Lex Fridman Podcast - #401 – John Mearsheimer: Israel-Palestine, Russia-Ukraine, China, NATO, and WW3
Episode Date: November 18, 2023John Mearsheimer is an international relations scholar at University of Chicago. He is one of the most influential and controversial thinkers in the world on the topics of war and power. Please suppor...t this podcast by checking out our sponsors: - Notion: https://notion.com - ExpressVPN: https://expressvpn.com/lexpod to get 3 months free - InsideTracker: https://insidetracker.com/lex to get 20% off - Eight Sleep: https://www.eightsleep.com/lex to get special savings - AG1: https://drinkag1.com/lex to get 1 month supply of fish oil Transcript: https://lexfridman.com/john-mearsheimer-transcript EPISODE LINKS: John's Website: https://mearsheimer.com John's Books: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics: https://amzn.to/3FWrqkX How States Think: https://amzn.to/3udaWST The Great Delusion: https://amzn.to/3syXKXS Why Leaders Lie: https://amzn.to/3ucs4rU The Israel Lobby: https://amzn.to/47fxrVU Books Mentioned: Leviathan: https://amzn.to/49zCFgu The End of History and the Last Man: https://amzn.to/47wTVBf Who Are We: https://amzn.to/3QXDk44 PODCAST INFO: Podcast website: https://lexfridman.com/podcast Apple Podcasts: https://apple.co/2lwqZIr Spotify: https://spoti.fi/2nEwCF8 RSS: https://lexfridman.com/feed/podcast/ YouTube Full Episodes: https://youtube.com/lexfridman YouTube Clips: https://youtube.com/lexclips SUPPORT & CONNECT: - Check out the sponsors above, it's the best way to support this podcast - Support on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/lexfridman - Twitter: https://twitter.com/lexfridman - Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/lexfridman - LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/lexfridman - Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/lexfridman - Medium: https://medium.com/@lexfridman OUTLINE: Here's the timestamps for the episode. On some podcast players you should be able to click the timestamp to jump to that time. (00:00) - Introduction (09:52) - Power (33:06) - Hitler (50:33) - Russia and Ukraine (1:46:45) - Israel and Palestine (2:47:37) - China (3:29:58) - Life and mortality
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The following is a conversation with John Mershimer, a professor at University of Chicago,
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And now dear friends, here's John,
Mishammer. Can you explain your view on power in international politics, as outlined in your book, the tragedy
of great power politics and your writings since then?
Yeah, make two sets of points there. First of all, I believe that power is the currency
of international relations.
And by that, I mean that states are deeply interested
in the balance of power, and they're
interested in maximizing how much power they control.
And the question is, why states care so much about power?
In the international system, there's no higher authority.
So if you get into trouble and you down 9-1-1,
there's nobody at the other end.
In a system like that, you have no choice
but to figure out for yourself how best to protect yourself.
And the best way to protect yourself is to be powerful,
to have as much power as you can possibly gain
over all the other states in the system.
Therefore, states care about power
because it enhances or maximizes their prospects for survival.
Second point I would make is that in the real
story or in my story, power is largely a function of material factors. The two
key building blocks of power are population size and wealth. You want to have a
lot of people and you want to be really wealthy. Of course this is why the
United States is so powerful. It has lots of people and you want to be really wealthy. Of course, this is why the United States
is so powerful. It has lots of people and it has lots of wealth. China was not considered
a great power until recently because it didn't have a lot of wealth. It certainly had population
size, but it didn't have wealth. And without both a large population and much wealth, you're usually
not considered a great power.
So I think power matters, but when we talk about power, it's important to understand that
it's a population-size and wealth that are underpinning it.
So there's a lot of interesting things there. First, you said nations in relation to each other
are essentially in the state of anarchism.
Yeah, well, anarchy basically means the opposite of hierarchy.
Sometimes people think when you're talking about anarchy,
you're talking about murder and maim,
but that's not what anarchy means in the realist context.
Anarchy simply means that you don't have hierarchy. There's no higher authority that sits above states.
States are like pool bowls on a table, right? And in an anarchic world, there's no higher authority
that you can turn to if you get into trouble. And of course,
the political philosopher who laid this all out was Thomas Hobbes. And Hobbes talked about life
in the state of nature. And in the state of nature, you have individuals. And those individuals
compete with each other for power. And the reason that they do is because in the state
of nature by definition, you have no higher authority. And Hobbes' view is that the way to get out of
this terrible situation where individuals are competing with each other and even killing each other
is to create a state. It's what he calls the Leviathan. And that, of course, is the title of his famous book.
So the idea is to escape anarchy, you create a state. And that means you go from anarchy to hierarchy.
The problem in international politics is that there is no world state. There is no hierarchy. And if you have no hierarchy and you're in an
anarchic system, you have no choice, but to try to maximize your relative power, to make
sure you are, as we used to say, when I was a kid on New York City playgrounds, the biggest
and baddest dude on the block, not because you necessarily want to beat up on other kids or on other
states, but because again, that's the best way to survive. And as I like to point out, the
best example of what happens when you're weak in international politics is what the Chinese
called the Century of National Emiliation. From the late 1840s to the late 1940s, the Chinese
were remarkably weak, and the great powers in the system prayed upon them. And that sends
a very important message to not only the Chinese, but to other states in the system. Don't
be weak. Be as powerful as you can.
And we'll talk about it, but humiliation can lead to resentment or resentment leads to
something you've also studied, which is Nazi Germany in the 1930s.
We'll talk about it.
But staying to the psychology and philosophy picture, what's the connection between the
will to power and the individual, as you mentioned, and the will to power in a nation.
The will to power in an individual has a lot to do with individual psychology. The story
that I tell about the pursuit of power is a structural argument. It's an argument that
says when you are in a particular structure, when you're in a system that has a specific architecture,
which is anarchy, the states have no choice
but to compete for power.
So structure is really driving the story here.
Will to power has a lot more to do with an individual in the Nietzsche story where that concept comes from.
So it's very important to understand that I'm not arguing that states are inherently aggressive.
Right. My point is that as long as states are in anarchy, right, they have no choice,
but to behave in an aggressive fashion. But if you
went to a hierarchy system, there's no reason for those states to worry about the balance of power.
Because if they get into trouble, there is a higher authority that they can turn to. There is
an effect, the Leviathan. So what is the role of military might in this, uh,
will to power on the national level?
Well, military might, but ultimately matters.
As I said to you before, the two building blocks of power are
population size and wealth.
You didn't mention military might.
I did not know.
That's right.
And it's good that you caught that because if you have a
large population and you're a wealthy country what you do is you build a large military and it's
ultimately the size of your military that matters because militaries fight wars and if states are
concerned about survival which I argue is the principal goal of every state in the international system
for what I think are obvious reasons, then they're going to care about having a powerful military that can protect them if another state comes after them.
What's not obvious is that a large nation with a lot of people and a lot of money should necessarily build a gigantic army and seek
to attain superpower, like dominant soul,
superpower status, the military might.
But you're saying, as you see the world today,
it has to be that way.
Yeah, I'm arguing it is obvious.
If you're a state in the international system,
do you want to be weak?
If you live next door to Nazi Germany or Imperial Germany
or Napoleonic France or even the United States,
the United States is a ruthless great power.
You surely recognize that.
If you're dealing with the United States of America
and you're Vladimir Putin,
you want to make sure you're as powerful as possible. so that the United States doesn't put its gun sites on you
and come after you. Same thing is true with China. You want to be powerful in the international
system. States understand that and they go to great lengths to become powerful. Just
take the United States of America. When it started in 1783, It was comprised of 13 measly colonies strung out along the Atlantic seaboard.
Over time, the various leaders of the United States went to Great Laints to turn that country
into the dominant power in the Western hemisphere.
And then once that was achieved in 1900, we've gone to great lengths to make
sure that there's no peer competitor in the system. We just want to make sure that we're
number one. And my argument is that this is not peculiar to the United States. If I'm China, for example, today, I would want to dominate Asia the way
the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. They'd be fools not to. If I were Imperial
Germany, I'd want to dominate all of Europe the way the United States dominates the Western
Hemisphere. Why? Because if you dominate all of Europe, some of your
imperial Germany or Napoleonic France, then no other state in the area or in the region
can threaten you because you're simply so powerful. And again, what I'm saying here is that
the structure of the international system really matters. It's the fact that you're in this
anarchic system where survival is your principal
goal and where I can't know your intentions, right? You're in other state. I can't know
that at some point you might not come after me. You might. And if you're really powerful
and I'm not, I'm in deep trouble.
Yeah. So some of the ideas underlying where what you've said, offensive realism, which I would love to
talk to you about sort of the history of realism versus liberalism, but some of the ideas you already
mentioned, uh, anarchy between states, everybody's trying to develop a military capabilities, uncertainty,
such an interesting concept, uh, states cannot be sure that other states will not use military capabilities against them, which is
a massive enormous importance. Really important. And it's so interesting because you also say that this makes realists more cautious and more peaceful.
The uncertainty, because of all the uncertainty involved here. It's better to approach international politics with caution
It's really interesting to think about
Again survival most states interesting and survival and the other interesting thing is you assume all the states are rational
Which most of the time most of the time, most of the time, you call this framework offensive realism.
Can you just give an overview of the history of the realism versus liberalism debate as world
views?
Well, I think for many centuries now, the big divide within the world of international relations theory
is between realism and liberalism. These are time-honored bodies of theory. And before I tell you
what I think the differences are between those two bodies of theory, it is important to emphasize
that there are differences among realists and differences among liberals.
