Kitbag Conversations - Episode 17: Aggression in the Aegean

Episode Date: July 11, 2022

Hello everyone, this week I sat down with Polity 21 (@polity21_) , a Instagram based conflict and analysis page focusing primarily on Greco-Turkish relations as well as the current Russo-Ukrainian war. This week we talk about: - Greco-Turkish relations regarding islands in the Aegean  - The Cyprus question  - A Turkish third option  - And the relationship between nations in the Eastern Mediterranean 

Hello, everyone, and welcome back to the show. This week we were joined by, is it Pauldi21? Yes, Pauldi21. Yeah, Pauldi21, an Instagram-based journalist, conflict reporting member of the Instagram community, but really focuses on Turkey, Greece, the Aegean, parts of the Mediterranean, and I guess a little bit of Ukraine, now that that's in everyone's eye, guys. So hey, man, how are you doing today? Fine, what about you?

Oh, I'm pretty good. Thanks for inviting me, first of all. So basically, my name is Konstantinos Kolokotronis, I'm originally from Greece, starting in the UK at the University of Leicester. My interest, I mean, you reflected it very well, I think. It's pretty much in all Greece, Turkey, with the Aegean and the ISPAD, and as well as Ukraine, especially since the Russian invasion, but also before, you know, during the, you know, after 2014, at the onset of the Ukraine crisis, and I mean, of course, the page now

reflects mostly the Ukraine part. I mean, you know, but I mean, I'm looking to, you know, gradually shifting to the former, you know, Greece, Turkey, and especially, I mean, since, I mean, everyone's expecting that we're going to have a hot summer over the Aegean, especially, and the ISPAD as well. So I guess I'll be shifting more to that in the coming days, if not weeks. OK, OK, that's, that part of the world seems really under-covered or under-discussed simply because it's always just, oh, Turkey's just being a pain in the ass, but there's so much more that goes into that.

Yes, certainly. I mean, I mean, it obviously reaches the, you know, the headlines here and then, especially when we have certain Turkish actions, such as the, you know, if when Turkey, you know, sends a drill and ship or, you know, plans and exploration mission and uses one of its ships, then, of course, that reaches the headlines as it did back in 2020, the four trace when it sailed into the Eastern Mediterranean. But other than that, I would say that the public, especially in Europe, and I would imagine in the U.S. as well, you know, they don't know the facts about the border context of the

country. So what is your, we mentioned it on the offline, but like, what is your background? So you're not like a intelligence analyst or former military or anything. You're just more of a college goer and just have an interest in what's going on. Yeah. So yeah, I mean, I would definitely not describe myself as a journalist, first of all. I would say I'm rather a more of an observer when it comes to decisions. I mean, I'm studying politics at the University of Leicester, as I said.

So my interest is first and foremost academic when it comes to all of those issues, you know, did Turkey versus Greece, did the Ukraine war and almost every other issue of international politics and, you know, relations that make the headlines. But of course, you know, I mean, on another note, I also, I mean, I was also becoming increasingly interested in the user aspect of all of this, you know, the information that comes out, the videos, the, you know, certain aspects. So, you know, I mean, the page started first and foremost, you know, for me to write articles there, you know, and then publish them.

And so, you know, I mean, I would have a website and I would direct to the websites. So Instagram was only my way of communicating that. And, but gradually, I think, you know, Instagram has become the main medium, the main form, or, you know, my ideas post articles. And the website has taken a rather secondary role, if you will. But yeah, I mean, I guess articles is my main thing. And then, you know, everything else comes after. Okay.

So, hey, man, what's going on with Greece and what's going on with Turkey and what's going on with that part of the world? Because for a lot of people who don't know that the Greeks and Turks usually don't get along. And because Turkey has a role that whole thing going on in like Northern Syria to get rid of Kurds. And our quasi playing both sides of the Russian-Ukraine situation in a very not, not kinetic or hostile, but just not very, I guess, friendly with the Greeks.

