If Books Could Kill - The World is Flat
Episode Date: June 1, 2023Much has been said about globalization, but perhaps no one has said it worse than Thomas Friedman.Content Note: Discussions of xenophobic and racist content, especially toward the end of the episode.S...upport us on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/IfBooksPodWhere to find us:Â TwitterPeter's other podcast, 5-4Mike's other podcast, Maintenance PhaseSources:Why The World Isn't FlatThe World Is Still Not FlatDHL Global Connectedness Index 2022The Fallacies of FlatnessThe Sociopathy of Thomas Friedman: A CompendiumThomas Friedman sums up the Iraq War (YouTube)Â Thanks to Mindseye for our theme song!
Transcript
Discussion (0)
Michael Peter what do you know about the world is flat nothing not even enough to make a joke
So I know the music kicked in but like I'm not making a joke. I really know nothing.
So I'm excited to talk about it.
Well, what do you know about Thomas Friedman?
I know that he's a New York Times columnist.
I know that a lot of people on the left like really dislike him, but I've never really known
why.
Like he's always been somebody who's been in the side mirror for me as someone who people
like me talk about a lot, but like I've never really understood why. has always been somebody who's been in the side mirror for me as someone who people like
me talk about a lot, but like I've never really understood why.
He's how I regarded Taylor Swift until you told me about 1989.
It's just like, I don't know about this person.
There is no need to know about Thomas Friedman.
He doesn't add any value to the world in any meaningful way.
The background is actually relatively simple.
He made a name for himself covering the Lebanese Civil War in the late 70s.
The Times picks him up.
They dispatch him to Beirut for a bit.
He's covering the conflicts in the region.
He's winning Pulitzer prizes.
And then in the 90s, he sort of drifts his way over to the op-ed pages where he has remained
ever since.
But I think like the reason that he's so annoying is not just his ideology, it's his style.
Malcolm Gladwell was like an anecdote guy, right?
He tells us anecdote and then he follows it up with some data that we ended up thinking was maybe some cherry-picked data.
Friedman does the anecdote part and then just stops and then he starts speculating wildly.
He could be like in a bodega in New York and if two guys walked in in sandals
he would write a column that starts with like in New York City, no one wears shoes.
Yeah, that's the level of reasoning that I was reading over and over again for 600 pages.
No way, this book is 600 pages long. 600 pages. So let's dive into the book. He starts off on a
golf course in India.
Okay.
He's golfing and he's looking around and he sees billboards for all sorts of like big
western companies, IBM, Microsoft.
And he's like, whoa, I'm in India, but there are signs for companies from America. And this is when he has his revelation
about the globalizing world.
He goes on to compare his journey to India
to that of Christopher Columbus.
Okay.
Now I'm gonna send you an abridged quotation.
And I think this will give you a good sense
of how he writes and the sort of like comparisons he likes
to draw his style.
You love sending vibe setters.
He says, I had come to Bangalore.
India's Silicon Valley on my own, Columbus Lake Journey of Exploration.
Columbus sailed with the Nina, the Pinta, and the Santa Maria in an effort to discover a
shorter, more direct route to India by heading west across the Atlantic on what he presumed to be an open sea route to the East Indies.
I set out for India by going to East via Frankfurt.
I had Louvthon's a business class.
I knew exactly which direction I was going thanks to the GPS map displayed on my screen
that popped out of the arm rest of my airline seat.
I too encountered people called Indians.
I too was searching for India's riches.
Columbus was searching for hardware, precious metals, silk,
and spices, the sources of wealth in his day.
I was searching for software.
Brainpower, complex algorithms, knowledge workers,
call centers, transmission protocols, breakthroughs,
and optical engineering, the sources of wealth in our day.
OK.
So he's doing some like, it's a land of contrasts.
Look, this is different in these really obvious ways.
Right.
So this is like high school term paper level observations.
Yeah, it's coming.
But also calling metals, silk, and spices, hardware.
Yeah.
And then like, workers and call centers are software
for some reason.
I don't quite what?
I love that your brain is like fried
from 600 pages of this,
because I'm like, this isn't that bad,
but I've only read one paragraph of this.
The compounding effect of this is like,
I had a whole section of this episode
that I was just like writing out,
and then I was like, oh man, this is fucking hilarious. And then I was like, and then I took a day was just writing out, and then I was like, oh my God, this is fucking hilarious.
And then I was like, and then I took a day off
and read it again, and I was like,
Mike is not gonna understand why it's so funny to me.
You need to read 400 pages of Thomas Friedman
and then read this, and you'll understand why it's funny.
I'm looking forward to you turning my brain
into this specific type of mush.
So the section continues, and I've sent you that.
Okay.
Columbus was happy to make the Indians he met his slaves, a pool of free manual labor.
I just wanted to understand why the Indians I met were taking our work,
why they had become such an important pool for the outsourcing of service and information
technology work from America and other industrialized countries.
Columbus had more than 100 men on his three ships.
I had a small crew from the Discovery Times channel
that fit comfortably into two banged up vans
with Indian drivers who drove barefoot.
Columbus accidentally ran into America
but thought he had discovered part of India.
I actually found India and thought many of the people
I met there were Americans.
Some had actually taken American names
and others were doing great imitations
of American accents at call centers
and American business techniques at software labs.
Columbus reported to his king and queen
that the world was round and he went down in history
as the man who first made this discovery.
That's not true.
I returned home and shared my discovery only with my wife
and only in a whisper, honey, I confided,
I think the world is flat.
God, the brain mush is starting to happen.
Right. Okay. Look, he's doing another thing that I feel like I saw in rich dad,
poor dad words, like a very simple concept, but he just like over explains it again and again.
And you're like, okay, I get it. Like your experience is similar to Columbus in some ways and different
in others. I don't know that I needed like, what is this 12 different
examples?
This is a consolidated version of this passage. I can't tell you how much I
cut out of this. This is like four pages in the book of just like going
on about the comparisons between Columbus going to America versus me going to India.
And it just drones on. Yeah. It's the perfect vignette to open the book because all of the quintessential
Thomas freed Minisms are here. So yeah, first you have like the glaring factual inaccuracy,
right, that you noticed. It's a well-known myth that Columbus was the first person
to discover that the Earth was round.
I knew that in ancient Egypt.
I would have learned that that was a myth
in elementary school.
Yeah, yeah, yeah.
So then second, it has all of these try hard comparisons
that you do not need, right?
Columbus was on a wooden ship,
but I'm in a big metal airplane. Yeah.
And then third, you have like something that makes you feel like maybe it's racist, but you're
not sure.
Yeah.
I too encountered Indians.
And then the last thing we have here is the bizarre metaphor about the world being flat.
So the name of the book, of course, and he uses the idea that the earth is flat as a metaphor
for our increasing interconnectedness. I will kind of defend the concept of it. It's like
the fact that the world is becoming more interconnected and that people can much more quickly and
easily travel from place to place and communicate across the globe is like genuinely something that has profound impacts
on the world.