And so when you talk about me as an offensive realist, you should understand that there are also
defensive realists out there. And there are a panoply of liberal theories as well.
But basically, realists believe that power matters, that states compete for power, and that
war is an instrument of statecraft, and liberals, on the other hand, have what I would say
is a more idealistic view of the world
This is not to say that they're naive or foolish, but they believe there are aspects of international politics
that lead to a less competitive and more peaceful world than most realists say.
And I'll lay out for you very quickly what are the three major liberal theories today
that I think will give you a sense of the more optimistic perspective that is inherent in the
liberal enterprise. The first and most important of the liberal theories is democratic peace theory.
And this is a theory that says democracies do not fight against other democracies.
So the more the world is populated with democracies, the less likely it is that we will have wars.
And this basic argument is inherent in Francis Fouciam
as the end of history.
He argues that democracy triumphs first over fascism
in the 20th century.
It then triumphs over communism.
And that means that in the future
have more and more liberal democracies
on the planet.
And if you have more and more liberal democracies and those democracies don't fight each other,
then you have a more peaceful world.
That was his argument.
It's a very liberal argument.
A realist like me would say that it doesn't matter whether a state is a democracy or not.
All states behave the same way because the structure of the system, getting back to our earlier
discussion about international anarchy, the structure of the system leaves those states no choice,
whether they're democracies or autocracies.
And again, the liberal view, this first liberal theory,
is that democracies don't fight other democracies,
and therefore the more democracies you have,
the more peaceful the world.
Can I just sort of try to unpack that a little bit?
So on the Democratic peace theory, I guess would say
that in democracies, leaders are elected
and the underlying assumption is most people want peace, and so they will elect peacemakers.
So the more democracies you have, the more likely you have peace.
And then the realist perspective, what says that it doesn't matter if the majority of people want peace. The structure of international politics is such that superpowers want to become more
super and powerful, and they do that through war.
You can't make that argument that you're making about democracies, because if you're saying
that democracies are inclined toward peace and that the electorate picks leaders
who are inclined towards peace, then you have to show that democracies are in general
more peaceful than non-democracies, and you can't support that argument.
You can find lots of evidence to support the argument that democracies don't
fight other democracies. So the argument, I believe, that you have to make, if you're
going to support democratic peace theory, the main argument you have to make is that liberal
democracies have a healthy respect for each other, and they can assess each other's intentions.
If you're a liberal democracy and I'm a liberal democracy, we know we have value systems
that argue against aggression and argue for peaceful resolution of crises. And therefore, given these norms, we can trust each other.
We can know each other's intentions.
Remember, for realists like me,
uncertainty about intentions really helps drive the train.
But if you're talking about two democracies, right?
The argument there is that they know each other's intentions.
And for you, sure, maybe democracy's reduced uncertainty a little bit, but not enough to stop the
train. I think that's right. Yeah. That's that's right. So that's democratic peace theory. Yes.
The second theory is economic interdependence theory. And that's the argument that in a globalized
world, like the one that we live in and have lived in for a long time. There's a great deal of economic interdependence, and if you and I are two countries, or if you
and me are two countries, and we're economically interdependent, and we're both getting prosperous
as a result of this economic intercourse.
The last thing that we're going to do is start a war, either one of us, because who would
kill the goose that lays the golden eggs, it's that kind of argument.
So there you have an argument that economic independence leads to peace.
And then the third liberal argument has to do with institutions, sometimes referred
to as liberal institutionalism.
And this is the argument that if you can get states into institutions where they become
rule abiding actors, they will obey the rules that dictate that war is not acceptable.
So if you get them to accept the UN rules on when you can and cannot initiate a war, then you'll have a more peaceful world.
So those are the liberal theories, and as you can tell, they're very different from realism
as articulated by somebody like me.
Can you maybe argue against the economic interdependence and in the institutions that institutions follow rules a
little bit so
the golden goose with the golden egg
you're saying that
Nations are happy to kill the goose
because again
They want power if they think it's necessary to kill the Golden Goose,
because of security concerns, they will do it.
The point is that economic interdependence at its root
has prosperity as the core variable.
In the realist story, the core variable is survival and survival always
Trump's prosperity. So if you go back to the period before World War One, we're in Europe,
it's 1913 or early 1914. What you see is that you have an intense security competition
between all of the great powers. On one side, you have the triple alliance and on
the other side, you have the triple ontant. You have these two alliances and you
have an intense security competition between them, okay? At the same time, you
have a great deal of economic independencedependence. It's amazing how
much economic intercourse is taking place in Europe among all the actors. Right? And people are getting
prosperous. Our countries are getting prosperous as a result. But nevertheless, in the famous July
crisis of 1914, this economic prosperity is unable to prevent World War I because security concerns
or survival is more important. So there are, you know, going to be lots of situations where
prosperity and survival come into conflict and in those cases survival will win.
And maybe you can speak to the different camps of realists.
You said offensive and defensive.
Can you draw the distinction between those two?
Yeah.
Let me just back up a bit on that one.
And you were talking about will to power before.
The first big divide between realists is structural realists and human nature realists.
Nice.
And Hans Morgan Thou, who was influenced by nature, and therefore had that will to power
a logic embedded in his thinking about how the world works.
He was a human nature
realist, okay? I'm a structural realist and I believe it's not human nature, it's not
individuals and some will to power that drives competition and war. What drives competition
and war is the structure of the system. It's anarchy.
So you're not as romantic as the human nature realists?
Yeah, there's just a world of difference between the two.
Sure. It's just important to understand that.
So within that, from the structural, there's a subdivision also of offensive, offensive. Yes, inside the structural realist world, right? And you have a handful
of realists who believe that the structure of the system fosters competition for sure, security
competition, but it really rules out great power war almost all the time.
So it makes sense to care about the balance of power,
but to focus on maintaining how much power you have.
That's the defense of realism, maintaining how much power you have,
not trying to gain more power.
Because the argument the defense of realists make is that if you trying to gain more power because the argument the defense of
realists make is that if you try to gain more power, the system will punish you. The structure
will punish you. I'm not a defense of realists. I'm an offensive realist. And my argument is that
states look for opportunities to gain more power. And every time they see, or almost
every time they see an opportunity to gain more power. And they think the likelihood of
success is high and the cost will not be great. They'll jump at that opportunity.
that opportunity. Just a link on the human nature perspective. How do you explain Hitler and Nazi Germany? Just one of the more recent aggressive expansions through military might. How do you explain that in the framework of offensive realism?
Well, I think that Nazi Germany was driven in large part by structural considerations.
And I think if you look at Imperial Germany, which was largely responsible for starting World War
One, and of course, Nazi Germany's largely responsible for starting World War I, and of course Nazi Germany is largely responsible for starting World War II.
What that tells you is you didn't need Adolf Hitler to start World War I, right? And I believe
that there is a good chance you would have had World War II in the absence of Hitler, right?
I believe that Germany was very powerful. It was deeply worried about the balance of power in Europe and it had strong incentives
to behave aggressively in the late 1930s, early 1940s. So I believe that structure mattered.
However, I want to qualify that in the case of Adolf Hitler because I do think he had what
you would call a will to power. I've never used that
word to describe him before, but it's consistent with my point that I often make, that there are two
leaders, or there have been two leaders in modern history who are congenital aggressors, and one
was Napoleon, and the other was Hitler.
Now, if you want to call that a will to power,
you can do that.
I'm more comfortable referring to Hitler
as a congenital aggressor, and referring
to Napoleon as a congenital aggressor,
although there were important differences between the two
because Hitler was probably the most murderous leader
in recorded history, and Napoleon was not
in that category at all. But both of them were driven by what you would call a will to
power. And that has to be married to the structural argument in Hitler's case and also in Napoleon's case.
Is there some degree on the human psychology side that resentment because of what happened
after World War I led to Hitler, really so much power, and then Hitler starting World War
II.
So this is the human side.
Perhaps the reason I asked that question is also because you mentioned the
century of humiliation on the China side. So to which degree the humiliation lead to Hitler and lead to World War II.
Well, the question of what led to Hitler is a very different question than the question of what led to World War II, once Hitler was in power. I mean,
after January 30th, 1933, he's in power. And then the question of what is driving him comes
racing to the fore? Is there resentment over the Versailles Treaty and what happened to
Germany? Yes. Did that matter? Yes. but my argument is that structure was the principal factor
driving the train in Hitler's case, but
what I'm saying here is that there were other factors as well.
Resentment being one of them will to power or the fact that he was a congenital aggressor in my
lexicon Certainly mattered as well.
So I don't want to dismiss your point about resentment.
So Hitler in particular, the way he wielded the way he gained so much power might have been
the general resentment of the populace of the German populace.
in the general resentment of the populace, of the German populace.
I think that as a result of defeat in World War I,
and all the trials and tribulations associated
with Vimar Germany, and then the coming
of the Great Depression, all of those factors
definitely account for his coming to power.
I think that one of the reasons that he was so successful
at winning over the German people
once he came to power was because there was
a great deal of resentment in the German body politic
and he played on that resentment.
That surely helped them get elected too.
But I think, having studied the case,
it was even more important once he took over.
I also believe that one of the principal reasons
that he was so popular, and he was wildly popular inside Nazi
Germany, is because he was the
only leader of an industrialized country who pulled this country out of depression.
And that really mattered.
And it made him very effective.
It's also worth noting that he was a remarkably charismatic individual.
