force the pit city to pay $11 million to link the bridge to the West Side Highway when LaGuardia says, I don't want the city to have to pay for anything for this. And the reformers, they're united. They were strong in the recent local elections. They got their fusion candidates in, they're marshaling their total forces and their goal is modest. They just want to get a bridge to be studied.

They just want to study done before the bridge is agreed to. And they use that influence to see the mayor. They get their opinions printed in the papers, public opinion. It starts to turn in favor of the tunnel over the bridge. And the reformers are like, well, if we have public opinion, that's crucial in a democracy and we'll just direct that pressure at the city council before it meets about the bridge and we'll get them to get the study because the people want it. And meanwhile, most is so confident that none of this matters that he goes to

Florida for three weeks on vacation. And Moses, he does take a moment to send LaGuardia a telegram with an ultimatum that says, I will only pay for a bridge. I will not pay for a tunnel. And so LaGuardia again,gram with an ultimatum that says, I will only pay for a bridge. I will not pay for a tunnel. And so LaGuardia again, he can't cross him. It's the money is going to be more important than, than this kind of public force. And so Caro, he takes us into the city council chamber. He describes it, mahogany panels, delicate, Wayne Scotting.

There's a ceiling mural with gold details. This is a space for democracy. This is a temple for the respect of the, of the people of New York. And the audience is filled with veteran reformers. And Carroll takes us through the city council meeting where Stanley Isaacs introduces a series of experts who systematically dismantle all of Moses' claims in favor of the bridge. And they show it's going to be more expensive than he says. It's going to be more heavily impacted by weather than a tunnel.

A tunnel can operate in snow. It can operate in rain. And the bridge is going to be more heavily impacted by weather than a tunnel. A tunnel can operate in snow. It can operate in rain, and the bridge is going to be impacted by that. And that battery park deserves better than to essentially become a highway on ramp. And the Reformers talked for four hours. They've really made their case. They did it. If this was the movie, then they'd make their case, and Moses would rip up his papers and walk out defeated, and the council would vote and be like,

well, it will be a tunnel, and they'd all celebrate. But then Moses gets up and his papers and walk out defeated. And the council would vote and be like, it will be a tunnel and they'd all celebrate. But then Moses gets up and speaks and he says, my opponents are communists. They're just naysayers. They're always wrong about everything. He refers to George McEnany as an extinct volcano and an exhumed mummy. This is what he's saying in the meeting

about these people who are right there. And he just, it's a tax, it's nonsense. He refuses to answer their arguments. And when he is asked, why can't you just delay it so we can study the proposal? He goes, this is a showdown project. Either you want it or you don't want it. And either you want it now or you don't get it at all.

And the committee wants it. And they immediately vote unanimously in favor of supporting the bridge to the full city council for the vote the next day. And the reformers are, they're so shocked by his tactics that he just got up there. And instead of saying, well, actually here's why my facts and figures are correct. He says, everyone's a communist. He's a dumb old man.

Don't listen to them. And Carol says they had no justification for such an emotion. There was nothing new about that philosophy or those tactics. It's the same thing he's always done, but now he's doing it against them. He is now using the tools that he's used to ruin and, or, and stampede over and shove aside and bully other people. He's using it against them now and they cannot avoid this. And now they're his enemies.

They finally realize it. This is not the guy we thought he was. He's our enemy now. And they're also starting to realize, even if he is our enemy, even if we're opposing him, it doesn't really matter because he has so much power. He doesn't need our support. We used to feel like we were one of the pillars that was holding Moses up. And Moses himself has already just like knocked that pillar out. It was like, don't need this. I'm like, I'm in a hot air balloon now. I don't need a pillar.

It must have been a very, especially for these, especially the older members of the crowd, it members of the crowd, it must have been a very dramatic and shocking moment to just sit there and realize like, oh, this is not the game we thought we were playing. But I like Caro's indictment here. It's pretty mild. It's not like extremely forceful and condemning, but like he's saying, you know, like they have no excuse to think

that this is new behavior for Moses. And this is where like the good, you know, like they have no excuse to think that this is new behavior for Moses. And this is where like the, you know, the good, you know, progressive liberal Caro, you know, stands out. It's just, you know, like he's just like, they can't, they can't have been fooled by Moses. They had to have known this is the way he was because this is the way he was over and over and over again.

They just do not like it when it's pointed towards them. Either their ignorance of who this guy really is was the case which is inexcusable or they knew it and like you're Saying they didn't care because it wasn't affecting them, which is also inexcusable And it's I mean Caro is he is it is a kind of mild in the way he writes it because he is He is very enamored and attracted to these older reformers the the kind of older people who represent in earlier, New York But at times he is kind of like this judging angel of vengeance who's like, yeah, you should have realized it guys, like where were you?

You know, you brought this on yourself. It doesn't matter. The fact that he talks about, you know, it's for Moses to refer to this guy as an extinct volcano is incredibly insulting, but Caro is kind of, it in a way implicitly is like, he kind of is, like his time is, the time for this kind of reform is passed partly because of their own actions. You know, they've sown the seeds of their own obsolescence and now they are reaping what they've sown.

And he says this is a turning point for the city. This is the first time that everyone is against Moses' plans, privately or publicly. The reformers don't like it. The elected officials don't really like it, the press doesn't like it. There's no groundswell of opinion that says, come on, we deserve a big beach or we need a new bridge to get to this place. Nobody wants it. But Moses calls the shot. It doesn't matter. The city council, the full, it goes to the full council the next day. They vote 19 to 6 to support Moses, even though they don't want it. They don't like it. And the next day after that, the state assembly, the state Senate, they overwhelmingly approve the bills, giving Moses this authority to build the crossing. Governor Layman says he'll sign the bill right after that. All

Moses needs is the simplest, most unnecessary of formalities. The war department giving him permission because the bridge is built on navigable waters that are near the Brooklyn Navy yards. And that is so pro forma, he's not even thinking about it. He gets that kind of stuff all the time. The War Department has never been like, no, you can't build this thing in New York because what if we fight a war in New York someday? You know, it's just never has happened.

And this one, Carol reveals the meaning of the title of the chapter, when the last law was down. It comes from some dialogue from A Man for All Seasons. And the character Roper is telling Sir Thomas More that he would cut down every law in England to get after the devil and Moore responds to him, oh and when the last law was down and the devil turned round on you, where would you hide Roper? The laws being all flat and that's exactly what these reformers have done to help Moses get things done, to help

him do things like the parks and the beach. They have cut down all the laws that stood in his way and now that what he's doing is something they don't want and they need something to have stand in his way. There's no laws left for the city to hide behind. There's nothing that the city itself can do. There's nothing the state can do. And the reformers, they are out of ideas. They are, they've done the things they were supposed to do. They tried to get a meeting. They made a presentation at a city council. It didn't, it didn't work. And so they don't have to do, they turn to advice to this new character comes in, Charles Culp, C.C. Burlingham, 81 years old, from the most respected old school reformers.

And Caro doesn't mention this, but Wikipedia describes him as being known as the first citizen of New York. He was just like a civic reformer, you know, since the late 19th century. And they go to him and Caro describes him, he thinks, and then he smiles and he says, call Eleanor. And on April 5th, 1939, Eleanor Roosevelt, who Robert Moses has called terrible names and said horrible things about, and she knows it. At this point, she's writing a daily newspaper column called My Day, and she puts a paragraph in it about the bridge. She doesn't mention Moses, but she mentions, oh, they're going to build this bridge. And she says, isn't there room for some consideration of the preservation of the few beautiful spots that still remain to us on an

overcrowded island? And Caro describes this paragraph as a small ripple showing that there's larger movement going on beneath the surface of the water of this, not, you know, the New York harbors, but I mean, the metaphorical water, because as you may remember, Eleanor Roosevelt is of course married to the most powerful man in the United States of America, who is also Robert Moses' greatest enemy in the history of the world, Franklin Roosevelt. Yeah. And this problem that he has has been kicked up to the war department, which is something under Roosevelt's purview.

This is, yeah, this is the, if there's one person who can tell the War Department to do something or not do something, it is the commander in chief, literally the highest ranking official in the military and the United States government. And so they, the reformers, they're still having letters printed in newspapers saying we should have a tunnel on a bridge, but it's the private letters that they're writing to Roosevelt that end up being decisive in this. And so the pro forma hearing for the war department report somehow mysteriously gets delayed. And Harold Icky is the, the interior secretary who we remember from before he took the blame for order number 129 and things like that. He wants this bridge to be built. He wants big

projects that are going to employ people still. And he keeps bringing up in meetings. Each time Roosevelt's like, I don't know. I'm not so sure about it. And eventually it gets through to Icky's that he's going to have the war department to say that the bridge impedes navigation too much around lower Manhattan. Like Roosevelt is not going to let this bridge get built. Not because of necessarily the things that Robert Moses says about it, not necessarily even because the reformers have a good argument about it. Though I'm sure if any president would understand the importance of the battery as a place, it would be either Franklin Roosevelt or Theodore Roosevelt, who literally grew up in Manhattan

and would go down to the battery. There's a story in his autobiography about going down to the maritime parts of the city and seeing a seal carcass that had been laid out on a table and that instilling in Theodore Roosevelt his interest in naturalism and animals, which would run through the rest of his life and be such a big influence on the park system, the national park system. So anyway, the Roosevelts, they understand New York and they understand water. They love water and they like New York water. So if there's any president who's going to take an interest in this, it's Franklin Roosevelt. But he may be doing this just because he hates Robert

Moses. And finally, he has a chance to get at him. So the war department, they do exactly that. They decide, nah, we're not going to give permission for this. They sit on that decision for two months before releasing it on July 17th, 1939. They go, yeah, this bridge is going to be too close to the Navy yard in Brooklyn. So if there was a war and someone bombed that bridge and it fell into the water, it would block the access. We can't build that. And Robert Carroll points out and Robert Carroll doesn't want this bridge built either, but he points out, this is pretty ridiculous. There are other bridges in the same basic position to the Navy yard.

And it's a suspension bridge. It's not easy to knock down. Like if you bomb it from the air, the bombs are just gonna go through or blow up the deck. They're not really gonna get there. It's gonna be hard to knock it down, but that's the reasoning they give. And Moses is furious and he tries to do what he did with order 129.

He tells the press, Roosevelt is buying this decision. And when the press goes to Roosevelt, they go, did you decide this? He goes, I don't think so. I don't really care. Like a bridge, I'm not even thinking about it. And Moses tries to get LaGuardia to back them up. And LaGuardia suddenly is not that interested in the bridge anymore either.

