All-In with Chamath, Jason, Sacks & Friedberg - E72: Impact of sanctions, deglobalization, food shortage risks, macroeconomic outlook and more
Episode Date: March 19, 20220:00 Jason's new "family office" and Sacks' new strategy 2:39 Understanding where all sides stand in the Russia/Ukraine War three weeks in 15:21 Sanctions risking a major food shortage: possible solut...ions, how we got here, creating distributed manufacturing and supply chains, capitalist incentives flipping 34:59 Breaking down the second- and third-order effects of the massive sanctions on Russia; best case/worst case outcomes for this new form of economic warfare, deglobalization 49:26 US economy big picture outlook: inflation, rising rates, decreasing uncertainty potentially a bullish sign in public markets; how that flows to private markets 1:02:06 Rewriting foreign policy playbooks Follow the besties: https://twitter.com/chamath https://linktr.ee/calacanis https://twitter.com/DavidSacks https://twitter.com/friedberg Follow the pod: https://twitter.com/theallinpod https://linktr.ee/allinpodcast Intro Music Credit: https://rb.gy/tppkzl https://twitter.com/yung_spielburg Intro Video Credit: https://twitter.com/TheZachEffect Referenced in the show: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/16/us/politics/russia-troop-deaths.html https://www.axios.com/zelensky-russian-invasion-ukraine-ea623eb5-4a14-4458-9640-af981081e4a4.html https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/russia-ukraine-invasion-francis-fukuyama-b2035413.html https://twitter.com/davidfrum/status/1504601558184517637 https://uscnpm.org/2022/03/12/hu-wei-russia-ukraine-war-china-choice/ https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/16/ukraine-zelensky-information-war/ https://twitter.com/RichardHanania/status/1504824837964926981 https://twitter.com/ClintEhrlich/status/1504618754784735232 https://www.ft.com/content/7b341e46-d375-4817-be67-802b7fa77ef1 https://www.nbcnews.com/science/environment/first-drought-now-war-global-wheat-supplies-peril-rcna19298 https://www.agweb.com/news/policy/politics/if-you-think-fertilizer-prices-are-bad-now-heres-why-china-could-make https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/images/Fig4.png https://www.agriculture.com/news/business/skyrocketing-fertilizer-prices-gouge-farmer-profits-groups-blame-consolidation https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/future/cu22 https://twitter.com/ianbremmer/status/1504214235114577926 https://www.bls.gov/charts/consumer-price-index/consumer-price-index-by-category-line-chart.htm https://www.cnbc.com/2022/03/10/there-are-more-than-11-million-open-jobs-in-america-right-now.html https://www.nytimes.com/live/2022/03/16/business/fed-meeting-interest-rates https://twitter.com/DavidSacks/status/1503989745939980292 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26079957 https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2021-06-16/the-latest-kremlin-official-says-summit-will-not-be-easy https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-14/biden-says-ukraine-has-work-to-do-on-corruption-to-get-into-nato https://theintercept.com/2022/03/15/ukraine-russia-war-sovereignty-negotiations/ https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/01/politics/ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky-biden-white-house/index.html https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/01/joint-statement-on-the-u-s-ukraine-strategic-partnership/ https://www.state.gov/u-s-ukraine-charter-on-strategic-partnership/ https://www.amazon.com/Changing-World-Order-Nations-Succeed/dp/1982160276/ https://www.salon.com/2021/01/19/who-is-victoria-nuland-a-really-bad-idea-as-a-key-player-in-bidens-foreign-policy-team/
Transcript
Discussion (0)
I now have a chief of staff. He's pretty great. He's worked for me for a while and he's doing a great job
But it's actually really helped. I will say that and then I started a family office. Wow congrats
What does that mean you have it placing your home that you call an office?
You know like the great-great-grandfather of your refrigerator? Is it office? Is that some family office? Yes
The family goes in there to talk about office time
Where does Jade put the stickies? I'd say we're out of granola bars in the sand?
Hey everybody, welcome to another episode of the All in podcast episode 72 part do with us today again.
The Prince of panic attacks the Sultan of science David Friedberg.
The Prince of fact.
Oh yes, Ed also Zeppro of Ziloft.
And also as you're hearing cackling the duke of degeneracy,
uh, the dictator himself.
Shema, from Bolly Hoppati.
And of course, everybody's, uh, favorite, the rainman himself, the drunk history channel,
Uncle David Sacks. I mean, David, I follow you on Twitter.
You're tweeting 50 times a day.
Oh, I was thinking the same thing.
When do you work?
What has happened to you?
You won't meet with startups anymore.
I bring you startups.
You said, you know what, I'm no longer gonna meet with you.
I start out like stuck in your room, tweeting.
I don't do first meetings.
That is the end of your career.
Huge mistake.
No, it preserves my energy.
There's nothing more draining than endlessly
spending your day in first meetings.
No, why don't you just have a short first meeting, like a 15-minute first meeting?
Well, we have a team for.
Well, they have a bad judgment.
They don't, because we know exactly what we're looking for.
SAS investing is very metric-striven, and so the first meeting.
Oh, that's fair.
That's a good one.
Yeah, exactly.
So it's like, the first meeting we just find out, do they meet our basic threshold for growth? Love it. Yeah, exactly. Yeah,'s like, you know, the first meeting we just find out do they meet our basic threshold for love it for growth and yeah, exactly.
Yeah, so you run the numbers and I I will meet with them if they look good.
I love this. I would like all VCs to take the same approach.
And I will let everybody know my DMs are open Jason at Cali, Cali,
I will take the first meeting.
Jason at Calacatastac.com, I will take the first meeting. Sax, I need to call you after this.
One of our businesses, which is not in Sass,
has started to sell Sass software,
and we've already booked $40 million
of fucking ACV by complete accident from zero.
You stepped in it, and I need some advice.
Okay, yeah, let's talk.
All right, everybody.
It's been a bit of a crazy couple of weeks here,
and we have to start with the war in Ukraine
and do a bit of an update.
It's been over 20 days.
The death toll continues to climb.
We don't know exact numbers here.
It's very hard to get information.
We're not experts.
We don't have boots on the ground.
But according to the New York Times, 7,000 Russian troops have been killed.
And Zelensky said on March 12, 1300 Ukrainian troops have been killed. I think we've got three or
four angles we need to talk about here. One, I want to talk about food supply with freedberg,
since you ran climate.com and have a lot of expertise in that. And of course, Ukraine and Russia
are the bread basket of the world. Tremoth, I want to talk about markets, of course. But let's go to our history channel,
Uncle First, Sacks. You have been going down the rabbit hole, looking at the history of
this. Let me just ask you a just a point in question. Is Russia losing the war? And if
they are losing the war, if that is a the war if that is a past is that even a possibility that the losing the war are they losing the war
and then what is the exit ramp here what does it mean on a go forward basis right i think great question so here's where i think we stand through
the war is that
put clearly miscalculated he thought this would be a cake walk it's turned out not to be the Ukrainians have put a very fierce resistance.
The Russians have taken very serious casualties and losses.
And so the war is very much up in the air.
The outcome is very much in doubt.
So I think Putin was overconfident, made a political economic and obviously humanitarian
mistake.
But I think three weeks in, here is where I would characterize things, is it feels to me
like the West might be making a similar mistake of sort of excessive overconfidence and triumphalism,
meaning that we think the rest of this war is going to be a cakewalk.
And the reason I say that, let me just give you some examples and then tell you why it
may not be a cakewalk.
So you've got Francis Fukuyama had a piece this week, basically.
He's back with the end of history.
He predicts that imminent rush and defeat and that there's going to be a new birth of
freedom for the West.
It's going to be like the Bush doctrine and 20 years of field policy, and then at least
never happened.
You got David from all but predicting mission accomplished, just like the Iraq war.
He said the spring
time is going to be bad for anyone who bet on Putin, his words, which in his view is anyone
who isn't a basically a neoconny favors regime change. You had a piece get a lot of circulation
of the last week in the U.S.-China perception monitor by I think a former Chinese observer
named Hugh Wei.
And he basically predicted that China would be under
so much pressure by what the Russians have done.
In terms of humanitarian losses,
that they would come out basically denouncing Russia
and support the West.