I find that hard to believe, because every time I look at him
or listen to his speeches, he does not appear to be charismatic to me, but I've talked to a number of
people who are experts on this subject who assure me that he was very charismatic. And I would note
to you, if you look at public opinion polls in Germany, West Germany in the late
1940s, this is the late 1940s after the Third Reich is destroyed in 1945.
He is still remarkably popular in the polls.
Stalin is still popular in many parts of Eastern Europe.
Yeah, yeah.
And Stalin's popular in many quarters inside Russia.
And Stalin murdered more of his own people than he murdered people outside of the Soviet
Union.
And still to you, the ties of history turned not on individuals, but on structural considerations. So Hitler may be a surface layer characteristics of how Germany started
war, but not really the reason. Well, history is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. So I hear
and we're talking about interstate relations. Yes. And realism is a theory about how states interact with each other.
And there are many other dimensions to international politics.
And if you're talking about someone like Adolf Hitler, right?
Why did he start World War II?
Is a very different question than why did he start the Holocaust?
Or why did he push forward a Holocaust?
I mean, that's a different question.
And realism doesn't answer that question.
So I want to be very clear that,
I'm not someone who argues that realism answers
every question about international politics,
but it does answer what is one of the big, if not the biggest questions that I
are scholars care about, which is what causes security competition and what causes
great power war.
Does offensive realism answer the question why Hitler attacked the Soviet Union?
Yes.
Because from a military strategy perspective, there's pros and cons to that decision.
Pros and cons to every decision.
The question is that he think that he could win a quick and decisive victory.
And he did, I mean, as did his generals.
It's very interesting.
I've spent a lot of time studying German decision-making in World War II.
If you look at the German decision to invade Poland on September 1, 1939, and you'll look at the
German decision-made France on May 10, 1940, and then the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.
What you see is there was actually quite a bit of resistance to Hitler in 1938 at the
time of Czechoslovakia Munich. And there was also quite a bit of resistance in September
1939, internally or internally, internally for sure. Yeah. People had doubts. They didn't think the Varemoct was ready and given the fact
of World War I had just ended about 20 years before the thought of starting another European
war was not especially attractive to lots of German policymakers, including military
leaders. And then came France in 1940. In the run-up to May 10, 1940, there was huge resistance in the German army to attacking
France.
But that was eventually eliminated because they came up with a clever plan, the Manchstein
plan. If you look at the decision to invade the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941,
which is the only case where they fail. They succeeded in France, they succeeded in Poland,
they succeeded at Munich in 1938. Soviet Union is where they fail. This hardly any resistance at all.
Right. Yeah. Well, and to say that they failed the Soviet Union, I mean, my grandfather, I
thought, I mean, I'm from the Soviet Union. You know, there's a lot of successes early
on. So there's poor military, I would say, strategic decisions along the way. But it was a solid off-guard. Maybe you can correct me, but from my perspective, terrifyingly so, they could have been successful.
If certain different decisions were made from a military perspective.
Yeah, I've always had the sense they came terrifyingly close to winning.
You can make the opposite argument that they were doomed, but I'm not terribly comfortable
making that argument.
I think the very mocked by the summer of 1941 was a finely tuned instrument for war. And the Red Army was in quite terrible shape. Stalin had purged the
officer corps. They had performed poorly in Finland. And there were all sorts of reasons
to think that they were no match for the Varemocht. And if you look at what happened in the
initial stages of the conflict, that proved to be the case.
The Germans won a lot of significant tactical victories early on.
And if they focused and went to Moscow as quickly as possible, it's, again, terrifyingly.
So could have been a basically topple Stalin.
And one thing that's that's possible. That's possible.
Fortunately, we're not going to run the experiment again.
But one could argue that that had they concentrated as the
generals wanted to do in going straight from Moscow that they
would have won.
I mean, would Hitler wanted to do is he wanted to go into the
Ukraine. I mean, Hitler thought wanted to do is he wanted to go into the Ukraine.
I mean, Hitler thought that the main axis, there were three axes, the northern axis,
went towards Leningrad, the central axis, of course, went to Moscow, and then the southern axis,
Army Group South, headed towards Ukraine and deep into the Caucasus. And Hitler believed that
and deep into the Caucasus. And Hitler believed that that should have been the main axis.
And in fact in 1942, the Soviets,
excuse me, the Germans go back on the offensive in 1942.
This is Operation Blow.
And the main axis in 42 is deep into the Ukraine
and into the Caucasus.
And that fails.
But one could argue that had they done that in 41, had they not gone to Moscow, had they
concentrated on going deep into Ukraine and into the Caucasus, they could have knocked
the Soviets out that way?
I'm not sure that in the end, I believe that. I think in the end, the Soviets would have won no matter what,
but I'm not 100% sure of that.
So sometimes maybe you can educate me,
but sometimes, they say, just like with Napoleon,
winter defeated Hitler in Russia,
I think not often enough, people tell the story of the
soldiers and the motivation and how hard they fight. So it turns out that Ukrainians and Russians
are not easy to conquer. They're the kinds of people that don't roll over and fight bravely. There seems to be a difference in certain people,
peoples in how they see war, how they approach war,
how proud they are to fight for their country,
to die for their country, these kinds of things.
So I think Battle of Stalingrad tells at least to me
a story of extremely brave fighting on the Soviet side.
And that's a component of war too. It's not just structural,
it's not just military strategy, it's also the humans involved. But maybe that's a romantic notion
of war. No, I think there's a great deal of truth in that, but let's just unpack it a bit in the case of the Soviet Union in World War II.
The counterargument to that is that in World War I, the Russian army disintegrated.
If you look at what happened when Napoleon invaded in 1812, and you look at what happened in 1917 and then you look at what
happened between 41 and 45, then Napoleon case looks a lot like the Hitler case and it fits
neatly with your argument, but World War I does not fit neatly with your argument because
the Russians lost and surrendered and And you had the infamous Treaty
of Brest Latovsk, where the Soviet Union then, because it went from Russia to the Soviet
Union in October 1917, the Soviet Union surrendered large amounts of Soviet territory because
it had suffered a humiliating defeat. My argument for why the Russians, let me take that back, why
the Soviets fought like wild dogs in World War II, is that they were up against the genocidal
adversary. You might understand that the Germans murdered huge numbers of Soviet POWs.
the Soviet POWs. The overall total was 3.7 million. And by December, December of 1941, remember the invasion is June 41 by December of 1941. The Germans have murdered 2 million
Soviet POWs. At that point in time, they had murdered many more POWs than they had murdered
Jews. And this is not to deny for one second that they were on a murderous rampage when it came
to Jews.
But they were also on a murderous rampage when it came to Soviet citizens and Soviet soldiers.
Right.
So those Soviet soldiers quickly came to understand that they were fighting for their lives. If they were taken prisoner,
they would die. So they fought like wild dogs.
Yeah, the story of the Holocaust, the 6 million Jews is often told extensively. If Hitler
won the Concordes of the Soviet Union, it's terrifying to think on a much grander scale than the Holocaust.
What would have happened to the Slavic people, to the Soviet people?
Absolutely. All you have to do is read the hunger plan.
And they also had a plan, what was it called, grand plan deist. I forget the exact name of it, which made it clear that they were going
to murder many tens of millions of people.
And by the way, I believe that they would have murdered all the polls and all the Roma.
I mean, my view is that the Jews were number one on the genocidal hit list.
The Roma or the gypsies were number two, and the Poles were number three.
And of course, I just explained to you how many POWs they had killed, so they would have
ended up murdering huge numbers of Soviet citizens as well.
But people quickly figured out that this was happening.
That's my point to you, and that gave them needless to say very powerful incentives to fight hard
against the Germans and to make sure that they did not win.
To fast forward in time, but not in space.
Let me ask you about the war in Ukraine.
Why did Russia invade Ukraine on February 24th, 2022?
What are some of the explanations given and which do you find the most convincing?
Well, clearly, the conventional wisdom is that Putin is principally responsible.
Putin is an imperialist. he's an expansionist.
That's the conventional thinking. Yeah, and the idea is that he is bent on creating a greater Russia,
and even more so, he's interested in dominating Eastern Europe, if not all of Europe,
Eastern Europe, if not all of Europe, and that Ukraine was the first stop on the train line.
And what he wanted to do was to conquer all of Ukraine, incorporated into a greater Russia, and then he would move on and conquer other countries. This is the conventional wisdom.
My view is there is no evidence. Let me emphasize zero evidence to support
that argument. Which part does he would, the imperialist part, the sense that he would, he sought to conquer
all of Ukraine and move on and conquer? There's no evidence he was interested in conquering all of
Ukraine. There was no interest in, there's no evidence beforehand that he was interested in conquering all of Ukraine. There was no evidence beforehand that he was interested in conquering any of Ukraine.
And there's no way that an army that had 190,000 troops at the most could have conquered all of Ukraine.
Just impossible. As I like to emphasize, when the Germans went into
Poland in 1939, and the Germans you want to remember were only intent on conquering the western
half of Poland, because the Soviets came in later that month, we're going to conquer the eastern
half of Poland. So the western half of Poland is much smaller than Ukraine. And the Germans
went in with 1.5 million troops. If Vladimir Putin were bent on conquering all of Ukraine,
he would have needed at least 2 million troops. I would argue we'd need 3 million troops
because not only do you need to conquer the country, you then have to occupy it. But the idea that 190,000 troops was sufficient
for conquering all of Ukraine. It's not a serious argument. Furthermore, he was not interested
in conquering Ukraine. And that's why in March 2022, this is immediately after the war starts. He is negotiating with Zelensky to end the war.