And then they're in this perfect spot where they can just do whatever they want and coming on top in every angle. So how, because you're from that part of the world. How, what is going on, I guess, in the big picture? Yeah. I mean, as you said, there's always that quasi-stereotype, quasi-stereotype, you know, Greeks and Turks that go along together. I mean, okay, there is also a historical aspect in that regard, because, you know, we had the

1821 war of independence when Greece, you know, successfully fought against the Ottoman Turks. Of course, with support from other Western nations and powers. And that allowed, basically, for the defeat, if you will, of the Ottoman forces, the independence of Greece, and then actually its enlargement, and that was essentially solidified in 1922, 1923, 100 years after the Greek War of Independence, with the Treaty of Lausanne. Basically, you know, I mean, many people are not again aware of that, but after World War One, in 1919, the Greek army basically invaded main Asia.

And there was a Treaty of Severus, which effectively ceded control of some of the facisable portion, I would say, of territory in main Asia, surrounding the Ottoman town city, basically, of Izmir, or Smirna, if you will. And so, basically, I mean, after that, following that, the Greek army landed there to consolidate control of that area, but then it pushed forward to, you know, all the way to Ankara. And it was basically the fact of capital, or century, you will, not exactly capital, but administrative center of the government by Kemal Ataturk, who was at odds, by the way, with the Ottoman government, in Constantinople or Istanbul.

So, basically, I mean, okay, that war ended in the catastrophe, the Greek army was defeated outside of Ankara. And they retreated all the way back to Izmir. They went back to the Greek islands. And then after that, of course, we had the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, and the creation of the modern Turkish state followed right after that. And Kemal Ataturk, which is also known as the father of the Turks, was the father of the founder and after, if you will, of that nation, of the modern Turkish nation. So, you could say in the sense that everything did back then, to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which effectively created a Turkish state that consolidated borders, the borders of Turkey,

as we know it nowadays. So far, yeah. Well, I was going to say, like, now in just recent memory, they're both a part of NATO, and they're both pretty much just a part of the European bubble. So anything they want to do organically has to rely on, say, hey, what's going on in Brussels, because Greece had that huge economic situation a few years ago, and really relied on the European Union. But Turkey seems to be doing pretty okay in their own kind of corner, because what is the old saying, like, they're the sick man of Europe, like they're there, but they're not really there. But they hold that key access to the Black Sea through, was it the Bering Strait? So,

yeah, so with those two just kind of being at odds today, and who was it talking about militarization of these islands in the Aegean, where I think Turkey said, like, hey, Greece, go away. So that was a whole other thing that happened recently. Yeah, I mean, basically, the reason, you know, I just went back to history and referred to all those events is because, you know, the Disciple District about the militarization of Greek islands stems from the Treaty of Lausanne. That's where Turkey is basing its claims when it goes forward and says that, you know, a number of Greek islands in the Eastern, North-Eastern Aegean have been militarized. So basically, the Treaty of Lausanne, there are some provisions that provide for that, not for the

demilitarization exactly of those islands. And the Treaty of Lausanne said that it's in a second. They're basically four main islands, for a member correctly, in the Eastern Aegean. So those islands were to have not exactly demilitarized statues, but, for example, no naval bases, no Greek naval bases were to be established there, no Greek certifications there, and some limits on the kind of forces that were to be deployed there. But we're not talking about outright demilitarization, right? That's completely out of the question, even from back in 1923. So then we have islands in the North-Eastern Aegean, which are above those four that I'm just referring to. Those islands were also subject to a

demilitarized status, like a proper demilitarized status, which was subsequently, however, canceled with the coming of another treaty, the Treaty of Mondro, which essentially provides for the status of the post-postrates. Because the post-postrates were also to be demilitarized. But with this coming treaty, I think in the 1930s, 1932, if I'm not mistaken, basically the demilitarization of the straits was canceled, and so was the demilitarization of those islands in the North-Eastern Aegean. Then Turkey is also referring to the Canis, the Canisanguic, which are islands in the South-Eastern of Greece and the South-Eastern of the islands in the southeast of the islands of the North Aegean and the North-Eastern Aegean.