And then of course, I think the final example
of what you might call Western triumphalism right now
is that absolutely no one in Washington seems to be pushing for a ceasefire.
They are all paying lip service, at least to this no-fly zone idea.
Biden and the squad seem to be the last holdouts for the idea of not imposing no-fly zone.
So I would say right now the West seems to be very confident about the way this war is
going and not inclined to make any compromise or concessions.
I just want to flag quickly why there might be some clouds on this silver lining.
So you had a Washington Post article, first of all, warning.
It was very interesting that Ukrainian military progress may not be as great as their, quote,
stratcom, the strategic communications, you know,
AK propaganda. So in other words, the Ukrainians are very effective at fighting the information
war, but the Russians are still making progress on the ground. You also had this, um,
Washington Post story about neo-Nazis flocking from all over Europe to Ukraine to fight for
the cause. Again, that story got, it's very troubling and it got no likes or retweets because it just doesn't fit the great narrative here. You've got the
slow motion humanitarian. Is that true? Yeah, let's come back to, let me lay out all
the issues and we can come back to. You've got the slow motion humanitarian disaster of,
you know, a billion people across the world potentially starving if the spring planting
doesn't happen, which we should let Freeberg speak to more. You've got the fact that
Russia can still escalate this war.
I mean, they could still rubble cities.
Byelorus could enter the war, and God forbid they could even use WMD.
And then you have this idea, this dream of toppling Putin.
Probably, look, it could happen, but probably a fantasy you had.
Two and a thousand protesters, pro-war protesters turned out in Moscow today.
Nationalism is still strong. In Russia, yes, there's anti-war protesters there,
but the Russian people at the moment seem to be still behind Putin.
And then I think you had today, the foreign minister of China came out with a statement,
really throwing cold water on the idea that they support the West. They basically denounced the
West for NATO expansion.
So this whole idea of the Chinese bowing to Western media pressure, which they, in other
contexts called the Baisau influence, I think that's a fantasy that is not going to happen.
So look, I think that, you know, we all support the Ukrainian cause.
We all support their desire for freedom, to their freedom from domination,
from this Russian war of aggression.
But what I wonder about is whether this would be
the opportune time for Washington to try and push
for a ceasefire instead of a no-fly zone,
and we should talk more about what that might look like.
Can I give you a psychological assessment
of I think what's happening right now?
Yes, great.
Just as somebody who, as you know,
you guys and I were just joking,
but six days just being mostly off the grid
with my notifications off,
I was really like, honestly,
like you kind of like go through this dopamine fast
and what it actually helps you do
is pick out better signal.
And you know, with all respect
sucks, I think like a lot of what you said is not really as meaningful signal as the following,
which is the most important thing that happened was both sides basically said the surface area of
a deal was very much in sight and that they were down to three or four points. And I think that
that didn't get reported nearly as much as it probably should have. And what I thought was psychologically
interesting was that as soon as that was said, the next few days was when the rhetoric got
ratcheted up extremely aggressively on both sides. And the way that I interpret that typically
is having done deals. That's typically when you're closest to a deal and you're trying
to get the last few teas and sees. And in that same construct as applied to Ukraine and Russia, I suspect what's happening is
they both put out the trial balloon. It was well received on both sides. The surface theory is now
down to a few points. I'm not saying that those are justifiable in the end, but I think that if both
of these two parties want to come to a ceasefire, which I think it does, we're probably much, much closer than anybody thinks.
And right now, all of this rhetoric is meant to basically try to get the other side to
budge a little bit more.
And so I suspect, and I could be completely wrong, is that we're much closer to a ceasefire
than anybody thinks.
And I suspect that you could see something in the next two to three weeks.
And I think that that's really hopeful, because you want this thing to come to an end.
The thing I'm trying to parse here,
and I don't know if anybody here
can even answer this, is how did we either underestimate
or over at masturbate, depending on the time,
Russia's ability to invade another country?
I think that we can't even estimate correctly.
So for example, there was something that said
there was 100 out of 100,
Russia has 170 Italians, apparently.
I don't know if that's true or not.
Of which 100% did, we don't know if that's true or not.
Of which Ukraine apparently destroyed 50.
Of which we don't know if that's true or not.
So we're left to guess, and unfortunately,
what that does is it people psychologically
then fit as David is using the past year priors.
What are your biases?
Right, what narrative fallacy do you wanna believe?
And then you're gonna fit.
So the pro-Russian factions will say
that's entirely not true.
The pro-Ukrainian factions will say,
actually it's even greater than that,
huge sustained military losses.
The truth is somewhere in the middle
that will only get accounted for
after a ceasefire is in place.
So I think we almost need to, again,
if we can get caught in this fog of war
and talk about the stuff in ways
which we don't accurately know,
or we can level up and say the thing that we both know
is there was on the record statements
by the foreign minister of Russia
and the president of Ukraine that a ceasefire and the surface area of that ceasefire is within sight.
And unless something has materially changed and that's in the last three days, which it
hasn't, it means we are really, really close to this being done.
So I agree with a lot of what Tomas said.
I don't think it contracts anything I said before.
I agree that there was a big piece of news this week
that caused markets to rally for three days,
which is the announcement of a proposed 15 point piece deal.
And we do know sort of the key features of that deal.
It means that the three big features are Ukrainian neutrality.
So they don't become members of NATO.
You had Zelensky saying that NATO membership
was off the table.
Ukraine can't host foreign troops bases or weaponry.
There be limits on Ukraine's military, but they would get security guarantees from the
allies.
So it wouldn't be a complete demilitarization.
And then the other pieces of it were Ukraine recognizing Russia's control of Crimea, recognizing
that's not coming back.
And then some sort of independence recognized for the disputed territories in the Donbass.
So I think you're right, Chimath,
that everybody now knows the broad contours
of what a peace deal would look like.
And the markets are starting to price in them
getting to that peace deal.
But I'm worried that if you look at it
from the point of view of what people in Washington say,
that there's no pressure here coming from Washington
for Zelensky, who's basically our client,
he's an American client, to make a deal.
You know, if you compare this to say the 1973
you know, Kippur War, where the US was on the side of Israel,
but still acted as a peacemaker and got a ceasefire done.
You know, Kissinger got that deal done, even though we were on the Israeli side.
You don't really hear anyone in Washington saying, let's get a deal done.
So I hope you're right.
But because you're not, we're not talking about the elephant in the room, which is that
in the Yom Kippur Boer, the unitary resolve and the military dominance of America was
undisputed. And so as a result, its ability to be the dominance of America was undisputed.
And so as a result, its ability to be the mediator was also undisputed.
We've already talked about this.
When Biden called the UAE in Saudi, they wouldn't even pick up the phone.
The people that are negotiating this priest treaty right now are Natali Bennett and Emmanuel
Macron.
So we're not at the table.
So I think a lot of what we're hearing as well is just a lot of the rejection and the psychological,
you know, kind of anger that we have to not being even part of the process.
If the world doesn't want us to have such an outside Israel, well the point is it's we've moved past that.
Whether you wanted us to be involved in it or not, we're not involved.
And we are not the principal mediators in this.
And we, I hope to God that Israel and France
and whoever else is at the table gets this done.
Yeah, I agree with that.
But here's my concern is that I think everyone knows
the broad contours of the deal,
but if you're a Russia or you're Ukraine,
you're getting daily reports
of what's happening on the battlefield.
And if you think you're winning,
you have an incentive to stall the peace process
to cement greater gains and get more leverage
for those remaining details and negotiating points.
And so if Zelensky thinks that the Ukrainians are making progress on the battlefield, he's
going to wait.
And so neither one of them, I think, left to their own devices, can be fully trusted to
make it deal.
I think you need the US applying some pressure or acting in a constructive way towards the process.
And I think it's a huge problem that the US is not viewed as a peacemaker.
We're basically viewed as so partisan and on the side of Ukraine that no one is involved.
David, we've talked on this pod about us not being the global police officer of the world
and that other people need to stand up.
So maybe the lesson here is, you know,
maybe strategically.
It's not like we were called on and we didn't stand up.
We weren't called on.
Well, okay, that's, we assume that.
I mean, we don't have perfect information either,
but let's get to Freiburg here.