There are serious negotiations taking place in Istanbul involving the Turks, and Nauf-Tali
Bennett, who was the Israeli Prime Minister at the time, was deeply involved in negotiating
with both Putin and Zelensky to end the war. Well, if he was
interested, Putin, in conquering all of Ukraine, why in God's name would he be
negotiating with Zelensky to end the war? And of course, what they were negotiating
about was NATO expansion into Ukraine, which was the principal cause of the war.
People in the West don't want to hear that argument because if it is true, into Ukraine, which was the principal cause of the war.
People in the West don't want to hear that argument,
because if it is true, which it is,
then the West is principally responsible for this bloodbath
that's now taking place.
And, of course, the West doesn't want to be principally responsible.
It wants to blame Vladimir Putin.
So we've invented this story out of whole cloth
that he is an aggressor, that he's the second coming of Adolf Hitler
and that what he did in Ukraine was try to conquer all of it.
And he failed, but with a little bit of luck,
he probably would have conquered all of it.
And he'd now be in the Baltic States
and eventually end up dominating all of Eastern Europe.
As I said, I think there's no evidence to support this.
So maybe there's a lot of things to ask there.
Maybe just to link on NATO expansion,
what is NATO expansion,
what is the threat of NATO expansion
and why is it such a concern for Russia?
NATO was a mortal enemy of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.
It's a military alliance which has at its heart the United States of America, which is the
most powerful state on the planet.
It is perfectly understandable that Russia is not going to want that military alliance
on its doorstep. Here in the United States, we have, as you well know, what's called,
the Monroe Doctrine. And that basically says, no great powers from Europe or Asia are
allowed to come into our neighborhood and form a military alliance with anybody in this neighborhood.
When I was young, there was this thing called the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviets had the audacity to put nuclear arm missiles in Cuba.
We told them in no uncertain terms that that was not acceptable and that those missiles had to be removed.
This is our backyard and we do not tolerate
distant great powers coming into our neighborhood.
Well, what's good for the goose is good for the gander.
And if we don't like great powers coming into our neighborhood,
it's hardly surprising that the Russians
did not want NATO on their doorstep.
They made that manifestly clear when the Cold War ended and they
exacted a promise from us that we would not expand NATO. And then when we started expanding NATO,
they made it clear after the first tranche in 1999 that they were profoundly unhappy with that.
in 1999 that they were profoundly unhappy with that. They made it clear in 2004 after the second tranche that they were profoundly unhappy with that expansion. And then in April 2008,
when NATO announced that Ukraine and Georgia would become part of NATO, they made it unequivocally clear, not just Putin, that that was not going
to happen.
They were drawing a red line in the sand.
And it is no accident that in August 2008, remember the book arrest summit is April 2008
in August 2008, you had a war between Georgia and Russia.
And that involved that its core NATO expansion. So the Americans and their
allies should have understood by at least August 2008 that continuing to push to bring Ukraine
into NATO was going to lead to disaster. And I would note that there were all sorts of people in the 1990s, like George Cannon,
William Perry, who was Bill Clinton's Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, Paul Nitsa, and so forth, and so on, who argued that NATO expansion would end
up producing a disaster, which it has. I would note that at the famous April 2008 Book of Rest Summit,
where NATO said that Ukraine would be brought into the Alliance, Angela Merkel,
and Nicholas Sarcosi, the German and French leaders, respectively,
opposed that decision. Angela Merkel later said that the reason she opposed it was because she
understood that Putin would interpret it as a declaration of war. Just think about that.
Merkel is telling you that she opposed NATO expansion into Ukraine because she understood
correctly that Putin would see it as a declaration of war.
What did the United States and its friends in Europe do?
They continued to push and push because we thought that we could push NATO expansion down their
throat after 2008 the same way we did in 1999 and 2004. But we were wrong. It all blew up in our face in 2014. And when it blew up in our
face in 2014, what did we do? Did we back off and say, well, maybe the Russians have some
legitimate security interests? No, that's not the way we operate. We continued to double down.
And the end result is that in 2022, you got a war war and as I've argued for a long time now,
we the West are principally responsible for that, not Vladimir Putin.
So the expansion of NATO is primarily responsible?
Yeah, to put it in more general terms, what we were trying to do was turn Ukraine into a Western bulwark on Russia's border.
And it really wasn't NATO expansion alone. NATO expansion was the most important element of our strategy,
but the strategy had two other dimensions. One was EU expansion, and the third was the color revolution. We were trying to force orange revolution in Ukraine
and the basic goal there was to turn Ukraine
into a pro-Western liberal democracy.
And that meant that you'd have Ukraine, if it worked,
as a pro-Western liberal democracy that was in the EU
and that was in NATO.
This was our goal.
And the Russians made it unequivocally clear
Ukraine was not gonna become a Western bulwark
on their border.
And most importantly, they made it clear
that Ukraine in NATO was unacceptable.
Can we talk about the mind of Vladimir Putin? You've mentioned
that this idea that he has aspirations for imperialist conquest that he dreams of empire
is not grounded in reality. He wrote an essay in 2021 about one people.
Do you think there is some degree to which he still dreams of the former Soviet Union reuniting?
No, he's made it clear that anybody with a triple digit IQ
understands that it's nuts to think about recreating the Soviet Union. He thinks it's a tragedy that the Soviet Union fell apart, but as he made clear in that essay, the July 12, 2021 essay, and his
he made clear in speeches before, immediately before he invaded Ukraine, he accepted the breakup of the Soviet Union and he accepted the status quo in Europe,
safe for the fact he did not accept the idea that Ukraine would become part of NATO.
He's been in power for over two decades.
Is there a degree that power can affect a leader's ability to see the world clearly?
As they say, corrupt.
Do you think power is corrupted?
A lot of them are put into a degree.
It's very hard for me to answer that question because I don't know him and I've not studied
him carefully
in terms of his overall performance over the course of, you know, the 23 years that he's been in power.
I've studied him as a strategist
and I've studied how he deals with the West
and, you know, deals with the West, and deals with the international system more generally since 2014.
I think he is a first class strategist.
This is not to say he doesn't make mistakes, and he admits he's made some mistakes. But I think that the West is dealing with a formidable adversary here. And I don't see
any evidence that he's either lost speed off his fastball or that power has corrupted his thinking about strategic affairs. So he has consistently put as a primary concern security
as those United States, he's put for Russia security, making sure that NATO doesn't get close
to its borders. I think that's clear. Yeah. I think is a emphasized early on in our conversation that leaders privilege security or survival over
everything else.
And by the way, he gave a number of talks and press conferences in addition to writing
that famous article that you referred to on July 12, 2021.
So we have a pretty clear record of what he was saying. And I would
argue what he was thinking in the run-up to the war in February 2022. And if you read what he said,
it's quite clear that he privileged security or survival. He was deeply concerned about the security of Russia.
And Russia is a quite vulnerable state in a lot of ways,
especially if you think back to what it looked like in the 1990s.
You know better than I do.
It was in terrible shape.
The Chinese talk about the century of national humiliation.
One could argue that for the Russians,
that was the decade of national humiliation. One could argue that for the Russians, that was the decade of national humiliation. And it took Putin, I think, quite a bit of time to bring the
Russians back from the dead. I think he eventually succeeded, but it took a considerable amount of time.
And I think he understood that he was not playing a particularly strong hand. He was playing something of a weekend, and he had to be very careful, very cautious.
And I think he was.
And I think that's very different than the United States.
The United States was the Unipoll.
It was the most powerful state in the history of the world.
Most powerful state relative to all its possible competitors from roughly 1989, certainly
after December 1991 when the Soviet Union fell apart. Up until I would argue about 2017, we were
incredibly powerful. And even after 2017, up to today, the United States remains the most powerful state in the system. And because of our geographical location,
we are in a terrific situation to survive in any great power competition. So you have a
situation involving the United States that's different than the situation involving Russia. They're just much more vulnerable than we are.
And therefore, I think Putin tends to be more sensitive
about security than any American president in recent times.
Europe on one side, China on the other side,
the complicated situation.
Yeah, and we talked before about 1812
when Polly and invaded and Moscow got burned to the ground.
We talked about World War I where the Russians were actually defeated and surrendered.
And then we talked about 1941 to 1945, where although thankfully the Soviets prevailed,
The Soviets prevailed. It was a close call. I mean, the casualties, the destruction that the Soviet be able to understand full wealth while the idea of bringing Ukraine up to their border really spoke to them.
I don't understand why more Americans don't understand that.
It just, it befuddles me.
I think it has to do with the fact that Americans are not very good at putting themselves
in the shoes of other countries.
And you really, if you're going to be a first class strategist in international politics,
you have to be able to do that.
You have to put yourself in the shoes of the other side and think about how they think
so you don't make foolish mistakes.
And as a starting point, Americans tend to see themselves as the good guys and a set of others is the bad guys
and you have to be able to empathize that Russians think of themselves as the good guys. The Chinese
think of themselves as the good guys and just be able to empathize if they are the good guys.
It's like that funny skit, are we the baddies? Consider that United States could be the bad guys. It's like that funny skit. Are we the baddies? Consider the United States
could be the bad guys. First of all, see the world if the United States is the bad guys
and China is the good guys. What does that world look like? We able to just exist with
that thought because that is what the Chinese leadership and many Chinese citizens, if not now, maybe in the future
will believe.
And you have to kind of do the calculation, the simulation forward from that.
And same with Russia, same with other nations.
Yeah, I agree with you 100%.