And like he's exploring the impact,
he found a cute metaphor.
I think that's fine.
Having like a cute little phrase that you start your book with.
I think it's why the book is popular
because he has this metaphor.
Even though it doesn't really make sense,
like a flat world would be a less connected world, right?
Like I don't want to be too pedantic
because he is just being cute,
but I will say my tolerance for cutesy metaphors
declined pretty drastically over the course of the book.
When I first read it, I was like, sure, you know, I get it.
By the end of it though, I was like,
he doesn't understand shapes.
I'm not 100% sure that he understands shapes.
This, I also think what he's doing is,
it's kind of this like performance of intelligence
and analysis, he's basically drawing a metaphorical difference
between Columbus and himself.
And it, in the way that a high school essay would,
it sort of seems smart, like wow,
he's really like analyzing this.
But then when you actually think about it,
he's not really like saying anything.
There's no real insight or analysis.
See, you understand Thomas Friedman.
I know what's happening.
Thomas Friedman has been here with you all along.
So Friedman says that when Columbus set sail
until about 1800, that era was globalization one point.
Oh, we're doing the 1.0 metaphors.
Which was characterized by nation states
driving global integration.
Then you had from 1800 to 2000 or so,
globalization 2.0, which is characterized
by the rise of multinational corporations.
And now we are in globalization three point O,
characterized by the individual having access
to technology that allows them to compete globally.
Okay, I understand why people hate this guy now.
Yeah, pretty fucking annoying, right?
It only took like six minutes.
His pension for oversimplifying this shit.
It's like, for him, it's a, oh man,
I'm gonna mix metaphors now.
I was gonna say it's a pension
and then it's a thirst that can't be quenched.
Oh, you can't do it in the Thomas Friedman episode.
Yeah. He's ruined my brain.
Okay.
Okay.
Chapter two is called the 10 forces
that flattened the world.
I hope that I can do justice to how bizarre this chapter is.
It is 150 pages long.
Oh my gosh.
In isolation, a lot of this chapter is perfectly reasonable,
but he has this way of talking
until things no longer make sense, right?
Like it's the same thing with the Columbus comparison
where like if he had stopped after two sentences
You might have never thought about it again
But he spoke about it for so long that by the end of it you're like, what the fuck is this?
What is this about?
The first section the first flatener
It's titled when the wall came down and the windows went up. Oh, this is about the collapse of the Berlin wall
But also Microsoft windows getting popular.
Okay. I mean, I don't want to be unfair. He talks about like the decline of centrally planned
economies. Right. He's very anti-communist and he has all these snarky remarks. He says under
communism, everyone is equally poor and under capitalism, they are unequally rich.
Yeah, it's like again, he's like this perfect little zing machine. Yeah. But like, that's not really like
insightful or like accurate about the levels of inequality in the Soviet Union.
Again, for some reason, half of this section is about how the windows PC also helped like
precipitate the flattening of the world.
But the discussion is completely detached from the Berlin Wall discussion.
Right. He combines them into one flatener, and from what I can tell, it's just so he can have
that cute little title about the wall coming down and the Windows going up. Yeah.
Even though it doesn't make any sense, because how would you put windows up on a wall that went down. You're gonna just apply pure literalism to every single thing that he says,
aren't you? You're like no cuteness freedmen. There's only so many times you can do this. You know what I
mean? Like if someone just had the occasional metaphor like this, you'd be like, all right,
whatever. It doesn't quite work. It's a metaphor. But when someone does it 20 times in a row,
by the end of it, you're like,
you can't put a fucking window on a wall that came down.
So the next flatener is the Netscape IPO.
Okay.
He uses that as something that sort of symbolizes
the rise of the internet of the worldwide web.
Pretty inoffensive conceptually,
although there are like long sections that are like, what is the worldwide web. Pretty inoffensive conceptually, although there are like long
sections that are like, what is the worldwide web? And it was 2005. Yeah.
Yeah, we've all been searching for pornography rather than trading it with people in AOL chat rooms
for like seven seconds at that point. So the next one is workflow software Software. So, we get such insights as, quote,
the first big breakthrough in Workflow was actually the combination of the PC and email.
Okay.
That was one of many times that I just wrote Thank You Tom in the margin.
Very helpful Tom.
All right, the next Platner is uploading, which is what it sounds like, the ability to upload things to the internet
where other people can download them.
He gives you an example of Wikipedia and blogs.
Those aren't even really uploading though.
If you've been paying attention,
the last three were net scape workflow software
and uploading, which could probably just be consolidated
into the internet.
Yeah, the internet.
And then the next three flat-nners are also just one thing framed slightly
differently. outsourcing where you move a function of your company to another country. Offshoreing
where you move an entire operation to another country, which is outsourcing at a larger scale.
And in sourcing where a company takes on a function from another company, which is literally just
outsourcing from the other company's perspective. Right.
Well, the eighth flatener is supply chaining, which just means improving supply chains in various
ways.
The ninth flatener is informing, which is his term for how Google and Yahoo and other search
engines have sort of given us a wide array of information at our fingertips.
That's just the internet again.
It's the internet again.
And then his 10th flatener is what he calls the steroids.
All of the various technologies that he says are turbocharging the other flatners.
They include wireless technology, voice over IP, file sharing,
and more widespread use of personal digital assistance. Again, basically just the internet
again. So those are the flatners. If the metaphor of flatners with steroids isn't quite working
for you, the next chapter is about what he calls the triple convergence. Okay. He says that three simultaneous convergences have occurred
to drive globalization.
The first is the convergence of the 10 flatners
with one another.
The second is the convergence of the 10 flatners
with new business practices.
The third is the convergence of the resulting new economy
with new people from China, India, Russia, similar countries, right?
Peter, I'm exhausted.
So to synthesize, you have the 10 flat-nurs, ranging from the fall of the Berlin Wall to outsourcing
to blogs, and then you have the steroids that turbocharged the flat-nurs, which are themselves
also counted as a flat-nur, and one of which wireless technologies Friedman describes as
the icing on the cake.
Okay. Then you have the triple conversions, where the flat-nose,
including steroids in the icing on the cake,
converge with one another and also new business practices
and new populations.
And all of that is globalization 3.0.
This is like the part of being John Malkovich,
where he goes into his own brain.
Like, there's nothing makes sense in there.
Later in the book, there's a part where he says the next generation of like products and
services are the great synthesizers.
Oh my god.
I was like, it never ends.
It never ends.
This is again why these books should not be 600 pages long because like he could have,
I feel like he could have pulled it off.
It was just like the 10 flateners.
Right.
It's an excuse to talk about various ways
the internet is changing the world fine.
Yeah, yeah, right.
It seems like he's gilding the lily
and then throwing in these other like,
well, this is like the acceleration of the flattening
and then the unflattening and the refattening
at the same time.
It's like Thomas calm down.