I think the other wrinkle in all of this,
and I think it's quite positive is sanctions
are seeming to have a profound impact here and people are looking at them as potentially
maybe cyber warfare and just actual tactical warfare on battlefields is less important than economic
warfare. Russia has been essentially canceled from the global economy, from visa to McDonald's,
canceled from the global economy, from visa to McDonald's, to exports. And these sanctions are not just government sanctions.
These are people opting into them, whether it's corporations and other entities saying,
we're just not going to do commerce with Russia.
Unfortunately, and this is something you have great expertise on.
And so we're lucky to have you here to talk about it.
People may or may not know this.
I'm happy to be here. This is the bread basket of the world. They export more wheat than
anybody, and they also export fertilizer, soybeans, and some other inputs, which we've
talked about previously, that provide meat for the world. So what can you tell us about the downstream effects of...
They're not being potentially,
or half as much crops coming out next year,
and what would happen in places that are the beneficiaries
or dependent on wheat and fertilizer from Russia?
So, there's a number of first order
and then second order effects that are not just about sanctions, but
also about export controls by Russia that are creating swings in food markets like we've
never seen, and will almost certainly lead to widespread famine by the end of this year
at this point.
So the first important point to note is about 15% of the world's calories come from
wheat. About a third of that wheat comes from Russia, Ukraine. Russia has banned export
of wheat. And the wheat spring planting season is like now, this week. And there's not
a lot of planting going on. You know, a lot of commodity folks are in the field trying
to figure out who's actually going to go to field and plant, but no one's making the concerted effort that they normally would under normal circumstances.
So not only is the current wheat supply in Russia Ukraine blocked up and cannot make its way to
countries like Africa or countries in Africa and elsewhere, but the future planting season
is now significantly at risk. And again, that's 15% of global calories and I just to take a step back
The whole planet earth operates on a 90-day food supply
So once we stop making food humans run out of food in 90 days
So another way to think about that is our food supply excess our capacity
In excess is about 25% of our global production
our capacity in excess is about 25% of our global production. So if our global production goes down by 12%,
we've lost half of our global food supply.
And that's not just linearly across all nations.
What happens is the most vulnerable nations
lose their food supply first,
and the richer nations buy that food supply
to secure their populations' calories.
And so you very quickly see a bifurcation happen
when you have a shortage in a food supply like
this of just a few points where suddenly famine is a real risk. And we already have about 800
million people on earth that are subsisting on below 1200 calories a day. So this very quickly tips
the bucket in a significant way in a number of countries that's going to be really awful. And that's just on the wheat supply and wheat planting problem.
The bigger problem is the energy price problem
and the phosphorus and potassium problem.
All fertilizer is made up of nitrogen,
phosphorus or potassium.
Those are the three major types of fertilizer
that farmers around the world have to use every year
in order to grow that crop.
But that fertilizer plants don't grow. Nitrogen is made from natural gas.
98% of the world's ammonia is made from natural gas.
Natural gas prices, as you guys know, have doubled
and the future's market looks like in some places,
natural gas prices going up like 4x.
As a result, the price of ammonia fertilizer,
Nitrogen-based fertilizer has gone from $200 a ton
to $1,000 a ton.
So it's five times as. That's a big difference. That's a big difference. That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference.
That's a big difference. That's a big difference. That's a big difference. That's a big difference, there's a little variation around here, but about 10% of the world's
phosphate comes out of Russia. And about, you know, call it 25% of the world's potassium comes out of
Russia, potash. Both of those markets are blocked up. They are sanctioned and they have banned exports.
Russia has through the rest of 2022. So around the world, the cost to make nitrogen fertilizer
has skyrocketed because of natural
gas prices, because of the Russia problem.
And Russia is not exporting potassium and phosphorus.
And as a result, the price of nitrogen has gone from 200 to 1000.
The price of potassium has gone from 200 to 700.
And the price of phosphorus has gone from 250 to 700.
So now it's so expensive to grow a crop that a lot of farmers around the world are pulling
acres out of production.
And they're actually going to grow less this year than they would have otherwise because
it is so expensive and they cannot access fertilizer locally to plant crops.
So not only do we have the wheat problem, we now also have the fertilizer problem and the
acres coming out of production problem.
And so food supplies are going to go down even further,
and this is going to become even more catastrophic.
And so there's a scrambling going on right now.
Food prices around the world as a result.
Everyone starts buying up all the commodities.
They buy up all the corn.
They buy up the soybeans.
They buy up the wheat.
And the price for corn has nearly doubled
from where it was in July of 2020.
The price of soybeans, the price of wheat are all skyrocketing. And in a lot
of countries, they cannot afford to acquire and individuals cannot afford to buy food
with the skyrocketing commodity prices.
Can I ask you a question? I think it's estimated that the US food supply, if you could ex-out
the waste, would actually feed most of the developing world, because I think
30 to 40% of all of our food is wasted, can you do something with that?
Yeah, that is actually true.
A lot of that happens at the point of consumption, so it's in people's homes, so it's a reverse
supply chain problem, where we throw away a lot of like stale bread and cereal that goes
bad or whatever.
There's some in the fresh vegetables market,
but generally the core calorie-producing commodities
are rice, wheat, potatoes, and corn.
Those commodities don't go bad in the supply chain.
They end up getting cost out at the end of the supply chain,
which is at the point of consumption at home.
So, I'm not sure there's a real solution there right now.
The bigger issue is like, how do you get bulk commodities
to the places that are gonna need them over the next 12 months?
So look, right now we're reducing food supplies, stocks,
around the world.
There's strategic reserves that are getting opened up
and being released.
As that starts to get the planished diminished,
and as the production kind of numbers start to come out,
it looks like less acres are in production.
You know, and God willing, we have a good weather year everywhere this year because you know a bad weather year in some markets could completely decimate the remaining supply that's coming out this year. Regardless,
it is going to be a humanitarian disaster within a year. And we will see hundreds of millions of people go starving.
And there will be potentially, I think you said hundreds of millions of people. Hundreds of millions of people be potentially, I think. You said hundreds of millions of people
to start a starving.
That's never happened in the history of men.
800 million people already live on below 1200 calories
a year right now.
So this is digesting that over 100 million people
will die because of this?
I don't know about death, famine.
Like famine is this short of calories.
You know, within a market, it's not like,
hey, there's no food, like,
you know, there will be strategic reserves release, there will be stuff, but it won't be
enough. We just don't have enough. In the way supply chains are set up, there just isn't
enough. And so once again, we found another supply chain weakness like we did in COVID
over and over again. And always says free birth.
It's your eyes will be released. But then hoarding is starting. So David, you take it after
this. But the one question I had was maybe talk to me about this concept then hoarding is starting. So David, you take it after this, but the one question
I had was maybe talk to me about this concept of hoarding because there seems to be a cascading
effect. And you kind of, well, yeah, it's not just talking about it a little bit.
It is as with any market guys, as you know, when there's scarcity, people come in and
buy at a faster pace, you know, everyone. And so this is a market dynamic. It's not like
people are physically hoarding loads of bread, but commodity traders, countries, strategic reserves, they start buying up
what they can get to prepare for the famine that's coming. Then prices go even higher and then it
kicks other people out of the market that couldn't afford to buy it. And the whole thing gets really
ugly, really fast. And there's no offer up here. There's no way to solve this. Well, if
Freeberg, yeah, the thing I want to ask you is if we had a peace deal right now, a ceasefire, would we avoid this outcome? I mean, like, how long,
how long do we have to avoid this? We need Russia to reopen fertilizer export markets now.
We need natural gas prices to come down now and we need them to plant the spring wheat. Those are
three things that need to happen to solve this problem. If those three things don't happen, we're
going into spring right now. So around the world in the Northern Hemisphere, farmers are making
plans, they're planting, they're deciding how much fertilizer to use. And so as this market
starts to kind of work itself out over the next few months, a lot of the commodity traders
and the Ag departments, they publish these planting reports and they talk about how many acres
of what we're planted and then everyone forecasts how much the supply will be.
And we're going to start to see these uglier numbers come out over the next few weeks
and months.
Meanwhile, we're seeing supplies dwindle and Russia is holding all this stuff.