So these islands were originally, I mean, okay, there is obviously very rich history there, Ottoman history, but they're also in a part of Italy. Until 1947, when the Paris Treaty, the Paris Peace Treaty, ceded those islands to Greece. So Greece is the successor state with regards to those islands. And they were also subject as well to demilitarized status, which has also ended. The demilitarized status was basically an injection made by the Soviet Union back then. They wanted those islands to be demilitarized, the Canisanguic, because there was no, I mean, the arrangement obviously of NATO, when NATO to the Greece, I mean, the demilitarization clause, if you will, the demilitarization argument

put forward by the Soviet Union was not in effect. There were other territories that were also demilitarized. So, I mean, after the entry of Greece into NATO, I mean, you cannot talk about demilitarized islands to the Canisanguic, all that. So, I mean, demilitarization was effectively a bit like it after those events. It was all injected there because of concerns by the Soviet Union rather than Turkey. So that's the legal aspect, to follow it. But I mean, as you can see, those claims are of political nature. And if you look at the argument legally, both the arguments of Greece and both the arguments of Turkey, there's an asymmetry. I mean, the Turkish claims, and they know that. I mean, Turkey knows that, Greece knows that,

I think most of the world knows that, by now, that the Turkish claims, they lack any solid proper legal basis when it comes both to demilitarization and both of many other issues that are on the Greek-Turkish agenda. And I mean, most of them, their entirety are brought forward by Turkey. You know, Greece does not have a claim on Turkey. Greece, for example, is not claiming Turkish islands, does not claim Turkish land, doesn't claim anything, essentially. So, it's a Turkish claim. I mean, you can put it as a Turkish claim against the sovereign regime, the sovereign rights, and the territory, essentially, of Greece in that regard. So what is the current Greek government doing about this? Are they trying to be more diplomatic

about it? I'm sure they understand that Erdogan is going to be himself. So are they walking a fine line, or are they going to take up arms? What are we doing there? Well, I don't think they're going to take up arms against that. I mean, the Greek position has been fortified diplomatically, on a diplomatic point. So every time, for example, there is a Turkish overflight over Greek island or Turkish violation of the airspace, which is another reason, by the way. That's another reason, you know, the dispute of Turkey with regards to the Greek airspace, and its extent. So, you know, every time this happens, for example, there is going to be a demarche. There is already a definitive demarche. There is, you know, there are some strong

statements from both sides with regards to this. And, you know, I mean, every time there is a Turkish ship going into what's perceived to be by Greece, the Greek government itself, there's also response from Greece. They're going to be naval assets there, they're going to be naval units there, and the whole system is going to be mobilized, you know, the whole military. Or, I mean, not mobilized, but it's going to be on high alert. By the naval assets, you know, the warships, everything is going to be mobilized, and it's going to be on that area, you know, following closely the movement, the actions of the Turkish side, be it the Turkish ship, or be it the Turkish warships that accompanied. So, you know, this happened back in 2020, you know,

there was this kind of naval showdown where you had the whole of Greek fleet and perhaps the whole of Turkish fleet facing each other in the Aegean. So, that was a dangerous moment, of course, you know, for tensions, and especially, you know, it's not about what can happen intentionally, it's also what can happen accidentally. There can be some hot incident, you know, an accident, an exchange of fire, and then you find yourself in war, you know. So, there is a very thin red line, but both sides, I guess the Greek side tries not to step into that territory, you know. I was going to say both sides are a part of NATO, and so, what would happen? Yeah, what would, geopolitically speaking, how would NATO actually address something

where there's infighting within their own community? How would the rest of the world go, hey, they don't seem to like each other, they seem to want to fight each other more than they want to fight us, and so that could lead to say, like, I don't know, Russian incursion into Central Asia, or more Chinese bases in Africa, something like that. I mean, that's exactly the, you know, the irony and tragedy, if you like, of the whole situation that, you know, NATO is supposed to be a security organization made up of democratically minded states who share the same values, and I mean, we don't see that though, you know, we don't see that happening in the case of Britain-Turkey. You know, NATO's have worked peace in the region, right, in the Mediterranean,

in the Aegean, but, you know, we see that constantly, you know, there is, it doesn't have an effect on the conflict, it doesn't have an effect on the Turkish claims, it doesn't have an effect on great behavior, Turkish behavior, for that matter, at least not decisive and definitive effect. And, you know, I would go as far to argue that during the whole war, Turkey was more of a threat, of course, to Greece rather than the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union back then, right? That's no secret, you know, that's such a fact. And so that regard, I mean, NATO has failed, you know, NATO has failed to secure relative peace in its south-eastern flank. And, you know, when I'm talking about peace, I'm not talking about the exchange of fire,