That's the thing is there were all these little
data points in here where he's like describing
some business practice
that has evolved over the last few years.
And I'd be like, oh, that's fascinating.
But then he builds it into these metaphors in a way
where like, you can't actually appreciate them on their own
because he's trying to just like jam it into this narrative.
Right.
In a way that is clunky and like just doesn't quite work.
It's just so fucking annoying. And I don't even know like what the difference between flattening narrative, right? In a way that is clunky and like just doesn't quite work.
It's just so fucking annoying.
And I don't even know like what the difference between flattening and converging is like
several of the flat-nurs and convergences are the same thing from what I can tell like
outsourcing to India and China as a flat-nur.
But then people from India and China participating in the economy as a convergence.
Right.
I feel like he fundamentally doesn't understand
why we use metaphors.
It's funny because I'm like a big story telling structure guy.
I think the way that you outline chronological events
is really important.
And like what information you give to the audience
at what time is really important.
A lot of stories can be sort of under structured
with they feel kind of aimless.
And you're like, why is this person telling me this? But then things can also be over structured.
Where it's like, okay, there's this rule and then there's these 10 things and then there's
the three ways that the 10 things interact with each other. The kind of whole point of this is
to like make it easier to absorb the actual information. But it doesn't seem like he's giving you
much actual information. It seems like he's just kind of spinning his wheels and giving you more and more and
more metaphors.
Did you feel like you learned anything?
Like does he have interesting sequences in this book?
I mean, the book is basically a string of anecdotes packed into metaphors.
And there are times within the anecdotes where you're like, oh, that's sort of interesting.
At one point, he was talking about the bursting of the dot com bubble and how that actually helped
drive globalization in certain ways because like,
allocations of resources changed after the crash
in a way that benefited India.
That's interesting.
Yeah.
And there's a lot of good writing about how economies
are often shaped by market crashes.
And there are like, there are plenty of little things like that, right? It was like, oh, this is in and of itself, about how economies are often shaped by market crashes.
And there are like, there are plenty of little things
like that, right?
It was like, oh, this is in and of itself,
not the least interesting thing.
His problem is that he's just bit enough way more
than he can chew.
And his ability to sort of like boil this stuff down
to a clean narrative is just not there.
I was, I was yearning for like, Gladwell.
That is the sickest bird of this book
that it made you miss Gladwell.
Like, deliver me Malcolm.
I mean, look, Outliers was the first book I read for this show
and I didn't realize how good I had it.
Yeah, we retract our previous episode, it's fine.
So that is the first half of the book, basically. He's describing
how and why globalization 3.0 is happening. And I think maybe we can pause here and talk about
the concept of bullshit. Oh, because this is what this kept coming into my brain. Friedman is
super light on data.
There are no charts or graphs in the book.
There are only a couple of sections where he finds any data at all to support his conclusions.
The primary vibe you get is just like a guy talking out of his ass, just like telling
you a story and then telling you what you should extrapolate from the story without really
justifying that extrapolation. Right.
So I'm going to give you some of my favorite examples.
Oh, yeah.
And I want to be clear.
I chose these off the cuff.
These are probably not anywhere close to the worst things written in this book.
Okay.
It's the first one.
America in the 1990s under President Clinton was perceived as a big dumb dragon, pushing people around
in the economic and cultural spheres knowingly and unknowingly.
We were puffed the magic dragon and people wanted to vote in what we were puffing.
Then came 9-11, an America transformed itself from puffed the magic dragon, touching
people around the world economically and culturally, into Godzilla with an arrow in his shoulder,
spitting fire and tossing his tail around wildly, touching people's lives in military and
security terms, not just economic and cultural ones.
Oh my God, I get it, Peter.
I see it.
I see it.
What the fuck is he talking about?
What the fuck is he talking about?
Like, all right.
So, first of all, the overall lesson of this is supposed to be that prior to 9-11,
we weren't impacting other countries militarily.
That's true.
But then also puff the magic dragon.
What is this metaphor?
I mean, it really feels like he came up
with this like cute contrast
between puff the magic dragon and Godzilla.
Right. Godzilla with an arrow in his shoulder.
Where's the arrow?
I don't know where that comes from.
Who's big enough to shoot an arrow
that would harm Godzilla?
Yeah, and my brain is melting trying to think of this.
Yeah, because all he's really saying here
is that America before 9-11
had kind of like soft power,
and then that became more hard power after 9.11,
which I guess you could make the argument for that,
but like he's not even really making the argument
with like data or anything,
he's just making the argument with this fucking metaphor.
That's why it's so quintessentially freedman.
Right.
The underlying point is super vague and probably not correct.
Right.
And then also the metaphor he's using is baffling. Like people wanted a vote
in what we were puffing. Yeah, this makes you miss gladwell. This makes me miss huntington.
We're huntington, which is like say what he fucking means. All right, I'm going to send you another one.
Okay, he says, analysts have always tended to measure a society by classical economic and social
statistics. It's deficit to GDP ratio, or its unemployment rate,
or the rate of literacy among its adult women.
Such statistics are important and revealing,
but there is another statistic, much harder to measure,
that I think is even more important and revealing.
Oh my fucking god.
Does your society have more memories than dreams?
Or more dreams than memories.
What?
Peter.
You talk about GDP, but I talk about dreams and memories.
Let's talk about your memory to dream ratio, baby.
This is worse than rich dad.
This is pay yourself first levels of just like, all right, man,
sure.
What he's ostensibly talking about is like,
is your country living in its past glories
or does it have a plan for the future, right?
But he's trying to contrast it with other statistics
even though it's not meaningfully a statistic.
It's not that it's harder to measure.
It's that you cannot measure it.
It's not.
It's like saying other people measure their health
by how often they're going to the gym
or how many carbohydrates they're eating,
but I measure it with my ratio of excellence to laziness.
It's like fine, but that's a different category of thing.
I think what I see in this is just a guy who every time
he thinks of a metaphor has to put it in the book.
He's never like, I'm just gonna say that for my wife.
I've got a couple of bangers I'm leaving on the table.
It really struck me that I was like,
maybe this is why he's a popular op-ed writer
because if what you were doing was just turning each of these
into like a punchy little op-ed column.
Totally.
I could see how that works, right?
I could see how someone would be like,
oh, dreams and memories, sure, you know?
It's also a low key indictment of the rest of his career
because are we a dream society
or are we a memory society is like kind of a perfect
six to eight hundred word op-ed,
but it's also totally meaningless.
Like you can find anecdotes that pad that out,
but like these are just totally qualitative
categories. You can't say in any definitive or interesting way what we are.
But there's also a degree to which his bullshit like more directly impacts his thesis.
One of his worst tendencies is that he will squeeze any little anecdote that he can find into his
thesis. There's a section that starts off with in the fall of 2004, I went out to Minneapolis
to visit my mother and had three world as flat encounters right in a row. Right when I
write that, I was like, fuck, yes. Here it comes. This is about to be some good freedman. He says, first, before I left home in Washington,
I dialed 411, directorie assistants,
to try to get a friend's phone number in Minneapolis.