So they're holding hostage, phosphorus, potassium, and the natural gas pricing is just what
it is.
Remember, there are ammonia plants everywhere.
There are ammonia plants and all ammonia plants use natural gas to create the nitrogen-based ammonia.
Let me make a statement and I'd love your reaction. We're finding out all of these externalities
that was made with underlying poor scientific reasoning that has caused these issues to be
exacerbated. So we know, for example, that our overreliance on Russian hydrocarbons could have been
mitigated with nuclear, but we fell for shoddy science and we fell for a bunch of uninformed
people who ran this banner of environmental protection.
So they screwed us, okay?
And those people now have meaningfully less credibility.
Let me give you another cohort,
freeberg and you tell me.
All the people that pushed back on GMO
and said GMO was unacceptable,
it could never happen, it has to be X, Y, and Z way.
And there are ways where we could have been working on
plants that had different mechanisms of action
in order to actually absorb
and retain nutrients from the soil in different ways that would have made us less reliant in exactly
the way in which fertilizer works. True or false? Yeah, GMO technology as a former
Monsanto executive, so you can call me Monsanto Schill here. But, GMO technology has been hindered globally by a challenge to adopt it.
And there are techniques and technologies that have not been aggressively developed because
of the concern on approvals.
Just to get a single GMO trade approved, I mean, I'd say today, and get it to market,
can take 7 to 13 years.
And even then, you have to still go get China to approve
it because they're the biggest importer. And you have to get all these other market participants
to approve it. And there are multiple agencies to get to approve it. Europe is finally, the EU
is finally coming back to the GMO problem and saying, you know what, precision gene editing can
actually be beneficial to growing that at more stuff. Now, wouldn't have solved this particular
crisis? Sorry, can I just say what's so ridiculous about this?
The fact that we have a modern agrarian economy
is because we actually did figure out a way to do GMO
except we used the punitive square
and we used successive iterations.
But the minute that you try to scientifically scale it
in a lab, all of a sudden, that same process
does not make any sense.
To me, that's, it's just intellectually so inconsistent.
Yeah, the thing that really scares people about GMO,
I mean, I've spent a lot of time on GMOs
and the reason people are upset.
I have a broader thoughts on the point.
But do you believe in that?
Do you believe in that inconsistent,
that intellectual inconsistency?
How do you think somebody from pre-BC to today?
I think that agriculture-
You think we're iterated on our route.
No, I think agriculture itself is technology.
Think about it.
Humans used to go out and just eat whatever was lying around
what nature gave us.
Then we started making rows in the ground
and putting seeds in the ground and putting water on the ground.
We engineered the earth to make stuff.
Then we started to breathe.
And then we did plant breeding.
And traditional plant breeding,
through normal, normal, normal, normal, normal,
normal, normal, normal, normal, normal, normal. safe the world that is dramatically, it's modifying things.
It is. And then what we did with GMOs, which is the distinction just to be really clear
about the definitional distinction between GMO and traditional plant breeding, GMO is when
you take DNA from another organism and you put it in the plants DNA to get that plant to
do something very specific. And Jason, you came with me to Monsanto. I mean, you took the
turn. You're sure? Remember cautious. We should be cautious about any time we're doing stuff like that.
Right.
And then there's generally like a very visceral reaction when I make that statement and
people like, wait, you're taking the DNA from bacteria and putting it in plants and
how do I know that's going to work? And so there's these layers of concern, which are deeply
psychological layers, but we can scientifically resolve this over time. But look, at the end of the day, humans today,
you guys remember last year,
how much I was talking about that starch synthesis paper
and how important it was?
We don't need to grow plants to make the stuff we need to consume.
If every city around the world had a starch synthesizer,
and it took CO2 from the atmosphere and water from the ocean
and had this technique developed out.
It could synthesize its own calories in a physical device without needing to rely on the ammonia
supply chain and the phosphate supply chain and all of the systems that we rely on that
are super outdated that are all a scaled up industrialized version of old school agrarian
techniques.
Humans today, I think, have the ability to synthesize and print food and over the next couple of decades, particularly catalyzed by what's going on in Russia
Ukraine today, we're going to see these technologies accelerate. It's obviously where I spend
a lot of my time, but I'm super excited about it.
I think we suffer from a very insidious kind of plague in the world, which is the plague
of overeducated dumb people. And it's almost as if, you know, because of their degree in the school,
you give them inordinate power to make value judgments that really put the world in a very
difficult position. And so when you have something like a war in Ukraine, it just lays everything
bare. And you find, you find all these things like, you know, another, another version of this
example, how did an entire continent
that specifically, I mean, Europe, abdicate their entire energy security to a group of
environmentalists and to, you know, to a 16 year old girl without even thinking about
what the right answer was for themselves from first principles.
That's really crazy that that happened.
And you need a war, you know, where tens of
thousands of people have to die to realize that that was a really bad set of decisions that
have been compounding for decades. Here's another example where food security is yet another
one where, you know, we weren't able to think cleanly from first principles. And so depending
on who had more money or who was able to create more psychological guilt or fear was able
to get an outcome that fundamentally puts the world
at a hundred million person plus famine. So somehow we need to rethink how our institutions work
because we are giving folks who haven't proved that they can handle power, the ability to influence
outcomes for the wrong sets of reasons. Well, it's even worse from off these people you're talking about who are smart,
dumb people. They're so privileged that they're living in some bubble,
making decisions for people who have food insecurity or energy insecurity.
And it's only when COVID showed, hey, oh,
semi-conductors, I can't get my car that I want because it doesn't have the chip in it,
or I can't get drugs, or I can't get P.P.
Then all of a sudden, they see the value and redundancy and supply chain.
But when they were living high on the hog and had nothing to worry about in 20 different
flavors of Captain Crunch, they can't even think about people in Africa.
Jacob, I think it's really important to speak to the capitalist incentive and how you get
there.
We've globalized supply chains because as a business,
it doesn't make sense for me to do every step of the thing that I want to do because you can get
better utilization out of CAPEX if a system is running all the time to make stuff. So if one
step of the system doesn't need the other system running 24-7, it's going to outsource that.
And that's kind of think about like semiconductor, think about food manufacturing.
Right, doesn't make sense for a farmer today to make his own ammonia
So there's a pneumonia plant that centrally makes that stuff 24-7
Distributes it out to a bunch of farmers that brings the cost down per unit of production and so these systems
Have existed because we've had less capital with a higher ROI on capital invested at every point in the system by you know
Distributing and having a distributing and having a centralized supply chain
system like this.
Now, what we're looking at today is what happens
when one part of that system fails.
And now, I think the big trend for the next decade or two,
everyone's going to have an institutional memory of this.
And you're going to see companies that are going to start
to vertically integrate supply chains.
They're going to vertically integrate their manufacturing. We're going to see
a lot of businesses make what traditionally would have been really quote unquote bad
capex decisions and bad investment decisions. And they're going to say, you know what, we
need to have redundancy because we cannot face the cataclysmic kind of circumstance that
we face in the past.
I also think those should, by the way, the easy decisions. I also think that there are some more complicated ones of morality that we may have also misappropriated.
I'll give you one example.
So if you think about energy independence of America, I think there's not going to be there's not going to be many who think that it's not critically important.
Well, then you go and say we have a short-term bridge with hydrocarbons and the long-term solution is renewables
But underneath renewables is the idea that you have to store these things right you have to store the energy you make
Whether it's from wind or solar even if it's from nuclear, okay
And all of that results in us needing batteries while batteries need lithium there's enormous lithium deposits in the United States that today
The former Slithian deposits in the United States said today can never get access because we've decided that the upper land gross of the state is more important than America's
energy independence.
So when push comes to shove, a small rat-like creature is prioritized more importantly than
America's energy independence.
The downstream implications of that are now obvious.
Rising costs, inflation, unemployment, potential recession,
war, death, famine, is the upper land gross,
that fundamentally more important than all of these systemic risks to humankind.
And the thing is, for a long time, we would never even think about the trade-offs
to actually think about why that decision should be made that way.