And just, you know, I always think of Michael McFall at Stanford, who was the American ambassador
to Russia, I think, between 2012 and
2014. And he told me that he told Putin that Putin didn't have to worry about NATO expansion,
because the United States was a benign hegemon. And I asked my, what Putin's response was to that.
And Mike said that Putin didn't believe it.
But Mike believed that he should believe it, and that we could move NATO eastward to include Ukraine.
And in the end, we'd get away with it because we are a benign head
your mom. But the fact is that's not what Putin saw. Putin saw us as a
malign head your mom. And what Mike thinks or any American thinks doesn't
matter. What matters is what Putin thinks. But also the drums of war have been
beating for some reason. NATO expansion has been threatened for some reason.
So you've talked about NATO expansion being dead.
So like it doesn't make sense from a geopolitical perspective on the Europe side to expand NATO.
But nevertheless that threat has been echoed.
So why has NATO expansion been pushed from your perspective?
There are two reasons. One is, first of all, we thought it was a wonderful thing to bring
more and more countries in NATO. We thought that it facilitated peace and prosperity. It was ultimately all for the good.
And we also thought that countries like Ukraine
had a right to join NATO.
These are sovereign countries that can decide for themselves
and the Russians have no say in what Ukraine wants to do.
And then finally, and this is a point I emphasized before, no say in what Ukraine wants to do.
And then finally, and this is a point I emphasized before, we were very powerful and we thought
we could shove it down their throat.
So it's a combination of those factors that led us to pursue what I think was ultimately
a foolish policy.
We've talked about how wars get started.
How do you hope the war in Ukraine ends?
What are the ways to end this war?
What are the ways that Chief Peace there to end the, I would say, senseless death of young
men as always happens in the war.
I'm sad to say I don't have a good answer to that.
I don't think there's any real prospect of a meaningful peace agreement.
I think it's almost impossible.
I think the best you can hope for at this point is it's some point in the shooting stops,
you have ceasefire, and then you have a frozen conflict.
And that frozen conflict will not be highly stable.
And the Ukrainians and the West will do everything they can
to weaken Russia's position.
And the Russians will go to Great Lakes
to not only damage that dysfunctional rumstate
that Ukraine becomes, but the Russians will go to Great Lakes
to sow dissension within the alliance.
And that includes in terms of transatlantic relations. So you'll have this
continuing security competition between Russia on one side and Ukraine and the West on the other,
even when you get a frozen peace, or you get a frozen conflict, and the potential for escalation there will be great.
So I think this is a disaster.
That's a very realist perspective.
Let me ask you sort of the human side of it.
Do you think there's some power to leaders sitting down, having a conversation, man to man,
leader to leader about this.
There is just a lot of death happening.
It seems that from an economic perspective,
from a historic perspective, both nations are losing,
is it possible for a lot of Resolensky and Vladimir Putin
to sit down and talk and to figure out a way
where the security concerns are addressed and both nations can minimize the amount of suffering
that's happening and create a path towards future flourishing.
and create a path towards fissure flourishing. I think the answer is no.
Even with the United States involved.
Three people in the room.
Well, I think if the United States is involved, the answer is definitely no.
You have to get the Americans out.
And then I think if you have Solansky and Putin talking,
you know, you have a sliver of a chance there.
The Americans are a real problem.
Look, let's go back to what happens right after the war starts.
Okay?
As I said before, this is, we're talking March, early April of 2022.
The war starts on February 24, 2022.
And as I said to you, the two sides were negotiating in a stumble,
and they were also negotiating through Nufftali Bennett. And the Bennett track and the Turkish
track were operating together. I mean, they were not across purposes at all. What happened? Bennett tells the story very clearly that they had made significant
progress in reaching an agreement. This is Zelensky on one side and Putin on the other. Bennett
is talking in person to both Putin and Zelensky. And what happens to produce failure? The answer is the United States
and Britain get involved and tells the Lensky to walk. They tell Zelensky to walk. If they had come
in and encouraged Zelensky to try to figure out a way with Putin to shut this one down and work with Bennett and worked with
Erdogan, we might have been able to shut the war down then, but it was the United States.
Well, let me sort of push back on the, you're correct, but the United States paints this
like picture that everybody's aligned. So I, maybe you can correct me, but I believe in the power of individuals, especially individual leaders.
Again, whether it's Biden or Trump or whoever goes into a room and
says
in a way that's convincing that no more NATO expansion and
actually just in a basic human level
Ask the question of why are we doing all this
senseless killing?
And look at the interest of one, Russia, look at the interest of the other, Ukraine.
They're interested pretty simple and say, the United States is going to stay out of this.
We're not going to expand NATO.
And say all that in a way that's convincing,
which is NATO expansion is silly at this point.
China is the big threat.
We're not going to do this kind of conflict escalation with Russia.
The Cold War is over.
Let's normalize relations.
Let me just embellish your argument.
Okay. Thank you.
Thank you.
I need it.
If we say there's a sliver of a chance
that you can do this,
and I do think there is a sliver of a chance,
let me just embellish your point.
Thank you.
You know all the help I can get.
Two things have to be done here in my opinion.
One is, Ukraine has to become neutral. And it has to
completely sever all security ties with the West. It's not like you can say we're not going to
expand NATO to include Ukraine, but we're going to continue
to have some blue security arrangement with Ukraine.
None of that has to be completely severed.
Ukraine has to be on its own.
Okay.
And number two, Ukraine has to accept the fact that the Russians are going to keep the
four Oblos that they've now annexed
and cremated.
The Russians are not going to give them back.
What you really want to do, if you're Zelensky or who's ever running Ukraine in this scenario
that we're positing, is you want to make sure the Russians don't take another four Oblos
to include Archive and Odessa, right? If I'm playing Putin's hand and this war goes on,
I'm thinking about taking four more Obloss. I want to take about 43% of Ukraine and annex it to Russia,
right? And I certainly want Odessa, and I certainly want Harkey. And I want the two
old boss in between as well, right? Literally or as leverage and negotiation. No, I want them
literally. I want to conquer them literally. But my point to you is if we can begin to talk about cutting a deal now, you may be able
to head that kind of aggression off at the past.
In other words, you may be able to limit Putin and Russia to annexing the four-o-bloss
that they've now annexed plus Crimea.
That's the best I think you can hope for.
But the point is you have to get
the Ukrainians to accept that. You have to get the Ukrainians to accept becoming a truly neutral
state and conceiting that the Russians keep a big chunk of territory. It's about 23 percent
of Ukrainian territory that they've annexed. And I find it hard to imagine any Ukrainian leader agreeing to that.
Well, there could be more nuanced things like no military involvement between the United
States and Ukraine, but economic involvement, sort of financial support, so normalizing
economic relationships with Ukraine, with Russia.
I think you could probably get away with that.
I think the tricky question there that you would have to answer is what about EU expansion,
right? And I think EU expansion is probably a no-no for the Russians because most people
don't recognize this, but there is a military dimension built in to EU expansion. It's not purely an economic alliance or relationship
or institution, whatever word you want to use. There's a military dimension to that. And
in the run-up to the war, actually in the run-up to the 2014 crisis when it first broke out, the Russians made it clear
they saw EU expansion as a stalking horse for NATO expansion. So EU expansion is tricky. But I
think your point of close economic relations between or healthy economic relations to use a better term between Ukraine and the West is possible.
I think the Russians have a vested interest in if it's a neutral Ukraine they have a vested interest in that Ukraine flourishing
But that then brings us back to the territorial issue, right?
well, so
Do you believe it's possible for individual human relations to
counteract the structural forces that you talk about?
So meaning the leaders being able to pick up the phone and make
agreements that are good for humanity as a whole and for their
individual nations and along.
I think leadership matters here.
and for their individual nations and the long. I think leadership matters here.
I mean, one of the real problems here is that there's no trust
and on the Russian side, and that has to do
with the Minsk agreements, the Minsk agreements,
which were designed to shut down the Civil War in eastern Ukraine in the Donbass.
Really mattered to the Russians.
And there were four players involved in the men's process, four main players, Russia and
Ukraine, of course, and in Germany and France. And I believe the Russians took the Minsk Accords seriously.
I believe Putin took them very seriously.
He wanted to shut down that conflict.
And Angela Merkel, Francois Hollande, he was the French leader,
and Porte Chancault, who was the Ukrainian leader, those were the
three key players besides Putin. Again, Poland, France, Merkel from Germany, and Portechenko
from Ukraine, have all explicitly said they were not seriously interested in reaching
an agreement in all of the discussions with Putin. They were bamboozling him.
They were trying to trick him so that they would buy time to build up Ukraine's military.
Putin is profoundly upset about these admissions by these three leaders. He believes he was fooled into thinking that
Minsk could work. He believes that he negotiated good faith and they did not. And he believes
that the level of trust now between Russia and the West is virtually zero as a result
of this experience over Minsk. I only bring this up
because it cuts against your argument that leaders could pick up the phone and
talk to each other and trust each other at least somewhat to work out a meaningful
deal. If you're Putin at this point in time, trusting the West is not an idea that's
going to be very attractive at all. In fact, you're going to distrust anything they say.
Yeah, distrust any of the West say, but there is individual humans. The way human nature
works is when you sit across from a person, you can trust a human being while still distrusting the West. I mean, I believe in the power of that. I think with the right leaders, you
could sit down and talk like over override the general structural distrust of the West
and say, you know what, I like this guy or gal, whatever. I the lens came Putin sit down together and talk have multiple talks
Just remember they were doing that in March and the Americans came in and the British came in yeah, and they scotch the potential deal
well
The other beautiful thing about human nature is forgiveness and there's trying again.