A computer answered and a computerized voice
asked me to pronounce the name of the person
whose number I was requesting.
For whatever reason, I could not get the computer
to hear me correctly and it kept saying back to me
in a computerized voice. Did you say?
I kept having to say the family name in a voice that masked my exasperation. Okay eventually I was connected to an operator, but I did not enjoy this friction free encounter with directory information. I craved the friction of another human being. Representative. So he's saying that automation of 411 directory assistance is an
example of the world flattening. Yeah, and also being bad and not working. I don't really understand
and I think it is part of a mistake that he makes consistently, which is just folding any technological
enhancement or innovation into the flattening concept.
Right. He just thinks ways in which the world is changing basically.
Yeah. The next two world is flat encounters in this part are one, a friend of his is annoyed
that his clients prefer email. Okay. And two, another friend of his in marketing is an upset that
advertising firms are increasingly quote selling just numbers
Not creative instinct. What so one of those is at least about email, I guess although I don't the story was about his clients
Preferring email bids rather than bids over the phone and it's like is this about the world planning or is this just like someone is like
Can you shoot me an email and this guy's like this is just boomers complaining that things are different.
Right.
And the other guy is just complaining
about a trend in advertising pictures.
Ha ha ha ha.
Welcome to me reading fucking Nudge, Peter.
Where you're like, this is not a Nudge.
But yeah, he has this like,
there's no anecdote too thin for him to lean on.
And this made me think of the famous essay on bullshit, Harry
Frankfurt, where he describes bullshit as not simply lies, right? What he says is that
people who tell the truth and people who lie are both concerned with the truth, right?
The people who are telling the truth are trying to describe the truth and the people who
lie are trying to obscure the truth. Bullshit is people who have no concern for the truth.
Now, I'm not sure that I would go so far
to say that Friedman in general is bullshitting,
but what I think he is doing is prioritizing
telling this narrative, right?
So he packs every story he can into the narrative,
no matter how clumsy it is.
And by the end of it, you're not even really sure what flattening actually means.
Right.
It's kind of similar to David Brooks's stick to
where he's like, they eat Thai food in blue states
and they watch home shopping network in red states.
And then when people debunk it,
that like, yeah, there's plenty of immigrants
in red states and home shopping network
is extremely popular in blue states.
He's like, that's a, come on, don't be pedantic.
Yes.
You know what I'm getting at.
You know the vibes.
Right.
It's like, well, it seems like your kind of whole book is a vibe then.
You're not really meaningfully doing any research.
You're kind of throwing everything into your book and just leaving people with an impression
without really interrogating whether that impression is true.
Right.
There's this phenomenon that I first noted when we were discussing Phukiyama and the end of history. And then we discussed when we were talking about
Nudge. And that's that like a lot of these pop science, pop politics books are correct
only when you zoom out so far that their thesis is no longer interesting. Right.
So like if the claim is, hey, look, technology is creating a more interconnected world.
Sure.
That is true.
And that's what Freeman can always fall back on as like the obvious truth underpinning
the book.
But then it's like, it's something that no one needed a book to tell them in 2005, right?
It's, it would be very funny to be friends with one of these like opinion columnists where
like every single story you tell at dinner, you're like, oh, it's gonna be in the fucking book. Right. You're like, I was at the bank today
and somebody's eating a banana in line. Right. And then like two years later, you're like, oh,
God damn it. It's not even a good anecdote, man. Right. You're like, you know,
fucking advertising firms these days, they're all numbers centric and you look over at
Friedman and he's just wide eyed looking back at you. He's jotting notes.
He's slow down.
Slow down.
What's interesting about the world is flat is that if you look at it with a little more
granularity, the basic claim is actually a little more nuance than it might seem.
A couple years after the world is flat was published, there's this economist critical of
Friedman, Pankaj Gamma Wat, who wrote a piece for foreign policy
called Why the World Isn't Flat. He says, in truth, the world is not nearly as connected as these
writers would have us believe. Despite talk of a new wired world where information, ideas,
money, and people can move around the planet faster than ever before, just a fraction of what we
consider globalization
actually exists.
The portrait that emerges from a hard look
at the way companies, people, and states interact
is a world that's only beginning to realize
the potential of true global integration.
And what these trends backers won't tell you
is that globalization's future is more fragile than you know.
Hmm, what does he mean by that?
So what he says is, if you actually look at the data
about the flows of capital,
90% of global direct investment is still domestic,
and the level of cross-border migration, for example,
is surprisingly small.
4% of people live in a country
other than the one that they were born in.
Right.
One interesting thing is that the volume of cross-border flows has consistently increased,
but the geographic reach of those flows has not increased much since the turn of the
century.
So the flow of information, capital, trade, people is highly regionalized, meaning that these
things flow relatively freely within certain smaller regions, but not globally.
This actually came up a lot in the debate over Brexit. The Brexit campaign was saying,
like, oh, we're going to do all these great trade deals with China and India, and we'll replace
all of our European trade. But then people pointed out that the UK's biggest trading partners are
like Germany, Netherlands, France, Ireland, and America's biggest trading partners are Mexico and Canada.
And it's like, yes, we can do all these things, border flows, Skype moving money around whatever, but like most of what is actually happening is like fairly proximate.
Right.
Which is not to say that globalization is not happening, right?
It's just that it's much more complex than the world is getting flatter.
Right.
I think that that's important because the book is about globalization and how our world
is becoming more interconnected.
It's one of the most popular books about globalization ever written, but also by the time it was
published in 2005, there was actually already sort of like a cottage industry about globalization.
There's a sort of hack op-ed piece that is ubiquitous
by the end of the 90s.
That's like, I used to send paper mail,
and now I send email, right?
Yeah.
He's pitching this flatness concept as if it's novel.
When in fact, it's actually just an affirmation
of everyone's pre-existing intuitions
about globalization, right?
Which is sort of the opposite of what insight is.
And like, this isn't just academic, right?
Like there are policy decisions
that are impacted by perceptions of globalization.
There are surveys showing that people tend to vastly
overestimate the amount of global integration.
And that matters in a lot of ways.
Just for example, there's polling
that shows that people want to restrict immigration less
when they learn how low actual levels of immigration are.
Yeah, exactly.
That's the thing is he's not thinking like,
oh, I have this impression of what's going on, right?
Feels like globalization is happening in this way.
I should check into this.
I should talk to actual experts.
I should look at statistics. He's basically just reifying how it feels like globalization is happening in this way. I should check into this. I should talk to actual experts. I should look at statistics.
He's basically just reifying how it feels.
Right, but that's what journalism is supposed to do.
That's the number one fucking thing
you're supposed to do as a journalist.
It's this thing that feels true,
I'm gonna double check it.
Yeah, and it's also just what makes for compelling journalism.