Maybe it's because by coincidence, the federal government has just extended a low interest loan to the city that will allow them to build a Brooklyn battery tunnel. Maybe that has something to do with it. And years later, even after Moses eventually does get control of this tunnel, he doesn't get to build this bridge, but he does control the tunnel eventually. He still gets furious if the subject of the bridge comes up, and he will fume about Eleanor Roosevelt's involvement and what a moron she was,

and how, you know, how, what meddling it was. And to add further insult to injury, LaGuardia is like, oh yeah, Robert Moses, the city's not going to pay for the road linking the battery crossing to your parkway system. So you'll have to pay for that. This five mile gap in the belt system that he'd been dreaming about closing all this time. And weren't you just bragging that the authority has like $12 million on hand? So you should be able to pay for that fine. We don't have to help you with that at all. So not only does he not get to build his bridge, but he has to pay to build a road to link to the tunnel that he didn't want built. And the central committee of organization opposing the battery toll bridge, which is the full name

of the organization. I'll say it again, the organizations opposing the battery toll bridge, which is a very specific name for a group. And it's like, that's a civic group built like a public authority. It has one goal, stop a battery toll bridge, and then it's going to disband efforts. They hold a victory luncheon to celebrate winning the battle of Battery Park and Caro, again, he's like kind of shaking his head talking about it. You can imagine him going, the fools, the same way aliens do in movies where earth sets off atomic weapons or something. The aliens always go, the fools, they don't know what they're doing. He describes them as they're still ignorant on the most important lesson of this battle. Yes, they stopped Moses. That bridge is not going to be there.

But in order to stop him, the president of the United States had to step in. The city couldn't stop him. The state couldn't stop him. No civic or municipal or institutional check on his power, which could stand up to him. It had to take the most powerful man in the country who has a particular mad on for this guy to stop the bridge where that bridge would be there today battery park would basically not exist and there would be a bridge there today if the president stepped in and Moses

had still even after losing this this battle in the longer war of the control of New York he still has more say over the city's future than anyone else below the level of the commander in chief of the armed forces. It's really something. And this war is not over because the next battle is about to be fought and Robert Moses is going to get his revenge on the people who love the Battery Park. That is after this. So we're onto chapter 30 called Revenge. And it starts with a great chapter title.

Sorry. It's a really good one. It starts with a Sir Francis Bacon quote. What is that quote, Elliot? So the quote is, a man that studyeth revenge keeps his own wounds green. And this is from a short essay or writing, you know, they didn't really have essays per se,

but a short writing called Of Revenge from 1625. And it's a Francis Bacon piece all about how you should not try to get revenge. Yeah, yeah. Revenge will only, you know, as the old saying goes, he doesn't say this, but the old saying goes, when you seek revenge, dig two graves, you know. But Caro, I love, he's being very literary in this string of

chapters. When the last law was down, this one, he's, some would call it showing off, but I like to believe that Caro is just including the stuff that he discovered along the way while researching Robert Moses, which I think is really a fun way to do it. So revenge, what's this all about? As we know, he didn't get his bridge across from the battery to Brooklyn. He didn't get to rec battery park and turn it into the underside of an enormous highway bridge. So he wants revenge. He wants revenge on the people who did this to him. And he sits on it for a little bit. And he figures, what's the best way to strike out at these reformers? The best way to strike out these reformers is to petulantly destroy something that they

love. And so in February 1941, when much of the world is worried about the war that's going on in Europe, he decides that Castle Clinton, which holds the New York Aquarium, is unsafe and it needs to be torn down for the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel, and he's going to demolish it immediately. And then he's gonna give land to the Bronx so they can build a $2 million aquarium close to the Bronx zoo.

And you remember from earlier in the episode, Castle Clinton, it's an amazingly beautiful piece of New York history. Roman, you were so excited about hearing about all the famous people that came through it and how it could never be touched because it was so wonderfully historic. But you're not the only one who felt that way. Caro says that there's a storm of letters to the editor from people who love the old aquarium, love the old fort. They can't understand why for all that money, the $2 million that they say the

aquarium is going to cost in the Bronx, why they couldn't use that money to update the building, rather than tear it down and build a new one. And Moses is like, people, this fort is an eminent danger of falling down. It is a public safety hazard, which is clearly a lie. Like it's a ring of eight foot thick walls that have stood for 139 years at that point. And spoiler alert, he fails in tearing it down and they're still standing, you know, another hundred years later almost. So it's fine. But he tells people it's dangerous, it's ugly. He says it's not historical. And he says, nobody wants it there but those elderly goo-goos. But ordinary New Yorkers, which is a hard phrase to say, they're upset at the idea of tearing it down. And Caro asks in the book, even if they're building a new aquarium, why

did they have to tear down the old one immediately before the new one is even built? It doesn't seem like a big thing for a city to have an aquarium, especially for a maritime city that doesn't get to see the water very much, at least this is a connection to, to the creatures of the seas. But Roman, how do you feel about this tearing down the aquarium when there isn't even one there to replace it yet? I mean, it's awful. And you know, the thing is, is that there is no reason all of his reasons are trumped up nonsense. And the only answer is he's mad. Like he can't build the bridge the way he wants to the Brooklyn battery crossing is going

to be a tunnel. And he's going to destroy the park, which he has complete, uh, domain over like anything inside the park. He can kind of do what he wants to. And he's just taking it out on these people that wanted to preserve the park. And it's just awful. This is a situation where even the president of the United States who was able to stop him from building that bridge last time can't really do anything about it. This is park land.

Yeah. Moses has unlimited power in park lands. The courts always reaffirm that. Uh, and so Moses, he's like, I'm doing it. I'm closing battery park while construction is going on. I'm going to close the aquarium forever. And all the reformers can do their, their cold comfort is they can protest at a meeting of the board of estimate where Moses had asked for $20,000 to house the fish during the construction of the new aquarium.

And he's like, if you don't give me the money, I'm just going to throw the fish into the sea. Like this, this is a scorched earth aquarium policy of a kinds that New York has never seen before. Because Moses, he doesn't need their permission to do any of this. He doesn't need the permission to close the park, to tear the fort down. And he's still popular enough because of his parks work that the elected officials who could make a stink about it at least, they don't want to piss them off because there's another election coming up. There's always another election coming up. And these officials who had been on the record against Moses's plan to do this, when it comes to a vote, they vote to approve it. LaGuardia does not like the aquarium plan,

but he supports it, seemingly in exchange for Moses turning down the opportunity to run as the Republican mayoral candidate and publicly supporting LaGuardia's reelection. There's Moses is just still such a powerful figure in the public mind, even outside of his park power that people don't want to get on the bad side, even if they don't like what he's doing and they'll be mad afterwards when it happens. So by October 1st of that year, the aquarium is closed. The fish have been moved out, thankfully to tanks, I believe, and not just to their, their native seas.

Uh, and, and I just have this image. I wish, I almost wish he'd done it so there'd be a photograph of Robert Moses personally hurling fish into the water at the, at the tip of Manhattan, but it didn't happen. Uh, and he's preparing to tear down the old fort. Nothing can stop him from tearing down this old fort. But wait, there's that spoiler earlier. I said the fort's still there, right? Something does get in the way. It took the president to stop him last time. This time it takes World War II to stop him from tearing down

the fort. By this point, the war is, is starting up. America joins the war by December of 41. The war takes so much manpower out of New York that no demolition companies will bid on the job of tearing this fort down because they don't have the workers. They're busy. The workers are busy fueling the war machine that will destroy Hitler. And so Moses is, it's one of these weird things where Moses's interests are directly opposed to that of the free world because Moses wants workers available to take on the fort. So he's able to remove the fort's roof, but not those big walls.

And the reformers tie him up in court for a little bit, but he always wins in court because he wrote the law. The law is clear. He has supreme power over the parks and he knows he's not going to get the job done until the war is over. So he settles for just putting a fence around battery park and keeping the park closed to the public for five years, just out of spite. He doesn't need to do this.

There's no reason. Caro spent so much time in the previous chapter to about how necessary this park is for this overbuilt up part of the city. And now most is like, well, you don't get it. Like it's really one of his more petulant acts. It truly is. It's truly awful. And, you know, during this time period, the, the people are trying to, you know,

have the national park service take over the possession of the fort or store it, maintain it, you know, he puts a fence around it. He basically just does all these things to obstruct. He tells people, uh, the national park service can't take it over because I already destroyed it. Yeah. You can't see it, but it's already gone. And me, and like one of the newspapers eventually hires a plane to fly over and they're like,

it's still there. Like, we can see it there. And it's ridiculous that he's just going to such lengths to get this thing destroyed. And finally, in 1946, he gets a demolition authorization from the Board of Estimate. There's a new mayor, William O'Dwyer by then, and he told the fort preservers, yeah, you've got my support. And then he immediately flips and like, it's like, yeah, Moses tear down that fort. And another court battle.

And the reformers literally, they want to file a lawsuit to stop him. And there's a story where they're like, yeah, we'll file it on Monday. And the person is like, you got to file it this afternoon, Friday afternoon, because that fort will be gone this weekend if you don't do it. And eventually it takes a New York Supreme Court justice injunction to stop it from being torn down over this weekend in 1946. But the order is too late to stop Moses from taking these huge wooden doors on the fourth that have been there for over a century and just burning them. Like, just take them down. He's such a, he's such a kid, you know, such a child. And just to give you this, a little bit of idea of this, the amount of time here, what

World War II has happened, uh, FDR is dead. Like, like this is like, it's president Truman now. Like, and it's one of those things that when you get, when he mentions president Truman in the book here, it's like shocking because you realize. Like it feels like one fight, like this is a really fun and exciting chapter. It's really infuriating chapter actually, but it's also just like it moves.

And it's like easy to lose track of the fact that it moves so much is happening or so much time is going by. This revenge is just like these wounds are green. Like this is lasting a long, long time. His main nemesis in the White House is already dead, and he just keeps on having this fight, and he cannot let it go.

He's just an addictive man. And the same time that he's still working on this, he's doing many other things. It's not like this is the one thing that he's just gnawing away at. He's got lots of stuff to keep him busy, to distract him, and yet he cannot give up the idea of destroying this thing. So when he first starts getting involved with the possibility of a Brooklyn Battery crossing, that's 1938, it's the late 30s.

This doesn't stop until 1950 when finally Congress passes a law naming Fort Clinton as a national historic monument that's going to be preserved by the Park Service. So you would think over the course of the nine years between when he loses the crossing fight in 1941 and when the Fort is actually protected by Congress that he would lose interest, give up, do anything else. Like we've said, Roosevelt's dead. World War II has come and gone. Like this is the 50s now when this is happening.

And it's, this is a very different time in American history than we started, but he's just held out hope that he can destroy this thing until then, because when you hold onto revenge, your wounds stay green. Like your wounds don't heal, you know? And so he's still, it still bugs him. So the fort does get saved, but because it sort of houses this aquarium, there was kind of an ecosystem of attractions that made it a vibrant place. Like people wanted to go to the aquarium, it was close by on the tip of Manhattan.

And it was free at that time. And it was free and the fort was there and they all kind of supported each other. And Fort Clinton, like it was closed for a long time and then it had nothing in it and people didn't visit it as much. The aquarium was much further out and cost money. You know, it just was one of those things, and it took a long ass time for the new aquarium to open as well.