And now we actually have the ability to remake these decisions. So it's going to be really interesting to see whether we
upend all of these existing frameworks, you know, and there's enormous environmental
lobbies that have been created that have praised hundreds of millions, billions of dollars
to fight these battles systematically wherever they come up. And in some ways now what people
will say, well, you've really prevented progress, and you've actually done more damage. That's going to be a
really interesting point. Now, good intent. Good intent. Save the environment. And then there are
downstream impacts. Let's go to SACs about the sanctions. We saw a level of sanctions we didn't
expect. They were ferocious. They were, you know, lateral.
They're, you know, undeniably having an impact.
Do you think Putin would be at the table?
Do you think these sanctions are really having
a dramatic impact?
And do you think that there'll be a tool
that we should use in the future?
Or do you think maybe we need to be more thoughtful
about them?
In other words, cancel culture comes up as an analogy here.
People are saying, oh, it's like cancel culture for a country.
I think it's pretty great that a country that is murdering their neighbors doesn't get
to participate.
But obviously you can have some serious concerns if fertilizer and supply chain issues as we
just discussed are going to cause famine.
So what's the balance here?
Yeah, I think it's another great example
of, we're not thinking through the second
and third order consequences of what we're doing.
We're just reacting.
And so to Freeberg's point.
So first of all, we have to realize
this was more than just sanctions.
This was a complete severing of economic ties. I mean, basically every western country pulled up stakes out of Russia.
They did it on their own too. I mean, they did it because for the reasons you said,
because they wanted to make a statement that what Putin did was wrong. So every Russian who
is working for one of these companies basically got fired and all the stores closed and so on so I think I think it is
The repercussions of it are gonna be severe
however these things the economics of it take time to play out and
So do I think it creates pressure on Putin to make a deal? Yes, but you know if the if this is gonna be determined on the battlefield
One way or another in the next month. Do I think it has time to operate in that time frame?
Probably not.
And I think what's likely to happen here
is that in the same way that the real repercussions
of this war are going to be felt in grain production
in six months, there is an economic tsunami headed
for our own economy as a result of the
blowback from basically severing 144 million Russians from the global economy.
There's also going to be geopolitical blowback.
I think it's very likely that the way this is going to play out geopolitically is that Russia
will become a Chinese
client. All of those natural resources that China produces, the gas, all the mineral wealth,
those resources are going to flow on a conveyor belt, on a belt and a road conveyor belt,
from Moscow to Beijing, and they're going to fuel the Chinese economy.
Yes, I know, because the thing we have to remember is China is still a fund and from Moscow to Beijing, and they're gonna fuel the Chinese economy.
Yeah, yes and no, because the reality is, the thing we have to remember is China's
still up fundamentally, export-driven economy, of which 35%, just alone goes to the United
States.
When you add in Europe and other OECD countries, it's almost 60%.
So I think the idea that all of a sudden Russia will be able to backdoor all of these things through China into the rest of the world
I think is not really realistic and this is actually why I think the rhetoric is so high
Because those two countries specifically are put in a very difficult situation like what do you think the China calculus on Taiwan is looking
What's happening to Russia hasn't completely answered because it's completely off the table completely off the table. They would never consider invading to Taiwan knowing that it would put Apple in a position
or other companies that are entwined in the Chinese economy. I think what they have to pull out.
Again, I've said this before. Everybody has was always sort of like land-based economic sanctions. Even on this pod,
people, it's never going to work, it doesn't do anything, and it turns out it's just not true.
To be clear, I think sanctions are an appropriate way
to create economic pressure so that we can get
a ceasefire and a peace deal made, okay?
So I do believe, in the same way that I believe we should
arm the Ukrainians so they can defend themselves,
well, I'm against a no-fly zone.
The issue is just, are we actually using the leverage that we're creating to drive this
process to a successful resolution?
Because if we just make this the new normal, which is basically an insurrection in Ukraine
that drags on forever and Russia cut off from the global economy and
becomes a client of China. I think there's a parade of horribles that flow from that and
Freeberg just outlined one of them, which is hundreds of millions of people across the world
potentially starving. So my point about sanctions is not that we shouldn't have done them, but
there are going to be big repercussions for our economy
if we don't resolve the situation in Ukraine.
Let's do best case worst case with this new economic order here, an economic sanction
ability that the West has now demonstrated quite effectively.
For me, the best case scenario here is if you want to participate in the global economy
and globalization 2.0 means you're going to have to hit some base behavior level of being
a good actor in the world if you want to participate in the wider economy.
Therefore, as Trimoff just pointed out, Ivan quite correctly, Taiwan's off the table.
I mean, China already is having massive economic downturn
and headwinds.
The idea that they would face what Russia is facing right now
in terms of sanctions globally would be cataclysmic for them.
So, do we think what's the best case
in your mind, Friedberg, the worst case
of this new economic sanctions that we've just outlined?
Best case, worst case of this new economic sanctions that we've just outlined. Best case worst case. Much of this is driven by Russian decision making,
not just our decision making.
And so there's a lot of question marks around what they're going to,
they've said definitively, we are banning all fertilizer exports through 2022.
Okay, so like does changing a sanctioned model
at this point get enough resolve for them
to kind of come back to the table,
do we need to kind of weave that in
to some discussion, piece discussion
that they're having with Ukraine?
I think there's gonna need to be this multilateral
like global either support or partnership model
that's gonna have to kind of emerge
for this to all get resolved positively.
I don't think that it's just about Russia
and Ukraine agreeing to a bunch of terms,
we're all gonna be affected by what's going on
and what Russia has chosen to do back to us.
And we all think we're in the power
and we've blocked them and destroyed the rubble
and knocked them back to the Stone Age, Yadiyata,
but we're hurting ourselves far more than we realize,
and we have to go get something back from Russia
in order to resolve this.
So nuance.
I'm not sure I totally agree with that.
I actually think that necessity,
what does it mean?
Necessities, the mother of invention.
I think that this has the ability
to circling back to what we said before,
for us to rewrite all of
these other decisions that were frankly not necessarily rooted in either first principles
or long-stro pedgy thought in a way that can actually improve the state of play for everybody,
not just including us for the next 50 or 100 years.
So I'm not completely convinced that it's as catastrophically bad as you think.
Well, what about this, Friedberg, if we were thinking about food stability, you mentioned
your slurry and, you know, being able to make these calories without actually planting
any food.
If we-
It's not going anywhere if you call it a slurry, but yeah.
Okay.
Let's call it a protein bar.
You know, like ultimately, Jason, we can actually create pasta, bread, rice.
I mean, that's where this all goes.
Perfect.
By the way, just so you guys know, I want to frame this up.
It's super important.
60% of the world's calories come from carbohydrates, which are basically two molecules,
amylose and amylopectin.
Okay.
That's what makes up stars.
So if we can synthesize amylose and amylopectin, we can make it into any plant.
How long would it take?
How long would it take?
What would it cost to build your pasta making machine
and rice making machine to have more.
These are decades long-stay-la problems, right?
This is not like, hey, we got a solar solution.
So it's similar to nuclear or solar, exactly.
Yeah, yeah, got it.
But there are solutions to this.
Look, I mean, this is why I keep coming back to saying,
like we're evolving the global economy
and plan it earth away from this model
of centralized industrial manufacturing
into a production system that looks more distributed,
more decentralized with better technology.
And that's really a big trend for the century
for our global economy.
And that's why right now, I think the near term trend
is in de-globalization.
People making less capital efficient decisions
that create redundancy and supply chains.
And there's a lot of ways as investors to play that, by the way.
Saks, where are your thoughts on maybe the high order bit
for the West being a race to resiliency
or a race to redundancy in energy, in semi-conductors,
this race to resiliency in food supply.
Yeah, I mean, look, trade creates economic wealth
that also creates dependency.
And we're realizing the downsides of having that dependency.
If we're dependent, or Europe is dependent on Russian cast,
or you saw during COVID, we've become dependent
on Chinese pharmaceuticals, all the pharma companies
that move their manufacturing over there.
And then that got, when China was rattling the saber because we were blaming them for COVID.
This is back in 2020. The Alva started to imply we might not get access to pharmaceuticals.
So, look, we are going to have to rethink all those trade relationships. You can't have trade
without trust because, again, if you are empowering the producer to cut you off when you make yourself
dependent on that.