Just as a selfish reader.
Tell me something interesting, please. I'll say that about Gladwell. for like compelling journalism, just as like a selfish reader, you know?
Like tell me something interesting, please.
I'll say that about Gladwell.
He told me some interesting stuff.
Even if it turned out to be weird racist lies,
I was compelled, all right.
And who can fault him for telling you
racist lies that were wrong
as long as it was entertaining?
So I do have a more specific criticism of the book
and Friedman in general, which is that he is like
endlessly sicko-phantic and deferential toward corporations.
Oh.
And generally just sort of presents his narratives
through the eyes of elites.
Again, I've said that the book is sort of a string
of anecdotes and like each has a little lesson
that you're supposed to take away. A huge percentage of those anecdotes come through interviews with corporate executives.
The result is that this is really the story of globalization as told by corporate elites.
Right? There's a segment where Friedman is discussing Walmart as an example of how flattening forces can create tension between
workers and consumers.
He says, quote, in pursuit of the world's most efficient supply chain, Walmart has piled
up a list of business offenses over the years that has given the company several deserved
black eyes and that it is belatedly starting to address in a meaningful way.
I am talking about everything from Wal-Mart's recently exposed
practice of locking overnight workers into its stores
to its allowing Walmart maintenance contractors
to use illegal immigrants as janitors
to its role as defendant in the largest civil rights class
action lawsuit in history.
One can only hope that all the bad publicity
Wal-Mart has received in the last few years
will force it to understand
that there is a fine line between a hyper-efficient
global supply chain and one that has pursued cost-cutting
and profit margins to such a degree that whatever social
benefits it is offering with one hand,
it is taking away with the other.
And Wal-Mart never violated workers rights again.
So, Thomas.
I, you know, I read that.
I was like, I was like, actually, cool.
Yeah, yeah, that's a good, that's true.
You know, there is trade off between these things.
And this was sort of the first time I saw him openly
taking a company to task.
But then he writes this, which I have sent you.
You can read what's highlighted there.
Okay.
The successor generation to Sam Walton's leadership seems to recognize that it has
both an image and a reality to fix.
How far Walmart will adjust remains to be seen, but when I asked Walmart's CEO, H. Lee Scott
Jr., directly about these issues, he did not duck.
In fact, he wanted to talk about it.
What I think I have to do is institutionalize the sense of obligation to society to the
same extent that we've institutionalized the commitment to the customer, said Scott.
The world has changed, and we missed that. We believe that good intentions and good
stores and good prices would cause people to forgive what we are not as good at, and we
were wrong. In certain areas, he added, we are not as good as we should be. We just have to get better.
This sucks.
This is literally the last word on the subject in the book.
Just actually running PR for Walmart.
Yeah.
Unreal.
And by the way, the lawsuit,
the largest civil rights lawsuit in history
that he was referencing, how did Walmart handle that?
They ran it up to the Supreme Court
and got it tossed on a technicality.
Walmart be dukes.
Right.
The fact that he would like outline all of this
and be like, let's see what the CEO has to say.
Yeah, good God.
Or how are you a fucking journalist, dude?
I loathe this like constant baby brain naivete
of these journalists who are like,
we talked to a CEO and he said he's gonna institutionalize
their social impact to the same extent
that institutionalized good prices.
But like this is a company, it's a profit maximizing company.
It's publicly traded.
The CEO cannot prioritize social impact over profits.
This is how we've decided a structure
are fucking economy.
You can't constantly pretend
that this is not the case. I talked to the CEO and he said that Walmart rules.
There's also a weird pooping back and forth element to this too because when I worked in human rights,
I always worked on corporate human rights violations and part of my job was dealing with corporations
directly. I would go to these meetings and have to put on a suit and go talk to like corporate
types and go to these like corporate dinner type things. And a lot of like see sweet people
kind of fashion themselves as like thought leaders. Yeah. But then a lot of the actual kind of like
punditry that they're doing and like things that they talk about at these dinners. It's stuff
that they're regurgitating from Thomas Friedman columns.
Right. I guess at some point, it's like,
he's talking to CEOs.
He's also, by the way, talking to elite government officials
at times, right?
Right.
He takes their thoughts,
pumps them into the New York Times with a metaphor.
Those guys read it.
They make policy based on it,
and then they talk to Thomas Friedman again.
Right.
It's hard not to see that perhaps Thomas Friedman is a pawn in the games of powerful
people. Right.
If he's just going to regurgitate what they tell him, that can be useful.
Right. When Tom Friedman is going to publish your little
greed about how Walmart's going to do better in his book. That's useful for a CEO.
I cannot believe he actually like listed out all of the problems with Walmart and then was like the CEO told me they're gonna do better
I like I cannot fucking believe it. It's insane. I
Also, I like I guess I knew this because he's constantly talking to CEOs and other people and interviewing them
But I want to point out that like if you look at the book knew this because he's constantly talking to CEOs and other people and interviewing them.
But I want to point out that like, if you look at the book, he is interviewing tons of
people, his acknowledgments are extremely lengthy.
He put in a ton of legwork.
So like, I don't want to say that he's phoning it in really, right?
He's not just sort of like doing this cash out book.
He's trying very hard,
which is what makes it even worse and more embarrassing.
That's so dark, dude, that he, like, this is like the best that he can do.
Right.
It's like, I'm going to spend months and like, really, like, put my whole pussy into this
book as the kids say.
To the kids say, what kind of kids are you hanging out with?
This is on gay Twitter.
This is what they say on gay Twitter.
Like she really put her whole pussy into that chorus.
You've never heard this?
You say the kids.
You just mean gay 24-year-old man.
That's 100%.
And the gay 41-year-olds who thirst follow them.
So there's actually a part a little closer to the end
of the book where Friedman is talking about how we should
be sort of conceptualizing the government's role in a globalizing world.
He says, the social contract that progressives should try to enforce between government and
workers and companies and workers is one in which government and companies say, we cannot
guarantee you any lifetime employment, but we can guarantee you that
we will concentrate on giving you the tools to make yourself more lifetime employable.
We're teaching people to code.
Right.
In the flat world, the individual worker is going to become more and more responsible for
managing his or her own career, risks, and economic security.
The role of government and business is to help workers build
all the muscles they need to do just that.
Now, Friedman considers himself a progressive, but I do think that he is envisioning a much
more atomized world, right?
He believes the welfare state, as it is constructed, is inadequate to address globalization 3.0.
And I find that relatively disconcerting.
Again, this is a guy that's just talking to CEOs and elite government officials about
what's happening and part of his takeaway is like, well, we might have to transform the
way that government aids people to make it less about giving
them money and more about giving them skills.
It's funny how all of these big ideas, books lead to just cutting welfare for people, regardless
of what the actual topic is.
It's like, well, I'm going to have to make some tough choices.
That's probably a good transition into the second part of the book, which is really dedicated to the downstream effects of all of this globalization.