Yes, it goes, so New York doesn't have an aquarium for 14 years. It doesn't open again until 1955. And Robert Caro, he really, he really kind of takes a dump on the Coney Island Aquarium. The one that's like, he's like, it's a new aquarium, but people don't really like it very much. And as a kid who went to that aquarium and has been there as recently as last year,

I still like it. And I was very saddened by the fact that when Hurricane Sandy hit New York, it really trashed that aquarium and the aquarium has not fully recovered from it. But I feel like Caro, he's letting the old be the enemy of the new there, where it's like, there are generations of New Yorkers who, and people in the New York area who do like that aquarium, but he's really like, he's like, the old one was great. It was musty and nice and this one sticks.

It's too slick, no one goes to it. But that fort, because of its location and because of the aquarium, you're right, it was a vibrant living part of the city. And at the time that Caro was writing this book, it is now a dead thing. It's a thing that is a historic piece of architecture, but there's no reason for people to go there. It's just a monument. And of course, since the book was written, that has changed. And in 1986, it became the ticket office for the Statue of Liberty.

So it's now incredibly busy now. Now it's a site that, if you've ever been there, it's very crowded. And so there's some life to it there. But even 1986 is 12 years after this book came out. So it's these long stretches of time that this building that could have use. And I know Roman, like you're saying, you like things that are useful. You don't like just having a monument that just sits there, taking up space. I like plenty of monuments. When living people can do things. I just think that people lay it on kind of thick and use it as a cudgel when it really can be a place

that's vibrant and historic and develops with the times. That's all I'm saying. Yes, but it means that this building, because of Robert Moses' petulance for almost half a century, basically, for more than 40 years, it was just off limits. You just couldn't do anything with it because he just didn't want people doing anything with it,

which is astounding. You know, it's such a show of, and you think it's like he didn't fully get his revenge, but he did kind of get his revenge. Like by the time that was now a place that people would go again for the ticket office, the sexual liberty, everybody Moses fought with in the reformers movement,

I assume was either dead or elderly. Most of them did not see that ford again as a vibrant place. And it's just too bad, but it means that opinions about Moses among the majority of the reformers has now turned. He is no longer their young champion, the miracle man who occasionally oversteps and is sometimes a little reckless. Now they see him, he's a liar, he's a bully. More than one person compares him to Hitler

when talking to Robert Caro, which is a bit much, which is, I mean, what he's doing is bad, but it's not quite that bad. But they're reaching, they're so mad at him that they're reaching for literally the most sinister thing in their lifetime that they can think of to compare him to. And he clearly puts his own whims above the needs

of the people and his own pettiness and people recognize that now. And they're starting to realize like, Oh, just because he doesn't have a financial interest in things, doesn't mean he is disinterested. He has interest and that interest is in power and throwing his weight around. And now he has, as we've said before, now he has enemies, but those enemies. Are kind of weak. They can't really stop him from doing much.

In this case, what's their victory? That eventually he didn't finish destroying this building and just let it molder for many decades. You know? Yeah, it's really a shame, but it really shows what he is like during this period. I mean, it shows what he was always like. There's another example of maybe Carol like pointing out

the idea that these people should have known better at different points in Robert Moses' career. They just seemed to like the direction his bullying was pointed in, and now that it's pointed towards them, they do not like it, and it's just awful. Maybe there's something, I don't know, maybe this is a conservative thing too,

but liberals, they get mad at conservatives, but there's nothing that they despise more than older liberals who are kind of out of touch and don't see things that seem clear. And it feels like Caro is a little bit doing some of that stuff here where it's like, I don't like Moses, I don't like the things he did, but even more than that, I'm like disappointed in these older liberals who could not recognize the trap they were falling into. Yeah. Certainly the same way that I get mad, more mad at the baby boomers for being not as good as hippies as I wanted them to be, as I am at conservative people.

Cause I'm like, well, of course conservatives will do stuff I don't like, but you guys, come on, you should be better than this. There's, there's some of that disappointment in there. There's a, it's funny to think about this in a book that is 50 years old, but there's, there's a generational energy there of Caro as a younger man finding fault with these older people who he otherwise admires, but who he sees the shortcomings of. And that's it.

It's another kind of, it's something I hadn't thought about too much before with this, but it's something that just adds to the richness of the book. It makes the book feel more like a living thing, you know, as opposed to just kind of old history. Totally, totally. I think that's really astute. It's really interesting to think about him as a disappointed young man in his 30s, looking at these old guard liberals and how they failed and keeping watch over the things that he cares about. It totally, that makes sense to me.

Yeah, Robert Carroll, he wasn't always the kind of elder statesman of American biography, you know. He was a young guy who was a reporter and he wouldn't have written this book without ideals, without things that he believed in and passionately wanted to push forward. And yeah, that he's able to express that disappointment in a way that feels subtle to me and not a screed. This is not the way that like

Hunter S. Thompson would write this book where Hunter S. Thompson would just be kind of out on the page being like, these old farts that didn't really, I mean, saying the kind of stuff that Moses would say, honestly, you know, being openly insulting, these dinosaurs falling into tar pits, unable to see the asteroid flying towards them, you know, that's a, this is me. I'm not as good a writer as Hunter S. Thompson, so I'm not doing a good job of parodying him, but it's that he's able to layer that, that emotion into it.

It just, it's just a, it, it's a, it really shows why on this 50th anniversary of the book, it bears taking us back, taking ourselves mindset wise back to the year it was written and not just the year that we were reading it. That's right. That's right. So Moses has demonstrated his power and his vindictiveness in this fight. And if we sort of go back in time a little bit again, because now we're in a roll back from 1950 to the end of this fight, into back when the Brooklyn battery crossing was done, he's going to get even more power

and the power of a monopoly. That is on chapter 31, Monopoly, where Moses gets the second chance to take over the battery tunnel, a thing that he wanted nothing to do with, but now that it exists, he really thinks that he should control all the ins and outs of this city.

We'll talk about this a little bit later on when he achieves this, but it's like, he's essentially kind of a super villain at this point, where he's like, no one will cross Intor out of Manhattan without my having control, like, no, only with my leave will this city live. Like it's such a, it is a scale of needing power that is on a comic book level, you know?

Like this is the kind of thing that Batman is fighting against, you know, that a villain is going to take control of all the water crossings in and out of Gotham. But he's got his chance because of World War II. World War II got in the way of him tearing down that fort, but don't worry, silver lining. World War II gives him more opportunities to get power and take over that tunnel. He uses his new position that he only holds for seven weeks as head of the city's scrap

metal drive. He says, hey, there's 28,000 tons of steel, in quotes, lining the tunnel that's under construction. And we need to stop work on that tunnel so we can strip that steel and then we won't finish the tunnel to the wallers over because we need that steel for the war effort. And in reality, the tunnel, it only had a couple more years left of work to go. It could have been up and running before the war was done. And the steel that he wanted was actually cast iron that was unsuitable for military use.

The military did not want it, but he's able to kind of confuse people's knowledge of metals enough to convince them to shut down tunnel construction. And the War Production Board is like, yeah, we're kind of worried that the public will see this tunnel continuing and think, well, that effort should go towards the war. So we won't finish the tunnel for the duration of the war, which means the tunnel authority is not collecting toll money on that tunnel, which means they can't cover the interest payments on their bonds. Even though the federal bondholders say, we're willing to wait, but Moses uses this situation to present a kind of dubious financial statistic to convince LaGuardia that the tunnel authority

cannot meet its needs. It's falling behind on its bond payments. It's doing this because of a situation Moses has orchestrated, the kind of thing we see a lot in politics now where a politician will stop a project or stop a law from passing and then be like, well, I told you it wouldn't work, that it wouldn't happen. And even though they're the person who stopped it from happening. And he badmouths Ola Sinstad, the tunnel engineer. He says the only solution to solve this revenue shortfall for the tunnel is for Trib-brow to take over the tunnel authority, even though, and he doesn't mention this tri-brow is also facing a revenue shortfall because there's a war

on it's the biggest war in the history of the world is going on. There's few people driving to work across across the tri-brow bridge. You know, that's, but he also has a secret up his sleeve. Moses's bloodhounds. We hear a lot about the bloodhounds in mentions, but we don't hear a lot about what they dug up in the book, but we do hear this. And what they dug up here is pretty relatively underwhelming,

but they find out that Ola Singstad's brother-in-law purchased some tenements in the area where the tunnels entrance plaza is supposed to go. And obviously that's a possibility of corruption that his brother-in-law had inside knowledge, bought those buildings, is gonna sell them to the city for an inflated price. An investigation shows that Singstad was not involved

with the purchase, was mad at his brother-in-law for doing it and made him lower the price that he was selling the land to the tunnel authority for and that he didn't even wanna put the plaza there in the first place, that his plans had been changed. But he's totally blameless in this, but he never reported his brother-in-law's interest because he was worried Moses would find out about it and smear him. Unfortunately someday. I don't know what he's going to do. He's going to run for president. He's going to run for president.

And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president.

And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's going to run for president. And he's was caught in his graft, that he's corrupt, you can't trust him, he's just lying.

And LaGuardia is like, I'm going to run for president someday. I don't want to have any whiff of scandal involved. LaGuardia, of course, will never run for president. He won't live to run for president. So in 1945, Moses again says, give me control of the tunnel authority. And LaGuardia, after years and years of saying, no, you can't have control of this thing, he gives in and he gives it to him. When's he going to be able to do it?

There's three members in the tunnel authority because each, even though it's called an authority and it's a big organization, there's essentially always like a committee that runs it, you know, and there's three people on that committee. In 1943, one of the members dies and the other two members are like, well, we're not doing any work on the tunnel. I guess there's no rush to recommend a replacement to LaGuardia and And whenever it's time, we'll tell him and he'll hire that one. So we're not going to bother telling him who we think should fill the seat. And Moses is like, take my guy, put him in there to LaGuardia. He says, put my guy in there.

And LaGuardia says, no. But this means in 1945, another authority member, his seat expires. There's now two vacancies to fill. And the authority member who was in that seat, he's like, well, I'm sure I'll be reappointed just as I was before. There's no reason to think LaGuardia wouldn't reappoint me. I'll just open this letter from LaGuardia that I'm sure is saying that he's reappointing me. What? Thanking me for my service? Appointing somebody else? And LaGuardia announces he's merging the tunnel and tribal authorities. He appoints Moses and one of Moses' men as commission members.

And Moses essentially bullies the final authority board member into resigning and has him replaced by another member of the Triborough board. And so now Moses has total control of the tunnel authority. He cleans house, he fires all the previous leaders, he fires Singstad and his engineers. And now, like we said, he is the successful supervillain who has control as, as Kairos says, of every modern water crossing within the city's borders. Not only those above the water, but those beneath it. Not only every bridge, but every tunnel constructed within the city's borders for the use of motor

vehicles since 1909 was now under the control of authorities that he controlled. More important, all new water crossings would also be under his control. He and he alone would be able to decide which crossings will be built and when, what their shape and design would be, and where their approach roads would run. He and he alone, moreover, would decide what tolls would be charged on these crossings.