I'm not talking about war, obviously, but, you know, it's this state of war that prevails, both in the Aegean and the East Med. And, I mean, you know, this goes down back to the 1970s, after and right before the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, that's where all these issues began on the surface, like, you know, one by one. So, Turkey has been building its case for the revision of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 and all those claims against, you know, good territory, good sovereignty, good sovereign rights, they have been building up since then. But now you have seen the apogee, now you have seen the highest point, let's say, so far, you know, of all these claims and all this tension. But, you know, it's nothing new, you know, for the region, it's nothing new

for Greece and Turkey, you know. But the rest of the world has been seeing that increasingly now, you know, and that's obviously due to exposure by, you know, international news outlets, it's making the headlines, you know, more and more. I mean, it was making the headlines back then, as well, but I think because it's an issue that dates all those years, you know, back from the 1970s to now, you know, people tend to forget about that, they don't follow the conflict that goes there, obviously. So, you know, there is a gap in there. You think that the refugees coming out of Middle East and Northern Africa has anything to do with this, or is it a contributing factor in the decision-making of what's going on? Because I know

Greece had received a lot of migrants and Turkey really doesn't seem to like them. So, yeah, do you see that being anything at all? That's certainly a contributing factor. It's not a central factor of the disputes, of course. I mean, it is, but to a lesser extent, I'm not going to go into that now, how that goes into the disputes. That's more complicated territory, but you see, for example, you know, the weaponization of migrants sometimes. I mean, there were these crises in the northeastern land border between Greece and Turkey that happened back in 2020, if I'm not mistaken. It was February and March of 2020. I mean, I might be a bit wrong about the date. So, essentially, you had, you know, Turkey opened

the borders there. They opened the borders and you had the thousands of migrants moving towards a Greek border, a Greek and Turkish land border, of course. And there was a whole operation there, but the Greek authorities contained that wave of migrants, that flow of migrants into Europe. Because, you know, if they made it to Greek territory, I mean, you know, who's going to accept them then? They're going to stay there. Bulgaria has its borders closed down. Europe is enforcing a strategy of, you know, fortifying its borders as well. I mean, they were going to stay there. But also, you have the weaponization of the migration issue in the Aegean as well. I mean, as you know, perhaps, as listeners may have heard, there is a deal between the European

and Turkey with regards to refugees. Turkey houses approximately, I mean, I don't know, 2 million refugees, migrants. So, essentially, you know, the EU is paying the Turkey to house those migrants to provide for them. So, there is this deal that dates, seems 2016, with regards to these issues. But I mean, the deal has been problematic, you know, to say the least. Don't even step back and kind of changing directions. What about Cyprus? Because Turkey seems to be the catalyst for most of the instigation in the region. And Cyprus itself has been, you know, it has this very deep history of being divided and whatnot and multiple conquerors. But their economy is currently in freefall and the Turks really seem to want to

take it back. So, what do you see that going? I mean, sorry, can you, I mean, now we're talking about the occupied part of Cyprus, Cyprus as a whole. Cyprus as a whole, because the idea was unification for the entire island was impossible. But now these days are like, they might have to start working towards one direction or the other, because their economy is very bad. Yeah, I mean, there are a lot of challenges, you know, both for the Turkish economy, both for the, you know, economy of the occupied part of the, I mean, you know, the occupied part