So, look, I think we're going to have to rethink all of that.
But can I go back to your best case worst case question?
Yes, I was trying to get somebody in there on the...
I think it's a good question.
And, you know, I hear, lay out the best case, so the best case, look, the best case is
the sort of the Fukuyama argument, the sort of the from argument is
the swedish and triumphalism, which is like sanctions are going to drive the Russians into
submission.
They're going to topple Putin.
The people are going to rise up.
They're going to lose this war.
We are going to strike a great blow against autocracy and liberal democracy is going to win.
Okay, I understand that argument.
Okay, now what's the worst worst case scenario worst case scenario is
freeberg's right we ended with hundreds of millions of people starving the war drags on because Russians are going to give up so the sanctions
you know while be while hurting the Russians don't end the war and in fact drive them into the arms of the Chinese.
Don't end the war and in fact drive them into the arms of the Chinese
You know the rush has been called a big gas station with the nukes that gas station will now fill up the Chinese economy hence fourth
Worsing the balance of power in cold war two and then there's a big, you know
tsunami or boomerang headed for the US economy and we we have a recession later this year as gas prices go to
$7 and $10 a gallon and
So it ends up hurting us. And so I know, I certainly see the case for sanctions, but I wonder if people are really thinking through
the downside scenarios. And what I do think is that if that the removal of sanctions
should be certainly something we're affirmatively putting on the table in these ceasefire negotiations and that
sounds obvious but I saw a tweet from Ian Bremer who's sort of part of the
foreign policy establishment.
I think I think I who has been pretty good on like he's smart and he's been
good on no fly zone. He's been saying the same things I've been saying like guys
this is tandem out to a declaration of war we're not going there. Also basically saying that listen to matter what the Russians do, we are not gonna get into war three here.
He's been cool headed about that, but he also tweeted that listen as long as Putin's in control of
Russia, we can never do business with them again, sanctions are sticking around basically forever. And I just wonder if that is
basically forever. And I just wonder if that is an overreaction. If we're going to make that policy, I'd rather see us as America be willing to put economic relations back
on the table as, you know, in this peace process, as opposed to saying that Russians are cut
off forever. Because otherwise, they're just going to become a Chinese client state. I
don't see how that benefits us long term.
Well, again, I see.
But again, David, what do you think they do with China?
China, what are they going to do?
Take 60% of their goods and still export them to us, even though it just contains Russian
materials that are now considered contraband.
So they can't absorb it economically as my point.
There's not enough demand outside these OECD countries to absorb all of that.
Well, here's what I think is. It's just mathematically not possible.
I think, so look, I think you make a point, but I think if you're going to look at this from like a 50,000 foot level, I think there's like two grand narratives about what is happening in the world.
One narrative, sort of the Neocon, sort of liberal, hegemgemony narrative is that we're in a great battle
between democracy and autocracy.
The other narrative is that we're in Cold War II,
it's that it's more of a great power rivalry
between the US and China.
I tend to think that the latter is where we're really at
in the world, and the reason why I say that is
you look at, there's a lot of autocracies
who frankly we support because we want them on our side.
For example, Turkey is run by an autocrat.
Erdogan is becoming more autocratic.
In Egypt, we had sort of democracy there for a brief moment when Merubarca overthrown.
Guess what?
They elected the Muslim Brotherhood.
And we didn't like that too much.
Now we got General L. C. C. in charge. We like that a lot better. We are still allies with
the Saudis and they're more on a credit government. So I tend to think that the better way to
describe what's happening in the world is a balance of power rivalry between the US and China,
which is only going to pick up momentum in the coming decades.
And we have to think about who's on the other side of the ledger
and who's on their side of the ledger.
And I think at this point,
we've pretty much driven Russia completely
onto the Chinese side of the ledger.
And I think it's going to have very bad consequences for us.
All right, let's segue from here
into the economy inflation and markets.
In a previous episode, Jamat,
you talked about the psychological cycle of ignoring good news
than accepting it being outraged by it
and then maybe not taking the good news.
good news than accepting it being outraged by it and then maybe not taking the good news. In the bad news column, obviously inflation continues.
Less six months of CPI numbers year over year, obviously September 5.4.
I'll fast forward to November 6.8, January 7.5, February 7.9.
Excluding food and energy, core inflation still rose 6.4%. That being said, we have 11.X million jobs available for Americans, five or six million
people unemployed who are looking for work. Obviously, there will be some mismatch in terms
of geography and skills there. And then corporate earnings, great, but a recession, possibly
looming. Where are you on this? And obviously,
the market's bottomed out. So where are you at with the economy? Hope, fear, and otherwise.
Well, I think that we're in the midst of what I would call a melt-up. So, you know, probably the next
month, month and a half. There really isn't much, quote unquote, bad news that hasn't been
priced in.
The thing that I've learned over the last few years is that markets don't actually care
what the news is.
They can process good news and bad news equally well.
What they despise is the uncertainty of what the news could be. And so this week was
really important because we had two huge buckets of uncertainty taken out of the market. So the
one we've already talked about, which is when the market saw that there was a surface area of
a deal between Ukraine and Russia, that was really constructive, because neither
side would have signaled something if both parties were very far apart.
So that meant to the markets were a few weeks out from something getting done.
And then the second thing was Jerome Powell and the Federal Reserve.
They finally had their meeting.
They raised rates 25 basis points, but even more importantly, they gave you a very prescriptive forecast of
what the next year will look like at a minimum, and possibly even two years.
And once you could have that, you were able to then go and redo all of your expectations,
and what people realized was, okay, inflation may actually start to get teamed in the back
half of the year the economy is still quite strong
And we could actually support two to and a half percent interest rates and still actually grow really well
And so what you've seen in the last three or four days is a reaction to the loss of uncertainty and
so there really isn't now
The only thing the fine the ointment could be if
the war all of a sudden escalates, not that it gets dragged on because at that point that's
also, I think, been priced in.
But if something very meaningfully different and some and Russia, in this case, ratchets
up the intensity by going, you know, nuclear or something else, although I think that's a very long tail.
Chemical weapons seems a possibility,
or carpet bombing.
I think these are all very, very low probability events.
But in the absence of these things,
you basically have really constructive dynamics right now
for at least the next month and a half, maybe even two months.
How much of this has to do with retail investors
who were Y-lo,
hotelers, speculators,
Stimmi Chess.
I'm going to get in.
I'm going to get in. I'm going to get in.
Super active for two years and then maybe getting super spooked right now
and maybe needing the money to deploy in their lives.
Look, the thing to remember,
and I hate to be this blunt, but it's true.
Retail is not a very good signal of anything.
In fact, if you actually look at retail flows, typically you will make money by doing
the exact opposite of what retail does.
And I post this in the group chat to you guys.
Every single day since the beginning of this year, retail was a net buyer.
In all of those days, the market got punched
in the face. Finally, at the beginning of March, retail capitulated. Right? And I posted
that same day, and I said, guys, this is the moment to buy. And it low and behold, what
happened, the markets rallied meaningfully from that point. And the reason is because they
were going into the end of Q1, you have a huge tax bill,
due in April 15th, people were starting to just finally give up.
They were buying every single day and they finally gave up.
But that capitulation was the moment that you buy.
So, if anything retail is the, you know, I've said before, you fade your faith list,
you know, retail flows or something, you typically will make money by fading by doing the exact
opposite of whatever retail is doing.
And you just need to have access to that information.
If you have access to it, you can kind of, you know, profit from it.
So where are we going from here?
Probably out.
David, you've been pessimistic.
We're seeing a lot of changes in the private market, funding rounds taking longer, a lot
of funds getting closed,
venture funds that is,
but seems like a lot more diligence is being done.
The time, meantime to closing a deal
has definitely extended massively.
What's your betting strategy now is a venture capitalist?
I think that there's gonna be a trickle down effect
of what's happened in the market to privates
and the valuations are gonna go back to their pre-COVID levels.
I mean, ARR multiples pre-COVID were like 20, not 100.
So we're seeing a massive repricing of deals,
and that's gonna continue.
And I don't think it's just gonna be this like transient effect.
Everything's gonna bounce back in a few weeks.