So he's got, he's just, he has a monopoly. He did it. He's eliminated his competitors. He has a monopoly on going into or out of Manhattan. Like he has a monopoly. He did it. He's eliminated his competitors. He has a monopoly on going into or out of Manhattan. Like he has a monopoly on crossing the Hudson and East rivers and the Bronx river. Like it's amazing. And so Carras says,

henceforth for the remaining quarter of a century in which he would be in power, no motorist would be able to use a modern bridge or tunnel in New York city without paying his authority, his tribute. And this is an amazing windfall and coup for him, as we talked about earlier, as long as he's bringing in revenue, he can float bonds

and he can make more money to build more things off of that. And now he has what the tunnel revenue is gonna be, says that his public battle to take over the tunnel authority had failed, but Kara notes that the private battle to do so had succeeded. And it's just that the stakes battle to do so had succeeded. And it's just that the stakes involved are enormous.

The amounts of money are enormous. They're going to bring in hundreds of millions of dollars per year. And beyond even that, Moses now has such vast power. He controls transportation in the biggest city in the United States. It's essentially invested in one man, and this is all being decided away from the public eyes of the city. Carr says there were no newspaper stories about Moses trying to take over the tunnel 30

in all of 1942, 1943, 1944. Now again, these are big years. World War II is going on. How many Einstein stories are there? Exactly, yeah, that's true. But I mean, these are, but the newspapers got to fill all, there's a city edition, you know,

maybe they could do one story on it. But he is, Moses, he now has this total control. And part of his doing this is he immediately has to denigrate all Sincstead's engineering abilities. This is a guy who is not an engineer, is denigrating the world's greatest builder of underwater tunnels. And he goes on to use the Sincstead's plans exactly as they're drawn, aside from one change in waterproofing the tunnel that they end up having to go back to the original plan on and change because the new version doesn't work as well. But even while he's using Sinkstad's plans, he talks about how bad he is engineering and he goes out of his way to remove all public credit for him. He's not invited to the opening of the

tunnel that he designed. The promotional brochures, they list 21 engineers, but they don't list him. And Sinkstad, he would live in New York for the next 24 years. He would never again build anything in New York city or New York state. And Caro describes interviewing Singstead in his office and he's that housing status basically told that Singstead would bid on jobs and would be told you're never going to build a New York state as long as Robert Moses is alive and that he's going to build a New York state in the next 20 years. And he's going to build a New York state in the next 20 years. And he's going to build a New York state in the next 20 years. And he's going to build a New York state in the next 20 years. And he's going how Singstead is basically told that Singstead would bid on jobs and would be told,

you're never gonna build a New York state as long as Robert Moses is alive. And the scene here, it's really powerful. The way he writes it is really, you just gets a sense of Singstead as this, just this forceful figure caught in a box that in his own, he's made his home city, he's just been cut out and there's nothing he can do about it. And it has nothing to do with anything he's made his home city. He's just been cut out and there's nothing he can do

about it and it has nothing to do with anything he's done. Other than that, I guess he refused to roll over and let Moses take over and be an ally for him. And it just, it's of all the, of the many heartbreaking things in this, this is one of the smaller heartbreaking moments because again, he's still hugely successful, but there's still a little bit of heartbreak to it.

Yeah, yeah. And then it turns out in the end that all this is a lie. All the pretext for taking over the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel is a lie. The tunnel was not in financial distress. I mean, it was a little bit from the war, but as soon as the war wasn't happening, the tunnel was profitable. And so much so that in the end,

it contributed 20% of Tribor authorities total revenues at the end. Like there was just, I mean, it was more successful than his bridges, most of them. And so it's just kind of a crazy thing that he got away with. Like he was, he had this ability. I mean, Moses had command of so many facts

at his fingertips and he sort of like opened up the fire hose of facts and his authority on so many facts at his fingertips, and he sort of like opened up the fire hose of facts and his authority on so many subjects that people just didn't question this stuff as much as they should have. In the beginning, maybe he was a little more on the level, but by the end, he was just making completely, you know, just erroneous lies about what was going on

in terms of transportation in the city. It was just, it's just, he just made stuff up. His whole argument was these tunnels are unprofitable. My bridges are necessary to bail them out. And by the sixties, the tunnels are bailing out the bridges. The tunnels are what's keeping Triborough float. And it's just, yeah, it's amazing. And it reminds me of what you're saying

about this kind of firehose of facts and people can't really check it. They just kind of take it as truth, even when it's made up. I read a book once about life in the 13th century and they were saying that to be kind of like a wise man or an intelligent man or scholar, the emphasis was on how much you know, not how true the things you know are. It was better for you to know a thousand things about which type of frogs you have to insert into your mouth overnight to cure the mumps than it is to know one thing about, you know,

how electricity works in lightning or something like that. You know, it's, it's, it's better to know everything about dragons than to know one thing about, you know, measles. And it's kind of the way Moses works. He will bamboozle you with so many pieces of information that you don't have the expertise or the time to check. And my old AP psychology professor, Mr. Bester Covey, he used to say, if you can't dazzle them with brilliance,

baffle them with bullshit. That was his advice on how to write papers for his class and for college classes. And that's what Moses is doing. He will baffle you until you don't know which way is what and you have to give in because he's so confident and you're so swimming in, in argument that you don't have a choice.

Totally, totally. Um, well, it's amazing that he just, at this point, he just has a lock on nearly everything. And so this leads us to the, the, the next chapter is chapter 32, quid pro quo. Uh, it's the shortest chapter in the book. It's, it's quite short, it's only three pages long. It's three pages.

Considering we had a 75 page chapter last episode, I'm like, three pages? Robert, Carol, are you feeling okay? Are you feeling healthy? And it's all concerned about Mayor LaGuardia, who has another sort of ignominious end in his life, like we've seen a number of times. It's very reminiscent of the end of Al Smith.

Yeah, and it makes you wonder, does anyone leave New York politics successful or satisfied or happy or healthy? Probably not, I don't know. They all seem kind of angry when they leave, but it's 1945, we're kind of in between where those other chapters were. Mayor LaGuardia is dying. He has cancer that run for national office. That's not going to happen. He's in frequent pain, leaves him drained and tired. His popularity has cratered. His political

sport has cratered. He has been privately refused the fusion and GOP nominations to run for mayor again. So he announces he will not run for reelection. And LaGuardia backs this new fusion candidate against the Tammany Democratic candidate, William O'Dwyer. And Moses, he has spent years attacking the Tammany machine. He has been the fusion champion all this time. The campaign comes and he pretty much stays out of it. He doesn't really want to get involved

and he doesn't say a word against O'Dwyer. And the reason is because four days before a word against O'Dwyer. And the reason is because four days before the election, O'Dwyer goes on the radio and he says, if he's elected, he'll appoint Moses to a new post, coordinator of construction with power over public housing. Finally, he'll get public housing and all the major public works in the city.

And O'Dwyer wins in a land side. Partly thanks to the way having Moses on his team makes him seem less like a Tammany hack. The press, they still don't get it. So they're like, how will the noble, incorruptible Moses, how will he possibly function in this administration that's bound to be full of back-scratching Tammany grafters? And the Herald Tribune says, how long?

How long would Mr. Moses last under an administration that was dominated by the more selfish and corrupt elements of Tammany Hall? At a good guess, we would give him about six weeks. And Caro continues, the guess off by approximately 15 years was about as good as the assumption that underlay it. An assumption revealing only the depth

of the misapprehension about Moses' true character. For the Robert Moses about whom the Herald Tribune was editorializing hadn't existed for a long time. The Robert Moses of 1945 was not the foe of the practical politician, but the essence of that peculiar animal. He was the complete realist, willing in order to accomplish his purposes, purposes which in 1945 revolved around the retention and acquisition of power, to throw onto the table any chip he held.

He had, in the election of 1945, with a chance to obtain more power than he had ever possessed before thrown onto the table the most valuable of all his chips, his name. He is at this. It's he's gone as far as he can go at this point. He's like, yeah, Tammany use me. You're going to give me power over all major construction in the city. Yeah, definitely. I'll do it.

That's all I care about. And I just love that. They're like, we give it six weeks. And I have to imagine at the seventh week, they were like, any day now. And then 15 years later, they're like, we're pretty sure this isn't going to last too much. Like they were still holding on to it. And by the end of the chapter, we're reaching this. Moses sees LaGuardia for the last time in 1947 when the ex-mirror is on his deathbed. And Moses is kind of shaken by it. And Carrow ends the chapter with

the story of a moment in 1946 before LaGuardia dies when this engineer and reformer Walter Binger, he sees LaGuardia eating lunch somewhere by himself looking gloomy and he comes over to talk to him and LaGuardia is like, he's got too much power now. Moses has too much power. And Binger says, well, Major, who gave it to him? And Binger recalls LaGuardia answering, sadly, yes, but I could control him. Now no one will be able to control him. And Caro ends the chapter saying the first part of the ex mayor's statement was not completely accurate. The second part was like LaGuardia to his deathbed is still like, I was the

only one who could harness Moses, but he couldn't, nobody can. And thanks to LaGuardia, no one maybe ever will ever again. He may still be running New York City to this day, Roman. We have to read the rest of the book to find out. We do have to find out. And this is really interesting because again, it sort of mirrors the Al Smith chapter. But at this point,

because Moses is such a different character or sort of has such a different relationship with LaGuardia than he did with Al Smith, you know, LaGuardia is aware of what he's created here. I mean, it's a little bit like, you know, just like, there was a, oh, just a real, I don't know, a callow, weak-willed kind of like quality to him, where you're just like, oh, come on, like,

this whole thing, like, you knew what was going on here. Well, there's an overconfidence in LaGuardia. It's almost like he saw himself having a similar relationship to Moses that Al Smith had, not realizing one, Moses is smarter than him. And two, Al Smith made Moses, like Al Smith raised and taught Moses and made him like, the relationship between Moses and Al Smith was almost father and son.

And the Guardia is like, I'll run him the way Al Smith ran him. And it's like, no, no, no, you are at best an equal colleague and at worst, someone that Moses sees as a temporary lever of power and someone to get more power. And I think it's, maybe it's the egotism of, of anyone who runs for executive office, you know, that they assume they're the top guy who can control everything or else they wouldn't go for it. But I feel with Al Smith, there's that last scene with him and Moses and Al Smith is basically like, learn from my example, I'm warning you that eventually the public will turn on you. And Moses like, nah. And with LaGuardia, it's more being like,

not quite, but almost bringing himself, he's realizing the mistake he made, but he can't bring himself to realize how he was the one who was not in the power position in this dynamic, in this relationship. Yeah, no, he has this thing of like, of thinking that, oh, now all of a sudden, Moses is gonna be so much worse. And he was bad this whole time.