He says that we will experience the great sorting out essentially the process by which globalization creates certain winners and losers.
He starts to talk about America experiencing what he calls a quiet crisis that consists
of several parts, which he calls our dirty little secrets.
Number one, the numbers gap, which is the relative lack of young scientists and engineers in
America compared to China and India.
Number two is the education gap, meaning that American schools don't push or invest in
math and science education enough.
And three is the ambition gap, meaning that our youth are less ambitious than youth in
China and India.
The evidence for which per freedman is one teacher who told him that his students were lazy
and another teacher who said that her students were lazy. Finally, finally, we're talking about how the kids don't want to work anymore.
It always eventually gets to the lazy kids.
Um, this is also the part of the book, the very long part of the book that is basically,
like, we need to become a STEM country.
Okay.
We need to pile resources into science and engineering if not rescrewed, right?
Because manufacturing, we're getting out competed.
So what do we need to do?
We need to be the managers and IT experts, et cetera.
We need to sort of like educate our way to the top of the global hierarchy.
He says, quote, every young American today would be wise to think of himself or herself as competing against every young Chinese, Indian, and Brazilian.
That's a fucked up way to think about your life.
It's competing at these little, these spry little Chinese kids, like 14 years old.
A fucking weird way to think about the world.
Later, he says, JFK wanted to put a man on the moon.
My vision is to put every American man or woman on a campus.
He does love his little phrases.
He loves it.
He loves it.
He loves it.
I would love to just watch an editor go through a Thomas
Friedman book draft and just write, do you need this?
Every, like, right next to everything that he doesn't need to say.
Remember how I said he talks to CEOs about where business is going.
In this part, he talks to the Chinese vice minister of education.
And that person is obviously like touting Chinese education.
And he's like, oh my god, they're good.
And I was like, you're literally absorbing propaganda and telling it to me, like, whatever.
So you're starting to see like his pivot in this book, what started out as a book that's
just like a shallowish dive into the many ways that globalization has impacted the world
becomes a book about how to retain America's global hegemony.
Right. And that's what actually becomes the takeaway of the book, right? Not just like this stuff
is happening and it's interesting, but we must act now or we will be overtaken by India and China.
Right. And built into this is like a lot of pretty aggressive fear
mongering about like America's getting weaker. Other countries are going
stronger. Yeah. And he has a chapter called this is not a test where he
compares the modern moment to the Cold War. Okay. So he says what this era has
in common with the Cold War era is that meeting the challenges of flatism requires as comprehensive, energetic, and focused
a response as did meeting the challenge of communism.
I'm sending you a couple of paragraphs.
I know it's long.
This is his Cold War comparison.
He says, getting Americans to rally around compassionate
flatism is much more difficult than getting them to rally around compassionate flatism is much more difficult than getting
them to rally around anti-communism.
Economics, as noted, is not like war, because economics can always be a win-win game.
But sometimes, I wish economics were more like war.
In the Cold War, we actually got to see the Soviets parade their missiles in Red Square.
We all got to be scared together, from one end of the country to the other. Don't you wish that we had an all-encompassing,
pervasive sense of fear in this country?
About like Chinese people in Indians getting educated.
That, you know what I miss about the Cold War?
Always being scared.
But today, alas, there is no missile threat coming from India.
The hotline, which used to connect the Kremlin
with the White House, has been replaced by
the helpline, which connects everyone in America to call centers in Bangalore.
Nicely done, Thomas.
While the other end of the hotline might have had Brezhna of threatening nuclear war,
the other end of the helpline just has a soft voice eager to help you sort out your
AOL bill or collaborate with you on a new piece of software.
No, that voice has none of the menace of Nikita Khrushchev pounding a shoe on the table at the UN,
and it has none of the sinister snarl of the bad guys in from Russia with love.
There is no Boris or Natasha saying we will bury you in a thick Russian accent. No.
That voice on the helpline just has a friendly Indian lilt that masks
any sense of threat or challenge.
It simply says, hello, my name is Rajiv.
Can I help you?
God, dude.
Wait, come on, you gotta read the last line.
Oh, and then hell fuck, I didn't even see that.
No Rajiv, actually, you can't.
God.
God, Peter is every paragraph like this.
He just extends it and goes and goes.
The help line.
The comparison between the line between the Kremlin and the White House
and a call center help line.
Yeah. Again, if he thinks of anything, any comparison, any metaphor,
it is in the book. There is no editorial process to speak of. It's so fucking bizarre. Like,
you sort of forget that he is advocating for like a heightened sense of fear and terror
about all of this.
But like that's what's happening, right?
He's basically being like,
oh, we should be more scared by the fact
that like people in Indian call centers
are helping us out.
Yeah, it doesn't even make sense to say no, Regif,
you can't help me.
Cause like, he is helping you.
He can.
I mean, if you like want wanna contest your Comcast bill,
you call and receive is like,
oh yeah, we'll get that fixed.
I like, it just is like a metaphor
that completely breaks down
and doesn't make any fucking sense.
It's like, these two things are the same,
but actually they're the opposite of each other
because one of them was missile threat,
and the other is just like me calling a phone number.
People helping you.
Yeah.
Is this unfair?
Is it unfair to show you all of his metaphors?
Like, maybe it's rude of me to center so much of microcheek
around the fact that every time he tries to say something,
he can't say it good.
Yeah.
He can only say it through these like completely assenine
metaphors and comparisons. He can only say it through these like completely
ass and eye metaphor and comparisons.
And then he mentions like it's not like Nikita Khrushchev.
It's not like from Russia with love.
It's not like Boris and Natasha.
I don't need three examples of things that it's not like.
I get it on the first one.
Also did you notice that he basically compares
like the harsh and scary Russian accent
to like the soft Indian lilt?
Like, you might notice that his accent is less scary.
Like, what the fuck?
Putting the casual xenophobia aside.
I have a little bit of sympathy for this
because sometimes when I'm editing the show,
I'm like, okay, this action doesn't make that much sense
but like there's a good joke at the end of it,
and I wanna leave it in the show.
And I feel like she's doing the thing where like,
you can tell he thought of the helpline hotline thing.
It was like, damn, that whips,
and then he has to build this whole fucking preamble to it.
Like, I wish economics were more like war.
In the cold war we had, and then it's like,
and then he finally gets to the fucking helpline metaphor, and it's like, okay, that's why you were more like war. In the cold war we had, and then it's like, and then he finally gets to the fucking help line metaphor.
And it's like, okay, that's why you were saying all this.
You thought it was cute.
That is the best explanation of like why the book exists.
So one of the more interesting things I read about all of this
was an academic article by Kathleen Abowitz and Jay Roberts
who point out that this is essentially just a replication
of a moral panic that we had in the early 1980s about how American students were being overtaken
by students in Russia and Japan. And that panic was driven by a report. Ronald Reagan formed a
committee to evaluate American education. And in 1983, they put out a report
titled a nation at risk, an imperative for educational reform. The report very famously declared that
quote, the educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of
mediocrity. The threatens are very future as a nation and as a people. That report, very influential, continues to drive a lot of education policy,
despite the fact that other government initiated reports have called many of the
conclusions into question.