On the public markets, the defining characteristic
of these markets is volatility. I mean, the VIX, which is the measure of volatility, is at one of its all-time highs. And so, it's
true that over the past week we saw a nice sort of melt-up or rally because there was speculation
about this piece deal. The Financial Times had that article on the 15-point plan.
the financial times had that article on the 15 point plan. Jamat is right that if that piece deal gets signed, I think the market rally strongly,
because it went up considerably just on hopes that it might be signed.
But on the other hand, if this piece process falls apart, I think the market will give
back all those gains and then some.
I think we are nowhere near out of the woods on all the risky scenarios
that could develop from this war. I think that if there is no peace deal, I think you can almost
expect Russia to escalate in the war. They have said this is an existential issue for them.
I think that would mean at a minimum, you know, heavy bombing of Ukrainian cities, and then they'll
step up the pressure even more on Biden and Washington to get militarily involved.
This situation could still spend out of control.
So, you know, I think in the absence of peace deal, and then finally, we have all the risk
of recession.
We definitely are seeing a slowdown in the economy right now.
And I think if this war continues, and we don't get the spring planning and
Things keep you know deteriorating. I think we're headed for a very serious recession in this country I think we'll go from slowdown to recession
So if I were advising Biden of course no one's listening to me
But if I were advising Biden I would be telling Biden listen mr. President
We are gonna have a horrible midterms in November and you know
We are gonna have a really hard time in 2024.
If this war continues and, you know, we head down into a session or any of the other
catastrophes that could happen, we need to push for a peace deal right now.
And the US should be playing a constructive role and we should be applying pressure wherever
we can to make a deal because the broad contours of this deal to Tomas Point have been set.
I don't think any of the details now that we know look it's about korean about donbas about neutrality.
None of the details that we're still fighting over are more important than getting a piece right now and if I were in the white house I'd be seeing the pushing for that.
Yeah, it's uh, it's complicated.
The counter to that, obviously, is this could be the beginning of the end for Putin.
And even if that's a 10% chance or 20% chance, the possibility that in our lifetime, Russia
could have a leadership change, could be tremendous.
Obviously, it's a coin toss, which way it goes, but change could be.
I think that's certainly in the cards.
And look, if somehow magically Putin got toppled and replaced with a Democrat, that would
be a wonderful thing.
However, we shouldn't before it's rare, but it happens.
Yeah.
Well, tell me when was it happened?
East Germany, right?
We tore it down the wall.
Yeah, I mean, that was a reunification.
Here's the basic problem is, we understand the Russians and the Russian system.
We've got all these oligarchs are basically like bosses or mob bosses.
And then Putin's like the boss of bosses, right?
So what are the odds if you take out the boss of bosses that he's replaced with someone
who's a Democrat versus the next biggest baddest boss.
I think, you know, look, that that's certainly a possibility, but my concern is that when you play
for Maximus Upside like that, you're also taking Maximus down side. And a lot of people I've
made this point that look, if Putin's life is on the line, he's going to be more willing to do
anything. And I think the better approach, and you've forpules mentioned this idea of the golden bridge from Sun Sioux,
which is give your enemy a golden bridge to retreat,
mentioned it so that he's not fighting for his life.
That was a really clever framework, J.
go. I think.
I mean,
by the way,
if you guys went and created a tally, and I'm not trying to be Debbie down
here, but, you know, since the advent of the CIA, the number of times that we have tried to incite regime
change and then the number of times it's been successful, what is that percentage?
I mean, we don't know because we don't know how many times we've tried.
Well, we know we know many attempts.
Yeah, I mean, we've changed a lot of two outers, which take out every time we try it, we
either get the same or worse.
So for example, Syria, we tried to get rid of Assad.
He's still there and now it's worse.
Afghanistan, we tried it.
The Taliban are back in power.
No, but it's not enough to take it to the calculation is what if it does change?
Hold on, Iraq, we got rid of Saddam and now we've handed that country to Iran and the
Silver Platter, the IOTO was control it.
Kadofi in Libya, we got rid of him because he was so horrible and now that country is in chaos
You've got open air safe markets. We tried in
In Ukraine we tried in Ukraine in 2014
So our track record is not super good
Yeah, no, I mean, I think regime change is like chasing someone out or something.
You know, if we were a company at some point, we would have been pipped for our ability to
do regime change.
I don't think it's a great strategy.
I'm not necessarily advocating for it, but I'm not saying that.
I'm saying whether or not it's a good strategy.
I think that we are particularly not good at it.
Yeah, we need a performance improvement plan on that front.
Well, we should just, I think we should have stopped trying that. We shouldn't be going for regime change. We should be...
This is good. You and I had this thing where I said you and I are in sync that we both want to
contain dictators and maybe isolation and you were like, I'm not in isolation. So I think a definition
of like what is the strategy for containment going forward post a piece deal with Russia
and isolationism, you know, I guess is a bit of a trigger word and it's loaded but well, yeah
I'm not an Isolationist next person. I would describe my strategy as selective engagement
Meaning that we still engage internationally on behalf of vital American interests and our core interests
But we don't stick our fingers in the pie of the internal affairs of all these countries all over the world to try and
From meant regime change. So for example, like what's the example of a vital affairs of all these countries all over the world to try and ferment regime change.
So for example, like what's the example of a vital American interest?
I would say standing up to China in the sense that we do not want them dominating Asia
and becoming a peer competitor to the United States, that can then challenge us all over
the world.
So some more pragmatists on it.
I would be more pragmatists.
We can be isolationists with North Korea because there's literally nothing they can do for us. And look, I would not be throwing countries
like Turkey and Egypt and Saudi Arabia out of our coalition in Cold War II because we
don't like the nature of their governments. And I'm not saying I support autocracy. I don't.
But the reality is. Dialogue is reasonable because if you don't, then the other side will.
The foreign policy playbook is going to get fundamentally rewritten after this Russia-Ukraine
War in large part because of the effectiveness of government sanctions, plus corporate social
responsibility, whatever you want to call that, see that's our function.
Public sentiment, woke is an awkward word, whatever you want to call that, see that's our function. Public sentiment, wokeism, whatever you want to call it.
Yes.
I agree.
But the combination of these two things has proved to be incredibly effective at setting
the stage for some sort of compromise or regime change, the spectrum of outcomes is there.
But the point is that's an incredibly unique set of circumstances where before we never
would have thought an economy that large or a country that important on the world
stage, whatever have compromised in the absence of military intervention, and I think that
that's important to think about as we think about what our forward-going China policy
looks like, I think really like the importance of like the OECD, right? The importance of all these organized nations
that consume from China, becoming more organized now,
probably makes more sense.
I said this before to tweet,
but the importance of the US dollar
has become completely primary,
which has been an incredible benefit
of what has happened because of this war.
You know, very small silver linings
in the grand scheme of all of this humanitarian crisis, but those
are going to be really important things that the United States can seize on.
We may in some ways have had some diminished power in order to facilitate peace in this
conflict, but the downstream capital that we could accumulate by organizing these countries
more effectively, I think, could be really important. Then separately, we have to have a moral conversation in the United States about all
these things like environmental laws, like our approach to agriculture that may have been underwebbed.
Absolutely. Yes. With faulty logic. A little more pragmatism would go a long way.
Yes, it would. I'm a little more pessimistic about our foreign policy establishment. And part of the
reason I say this is because I'm very disappointed in the Republicans.
The Republicans used to be the party of vital national interest, meaning America did not
get involved all over the world unless we had a vital national interest.
You just never hear them making that case anymore.
It's all the way back to sort of bush doctrine.
As an example, they're all pushing for the no-fly zone.
They're all pushing for the delivery of the Migs, despite they want war.
Just say the words. They're weird. I mean, those were I mean,
they're crazy. Why are they so? I've been very critical. I mean, I've been to the war on this.
I don't understand their. Well, I think there's too possible.
I think there's anxiety. I think I think there's too possibilities. I think. What is it? What is it? Anxiety. I think there's two possibilities.
What is it?
Anxiety.
Yeah.
And this is why I predicted war the last year, but you know.
I think that's not a great prediction.
I've been very disappointed in the Republicans and I think here's what I think is going
on.