He just feels like it's worse because he's now on the O'Dwyer team and he has control over so many more things. But, you know, had he gone control over so many more things. Um, but you know, had he gone after that stuff with LaGuardia, um, he probably would have gotten it then too. Yeah. The idea that LaGuardia was the one holding him back, you know, who the only, the only, you know, guardrail of Liberty of democracy that was holding him is, is kind of silly. But also we should always remember this book is written for a real

Moses centric position. And when Garty has got other things going on in running New York and just dealing with Robert Moses, the same way that the book makes it seem like Franklin Roosevelt is just sitting in the white house, kind of stewing over Robert Moses for years when he is dealing with the depression of World War II. And I think maybe it's easier for me to come to this if only because I read, uh, the Al Smith biography that I mentioned in an earlier episode was sitting on my to be red shelf. And it was not the book that the power broker is,

but there was something kind of refreshing of seeing the story of Al Smith and Robert Moses mentioned in it, but it is not the story of Al Smith mentor of Robert Moses. It's the story of Al Smith man and governor. And Robert Moses is a player in that and remembering that to all these people, they are not supporting players in the story of Robert Moses, the way they are in this book. They're all people with their own lives. And so I can kind of forgive LaGuardia a little bit because it's not like

LaGuardia was even spending all day every day being like, Moses, Ooh, how do it either the way that like in the, in the Tim Burton Batman movie, Joker is just sitting around watching Batman on TV going like, Ooh, Batman, what do I do next? You know, like this, the, uh, I've been talking about Batman so much in this episode compared to the other episodes. Uh, but maybe, but maybe that's the same thing. He thought with all this stuff that he's got to take care of as mayor, he can still keep Moses in control. And perhaps it,

it just helps Moses that he's off and up against people who are either not as powerful as him or potentially powerful, but also their attention is split. Yeah, and when you're busy and you have power, there's nothing you love more than having people who work for you or with you, who can handle things without you dealing with them on a day-to-day basis. And there's a real logic to like the Triborough Authority

taking over the tunnel crossing. And like, you just like, okay, I don't have to deal with this, these vacancies on this commission, I can do this, I can put it all together, I know he knows how to run things. There's a real logic to that. Obviously he had some warning bells going off that, you know, kept it from happening for those years. But eventually you can totally see why it's just like, okay,

just run it, just don't bother me again. You know, like, you know, like, and you just want to, you want one thing to be easy, because I'm sure everything else is, is so hard. What I do wonder about this is that, so Robert Caro was intending to write a biography of LaGuardia after he finished The Power Broker. It was kind of the next idea that he had. And he started working on it. And then he ended up abandoning that to commit to the LBJ project and commit he did. Literally committed the rest of his working life to it. But I do wonder if Caro wrote the LaGuardia biography, how much Moses would be in it?

Would he feel like he was still the center because that's where Robert Caro's mind is at? Or would he really be so off to the side because once you dug into LaGuardia as the main character, Moses maybe wasn't that important or not. I don't know. I would love to kind of get an idea of that to see if, you know, Moses loomed so large

in the LaGuardia biography if you were to start from there. It's a good question. It's a good what if, like in this alternate world where Caro did write the LaGuardia biography, how would it look? And also what would it mean for the power broker in terms of the power broker being the statement on New York political power during this period of history,

if there was this other book that was looking at it by the same author from a different angle and whether he would have been reevaluating things that he thought, like it's almost like there's another world where his LaGuardia biography becomes a rebuttal by the same author of the previous one or becomes a supporting one. But I think the, for that reason, I think that's probably one of the reasons that it was probably better for him to take on Alinda Johnson books. I think that was the thinking was he started working on LaGuardia and then he and Robert

Gottlieb were like, too much New York. I did New was the thinking was he started working on LaGuardia and then he and Robert Gottlieb were like too much New York, I did New York already. It's time to do something different. Yeah, I think he felt like he knew it, he'd already really said it. But I do wonder what the result would be like because of that. I mean, Robert Caro has told us that he doesn't think

that Robert Moses would be remembered today if it wasn't for the power broker. And I wonder in the examination of another history of the same time period, if that would kind of also be the case, like that there would be a kind of under the radar quality of Robert Moses, even during the, you know, writing about the contemporaneous period,

if Robert Moses was able to kind of like, kind of stick his head above to get notice when he needed stuff and then sort of stay under and be a functionary when he didn't. And I just wonder how that would play out if you were doing it from the LaGuardia perspective. I mean, in a way I'm very surprised by this scene with Walter Banger, like that LaGuardia is thinking

about Moses at all in a way. But maybe he thought about Moses all the time. Like I would just be curious to know how much he really thought about Moses when you took the totality of all of his tasks and the things he had to take care of in the city. Yeah. Yeah. I don't know. I mean, there's something, it sounds like an amazing project for another biographer to tell the story of a time through biographies of each,

like interlocking biographies of each of the people so that you can see what was going on. Because you're right that part of Moses's benefit to LaGuardia and the other mayors and governors he served under was you hand him a project and he does it. And the book as it's written, it leads you to believe that there was just this nonstop series of scandals. You know, everyone's always fighting Moses all the time and He's always stepping on toes. But the benefit was he gets things done and often gets things done in a way that doesn't splatter back on the mayor or the governor. And so probably a lot of his time was spent just working under the radar, working furiously, you know, with his own staff, but not, um, not in a way where every day LaGuardia

walks in and is like, okay, what did Moses do this time? You know, give me the Moses report. Well, Mayor, oh boy, this guy, you know, why else would LaGuardia put him in charge of the federal money at the beginning of the depression if he doesn't think of this guy as scandal prone and is then surprised to find out that he picked the one guy that the president of the United States hates the most in the world. But he still holds onto him even through that,

like learning that. And I think the other thing that is great about this section and really sort of begins to solidify a pattern that you see is this, the changing administrations and how, you know, normally, when a new mayor comes in, a new governor comes in, a new president comes in, everybody remotely connected to the last administration is out the door.

There is no part of them that lingers. Moses manages to get more powerful with each of these new elected officials. It's really, I don't know if I've ever heard of anything else like that. The only parallel I can think of is J. Edgar Hoover with the FBI, where he stays as head of the FBI for 40 years. And each new president coming in is like, we've

got to do something about Hoover and they can't because he's, he has, he has either dirt on them or he's just the only guy who they think he's the only guy who can run it. Or he's just so similar to Moses, like so beloved in the national consciousness, not as like a guy you want to, you don't want to hang out with J.F. Hoover, but like he's America's policeman, you know? And there's a, but yeah, otherwise it's hard for me to think of somebody who exactly in that position where they can not just avoid getting thrown out with the other political appointees, but like can amass

more power. You know, he's, he's set up the law so it's hard to get rid of him. But it's not like he put in a law that said every new mayor has to give me more stuff to do, you know, has to give me more control of things. No, no, no. He just, he's able to take it. Manages to get it. It's amazing. I think that this is so funny because I've just been circling the new, um, Hoover biography, G-Man.

I literally was looking at it on Amazon today. Like, like that I kind of want to check it out. And so maybe this is a, that would be also an interesting parallel with the power broker. Yeah, what he does for law enforcement is very similar to what Moses does for municipal transportation,

where it's like, I'm going to modernize this. It's going to be impressive looking. I'm going to crush a lot of people. I'm not going to treat people well, but my image is so strong that you're going gonna keep me doing it You know because the idea of getting rid of me is is impossible politically there. Yeah, he's like he's like the Gentile Robert Moses jayker Hoover

Not the gentle but the gentle Coming up our interview with Transportation Secretary Pete Buttigieg. And now our interview with Pete Buttigieg, Secretary of Transportation in the Biden administration. We wanted to talk with Secretary Pete about his philosophy on large-scale infrastructure projects in current times and also learn more about his experience at the local level when he was mayor of South Bend, Indiana. One thing I've always remembered about his time as mayor was when he led the city's overhaul of its wastewater system, something that feels like the opposite of a Moses project, an infrastructure improvement that is totally necessary and totally unseen.

We recorded this interview back in early June. So thanks so much for doing this, I really appreciate it. Yeah, nice to see you both. I think, Roman, you may know this, but you were responsible for one of my favorite episodes as mayor, which is getting a new South Bend flag designed. Because I saw your talk, evaluate our flag and found that it literally hit every single qualification you identified of a bad flag. It didn't just have a picture on a flag or text on

a flag, it had a flag on a flag. It was a flag on a seal on a blanket. And we thought, we're going to change this. And I'm really glad we did. It was great. Yeah, I was really honored to see that I had some influence in that regard. That was really nice to see. Well, thank you, Secretary Pete Buttigieg for being on the 99% invisible breakdown of the power broker. Thanks for being here. Thanks for having me on. So my first question is, early on in the Biden presidency, you said this in a press conference. I'm still surprised that some people were surprised when I pointed to the fact that if a highway was built for the purpose of dividing a white in a black neighborhood, or if an underpass was constructed such that a bus carrying mostly black and Puerto Rican kids

to a beach, or it would have been, in New York was designed too low for it to pass by, but that obviously reflects racism that went into those design choices. I don't think we have anything to lose by confronting that simple reality, and I think we have everything to gain by acknowledging it and then dealing with it. And so all the power broker heads in the world knew exactly what you were talking about when you said that. But many people, maybe some in good faith, maybe some in bad faith, were surprised or at least they feigned surprise in some way.

Can you talk about the variety of responses you got from that statement? Yeah, certainly I was taken aback by how controversial it was. I know there's always controversies about what to do next in transportation policy, but I imagined perhaps naively that it was widely understood that these decisions about where roads and other pieces of infrastructure go, sometimes also about where they don't go, reflect these patterns of exclusion. And this is something that was documented, it was documented certainly in some of the anecdotes that emerge in the power broker, but also just known as something that happened, not just in the South,

but in places from St. Paul, Minnesota to Pittsburgh, to Syracuse, to places like Birmingham and Atlanta. And part of what was really puzzling to me was who today stands to lose by acknowledging this historic fact. And that's part of what I was trying to get at too, in my remarks is nobody's worse off because we're taking this seriously.

In fact, when what's exciting to me about this moment and what's in the Biden infrastructure package is the resources to do something about it. So when we talk about these problems, we're not just wallowing in the harms, we're taking account of the harms and then getting involved in the remedy. And that's what's really exciting about this moment.

Not that we're, you know, erasing every historical harm, but that we're finding specific places where federal dollars help to divide a community. And we're using federal dollars to help reconnect those same communities. Can you talk about that? Like what does the current infrastructure bill, and we're using federal dollars to help reconnect those same communities. Can you talk about that? What does the current infrastructure bill,

how does it address those past injustices and how do you make it so it connects a community? So what's really extraordinary in the infrastructure bill is it contains dedicated funding for this. We just put out about $3.3 billion through a program called Reconnecting Communities and Neighborhoods. For folks who are watching really closely, which probably includes some of your listeners,

it actually stitches together two sets of funds. One was in the Inflation Reduction Act. Another was in the Infrastructure Bill itself. But they all added up into these billions of dollars to do things like stitch back together Chinatown in Philadelphia, where a route called the Vine Street Expressway, really in a slow motion disaster for the Chinatown community, in a process that began in the 60s and continued through the 90s,

cut that community up. And we're capping over it to put them back. We're doing something similar in Atlanta. There the project is called The Stitch. We're over $150 million in to help that. In Buffalo, it's the Kensington street expressway that came out of our first round of this programming, where we're teaming up with the state of New York to put a cap in there.