So one of the one of the things the report found was that SAT scores had been
steadily declining for like 20 years leading up to the early 80s.
And in 1990, there was a report that said, yeah, that's because poor people are applying
to college and greater numbers.
Like we had increased access to the SATs.
But you segmented out the populations, the scores are going up, not down.
You can maybe say that Friedman is identifying some real trends here.
He's also tonally and substantively replicating a moral panic that we have experienced before,
where you have people fretting about being overtaken by these foreign others.
Right. He just replaces Russia and Japan with India and China.
Right. Although I have to say branding wise, the war on mediocrity is incredible branding.
Oh, yeah. I actually think that we do have a huge problem with fucking mediocrity in
this country, but it starts at the top, not at the bottom. That's where I would aim.
It's like people running institutions who just like suck shit. There's definitely a
lesson you can learn about mediocrity from Thomas Friedman.
It's just not this one.
The fucking New York Times opinion page
should be the first stop on that tour.
So we can't wrap up Thomas Friedman episode
without talking about the Iraq war.
Oh yeah, I'm gonna send you a clip
that I know you have seen.
Now that the war is over and there's some difficulty with the peace, was it worth doing?
Well, I think it was unquestionably worth doing, Charlie. I think looking back at the 1990s,
I can identify, but there are actually three bubbles of the night.
Oh, now three bubbles. There was an Az-Back bubble. Classic treatment.
There was the corporate governance bubble.
Lastly, there was what I would call the terrorism bubble.
Oh, God.
And the first two were based on creative accounting.
The last was based on moral creative accounting.
What?
The terrorism bubble that basically built up over the 1990s said,
flying airplanes into the World Trade Center.
That's okay.
Oh, the Arab mind.
Wrapping yourself with dynamite
and blowing up Israelis in a pizza parlor?
That's okay.
And that built up as a bubble, Charlie.
And 9-11 to me was the peak of that bubble.
Peak of that bubble.
And what we learned on 9-11 in a gut way was that that bubble
was a fundamental threat to our open society.
Bubble threat.
Because there is no wall high enough, no INF agents smart enough, no metal detector
fish enough to protect an open society from people motivated by that bubble.
And what we needed to do was go over to that part of the world, I'm afraid, and burst
that bubble. And what they needed to see was American boys and girls
going house to house from bus Ra to Baghdad.
And basically saying, which part of this sentence
don't you understand?
You think this bubble fantasy we're just
going to let it grow?
Well, suck on this. He's really cooking there.
This is another thing that you wouldn't understand
is funny until you've read the whole book,
but when he says like, three bubbles,
I was like, Tom, use some of them.
You've done it again.
Can't stop him.
You can't stop him.
At all times, he's thinking of metaphors.
But also, it's the same thing where it's completely fucking incoherent what he's saying.
He's basically saying that like Muslims have a culture of violence.
And so we're going to go over there and bomb them to fix their culture.
This clip is somewhat famous because he is literally characterizing the Iraq war
not as an effort to oust Saddam or to protect anyone from WMDs, but to enact revenge
on the Muslim world for fostering illiberal ideas.
And I think that that was so like revelatory, like he's just sort of putting it on the table
and being like, yeah, you know, this was revenge on Muslims.
Everyone was sort of like, so you fucking admit it, right?
Because at the time the justification was all about like
saving these populations from their dictator.
Exactly.
We have to get him out of power to save these people,
and then it's like, these people are basically
fucking animals, and we should just like kill them
until like they behave better.
And keep in mind, this is where
Friedman cut his teeth, right?
Lebanon, Israel, Middle East, expertise.
Ostensibly.
Meanwhile, he was like many pundits,
deeply incorrect all the time throughout this era.
Like he said, the Afghanistan war was over in January, 2002.
Great.
Some highlights from his columns over the years.
Ooh.
In 1999, during the bombing of Iraq,
he suggested, quote,
blowing up a different power station
in Iraq every week so no one knows when the lights will go off or who's in charge.
In 2005, he wrote about Iraq, quote, if they come around, a decent outcome in Iraq is
still possible, and we should stay to help build it.
If they won't, then we are wasting our time.
We should arm the Shiites and Kurds and leave the Sunnis of Iraq to help build it. If they won't, then we are wasting our time. We should arm the Shiites and Kurds
and leave the Sunnis of Iraq to reap the wind.
Ghee.
A couple months into the Afghanistan war,
he wrote, quote,
think of all the nonsense written in the press,
particularly the European and Arab media
about the concern for, quote unquote,
civilian casualties in Afghanistan.
Quote, quote.
It turns out that many of those Afghan civilians, again, in quotations, were praying for another
dose of B-52s to liberate them from the Taliban, casualties or not.
Whoa.
Hey, he's sort of mocking the idea that there were civilian casualties, presumably being like,
come on, they were terrorists or something.
But then at the same time, saying that civilians wanted this to happen.
Yeah, it doesn't make sense.
It doesn't make sense.
It is like this fundamental contradiction.
And all of this, I bring up because a good chunk of the final chapters of the world
is flat is dedicated to Friedman's belief that the ostensibly insular culture
of the Muslim world
is a threat to globalization.
Wait, really?
Yeah.
He's got like a Huntington turn at the end.
It's in his final chapter titled,
the Muslim question.
Oh.
No, I'm kidding, I'm kidding.
She's like,
that's it.
That's it.
You gotta be careful, Peter.
That actually sounded pretty,
pretty real.
That actually sounded pretty plausible.
Sorry.
Yeah, he calls it, he calls the Muslim culture an unflashener.
Um, and he talked at length about how this is something that the Muslim world needs to reckon with.
I think that his writing about the Iraq war and about the Middle East and war in general
is actually really illuminating because the through line between his war coverage
and this book is that his primary goal revolves around retaining American hegemony in the coming
century. And like at first glance you might think that there's attention or inconsistency here
where like this guy is writing about our interconnectedness
with the rest of the world, but then he's championing these brutal campaigns of vengeance
in the Middle East. But I actually think it starts to make sense once he realized that his
primary concern is American power. He's not writing this book as like a student of technology
or something. He's writing it as someone who wants to ensure American supremacy,
whether that means funding science education or destabilizing the Middle East.
He's also doing a very similar thing to Nudge,
where he's pretending to be doing this cool, descriptive project.
Like this is just how human nature works.
I'm like, we should make policy according to human nature.
But then once you get into the guts of it,
and it's like, oh, actually,
we should do a bunch of crazy libertarian shit, right?
Like underneath it is this extremely ideological project.
Right.
And it seems like he's doing the same thing
like I'm just describing how the world
is becoming more interconnected.
And then whisper voice, like,
and the Muslims are really the problem with this.