I think if any of those Republicans like say Mitt Romney or something, I think Lindsey
Graham is just a crazy sort of warmonger.
But you take someone like Mitt Romney,
who's basically saying all of these sort of more
bellicose and escalatory things.
If he was actually in Biden's shoes,
I bet he'd be making the same decisions as Biden,
because he would not want to risk war three.
But it's such a cheap, easy partisan political
attack to say that Biden is being weak and he's not doing everything he can.
I don't think he's being weak at all.
I think history will look back and think two things about this whole thing with the
American lens.
The first thing was, for whatever set of reasons, we lost it and we diminished some
stature in the world as a perceived arbitrator
and mediator in these kinds of conflicts.
But separately, I do think Biden has done a very good job in seeing the forest from the
trees.
He held the line on military intervention and he has really ratcheted up the ability for
others to impose economic sanctions beside and behind the United States.
And I think that will turn out to be a masterstroke.
I give him credit. And I think that will turn out to be a masterstroke. I give him credit.
And I think that he deserves to be acknowledged.
I'm going to agree with you on that.
Because I think the Biden has done an amazing job
of just saying, outright, we're not going to war.
We are not starting war with a free-for-all.
Stop.
That takes a lot of courage.
He has not even, I mean, in sex, you've lauded him.
I think that shows some intellectual honesty on your part.
And to your point, you're not, There's a reason why we lost our credibility.
These misadventures of sacs-chalzum in the Middle East
have been disastrous.
We made huge mistakes, and we need to take a different approach.
I'll give a Trump compliment.
He didn't start any worse.
And if you look at every president who came before him
in our lifetime, every time they start two or three conflicts,
and he was like, we're going to have a no more policy.
And now you got Biden say, we're not going to go to war either.
This could be a tipping point.
And our focus, I think the ultimate checkmate should be Biden coming out and the EU coming
on saying, we are going to start a race to resiliency.
And here's how it's going to look.
Jason, it's an incredible point that you just made.
I just want to reiterate it. Since Reagan, I can explicitly point out incremental
conflicts that the president of the United States
has approved and greenlit to get us into since Reagan.
So we've been in seven wars.
We've been in seven wars since the end of the Cold War.
It's amazing.
The American people Trump was the only one
that did not start any new war. Right.
For Biden. You want to know why? Because he was a populist and the people of the United States
America don't want these crazy wars. They are sick of all these wars. It is the foreign
policy establishment that is pushing for all of these wars. And listen, why an Obama
the same way, oh, let's just go back. Obama beat Hillary Clinton for the Democratic nomination
because he was against the Iraq war and she was for it.
Yeah, Obama had the right instincts on Ukraine.
He did not want to escalate the situation.
Remember in 2014, when they took Crimea, he said,
America does not have a vital national interest
that justifies us going to war.
He was right.
The president that tried to incite regime change, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's, it's advisor for Dick Janie and these people bull weevil their way into the foreign policy establishment.
They're in the think tanks. They're in the state department. What would you use? Bull weevil.
They like, they are the permanent. The hold on a second. They are the permanent
establishment of Washington. The presidents come and go. They stay forever. She was there.
She was caught on a phone call basically picking the new leader of Ukraine after a coup in 2014
She she the one that had that famous quote that said
Putin fuck Putin was that he said he said yeah, she said yes is our guy basically picking yatson yuk to be the new leader
And she said fuck the EU when the EU wanted to take a more temperate approach, okay?
Okay, okay, William Fuckley here you go and sax I think the mistake Biden made listen the EU, when the EU wanted to take a more temperate approach. Okay.
Okay.
Look at William F. Buckley.
Here you go, and sax.
I think the mistake Biden made, listen, I think Biden has good instincts on this.
I think he had good instincts last year in June when he called for basically an emergency
summit with Putin to dial down the tensions.
And I think that summit was successful.
So what happened?
Okay.
The intercept just had a great article talking
about how tensions ratcheted down after that June summit, but they picked back up in October,
November. What happened between June and October? I'll tell you what. On September 1, Zalinsky
met with Biden in the White House and the State Department issued a joint statement.
Basically, reaffirming that Ukraine will be part of NATO, it would reaffirm military ties,
economic ties, and then on November 10th, they published a giant charter agreement between
the United States and Ukraine that was signed by Blinken.
Now look, did Biden know about this?
Yes, but this is the State Department agenda.
And it was on the heels of this charter agreement that the Russians basically said they had reached
the boiling point.
They basically delivered the ultimatum to the US in December and precipitated the crisis
that proceeded to this war.
So my point is just listen, we have a state department with its own agenda.
It loves regime change.
It loves having clients all over the world and inserting its fingers in the pie and unless
Biden, hold on, if unless
Biden stands up to his own state department, we will not get a cease fire and we will not
get a peace deal.
And that will be disastrous for his presidency.
What I will say is I think Biden has done a very good job and I know Tony really well
and I think Tony is trying to do the best job he can.
I think he's done a pretty good job.
All things considered as well.
That's all I'm saying.
Final thoughts here on, you know,
a very difficult time period we're living there.
The global order is being restructured.
It's predictable.
I think again, if you read Ray Dalio's book,
which I recommended heavily last year,
it's surprising how much of that simple rubric is playing out
today exactly as that rubric kind of estimated it would. And look, I mean, by the way,
one way to think about the China Russia-US dynamic, you got a one, two, and three player game
theories. Number one wants two and three to be at it, because then they'll, you
know, end up diminishing value. Number two wants one and three to be at it. Number three
wants one and two to be at it. And so we're seeing that, um, that multi-party game theory
playout right now. Um, and, you know, again, based on that rubric, you can probably predict
where this is all going to end up.
Brilliant point. Listen, if you're to look at this from the Chinese standpoint, they must
be loving what's going on loving it
Old saying I think Napoleon said it never interrupt your enemy when he's making a mistake. Why is China so quiet right now?
Well, yeah, because they love their dream. They're dream is the US and Russia attacking each other. Yeah, we have to implement
energy independence,
writ large, and we have to make sure that it is very clear we have influence amongst all
these OECD countries, because if China takes one foot over the line, we have to have the ability
to do to them what we've done to Russia economically. It's the only way in which we can ratchet down all this tension
and find peace. Yes, the new war is the war on our dependency on dictators. We must must
must have a race to resiliency. We're going to talk about this and more at the all in
Sunday. 1560. No more. May 1516 and 17 all in some at Miami. 500 of the 700 tickets are gone.
If you want to apply for a scholarship,
you can apply.
Tell us how much you love the show with the website.
Just do a Google search for all in summit.
Really excited to announce Keith Roboi will be joining us.
One of SACs is Besties, a very iconic classic person.
We're going for iconoclast.
Next up, Brian Peterson, friend of the pod from Flexport,
talking about all these supply chain issues.
The number of speakers we're gonna have is gonna be extraordinary. Brad Gerson, our friend of the pod from Flexport, talking about all these supply chain issues. The number of speakers we're gonna have
is gonna be extraordinary.
Brad Gerson, her friend of the pod,
is gonna come talking about markets, education.
Joe Lonsdale is halfway in.
Again, another iconoclastic controversial person.
And that's what we're going for the day and out.
Yeah, and we'll keep announcing more.
We'll keep announcing more every week.
Apply for a scholarship if you like.
And we'll see you all there for.
Love you guys.
Salt enough science.
The Rain Man and the dictator I'm Jake Al.
Love you, Bats and BYE BYE.
BABY BABY BABY BABY BABY SACS.
Love you, SACS.
Love you, Fiebert.
Back at ya.
Those are good feelings for you to have.
We're like your winners, right?
Rain Man, David Sack
I'm going on the way.
And it said we open source it to the fans and they've just gone crazy with it.
I'm going on the way.
I'm going on the way. What, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, Besties are gone. Go through that. That's my dog.
Take it away.
It's your driveway.
Sit next.
Get it off.
Oh, man.
My ham is the actual meaty.
I put it in.
We should all just get a room and just have one big hug.
Because they're all just like this like sexual tension
that we just need to release that house.
What?
You're the beef.
What?
You're the beer of beef.
Beef.
What? We need to get my best? You're a B I'm confused
Where did you get my cheese?
I'm doing all the...
I'm doing all the...