It's not always putting a cap over a depressed highway. Sometimes there are other approaches too. Sometimes you can mitigate this disconnection with something a little more modest than decking over a highway. Sometimes it's a transit mitigation or a pedestrian that's going to be a little bit more difficult to navigate. there are other approaches too. Sometimes you can mitigate this disconnection with something a little more modest than decking over a highway. Sometimes it's a transit mitigation or a pedestrian bridge. But what all these projects have in common is that they are knitting back together

a place that was divided. And importantly, we're also funding the planning. Sometimes it's going to take a lot of federal dollars just to get the idea on the drawing board so that it can turn into a proposal to go on and do the construction on. But another thing, and I think folks who are attentive to what happened in the Robert Moses era will recognize why this matters, we're investing in a process that engages and empowers the community so that these projects are being done with them and not to them. Yeah, yeah. So what is your experience with the book The Power Broker? I wish I could claim to have read every page of it. It is on my bedside table. I would say

that I have consulted it more than I could honestly claim to have read it. But like everything from Robert Caro, it is so absorbing. You look at a big brick of a book like that and can't imagine it to be a page-turner, and yet it is. And I can't remember actually when I was first exposed. I think like a lot of people, readers of my generation, I knew about the LBJ books before learning that the power broker was kind of Robert Caro's arrival.

But I'm also just fascinated with him as a figure. I have a nerdy fascination with people's daily routines, I think partly because I could never quite figure out my daily routine in a way that's stable, or at least it's always evolved. And his unbelievable discipline, especially in a field, you know, being a historian, being in the humanities, which is known for, you know, somewhat chaotic work styles and lifestyles, his unbelievable methodical nature, coupled with, I think, the reporter's instinct. He started out as a reporter, right?

Yeah. I think coupled with the reporter's instinct for how to make things readable and relevant and the knows for context, I just think it's something that is really compelling. And of course now, I first got interested in these things as a mayor, a mayor of a smallish city, South Bend, about a hundred thousand people,

but where we were wrestling with these kinds of questions. And now being in a city, which is famously all about the use and exercise of power. And knowing that, that, uh, you know, the power broker represents one of the most thorough going and, um, insightful accounts of how all of that actually works. I was hoping it was going to turn out that

you had been inspired directly by the power broker, because when you were mayor of South Bend You did a lot deliberately to make the downtown more pedestrian friendly And I imagined you reading Robert Moses and being like a punk rocker Listening to Led Zeppelin when punk artists were like this song is too long All of my songs are gonna be really short that you read and you'd be like too much cars My streets are gonna be for pedestrians. So that's my fantasy of the situation at least. I wish I was that cool and that quick to turn ideas into action.

But you know, I will say I surrounded myself as a young mayor with people who knew a lot about architecture and urbanism. The University of Notre Dame's architecture school is especially committed to some of the principles of new urbanism, which many of which I think were a response to urban renewal and the kinds of things Robert Moses was involved with. And that certainly trickled into the kind of intellectual architecture of what we were trying to do. I definitely set out as a mayor, partly because I was so new at it

and partly because it's how I do things, to say, okay, what are some principles to go by before we jump into this work? Even the most kind of unglamorous and day-to-day things, there need to be some principles at stake. I challenge myself and my team, for example, to say, okay, what's our philosophy of public work? What's our philosophy of wastewater?

And the more we thought about it, it was about freedom and it was about the idea that your freedom depends on not having to think about wastewater or water. And then we realized that translated into really reliability and then affordability being our kind of main things we were shooting for and how you run a water utility. Similarly, trying to connect the big things to the small things, the concepts and the ideas to the everyday, definitely motivated what we tried to do when we were reimagining our streets. The streets of my hometown were basically designed to just evacuate the downtown, to blast vehicles through it as quickly as possible.

In a pair of the main, two main kind of north-south streets of our downtown had been turned into this pair of one ways which Cars were going by so quickly. It was hostile to pedestrians You wouldn't want to walk on that sidewalk and by changing that we created a different more vibrant downtown It's funny. Obviously we were far from the only or the first community to take that approach, but some of the battles we had Within the community, you would have thought that I had made this up single-handedly in the shower.

And. You invented the roundabout. Yeah. And that we were more or less imposing it on everybody and basically banning the automobile. And it actually helped to get some top cover from this department where I now serve. We got an award.

It might have been the first time I came into this building that I'm now sitting in as I speak to you, was to receive an award from the then Secretary of Transportation, Anthony Foxx, for the work that we were doing. Back then there wasn't a giant infrastructure bill to fund us to do the work, but even just getting a lot of top cover to say we might be on the right track was a big shot in the arm that helped us pursue that philosophy and that strategy on our streetscapes. Yeah. That makes me think of another difference between you and Robert Moses, because if Robert Moses was in that room getting that award, he would have been thinking, I'm going to take this guy's job someday. I'll be Secretary of Transportation someday.

Yeah, it definitely did not cross my mind when I was here then that I'd be coming back to the building in that capacity. But now you gotta watch out for everyone you hand an award to that they're coming after you, yeah. So in this section of the book that we were talking about for this episode, the big drama that concerns it is about whether the Brooklyn Battery Crossing

should be a tunnel or a bridge. And every piece of empirical evidence is Brooklyn battery crossing should be a tunnel or a bridge. And every piece of empirical evidence is that that crossing should be a tunnel. But Robert Moses wants it to be a bridge and he has the funds to build it to enforce his will and only the power of the president stops him. And you know, there are a lot of weird biases when it comes to infrastructure that is worthy and exciting. But I feel like you really only understand the importance of infrastructure if you love replacing a lead pipe or putting sensors in the sewer as much as you love building a bridge. You know what I'm saying?

Yeah, I think so. I mean, look, a sewer system, or for that matter, a lot of tunnels, but definitely a wastewater resource, isn't something you can point to. It isn't something that you can put your name on. Again, to my earlier point, its elegance often is in the fact that you don't think about it. The way I always approach and conceptualize these things

is the less you have to worry about whether you're going to get a glass of clean safe drinking water, or for that matter whether there's a hole in the road on your way to work, the more free you are to concentrate on whatever lifts your soul, you know? I mean, whatever matters to you in life. Raising your kids, practicing your faith, starting a business, being a scholar, whatever it is. Now having said that, I mean, bridges are also beautiful. And there are pieces of our infrastructure that play this elevating role in addition to this functional role.

And I think about that a lot, although even that too, I think is best understood by bringing it back down to the everyday. And what I mean by that is, you know, a bridge, the beauty of a bridge, if it is beautiful, just like its utility, if it is useful, matters most because somebody's day goes different, both admiring that nice bridge on the skyline and, you know, getting to where you're going on time. They do add up into somebody's everyday life goes

a little bit better because that thing is there. Yeah. It sounds a lot like you're, you're articulating very well a, our kind of in-house philosophy that we talked about on previous episodes, that an acronym that I call noticeably improved people's lives or NIPL. And it's a, for term I'm not having a lot of success or luck. Yeah, I might work out a different acronym for use in federal policy here. But yeah, what was it again? Noticeable.

Noticeably improved people's lives. But you could what was it again? Noticeable? Noticeably improve people's lives. But you could just say nipple and people know what you mean, I think most of the time. Yeah. I'm really coming off as the shock chuck of the two co-hosts on this podcast. You're making me think though, because I think part of the tension in what we do as a department is some of it is noticeably improve people's lives for sure. Like I want you to see these great airport concourses that we're investing in improving.

And I want you to know that this happened because we got this bipartisan infrastructure law and it happened because of President Biden's leadership. On the other hand, like the most important things we work on in transportation should not be that noticeable. I mean, especially because first and foremost, we're a safety organization, right? So like you shouldn't notice that you didn't get injured or killed, you know, on your way to work. Like that should be something you don't even have to think

about. And that side of our work is actually one where, you know, no news is good news. So I'm half with you. I think a lot of times, especially when you're trying to get credit for good policy, it's very important to noticeably improve people's lives and make sure you remind people how it got done too. And there's this whole set of questions in moral as well as political about how credit is accumulated and distributed, which I might have some more thoughts on if you want to explore that. But then there's the other side of it where kind of the less people know you're there, the better. And that's how a lot,

maybe part of that's my mentality from having been in the military and being involved in counter-terrorism too, where like, you know, a good day is when nobody even knows that you did what you're doing. You just protected them and they get to go about their lives. Yeah. It's curious that you bring up the idea of credit, especially because so much of Moses's ability to navigate politics was about the apportioning out of credit for things, that he got a certain amount of credit for parks and people liked him, but he was always sure to include elected officials

in the debuts of the openings of his projects so that their names would be attached because he knew they wanted the credit and they would support him if they could get it. And I wonder if that kind of calculation is kind of like a sinister way to describe it. That part of the calculation is part of the politics of running a department like this, where like you're saying, some things are noticeable, some are not, and how the credit gets spread around in order to get that kind of support

or that kind of approval or other types of checkpoints met to get projects accomplished? Yeah, look, that's a thing, right? And up to a point, not to sound too naive, but up to a point, that's a really healthy thing. Like, part of how it's supposed to work in a democratic system is you, as a government official, deliver something for people. They notice that you delivered it for them,

and they give you credit for that, and you get to keep your job. Or, you know, you fail them, and they're mad at you, and you don't get to keep your job. On some level, that's the basic logic of electoral democracy. And I think, you know, it's definitely important to me as I travel the country to make sure that I talk about the different people who helped us get something done.

If I'm in Pennsylvania, I want people to know that a bipartisan law that was led by President Biden and was supported by their senator, Bob Casey, helped us get this bridge done that we're fixing in Philly or these safety dollars going to make a safer streetscape in Lancaster. Now one interesting thing about how our funding works is that the vast majority of it actually is not of the form of discretionary grants where our team puts together a list and then it's brought to me for a final sign off and we're literally picking and choosing winners and losers.

There is a lot of that, there's a record level of that and we try to have very clear principles for how we make those choices and be transparent about them. But for every dollar that we have going out that way, we have many more dollars that go out by formula where we just give it to the state. And within certain limits, they can use it however they want. And what's really interesting to me is that some states

and some governors will go out of their way to share the credit, to put up signs on the side of the road to make sure that everybody knows this happened because of President Biden's bipartisan infrastructure package and a partnership with the state. And some of them won't, right? But for those who do, I mean, the alchemy of that of that and this again I don't want to sound too Pollyanna but I really honestly believe this is true my favorite rule of political mathematics

is that if two willing parties like a federal administration and a governor or a mayor who work together if they each come in willing to share the credit, each one of them walks away with two-thirds of the credit. I don't know how it works, but there's kind of a magic to that that I love. And then, you know, look, obviously as a matter of fairness, I also consider it important if somebody tries to share in the credit for something they try to stop, like some of the members of Congress who celebrate projects that are going to their districts, funded with the bill that they voted against and in some cases attacked.