is not being recognized as a state by any other entity other than Turkey. You know, Turkey is the only one who recognizes the occupied part that doesn't depend on the state. So, I mean, it's a, I mean, the fact that it has the state structures in place, although they're heavily being propped up by Turkey, you know, there is about 40,000 Turkish troops there as an occupation army. And I mean, as you said, yeah, we, I think we started the four shows with reverse diseases, because Turkey wants to, I mean, has signal that it prefers two state approach. So, you know, either the, you know, some negotiations, I guess, for the recognition of the occupied parts, which are obviously, I mean, unthinkable for the Greeks,

the, you know, Cyprus, the Republic of Cyprus, or the Hellenic Republic, please. Or then, I guess, I mean, Turkey could annex, you know, the occupied part, the occupied part could be potentially annexed and be made part of Turkish territory. I think that's the worst scenario of them all, you know. They could just pull the whole Russian agenda of, this is mine, this is mine, Crimea. So, ethnic Turks live here. They kind of want, they are actively calling for unification within the Turkish state. It wouldn't be a too far fesh of an idea that just knowing Erdogan as an individual would probably push for something like that if it came to that kind of situation. Precisely, yeah. I mean, it's an extreme scenario. There are many parallels, as you say,

with what is happening in Ukraine now, with what has happened with regards to Crimea, and this whole, you know, 20th-century invasion. But, you know, I mean, it's an extreme scenario. I mean, there's been talks on days, there's been a lot of rumors in Washington and the region about such a scenario taking place in the near future. I mean, I remain skeptical, personally, I remain very skeptical of those talks, rumors, or whatever you want. But, you know, I mean, negotiations have reached a bit low. There's nothing happening nowadays with regards to the peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the, you know, the Cyprus question, the Cyprus issue nowadays. Because, you know, I mean, the unification rests on the idea of a regional federation,

of course, right? So, there's going to be an independent state where, you know, both Greeks and Turks are going to leave. But at the same time, there's going to be, like, a well-defined boundaries, if you'd like, you know, for both communities. I mean, a good case is the Anantlan of 2004, which was rejected by the Greek side. It was overwhelmingly, I mean, the majority of the Turkish Cypriots accepted it. But, you know, elements of the Turkish Cypriot leadership of the islands, such as Rauf Dentast, the former leader, he rejected it even back then. You know, he made the case that, you know, the Turkish Cypriots should not accept that. They did, though. You know, they voted positively in the referendum,

they voted yes. But, you know, nevertheless, the good Cypriots rejected that back then. I mean, I'm not going to make any choice again. Oh, I was going to say that another contributing factor to the Cyprus question or the Cyprus problem is the UN has a quasi-demilitarized zone between the two sides. So, then that's more of a UN issue that would have to be, that would have to step in to help mediate the two sides, not just, like, pro-Greeks, pro-Turks, or the Cypriots. It would have to be a larger entity overseeing everything. Yeah, yeah, definitely. I mean, you know, I mean, if every so infinitely, you know, solution is

going to be achieved, you know, where all sides are going to be involved, of course. I mean, the UN is going to have a role, perhaps, you know, even the day after. I mean, I don't know what kind of role they're going to have. But, you know, I mean, under the Anand plan, for example, we were going to have the gradual withdrawal of Turkish troops to the island. So, you know, there was, so obviously the UN was going to play a part in that. And, but nowadays, you know, everything stands in a limbo. You know, there is, I mean, it all depends to Turkey, largely. I mean, that both Greek sides, both Greece and Cyprus, sorry, are open in negotiations, diplomatic negotiations over what is to happen.

I get here on the Turkey side, the Greek side, and Cyprus and Greece, with regards to the failure of the most recent negotiations, Greece and Cyprus vice versa. I mean, I'm not going to make an assessment of that, and I'm not going to go into that. But yeah, it's a multifaceted and complicated issue with regards to the role of all those sides, the presence of Turkish troops in the island, of course, and what the solution could entail. You know, the most common issue right now is the Turkish army, the Turkish settlers. I'm talking about, you know, people of Turkish citizens, essentially, who came to the island after the Turkish invasion. And they were not there before the Turkish invasion, so there were no Turkish Cypriots or settlers, you know, from the Turkish