When you're the leader of a country in an anarchic system, you have to be very careful,
not to let your trust in a foreign leader take you too far, because if that foreign leader betrays you or betrays
your trust and stabs you in the back, you could die.
And again, you want to remember that the principle responsibility of any leader, I don't care
what country it is, is to ensure the survival of their state.
And that means that trust is only going to buy you so much. And when
you've already betrayed the trust of a leader, you really are not going to be able to rely
on trust very much to help you moving forward. Now, you disagree with that? I hope you're
right. And if they can shut down the Ukraine Russia war, it would be wonderful.
If I'm proved dead wrong, that would be wonderful news. My prediction that this war is going to go
on for a long time and end in an ugly way is a prediction that I don't like at all. So I hope I'm And, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, Can you explain? Well, a lot of people thought when they were having all that trouble, the Russians were having
all that trouble with pregozion and the Wagner group that Putin was vulnerable and was likely
to be overthrown.
And what would happen is a peace loving leader would replace Putin.
I made two points at the time
and I would make those same two points now.
Number one, he's not likely to be overthrown.
He was not likely then to be overthrown.
And I think, you know, as long as his health holds up, I think he will remain in power.
My second point is, if he doesn't remain in power and he's replaced, I would bet a lot
of money that his replacement will be more hawkish and more hard-line than Putin is.
I actually think one could argue that Putin was too trusting of the West before
the war started. And number two, I think one could argue that he has not waged the war
against Ukraine as vigorously as one might have expected. He was slow to mobilize the nation for war, and he has pursued a limited
war in all sorts of ways. The Israelis, for example, have killed more civilians in Gaza in one
month than the Russians have killed over 18 months in Ukraine. The idea that Vladimir Putin is
waging a punishment campaign and killing on purpose large numbers of civilians is simply not true.
All this is to say that I would imagine that if Putin leaves office and someone else comes into replace him, that someone else will
be at least, if not more hard-lined than him in terms of waging the war and certainly
will not trust the West any more than he has.
By way of advice, let me ask you, if I were to have a conversation interview Vladimir Putin and Zelensky individually,
what should I ask them?
If you, me and Vladimir Putin are having a chat, what are good ideas to explore, what are
good questions to ask, what are good things to say on or off the mic once again that could potentially
even slightly lessen the amount of suffering in the world caused by this war?
Well, I think if you get an interview with Adam here Putin, there's just all sorts of questions
you could ask him. And my sense is that Putin is a straight shooter. He's also very knowledgeable
about history, and he has simple theories in his head about how the world works, and I think
he would level with you, and all you would have to do is just figure out what all the right questions
are. And that would not be hard to do, right? You could ask him, why was he so foolish?
You know, you could ask him, why was he so foolish?
This is for example, why was he so foolish to trust Poroshenko, Holand and Merkel in the Minsk courts?
You know, why after his famous talk at Munich in 2007
where he made it clear that he was so unhappy with the West, after his famous talk at Munich in 2007,
where he made it clear that he was so unhappy with the West, did he continue to,
in a very important way, trust the West,
why didn't he mobilize the Russian military
before late September, 2022?
Once the negotiations that we were talking about before involving
this thombole and Naftali bin and once they broke down, you know, why didn't he immediately
mobilize more of the Russian population to fight the war and just all sorts of questions
like that. And then you could ask them questions about where he sees this one headed.
What's the best strategy for Russia if the Ukrainians will not agree to neutrality?
People like John Mirscharmus say, you'll probably take close to half of Ukraine.
Is that true?
Does it make sense to take Odessa?
And John Myrsharmer also has questions about China.
Your future relationships with China.
Yeah.
I mean, one really important question that I would ask him is, if the United States had
basically not driven you into the arms of the Chinese, if there
had been no war over Ukraine, and the United States had, and its European allies had gone
a considerable length to create some sort of security architecture in Europe that resulted
in you Vladimir Putin having good relations with Ukraine.
What would your relations with China be?
And you know, how would you think about that?
So there are just plenty of questions you could ask him.
Well, Hope burns eternal in my heart. I think probably in Putin's heart in Zelensky's heart, I hope.
in my heart, I think probably in Putin's heart in Zelensky's heart, I hope.
Because hope is the leap of trust that we've talked about, I think, is necessary for de-escalation and for peace. You realize I have, from the beginning, argued for different policies
that were all designed to prevent this war from ever happening. Yes. I don't know if you know this, but in 1993, I argued that Ukraine should keep its nuclear
weapons.
I was probably the only person in the West who made that argument.
In my argument in 1993, this is in foreign affairs, was that there may come the day when
Russia thinks about invading Ukraine.
And should that day come, it would be very
helpful for preventing war if Ukraine had nuclear weapons. So military might is essential for
maintaining a balance of power and peace. Well, if you're interested in deterring an adversary,
if I'm worried about you coming after me, the best way to deter you is to have military might. And if you're Russia and I'm Ukraine, I'm far weaker than you. Right. And having
a nuclear deterrent would be very effective at convincing you not to attack me. Because
if you attack me, you're threatening my survival. And that's the one circumstance where it is
likely that I would use nuclear weapons to defend myself. And that's the one circumstance where it is likely that I would use nuclear
weapons to defend myself. And given the consequences of nuclear use, you would be reluctant in the
extreme to attack me. So that's why I argued in 93 that if Ukraine kept its nuclear weapons
that made war down the road much less likely. And I believe I was correct.
And in fact, Bill Clinton, who played the key role in forcing Ukraine to give up its
nuclear weapons, now says he has said it publicly.
You can find it on YouTube that he made a mistake doing that.
Furthermore, I argued in 2014 that it made eminently good sense not to continue to push to bring
Ukraine and to NATO because the end result is that Ukraine would be destroyed and Ukraine
is being destroyed.
So I was deeply interested in time in making sure that that didn't happen for the good of
the Ukrainians not to mention because stability in Europe is a net positive for almost
everybody involved. But people did not listen to me then either. How did nuclear weapons change
the calculus of offensive realism because of mutually shared destruction? I mean, it's not just
military might. It's just so destructive that you basically can't use nuclear weapons unless you want
complete destruction.
There's no question that the presence of nuclear weapons makes it much less likely. I'm choosing my words carefully here,
much less likely that a great power would address against another great power. It doesn't take that possibility off the table,
but it makes it much less likely because of the reasons
that you articulated.
But with regard to nuclear use, it's an interesting question
how you think about nuclear use in a mad world.
I mean, your point that we're in a mad world is
that's mad capital MAD as well as MAD small letters. But let's stick to the capital letters. We're in a world of mutual assured destruction. There's no question that in that world
it's unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used.
But the way you use nuclear weapons in that world is you use them for manipulation of
risk purposes, demonstration effect.
You put both sides out on the slippery slope.
Now what exactly am I saying here?
Let me talk about NATO doctrine during the Cold War. We lived in a mad world.
United States and Soviet Union were the Warsaw Pact and NATO.
Both had an assured destruction capability, so you had mutual assured destruction.
If the Warsaw Pact were to invade Western Europe, and here we're talking about West Germany, and NATO was losing the war.
We said that we would use nuclear weapons. How would we use nuclear weapons, given that
we were in a mad world? The argument was that we would use a handful of nuclear weapons
against the war so packed. Not necessarily against their military forces could be
in a remote area. We would use a small number of nuclear weapons to signal to the Soviets that we
were deadly serious about putting an end to their offensive. And that we were throwing both sides out on the slippery slope to oblivion.
In other words, we were manipulating risk. And the last clear chance to avoid Armageddon
rested with them. And then we would tell them that if you retaliated with a handful of nuclear weapons and you
didn't cease your offensive against West Germany, we would watch a small, another nuclear attack.
We would explode a handful more of nuclear weapons. All for the purposes of showing you our resolve.
All for the purposes of showing you our resolve. So this is the manipulation of risk strategy.
And a lot of the language I just used in describing it to you is language that Thomas Shelling invented.
Now, fast forward to the present.
If Russia were you losing in Ukraine, that's the one scenario where I think Russia would have used nuclear weapons.
And the question is, how would Russia have used nuclear weapons? Again, we're assuming
that the Russians are losing to the Ukrainians. I believe they would have pursued a manipulation
of risk strategy. They would have used four or five, three or four who knows nuclear weapons.
Maybe just one rural area know, a rural area
that kills very few people.
Yes, exactly.
And basically, that would spook everybody.
The Americans.
Just the mushroom cloud.
Yeah, it's because of the threat of escalation.
Right.
Again, your point is we're in a mad world.
I accept that.
And if you have limited nuclear use, right?
We understand hardly anything about nuclear
escalation because thank goodness we've never had a nuclear war. So once you throw both sides out
on the slippery slope, even if you only use one nuclear weapon in your scenario, you don't know what
the escalation dynamics look like. So everybody has a powerful
incentive to put an end to the conflict right away. I might add to you that there were people
who believed that we would not even initiate a manipulation of risk strategy in Europe if we were losing to the Warsaw Pact or in the
Cold War.
Both Henry Kissinger and Robert McNamara said after leaving office that they would not
have done it.
They would have not initiated nuclear use, even limited nuclear use.
That's when we're talking about here.
They would rather be
red than dead, right? That was the argument. Too risky. Too risky. That's exactly right. But if
they had used one nuclear weapon in your story or three or four in my story, everybody would have
said, Oh my God, we've got to shut this one down immediately. I only tell you this story
or layout, this scenario, as an answer to your question of how you use nuclear weapons
in a mad world. And this is the answer.