We're going to call them out on that because it's just a matter of fairness there. We're still going to fund it if it's a good project, but if they're going to be cheeky about making it sound like they're the ones who brought the project, we're going to have something to say about that. I don't think that's unnecessarily political. I think it's just about fairness. Yeah. No, I think you're right.

And it's interesting because something that's come up as we've talked on the series is kind of the ways that to operate productively in politics, to do things for people, you need to have traits that at least, you know, we're taught as children or through fairy tales and things are not the ideal traits. Like you need a certain amount of ambition for power in order to do things to get to, and you need a certain amount of getting the credit in order to continue that support. Whereas I feel like what we're taught when we're young is, you know, to be that kind of like Gary Cooper, Lone Ranger humility where you're like, I didn't do anything. I'm just another man, you know, I, I, I know I stopped all these people, but anyone would have done it. Whereas if you do that in politics, you will not effectively get the support you need to get the things done that you're there in the first place to do, most likely. Yeah, maybe. I don't know, I think there are a lot of different ways of being effective.

I would definitely say some of the most effective people I've encountered since getting this job are not the ones who get their name all over the place. That's one way to do it, especially in a, you know, for elected officials. This sounds like that counterintelligence mindset again. Maybe, like, because in the military there's always the person who, like, according to the org chart is the is the person who will get something done and then there's the person who will actually get something done. Like, when I was was deployed I was a very junior officer like my most important responsibility probably was driving equipment or other

people who typically who outranked me around Kabul or between Kabul and Bagram and we didn't actually even though that was an important part of my job I didn't actually have direct control of any vehicles. So to get a vehicle, I had to really think about it. And there were two ways to do it. There was an official way to do it. It took forever and sometimes I would never get a vehicle. And then there was this guy named Marlin,

who to this day, I don't know what his job title was. I don't know, he's a civilian. I don't know what organization he was part of. I just knew that if I stayed on his good side and made sure that I helped him anytime he needed something and gave him first dibs on the chocolate chip cookie bars that came in the care packages from South Bend, Indiana to my little mailbox in Afghanistan, I'd get my hands on a Land Cruiser when I needed one. And that really mattered. And so all of which is to say,

there's a lot of different ways to do this, right? And I do think sometimes we get wrapped up in the myth of somebody who uses hard or even nefarious means to get something done is kind of the way, right? And it's fitting again that we talk about this in the context of Robert Kero book because I do think his scholarship on LBJ got a lot of people thinking about LBJ who delivered so many of these incredible results including this, you know, is in many ways credited

with the civil rights law that was one of the most important social leaps forward we've had as a country. But there's this idea that he, in terms of how he treated people, was a real bastard and that's what it took to get those important worthy things done. And there's a whole mythos around that, that we can have long historical debates about how much that's really the right account of what happened. But the point is, that's what people think works a lot around here, and some of them really lean into that in ways I would argue are actually counterproductive to their long-term effectiveness. That makes sense to me.

So one of the things about Robert Moses is that he had this idea for how New York should be, and it should be dominated by cars. He loved being a passenger in a car. He never learned how to drive, but he loved being a passenger in a car. He grew up in a time period in which driving was this leisurely activity. People didn't do it to commute, they did it for fun.

And so he was really into this idea of parkways, and he shaped New York in that image. And he really did not pay attention to the changing world. He had just had an idea that was fixed. And no matter what amount of empirical evidence, sort of counter-dicting that, just didn't work on him over the decades that he ruled. And I started thinking about this when it comes to being

in charge of transportation in the country and thinking about this when it comes to being in charge of transportation in the country and thinking about it, how much do you nudge? I mean, obviously, no one should do what Moses did and just steamroll over everything with this one ideology that doesn't change. But you do want to shape things and move things to be kind of different than they are now and not just build on what's already been built. How do you think about balancing that? Yeah, I think it's really important

to come in with a vision. Again, your account of the principles, the ideas, the concepts, and sometimes that means pushing. I mean, I was definitely pushing my community back in my formative years as mayor with ideas that I believed in that I really think we were right about, like a well-placed roundabout

was going to save lives. And a lot of people hated it. And in a democracy, you're supposed to be accountable to where people, you're supposed to be accountable to people and at the same time have a responsibility sometimes to lead in a direction that wasn't already how people thought. I mean, in fact, you could argue by definition you're not leading if you're just going to

where people already are. And so then the tension becomes how can you legitimately be responsive to people, which means listening and being open to the possibility that you're wrong and being ready to adapt your plan and still be doing your job as a leader, which is to arrive with a vision and try to persuade people. So when are you persuading people and when are you letting them persuade you? I think that we have a lot of process that goes into that. If you're at the local level, like I come out of, a lot of public meetings that were

probably not as much a feature of Robert Moses' life, but as a mayor. I mean, when I think about our complete street stuff, we counted into the dozens the number of public meetings we had. And I viewed them largely as persuasive, largely as an opportunity to say to the community, we really need to do this and here's why. But we really did adjust and adapt and rethink our plans because of the input we got.

And if I'm being honest, also because the city council made me to some extent, I couldn't get what I wanted to through on the first try without some adaptation. So there was that push-pull. But I still wouldn't have been doing my job if I just kind of polled people on what they already thought and went along with it. At the federal level, there's a much more

kind of thoroughly designed version of this, which is especially when you get into something like an environmental impact statement. So on the biggest, gnarliest, most complex projects, federal law requires that if federal dollars are involved, there's a very intensive process of getting comment. And we have had, whether it's projects or whether it's certain rules that we've been considering, literally get tens of thousands of comments. You go in on regulations.gov, which is a real website. Sounds made up and it doesn't sound very exciting,

but you know, when we propose something that we're eventually gonna make into a rule or contemplating making into a rule, everybody gets to weigh in and somebody has to read all of those comments. And that's good, right? Because we're making rules that everybody has to live by. So I don't know that everybody kind of draws a line

somewhere, but I think any leader earning their paycheck is not simply reflecting the population they serve, but also is not a good leader if they're ignoring the population and the community that they serve. And by the way, one other thing I want to say, which is the deployment of political capital, right? If you are for something unpopular and if you are right, that it is the right thing to do, then you do kind of a trust fall where you implement that policy and hope that over the years it delivers enough good results for people that they wind up giving you credit for it.

That's what I felt like happened with the kind of arc of my first term as mayor. I spent the first year, a lot of people got mad at me because of the things we proposed, things we tried to do. By the fourth year, I had enough results to show for it that I could earn enough trust to get re-elected and go at it again. Here in this administration, I feel like we're on a similar arc where we spent year one, you know, just getting this infrastructure built through. Now we're in the fourth year, turning it into actual results and hopeful that that earns credit. Mm-hmm.

As Roman was saying earlier, this episode that we're covering before this interview airs, so the listeners will have just heard this, but I'm going to recap it slightly anyway, is about the building of the Brooklyn Battery Tunnel and how he wanted it to be a bridge. And it took the President of the United States stepping in and pressuring the War Department not to give navigable waters permission for it to get it stopped. And it feels like so much of this is emblematic of an earlier era that was not as standardized and formalized as the process that you're describing now.

And there was no Department of Transportation at the time. It wouldn't be around until the 1960s when Moses was already basically out of power. And it makes me wonder how you would handle this kind of situation now, or if this kind of situation arises of sort of master builder, master planner type who has local control, local influence, and is trying to push through something very big using federal dollars that maybe isn't a good idea. Does the federal government have more tools to handle something like that now than it did back idea. Does the federal government have more tools to handle something like that now than it did back then when literally the president's wife had to say to him,

you should do something about this? And the president said, oh, yeah, yeah, let's not do that. Yeah, look, there are more tools now. We're very careful and very conscientious about the fact that a lot of these decisions are local. For example, 54,000 projects and counting that were funding through the Biden infrastructure package. Zero of those projects was invented here at the USDOT headquarters in Navy Art, all of them were developed by some city town state tribe, airport authority transit agency and then brought to us or got funding through a formula. And so we're very intentional about not dictating the terms of a

project. And at the same time, we have policy goals, right? Safety, job creation, climate equity, and to the extent that the law provides for us to do so, we shape things largely by which projects we select for funding in competitive processes and by other lawful means to be a certain way. And other tools competitive processes and by other lawful means to be a certain way. And other tools that didn't exist before are really designed to protect the rights of people who could be impacted by a project, notably Title VI of the Civil Rights Law that we enforce so that if people are about to get, you know, trolled, Robert Moses style, they have recourse and we come in as a watchdog or as an enforcer really to make sure that those people are heard.

But I'll also say this, one thing I've learned in this job or relearned in this job is the importance of informal or unofficial power. And I'll give you an example that's less in the realm of building things, but is one of the most important things we've worked on, which is how airlines treat their passengers. So there are some things we've been trying to get done and are still trying to get done through rulemaking. But the rulemaking process, the Administrative Procedures Act, the Notice and Comment, it can take years. While we were working on that, especially in the summer of 2022, and there were so many frustrations around cancellations and delays, the idea emerged that if we just put more information out in a really easy to understand form, that not only

would help passengers know which airlines would take better care of them, but knowing it was out there might actually change the airline's behavior. And living in this world where it takes months or years to do something, I asked the team, well, okay, if we set up a website, how long would that actually take? And they said, we could do it in a couple of weeks. And I said, okay, well, I'll send a letter

to all the CEOs of the airlines saying, hey, in a couple of weeks, we're gonna put this website up. You might wanna change your customer service plans before we do it. This is going to be a bunch of green check marks and red Xs. And they did. This was, I did not, this was not an enforcement action.

We've done those. This was not a rulemaking. We're doing those. This was just saying, hey, we're like, we're going to tell people what you're doing. So you might want to think about what you're doing. And it led to real change. And so I've been amazed at how powerful those tools can be

when used alongside tools like rulemaking and enforcement and spending money. Yeah, yeah. Of those 54,000 projects that you mentioned, I hope I got that number right. Don't ask him to tell us every single project, Roman. No, but I'm wondering, you strike me as a real systems thinker. I hope I got that number right. Don't ask him to tell us every single project Roman. But I'm wondering, you strike me as a real systems thinker.

You really enjoy solving a problem. And is there a certain type of project that really delights you in the way that it's the type of solution that it is? Or I don't know, the fact that I'm sort of struck by it. I've always felt like your wastewater thing, sewer thing in South Bend was just like great. You know what I mean?

And it is one of those things that, that absolutely passes by without notice. Is there a type of project that really delights you when you hear about it or it comes across your desk? Yeah, I love the projects that have a disproportionate impact in the places that they benefit. And often those are the actually smaller projects. They're not our marquee national headline projects.