mainland. And finally, you know, the property status of the group of Jews who left from the northern part, following the invasion and went to the southern part of the Republic of Cyprus, to the post control by the Republic of Cyprus, the factor. I mean, that's sounding an awful lot like what the Russians did with the Baltic States and Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. They were going, if we need to justify our claims, let's just pump our own civilians there and say, like, oh, no, they actually lived there. They are actively calling for XYZ. And you can see that. And looking at the Russia situation, looking at the Baltics, where a state like Latvia has 20% population as ethnic Russian within the last five years,

though, has gone up like 26. So they're like, yeah, these are definitely settlers for a reason, it's intent. And so they could help sway the political landscape left or right. And it's interesting to see that the Turks do the exact same thing. They're the kind of like, because they're in such a perfect spot. They have, everyone wants to be their friend because like, hey, the Russians want to access to the Black Sea, let's be pro Russia. But at the same time, I want to get all this UN and EU and NATO support. So I'm just going to have to stay on that side. So they're just playing both sides against each other and they're likely going to come on top. Yeah, I mean, definitely that's as much what is in the long run. I mean,

in the short run, rather, I mean, I don't know how it works in the long run. But yeah, I mean, you see there are many parallels, although, you know, situations are different, are different, and they have many unique characteristics. But yeah, I mean, I guess you can see many parallels and many similarities that are either restricted, you know, in one issue or the other. But yeah, I mean, certainly, you know, many people here in Greece or Cyprus, they have compared essentially the Russia invasion of Ukraine with Turkey's invasion of Cyprus. I mean, again, there are certainly many similarities, but they're not the same, right? They're not exactly the same.

Yeah, I think they're going to be 100%. So shifting gears a little bit. What about Azerbaijan and Armenia? Because Turkey, who was very supposed to be hands off, was very pro-Azerbaijan. And I think it was just because they don't like Armenians. So do you have any background or experience in that kind of the field because it hasn't cooled down over there recently? I mean, I'm going to be honest with you, I'm building a lot. I haven't really, I mean, I wouldn't, I mean, I haven't written any extensive articles on that. I haven't done the research that I should do with regards to that issue. I mean, obviously, I followed the Nagorno-Karabakh war, the recent one, 2020, the 44-day war, as they call it. And I'm watching the news as well,

of course, I'm keeping up with the developments. I mean, obviously, you know, the situation is even more complicated there, because, you know, Artsakh or Nagorno-Karabakh or Karabakh, you know, call it whatever you want. The euro, you know, is part of Azerbaijan. You know, the international community recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh to be legally part of Azerbaijan, while at the same time it has significant Armenian presence, historical one, dating back, you know, hundreds of years, if not millennia. And that also is reflected into the political sphere. You know, there is, you know, Artsakh, you know, the government of Artsakh there, Nagorno-Karabakh, the administration there, the state, you know, call it whatever you want. And I mean, obviously, you know, the recent

war changed dynamics, you know, radically in the region. I mean, you know, Artsakh now stands, I mean, you know, a large portion of its territory, of its previous territory, is now controlled by Azerbaijan. And the deal that followed the war has secured the Azerbaijani position along those new lines now. And Turkey is also, you know, supposed to play a significant role in the conflict, either be it to the logistical support that has provided to the Azerbaijani side, and also, you know, the Armenians claim, for example, that Turkey is F-16 fighter aircraft, you know, they shot down an Armenian SU-24 thing. So there was definitely involvement from that aspect. And there's also the issue of the Syrian mercenaries that Turkey and Azerbaijan

employed successfully in their fight against, you know, the Armenian forces. I think the future is very bleak, you know, the immediate future, the near future is very bleak for Armenia, the way I see it at least. I mean, we see the Armenian government trying to strike a more diplomatic and reconciliation approach, position with regards to Turkey, there's this normalization process going on. I guess remains to be seen where this all leads. But I mean, from my point of view, the situation is very bleak for Armenia and for Artsakh as well. Because, you know, I mean, the balance of power was