I, this is all very terrifying. Perhaps in part, it's terrifying to me because I can see in the 21st century China, Russia, Israel, United
States using a nuclear weapon in this way.
Blowing it up somewhere in the middle of nowhere that kills maybe nobody.
But I'm terrified of seeing the mushroom cloud and not knowing what given social media, given how fast news travels,
what the escalation looks like there. Just in a matter of minutes, how the news travels,
and how the leaders react, is terrifying that this little demonstration of power
The ripple effects of it in a matter of minutes seconds what that leads to
Because it's like it's human emotions. It's a you you see the landscape of human emotions
the leaders and the populace and the and the way news are reported and then the landscape of risk as you mentioned
shifting like the world's most intense nonlinear dynamical system.
And it's just terrifying because the entirety of human civilization hangs in the balance
there.
And it's like this, like hundreds of millions of people could be dead.
Let's just talk about this in the context of the Ukraine war.
If the Russians were losing, as I said before, which is not the case anymore, but in 2022,
it did look like that.
If the Russians are losing and they turn to nuclear weapons, the question is,
how do they use them? And they would use them in Ukraine. And because Ukraine has no nuclear
weapons of its own, Ukraine cannot retaliate. It's not a mutual assured destruction world. It's a case where one side
has nuclear weapons and the other doesn't. That means that the Russians are likely to
think that they can get away with using nuclear weapons in ways that would not be the case
if they were attacking NATO. And therefore, it makes nuclear use more likely. Okay, that's point one. Point two is,
let's assume that the Russians use two or three nuclear weapons in a remote area.
I'm following the question, by the way. This is a commentary. The question terrifying.
Yeah, the question then is, what does the West do? Now, Macron has said in Biden is also,
I think, implicitly made this clear, we would not
retaliate with nuclear weapons if the Russians were to attack with a handful of nuclear weapons
in Western Ukraine.
But then the question is, what would we do?
And if you listen to David Petraeus, what David Petraeus says is that we should attack the Russian naval assets in the Black Sea
and attack Russian forces in Ukraine. Well, once you do that, you have a great power war.
You have needle versus Russia, which is another way of saying you have the United States versus Russia.
We're now in a great power war.
They have nuclear weapons, we have nuclear weapons, they've used nuclear weapons.
What is the happy ending here?
And just to take it a step further and go back to our earlier discussion about moving NATO
up to Russia's borders.
The point I made, which you surely agree with, is that the Russians
are very fearful when they see NATO coming up to their border. Well, here's a case where
not only is NATO come up to their border, but they're in a war with NATO right on their
border. What do the escalation dynamics look like there? You know what the answer is? Who knows?
That should scare the living, but Jesus out of you, right?
And some of it could be like you mentioned unintended that could be unintended consequences. There could be a Russian missile misses and his Poland
These kinds of things that just escalate misunderstandings, miscommunications
even a I mean nuclear weapon could be, boy, it could have been planned to go location x and it went to
a location y that ended up actually killing a very large number of people. I mean, just
the escalation that happens, it just happens in a matter of minutes,
and the only way to stop that is communication
between leaders.
And that to me is a big argument
for ongoing communication.
You know, there's a story during the Cuban Missile Crisis
Kennedy put out the word, no aircraft,
under any circumstances, or to penetrate Soviet airspace.
And he then found out a few days later that some guy had the message and had penetrated
in an aircraft deep into Soviet airspace. And this supports your basic point that, you know, bad things happen.
And again, the overarching point here is we've never done this before, thankfully.
Therefore, we don't have a lot of experiences to how it plays itself out.
It's really a theoretical enterprise because there's no empirical basis for talking about escalation
in a nuclear crisis.
And that, of course, is a wonderful thing.
Well, in general, the human species as a whole is a one-off, is a theoretical enterprise.
The survival of the human species.
We've seen empires rise and fall, but we haven't seen the human species. You know, we've seen Empire's
rise and fall, but we haven't seen the human species rise and fall. So far it's been rising,
but it's not obvious that it doesn't end. In fact, I think about aliens a lot,
the fact that we don't see aliens makes me suspect that it's not so easy to survive
in this complicated world of ours. Switching gears a
little bit and going to a different part of the world also engulfed in war. Let me ask you about the
situation in Israel. Why did Hamas attack Israel on October 7th 2023? As you understand the situation,
on October 7th, 2023. As you understand the situation, what was the reason that attacked happened? Well, I think the main reason was that you had this suffocating
occupation. I think as long as the occupation persists, the Palestinians are going to resist. As you well know, this is not
the first time there has been a Palestinian uprising. There was the first intifada, there was the
second intifada. Now there's October 7th, and their uprising's, besides those three. So this is not terribly surprising. A lot of people hypothesized
that this attack was due to the fact that the Israelis, the Saudis, the Americans were
working together to foster another Abraham Accord, and that the Palestinians would in effect be
sold down the river. I think given the fact that this was in the planning stages for
probably about two years, and the Abraham Accords with regard to Saudi Arabia are relatively
new phenomenon. I don't think that's the main driving force here.
I think the main driving force is that the Palestinians feel oppressed as they should and that
this was a resistance move. They were resisting the Israeli occupation.
the Israeli occupation. So that resistance, the attack involved killing a large number of Israeli civilians. There's many questions to ask there, but one is, do you think Hamas
fully understood what the retaliation will involve from Israel and to Gaza. They had to understand. I mean, you had, you know, Operation Cast Lead in 2008, 2009.
It started, I think, right after Christmas 2008 and it ended right before President Obama
took office in January 2009. And the Israelis periodically do what they call mowing the lawn where they go into Gaza
and they pound the Palestinians to remind them that they're not supposed to rise up because
any problem. So there's no question in my mind that the Hamas forces understood
full well that the Israelis would retaliate and they would retaliate for us as they have done.
Yeah, even the metaphor of a moment of law is disturbing to me in many ways.
Therefore, a moment of law, there's disturbing to me in many ways. I actually saw Norman Focustin, I think, say that, well, then if you use that metaphor,
then you could say that Hamas was also a moment of law.
It's such a horrific image because the result on either side is just the death of civilians.
I mean, let me ask you about the death of civilians. So during the attack,
1400 Israelis were killed, over 240 were taken hostage, and then in response,
as we sit today, Israel's military response has killed over 10,000 people in Gaza and
Given the nature of the demographics is it's a very heavily young population over 40% of them are under the age of 18 of those killed
That's of course according to Ministry of Health of Palestinian Authority
So what do you think is the long-term effect on the prospect of peace when so many civilians
die?
I mean, I think it's disastrous.
I mean, the only way you're going to get peace here is if you have a two-state solution where the Palestinians have a sovereign state
of their own and there is a sovereign Jewish state.
And these two states live side by side.
American presidents since Jimmy Carter have understood this full well and this is why we
have pushed very hard for two-state solution.
Indeed, many American Jews and many Israelis have pushed for for two-state solution. Indeed, many American Jews and many Israelis
have pushed for a two-state solution, because they think that that is the only way you're going to get
peace between the two sides. But what's happened here is that in recent years,
the Israelis have lost all interest in a two-state solution.
And it's in large part because the political center
of gravity in Israel has steadily moved to the right.
When I was a young boy, the political center of gravity
in Israel was much further to the left than it is today.
And it is in a position now, the political center of gravity, where
there's hardly any support for two-state solution. And Netanyahu and the rest of the people
in his government were in favor or are in favor of a greater Israel. There's just no question about that. Well, on top of that, you now have had a war, where as you described, huge numbers of civilians
have been killed.
And you already had bad blood between the Palestinians and the Israelis before this conflict, and you could imagine how people on each side now feel about
people on the other side.
So even if you didn't have this opposition inside Israel to a two-state solution, how could
you possibly get the Israelis now to agree to a two-state solution. I think for the foreseeable future,
the animosity inside Israel towards the Palestinians
is so great that it is impossible to move the Israelis
in that direction.
And the Israelis here are the key players,
more so than the Palestinians,
because it's the Israelis who control greater Israel.
It's the Israelis who you have to convince.
Now I wanna be clear here,
you also ultimately have to get around the fact
that Hamas is not committed to a two-state solution.
But I think that problem could be dealt with.
It's important to understand that Arifat and the PLO
was once adamantly opposed to a two-state solution,
but Arifat came around to understand that that was really the only hope for settling this,
and he became a proponent of a two-state solution.
And that's true of Makhmoud Abbas, who runs the PA in the West Bank.
It's not true of Allah at this point in time.
They want a one-state solution, they want a Palestinian state.
And of course, the Israelis want a one-state solution too, which is a Jewish state that
controls all of greater Israel.
So the question is, can you get some sort of agreement, and I think to get to your, the
number of your question, given what's just happened, it's almost impossible to imagine that happening anytime soon.
The cynical perspective here is that those in power benefit from conflict while the people
on both sides suffer, is there a degree of truth to that?
Or for the people in power to maintain power conflict needs to continue?
No, I don't believe that.
I mean, just to take the Netanyahu government or any Israeli government that maintains
the occupation, what you want is you want a Palestinian population that submits to Israeli
domination of greater Israel.
You don't want resistance.
You don't want an interferedah.
You don't want what happened on October 7th.
In fact, I think one of the principal reasons that the Israelis are pounding Gaza and killing
huge numbers of civilians, punishing the civilian population in ways that clearly violate the laws of war,
is because they want the Palestinians to understand that they are not allowed to rise up and resist
the occupation. That's their goal. So I think the Israelis would prefer that the Palestinians roll over
and accept submission in terms of the people who live in Gaza to include the elites and the people who live in
the West Bank to include the elites, they would much prefer to move to some sort of situation
where the Palestinians have a state of their own.