Obviously I love the high speed rail we're doing from Nevada to Southern California. We're contributing $3 billion to make that happen and it could be amazing. But again, I mentioned I was just in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. It's just fresh on my mind because it's the last one one I visited 12 million bucks we're gonna help them do safer streetscapes that is both a

kind of a vote of confidence in the mayor's and the city strategy of Adding bike lanes not just not not in the idea that it's ornamental but actually for safety purposes Taking some one-way roads turning them into two-way Accepting that traffic can be a minute or two slower in exchange for a real safety payoff, that isn't our biggest dollar amount, but is something that we know is gonna make a difference.

We were in Chamberlain, South Dakota. This is a community that's 2,500 people, but believe it or not, they have an airport. And that airport really matters because they do air ambulance missions in a community that's a long drive from the nearest major hospital with the trauma center. And we're just getting them a building for their airport. Right now it's basically a manufactured home. You can tell it's kind of a double-wide. They've done a nice job with it. But they need an actual brick and mortar building.

And for less than a million bucks, we're getting them one. Those kinds of things are especially gratifying because you know, maybe it's just because of where I come from, you know, I was mayor of a smaller mid-sized city, you know how impactful they're going to be. And so I stack those right up alongside the, you know, what I often call the cathedrals of our infrastructure that we're working on. Yeah. I remember when the Eastern span of the Bay Bridge, it was rebuilt, I'm from the Bay Area, and the construction was running late,

and they canceled the event where you could walk across it before it opened. And I was so bummed, like I really, I wanted to take the kids, you know, like, I was like, there was this moment that I felt like that was just kind of lost in us just exalting in this idea of this thing that we built that only a government can build.

Amazon can't build it, Apple can't build it. A government builds this, and that's the collective will of the people, and I just wanted to have that moment of celebration. And I miss those, have that moment of celebration and I miss those. And I feel like, I feel like we're ripe for having that moment again, when it comes to infrastructure. I love that.

And I think we do need to do that. And I think the challenge and the opportunity with this particular infrastructure moment is that it's in so many places at once. So there's not this like the golden spike, like the single thing you can use to mark the completion of this coast to coast project of the transcontinental railroad, right? It's literally tens of thousands of places getting their golden spike. And I think the style of celebration you're talking about is really fitting for that, and having each community come up with its version of that. And there is something in particular a little magical about

when you give people access to a piece of infrastructure, they're already gonna use, like we will drive over the bridge every day, but when you walk it, you feel it differently. I'll tell you, that can be really powerful. I've had an experience of occasionally being on a runway to do my job, we either do a press conference on a tarmac that we're about to revamp or ride along

with a inspector going out on a pickup truck. And we're actually real- You're not sneaking onto runways at night, these are official. Yeah, all kosher. Yeah. But you, you know, from a distance, you could be forgiven for thinking a runway is

basically like a road and when you're on one, you realize it's more like a field. Yeah. I mean, in terms of its scope. Um, and there are things like that when you're on a bridge or, or, uh, or a runway or another piece of infrastructure that if, if you get the chance to interact with it in a non-normal way, it deepens your appreciation for it.

I mean, I honestly feel like there was this wave, this WPA, PWA period in which we took special pride in these things and there was an extraction period in which we didn't and we wanted to all public-private partnerships and we didn't want to. And now I feel like it's, do you feel that swell of people wanting to do this stuff a little bit more, a little bit, I don't know. It just seems like we're back into an era where we could build with abundance.

So I have a couple of thoughts about this. One is that I think we need to remember that what we're building is something that should be One is that I think we need to remember that what we're building is something that should be a source of pride and is not just making up for lost time. And here we may be the victims of our own arguments a little bit, because I think we said persuasively and correctly,

hey, for the last 40 years we've under-invested, we've got a huge backlog, maintenance is a problem, we gotta just fix all our stuff. And that's true, by the way, we have a whole philosophy around what's called fix it first, the importance of taking care of a backlog. But taking care of a backlog doesn't make the heart sore, right? And the truth is we're doing all of the above.

We're definitely dealing with things that should have been done 30 or 40 years ago and making up for lost time in repairing or restoring bridges or tunnels. But we're also doing whole new things. Again, the high-speed rail sphere just being one example of it. And so I think we need to remember to think about the positive, the proactive, that how we're gonna be not just as good

or as far ahead as we once were, but better than ever if we get this moment right. But the other thing I think that is always in play here, especially now that it's not the 30s and 40s and we have other things we pay attention to in terms of environmental impact and workforce and frankly just safety on building things, that means there's some delayed gratification here.

The real reason I call the biggest projects we're doing cathedrals of our infrastructure is actually not because it's a poetic word to talk about a big thing. It's a reminder of this central characteristic of cathedrals, which is that the people who built them weren't even around when they were complete. Now, unlike the builders of Notre Dame,

I very much hope to be alive when we finish the Hudson River tunnels, but it's unlikely that I'll be Secretary of Transportation when that happens. And so, unlike a piece of great, I don't know, tax policy, and I'm super proud of the tax policy administration, the child tax credit, they did it, and almost did a stroke in a matter of months, child poverty plummeted in this country. Like, that's amazing. It doesn't work that way when you're building a big bridge or a new

airport terminal. And so we need to be as excited and as emotional about a project that takes years to bear fruit as we are about something that gets done almost overnight. And to me part of how we do that is we take pride in the how. One of the coolest things I get to do is spend time with high school students who are in these vocational programs and pre-apprenticeship programs that prepare them. Some of them not going to college, some of them going to college but want to learn building trades anyway, but prepare them to have a hand in this building that's going on. And for all the hand-wringing that's gone on about how our

country doesn't do, would shop school in high school anymore and doesn't respect building, I see a real change, a real kind of counterculture thing happening and these students stand up taller and they're part of it and my point is they might be working on a bridge two or three or four years before anybody gets to drive across it, but it's already making somebody better off. And that's something that gets me excited and that I hope we all take a level of pride in.

That's a really exciting way to think about, It feels like one of the big flaws of Moses in the book is that, is this impatience. He's got to get it done. He's got to get it done now so we can move on to the next thing. And when you're building something that will last a hundred, possibly 200 years or longer, the impatience in getting it built is only going to hurt you in the long run. And you make those mistakes that he made or make those deliberate errors that he made. And there's something very exciting about that idea of focusing on the building of it too.

So that the period before the thing is completed isn't just a frustrating period of waiting. It's a period that you can also make the most of and take pride in. I think that's such an inspiring way to think about that process. Yeah, I mean, Roman, you talked about the participation in an event to mark a project completion, but there are also ways to do that along the way.

I mean, we, you know, this might be a little romanticized, but we often look back to the era of a barn raising, right, where people got together to do something and part of the fellowship that was created in the doing of it mattered. And I think that's true in a lot of service contexts in more modern versions of what we do. By the way, I would even say just the act of putting these resources together, I mean

the political construction project that was the bipartisan infrastructure law, if only because it was a bipartisan law in a horrifically divided time, which is the Washington of 2021, is something we ought to take some pride in. But I do think, look, we need to find ways to celebrate, not just as a political matter, so that people who helped get this done get credit, but to reconnect all of us with our role

because each of us paid into this, right? And each of us should take some pride in this getting done. And it's a big deal. In fact, my big thing, you've got your acronym, Elliot. I've got something I'm trying to get to catch on. Okay. Let's see if it's more appropriate than mine. I don't know.

Let's see. So I want the sum total of the Biden era investments in infrastructure, whether it's the stuff I work on or the getting rid of lead pipes or the internet access or any of these other things to come to be collectively known as the big deal. There was, there was the new deal, the square deal, the fair deal.

I think nothing could be more fitting for President Biden's infrastructure work than the big deal. So I'm going to keep calling it that. We'll see if it catches on. I like it. Well, Secretary Pete Buttigieg, thank you so much for joining us. It's been a real pleasure to talk to you. Same here. Thanks for having me on. And thanks for your attention to these things. Of course. They really matter and they're more fun to talk about and think about than people might realize. And that is this month's episode

of the 99% invisible breakdown of the power broker. Next month, we're going to cover chapters 33 and 34. That's pages 703 through 806 in my book, two very long chapters. And if you can't wait that long to hear me summarize something and you don't care what it is I'm summarizing, whether it's the Power Broker or say a really terrible movie, why not head over to the Flophouse

podcast, my other main podcast where you will hear me summarize some kind of terrible movie. And we've got some exciting news. We have new Power Broker breakdown merch for all of you following along at home. Something folks have been clamoring for from the beginning of the read-along. You can finally have something that shows off your enthusiasm for the power broker in addition to lugging around a four pound book. In fact, one of the things we've got is perfect for carrying around that massive tome, that four pound volume, that enormous municipal grimoire that you've come to love so much. And it is a tote bag, but not just any tote bag.

This one is from Bagu. It has two sets of handles. It has a zipper. It is pushing the limits of tote bagness in the way only a visionary like Robert Moses would, wondering what's possible with a tote bag and not caring who gets hurt in the process. Truly, this is the carrier that the power broker deserves. We also got a Nine IMPI power broker band t-shirt with Robert Moses on the front

and a list of episode dates on the back. It is the most hardcore metal thing that we've ever produced. You can find it all at 99PI.org slash store and we'll have a link in the show notes. By the way, the rest of the 99PI shop is discounted as we make way for some new merch, including a 99PI Power Broker Challenge Coin, which we'll have available for all you guys who have accomplished the read-along with us. The 99% invisible breakdown of the Power Broker is produced by the wonderful Isabel Angel,

edited by Comiti. Our music is by Swan Real, and our mix is by Dara Hirsch. 99% Invisible's executive producer is Cathy Tu. Our senior editor is Delaney Hall. Kurt Kolstad is the digital director from the Rosso team, includes Chris Berube, Jason DeLeon, Emmett Fitzgerald, Gabriella Gladney, Martine Gonzalez,

Christopher Johnson, Vivian Lay, Emmet Fitzgerald, Gabriella Gladney, Martín González, Christopher Johnson, Vivienne Ley, Lashma Dawn, Jacob Maldonado-Medina, Kelly Prime, Joe Rosenberg, Nina Potuck, and me, Roman Mars. The 99% visible logo was created by Stephen Lawrence. The art for this series was created by Aaron Nestor. We are part of the Stitcher and SiriusXM podcast family now headquartered 6 blocks north in the Pandora building, in beautiful Uptown, Oakland, California. You can find us on all the normal social media sites as well as our own Discord server where

we have fun discussions about the power broker, about architecture, about movies, music, all kinds of good stuff. It's where I'm hanging out most of these days. You can find a link to that Discord server, our merch page, as well as every past episode of 99PI at 99PI.org. Oh, sorry, I got carried away. I love that. What a great book.

It's a great book, you know. It's a good book. We should devote some time to it. We should talk about it once a month.