extremely disrupted, if you will, and sifted to the Azerbaijani side, Azerbaijan, you know. So Azerbaijan has the upper hand with regards to its military forces, with regards to its hard power there, the, you know, its armed forces, you know, the army, the drones, everything. So the Armenian side stands clearly at its advantage when it comes to, you know, those very crude issues, you know, hard power and, you know, the armed forces and the balance of power of the world. So, I mean, the result of the, you know, Nagorno-Karabakh war was not a surprise, in that sense. It was a few weeks ago or a few months ago now. There was that geopolitical deal between the Turks and the Assyrians,

where they were going to start creating like open pipelines and whatnot, do joint military, not joint military exercises, but they were being very friendly with each other. And that caused Iran to get suspicious and deploy their guys to the north along the Assyrian border. And who already hate Armenians, but hey, and they're like, well, this similar-minded organization to the north is not really a plan on our side. They seem to be more pivoting towards Turkey, which is a big picture. It's just interesting to see Turkey go its own way outside of everything and just see this huge ripple effect in the entirety of from Greece to Iran. Just that entire region is Turkey as the catalyst.

I mean, yeah, I mean, with regards to Turkey's role, the Turkish role into this region as well, be it the Assyrian, the Caucasus, or the Middle East more broadly, I mean, Turkey is pursuing the strategy of an autonomous strategy, or at least it's trying to pursue an autonomous strategy with regards to many aspects of the foreign policy. I mean, it has successfully done so in the defense sector. It's producing its own drones, producing its own military assets across the board. I mean, the most successful, of course, the most successful field has been the drones, of course. As we see, they've had a good record in Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya, now in the Ukraine war. I mean,

we don't know yet, I guess, we'll have to see at the end of the day. But, I mean, we see Ukraine, the Ukrainian armed forces using them effectively against Russian positions. And this is part of a larger strategy of pursuing strategic autonomy, be it geopolitically or with regards to its defense sector. And, I mean, at the same time, you see this behavior that is akin sometimes to a road doctor. So, it is pursuing certain strategies unilaterally. And so, the policies unilaterally, for example, these are the most prolific examples, or, and of course, you know, the invasions in Syria, you know, against the Kurds. Yeah, that's a whole just issue in itself with openly targeting pro-U.S. organizations in northern

Syria just because they're Kurdish. And then it's, that's an entire scenario. I don't think we have time for today to get into it. But I do have a question regarding the Aegean. Are there, like oil reserves or any minerals or resources that are in the Aegean? Because I know that in the Black Sea, just north of Turkey, they identified and found those oil reservoirs. And so, they started producing and exporting oil from there. But I don't know if there's something similar in the Aegean, which is more of a reason for heightened tensions between the two sides. Yeah, they're definitely significant, the oil reserves in the Aegean. And in this matter, more broadly, they're near Quit, the Greek island of Freik in the south, or, you know, the northeastern

Aegean. I'm not sure if there are any conclusive reports with regards to that. Of course, there have not been any conclusive, large-scale exploration missions there. But there are, there are definitely significant deposits there. I mean, there are many opinions with regards to their extent, their gravity, if they're going to be, you know, monumental, you know, of great size, or rather, more moderate portions. But I mean, in my opinion, that's not the issue, you know, but that's a secondary issue. So, you know, you see this opinion, you know, many times that the source of Greek-Turkish conflict is, you know, the hydrocarbon deposits in Aegean-based meds. That's a secondary issue in my opinion. I mean, it's mostly geopolitical power play

between Greece and Turkey and other powers in the region. And, you know, this is rather of secondary nature, you know. I mean, neither country is going to solve their economic problems right away if they gain access to those hydrocarbon deposits. It's going to take some time, obviously, to access those deposits if successful, and then to channel them to Europe, or, you know, for domestic consumption, respectively. I mean, it's certainly an aspect. It's certainly an aspect of the border geo-strategic geopolitical play, but rather a secondary one when you see what's happening in the field. I mean, we say, you know, 2020 Turkey brought forward the root race, this, you know, ship that conducted the drilling missions and exploration in the East Med.