Right.
Like that doesn't follow from the premise at all.
No, I mean, he has all of these ideas about like how,
oh, interconnectedness will foster peace in the long term.
And then he gets to the section of the book that's like,
now let's talk about how Muslims are a big wrench
in all of this.
Right.
I'm gonna send you something that is so long,
and I'm sorry.
I can't do the episode unless we say it.
And you make me go all the way through this fucking excerpt.
I want to say something before this.
I don't even know if it makes total sense to put it here
and at the end of this episode.
But, and I want you to listen to what I'm saying
because we've read a lot of excerpts here.
This is the worst thing in this book.
Okay.
I have a screenshot version of this,
that is the entire page is highlighted
because I started trying to highlight sections,
because I was like,
I don't want them to read all of it, it's too long.
And then I just, I realized that I was highlighting all of it.
Just kept going.
And so I was like, well, now it looks stupid.
I'm just gonna highlight the whole thing.
Okay.
Okay. he says,
What if regions of the world were like the neighborhoods of a city?
What would the world look like?
I'd describe it like this.
Western Europe would be an assisted living facility
with an aging population lavishly attended to by Turkish nurses.
The United States would be a gated community
with a metal detector at the front gate and a lot of people sitting in their front yards complaining about how lazy everyone else was.
Even though out back there was a small opening in the fence, for Mexican labor and other energetic immigrants who helped make the gated community function.
Latin America would be the fun part of town, the club district, where the work day doesn't begin until 10 p.m. and everyone sleeps until mid-morning. It's definitely the place to hang out, but in between the clubs, you don't see a lot of new businesses opening up.
Except on the street...
Except on the street where the Chileans live.
The landlords in this neighborhood almost never reinvest their profits here,
but keep them in a bank across town.
The Arab street would be a dark alley where outsiders fear to tread,
except for a few side streets called Dubai, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, and Morocco. The only new
businesses are gas stations, whose owners, like the elites in the Latin neighborhood, rarely reinvest
their funds in the neighborhood. Many people on the Arab street have their curtains closed,
their shutters drawn, and signs on their front lawn that say, no trespassing, they were of dog.
India, China, and East Asia would be the other side
of the tracks.
Their neighborhood is a big teaming market,
made up of small shops and one-room factories.
Interspersed with Stanley Kaplan SAT prep schools
and engineering colleges.
Oh, we're like halfway through.
Nobody ever sleeps in this neighborhood.
Everyone lives in extended families
and everyone is working and saving
to get to the right side of the tracks.
On the Chinese streets, there's no rule of law,
but the roads are well paved.
On the Indian streets, by contrast,
no one ever repairs the street lights.
The roads are full of wreaths,
but the police are sticklers for the rules. You need a license to open a lemonade stand on the Indian streets.
Luckily, the local cops can be bribed, and the successful entrepreneurs have their own
generators to run their factories and the latest cell phones to get around the fact that
the local telephone poles are all down. Africa, sadly, is that part of town where the
businesses are boarded up, life expectancy expectancy is declining and the only new buildings are health care clinics?
Fucking hell Peter
It's like just say what you mean man. It's not even a metaphor half the time
He's just described like he starts off with like the assisted living facility and the gated community and you're like, okay
This is a metaphor I guess. By the end of it though, he's just describing the countries
in the African neighborhood life expectancy used to
climb, you don't need the metaphor,
just say life expectancy used to climb in Africa.
What the fuck is this, dude?
Right, and like, there's no rule of law
in the Chinese neighborhood.
You're just talking about China.
Right.
You don't need the neighborhood thing for that.
And like the Eric Street is a dark alley,
except for Dubai, Bahrain,
and Car and Morocco.
Like this is not you stop doing the metaphor, please.
Yeah, I think what you said earlier is right
that like it's not clear that he knows how metaphors work.
Right.
Because like metaphors are supposed to simplify situations
or describe the nature of something
to say that the factory was hell.
It condenses all of this other information,
but if you're gonna say the factory was hell
and like hell, it was hot and loud and everybody hated it.
You don't need the middleman at that point.
You're just describing the factory.
The factory was like a neighborhood
where my boss was yelling at me all the time.
It's not a metaphor, it's not really a metaphor.
Yeah.
These are the sorts of like little things
that you encounter in Friedman's writing all of the time,
wrapped up in what we haven't even discussed
as the most ethnically insensitive.
Yeah, I know.
I've ever read it. Like I just like.
Parties in Latin America every night.
She literally ripped through every region of the world and was like a little bit rude
about all of them.
Yeah.
Plug man.
It's also just like isn't smart.
He's just like repackaging conventional wisdom bullshit.
That's why I thought it was worth ending on it. A because we have to talk about it. I mean, obviously,
lost my fucking mind when I read it. And B, because like, this is someone who is purporting to be
able to describe the world in an insightful way. And this is what he has to say about the entire planet, right?
This is his description of every continent.
There's just like nothing there.
This is, there's no real insight.
He is bullshitting.
Alexander Cockburn in 1999,
wrote a take down of Friedman that was devastating.
One line of it,
Friedman is so marinated in self-regard
that he doesn't even know when he's being stupid.
Just right to the heart of Thomas Friedman.
Got him.
But the other side of that is like,
Friedman has sway in elite circles
and was reportedly relatively influential
in the Obama administration.
I don't know, this isn't someone that everyone agrees is dumb.
Right.
I think that there is a market and has always been a market for people who are good at making
you feel like you learned something when you didn't.
Yeah, yeah.
You put together this cheeky little metaphor and people are like, oh, that's, that's a
way to look at it, right?
Right.
People are up late in Latin America?
Amazing.
Yeah, you ever think about the neighborhood metaphor,
like the United States is a gated community,
and the Middle East is a place where everyone sucks
and is stupid.
If it were a neighborhood, I'm saying
that's the type of neighborhood it would be.
Peter, it's very funny to me that when both of us
do our generic asshole voice,
we both do New York accents, but yours is your actual accent.
No, my accent is combination of New York and Philadelphia, full of the nicest people on
earth. So, yeah, I don't know where I adapted my-
Where you adapted. You just did it. I'm just like, I'm just like, I'm just like, I'm just like,
I'm just like, I'm just like, I'm just like, I'm just like,
I'm just like, I'm just like, I'm just like, I'm just like,
I'm just like, I'm just like, I'm just like, I'm just like,
I'm just like, I'm just like, I'm just like, I'm just like,
I'm just like, I'm just like, I'm just like, I'm just like, That's just a little bit easier to do so. I think it's the person you're still in danger of becoming. That's where my bad voices come from.
Like, this person lives inside me.
When I'm like 80 with dementia or whatever,
I'm just gonna be this like belligerent character
from the sopranos and people are gonna be like,
he was a nice guy and he didn't have this Brooklyn accent.
It's not real.
That's how I started saying hello.
I started saying it as a joke
and then it became like 80% of my personality. That was her fault.
you