I mean, that is largely the pretext. I mean, you know, Turkey is trying to effectively draw a line in the East Med, in this Mediterranean, if you will, with regards to its blue homeland policy, which claims the health of the Aegean and the good chunk of the portion of the Eastern Mediterranean as well. And so it's, you know, it's trying to demonstrate that on the field. It's trying to reflect that on the field, be it with military exercises, be it with, you know, the root race missions. And now, you know, we're going to see it again, you know, they said that in the beginning of August, you know, the first 15 days of August, there is going to be a similar mission in the Aegean. You know, we're going to see another ship, a new ship this time, sailing,

you know, the waters in the Eastern Mediterranean, which, you know, are claimed by both Greece and Turkey to be part of the respective, you know, continental cells. So, all of their part of the continental cells. This is definitely an under discussed topic in Europe alone, because I think, and I mean, I don't even think I know that the Ukraine war really elipsed everything going on there. And just going back to, in the beginning, you were talking about the rich history, it's, I think everyone's just used to it at this point. So they're just going, yeah, I mean, that's just how it is. You just got to get used to it. Yeah, I mean, that's why I said it's a stereotype, in a sense, you know, that they, they expect both countries to behave that way. And,

you know, they, they, they both need expectations. Yeah, they definitely didn't disappoint. Yeah, I asked for sure. Yeah. You know, but, but also, you know, what's another part of this conversation is, you know, the part that Europe plays, the part that the United States play into this conflict. Because, you know, Europe has not had a very influential role when it comes to, you know, when I say Europe, I mean, the European Union, first and foremost, when it comes to the conflict, the US has played a far more significant role, especially in the context of many crises that have taken place, such as the EMEA crisis of 1996, or, you know, or even the recent crisis nowadays. So this definitely, you know, takes part, you

know, I mean, there is a reason, you know, that the public in many European countries, for example, doesn't know about the context and the essence of the Greek Therapist conflict in its entirety, you know, and they, you know, they, they see something in the news, they hear something. And, I mean, you know, they either tend to believe that, or they either, you know, that's the sole source of information they have to save their views and save their position towards the conflict. But, you know, I mean, countries such as Greece, and not just as Turkey, obviously, you know, there is a plethora of information, you know, that goes, that, you know, that exists, that is not accessible, obviously, to other Western, you know, audiences.

You know, there's, there's definitely a lot going on in that part of the world. And I think, I don't think it's going to cool down at any point, because Erdogan's sticking around for a few more years. And based on, you know, current trends, just building a picture of how Turkey's going to go here in the next, say, decade or so. I don't really know. This probably won't get kinetic, but it'll definitely just be more meandering. And what's a good word to put forward? It would be just the instigate, the catalyst. They'll just keep on keeping on. And using that same international stigma of, yeah, just Turks being Turks, it's, it's not going to reinforce anything through the positive. But we're getting to about that time. So if you have anything you would like

to plug, we could start wrapping this up. So I guess, you know, I mean, any of you listening, I mean, you can set my Instagram handle, which is polity 21. And also you can see my page on Medium as well. This where I upload most of my articles. There is a lot of work that is still under, I mean, I'm still working on a few articles. I'm still working on a lot of content that hasn't been published yet. So hopefully I'll be publishing it in the coming days and weeks. Yeah, I mean, that's, that's it, I guess, yeah. I have a question about your, your, your name, where did you, where did, what is the origin of that? Polity 21, you know. Yes.

I mean, it's basically, you know, I mean, polity is the greatest work of Plato, you know, the group philosopher. So that's where politics came from. Whereas then, you know, 21 is, I mean, the page started taking off in 2021. That's when I first established the Instagram account. And that's when I first started publishing and writing some of my main articles. And, but, you know, obviously, I mean, it took a lot of time for the page to keep off, you know, gradually in Instagram. So yeah, but, you know, I mean, it's mainly, you know, 2021 when it all started. And also, you know, 2021 is 200 years from the group revolution of independence. So I guess, yeah, there's a symbol is there as well.

Too easy. That's pretty interesting. But all right, man, I really appreciate you coming on. And I will post this later tonight. Thanks a lot. We appreciate it. Take it easy. Have a nice day.