I think in the case of the PA under a boss, they would accept a two-state
solution. I think what at this point in time, Hamas wants is a one-state solution, but they
want peace, all of them want peace, you know, the two different sets of leadership in Palestine
and the Israelis. So you think Hamas wants peace? Sure, but on its own terms. That's the point. What does peace look like for Hamas?
At this point in time, I think peace basically means a greater Israel controlled by Palestine or Palestinians.
So essentially, I mean, it's the whole land is called Palestine and there's no Israel.
I think at this point in time that's their principal goal. I do believe, and there have been hints over time, Jimmy Carter has said this, that Hamas
can be convinced that a two-state solution, assuming that the Palestinians get a viable state
of their own, that Hamas would buy into that.
Can we say that with a high degree of certainty?
No, but I think the Israelis should have pursued
that possibility. They should have worked with the boss. They should have worked with the
boss to do everything they can to facilitate a two-state solution. Because I think ultimately,
that's an Israel's interest. Now, the Israeli government and most Israelis at this point in time,
I believe, don't agree with that.
What do you think of Israel starting the ground invasion of Gaza recently on October 27th?
The question is, should they continue until they have finally defeated Hamas.
There are all sorts of reports in the media,
including in the Israeli media,
that they're not gonna be allowed by the United States
to continue this offensive for much more than a few weeks.
The Israelis have been saying it's gonna take in the best of all possible worlds,
a number of months, if not a year, to finish off Hamas. Well, it doesn't look like they're going to
have enough time to do that. I doubt whether they can finish off Hamas, even if they're given the time.
I think they're going to run into fierce resistance.
And when they run into fierce resistance, and large numbers of Israelis start to die,
they'll lose their appetite for this.
And they, the Israelis, surely know at this point in time that even if they finish off
Hamas, even if I'm wrong and they're able to finish off Hamas, another group is going to rise up to resist the occupation.
The idea that you can use with Zee Vyabotinsky called the Iron Wall to beat the Palestinians
into submission is delusional.
It's just not going to happen. The Palestinians want a state
of their own. They don't want to live under occupation. And there's no military solution
for Israel here. There has to be a political solution. And the only viable political solution
is a two-state solution. I mean, you can't go to democracy. You can't go to a situation where you give the Palestinians equal rights inside a greater
Israel in large part because there are now as many Palestinians as there are Israeli Jews
and over time the balance, the demographic balance shifts against the Israeli Jews and
in favor of the Palestinians, in which
K-shell end up with a Palestinian state in greater Israel.
So democracy for all doesn't work.
The Israelis, I believe, are quite interested in ethnic cleansing.
I think they saw this recent set of events as an opportunity to cleanse Gaza, but that's
not going to happen. The Jordanians and the Egyptians have made it clear that that's
not happening. The United States has now made it clear that that's not happening. And
the Palestinians will not leave. They'll die in place. So ethnic cleansing doesn't work.
So you're really left with two alternatives,
a two-state solution or a greater Israel
that is effectively in apartheid state.
I mean, that's what the occupation has led to.
And all sorts of people have been predicting this
for a long, long time.
And you've now reached the point.
Here in the United States, if you say that Israel is in apartheid state, that's going to
get you into all sorts of trouble.
But the fact is that human rights watch, amnesty international, and bicellum, which is the
leading Israeli human rights group.
All three of those institutions or organizations have issued detailed reports
making the case that Israel is an apartheid state. Furthermore, if you read the Israeli
media, right, all sorts of Israelis, including Israeli leaders, refer to Israel as an apartheid
state. It's not that unusual to hear that term used in Israel. This is disastrous
for Israel, in my opinion. And Steve Walton, I said this, by the way, when we wrote the
Israel lobby, that Israel is an apartheid state, which is equivalent to Israel as an occupier,
is not good for Israel. And that brings us back to the two-state solution. But as you and I were talking
about a few minutes ago, it's hard to see how you get a two-state solution. And the
end result of this conversation is utter despair.
Because the path to a two-state solution is blocked by the amount of hate that's created
by civilian deaths. That plus the fact that the Israeli government is filled with people who have no interest in a
two-state solution. They are ideologically deeply committed to a greater Israel. They want all the
land between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea to be part of a Jewish state.
They're just ideologically committed to that. And of course, as we were talking about before
with regard to Hamas, Hamas wants everything between the river and the sea to be a Palestinian state.
to be a Palestinian state. And you know, when you have two sides with those kinds of views,
right, you're in deep trouble because there's a little room for compromise. So what you have to do to get this to work is you have to convince the Israelis that it's in their interest to have a
two-state solution. And you've already taken care of the PA on this front,
the Palestinian Authority, but you've got to convince Hamas
that its maximalist goals are not going to work,
and it's in its interest to follow in the footsteps
of Arifat and accept a two-state solution.
But even if you do that at this point,
let's say that there's a lot of willingness intellectually
on both sides to do that.
The problem is that the hatred that has been fueled by this recent, this ongoing conflict
is so great that it's just hard to imagine how you can make a two-state solution work
at this juncture. That's why I've sort of taken to saying, and I hope I'm wrong here, that on the
two-state solution, that boat has sailed. It's no longer possible.
Well, again, I believe in leadership, and there's other parties to play here, other nations,
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, other players in the Middle East that can help,
that can help through a normalization of relationships and these kinds of things.
There's always hope, like you said, slither of hope.
Slither of hope.
I think human civilization progresses forward by taking advantage of all the slithers it
can get.
Let me ask you about, you mentioned the Israel lobby or a book,
probably your most controversial book on the topic. Not probably. Clearly the most controversial
book I ever wrote. So you've criticized Israel lobby in the United States for influencing US
policy. In the Middle East, can you explain what the Israel lobby is? Their influence and your criticism over the past, let's say a couple decades.
Well, the argument that Steve Walt and I made actually we wrote an article first in which
appeared in the London Review of Books, and then we wrote the book itself. Our argument is that the lobby is a loose coalition of individuals and organizations that
push American policy in a pro-Israel direction.
And basically the lobby is interested in getting Israel, excuse me, getting the United
States, and he were talking mainly about the American government, to support Israel no
matter what Israel does.
And our argument is that if you look at the relationship between the United States and
Israel, it's unprecedented in modern history. This is the closest relationship that you can find between any two countries in recorded
history.
It's truly amazing the extent to which Israel and the United States are joined at the
hip.
And we support Israel no matter what, almost all the time.
And our argument is that that is largely due to the influence of the lobby.
The lobby is an extremely powerful interest group.
Now, it's very important to understand that the American political system is set up in ways that allow
interest groups of all sorts to wield great influence. So in the United States, you have an
interest group or a lobby like the National Rifle Association. It makes it well-ni-impossible it, well, now impossible to get gun control. And so with the Israel lobby, you have this group
of individuals and organizations that wield enormous influence on US policy toward the Middle
East. And this is not surprising given the nature of the American political system.
So our argument is that bilabi is not doing anything that's illegal or illicit or immoral
or unethical.
It's just a good old-fashioned American interest group and it just happens to be extremely powerful.
And our argument is that this is not good for the United States, because no two countries
have the same interests all the time.
And when our interests conflict with Israel's interests, we should be able to do what we
think is in our national interest, and America's national interest.
But the lobby tends to conflate America's national interest with Israel's national interest
and wants the United States to support Israel no matter what.
We also argue, and I cannot emphasize this enough, given what's going on in the world today that the lobby's effects, the lobby has not been pushing
policies that are in Israel's interests.
So our argument is that the lobby, right, the lobby pushes policies that are not in America's
interests or not in Israel's interests.
Now you're saying to yourself, what exactly does he mean by that?
What every president since Jimmy Carter has tried to do, as I said before, is to foster a
two-state solution, to push Israel, which is the dominant player in greater Israel. Push Israel
to accept the two-state solution. And we have run into huge resistance from the lobby.
Whenever we tried to, let's be blunt about it,
of course Israel, right?
In a perfect world where there was no lobby
and an American president was free to put pressure
on Israel, to course Israel,
I believe we would have gone a long way towards getting
two-state solution. And I believe this would have been an Israel's interest.
But we couldn't get a two-state solution because it was almost impossible to put meaningful
pressure on Israel because of the lobby. So this was not an Israel's interest and it was not an America's interest.
And that was the argument that we made and we of course got huge pushback for making
that argument.
What's the underlying motivation of the lobby?
Is it religious in nature?
Is it similar to the way war hawks are sort of militaristic in nature?
Is it nationalistic in nature?
What's... If you were to describe the
loose coalition of people, what would you say is their motivation? Well, first of all, I think you
have to distinguish between Jews and Christians. You want to remember that there are a huge number of
Christians, Zionists, who are deeply committed to Israel, no matter what, right? And then there are
a large number of Jews.
The Jews, they're obviously the most important of those two groups in the Israel lobby.
But you know, one of the arguments that we made in the book is that you should not call
it the Jewish lobby because it's not populated just by Jews. And Christians, I and this
are an important part of that lobby. But furthermore,
there are a good number of Jews who are opposed to the lobby and the policies that the lobby
pervays. And there are a number of Jews who are prominent anti-Zionists, right? So and they're obviously not in the lobby or if you take a group like
Jewish voice for peace, right? Jewish voice for peace is not in the lobby. So it's wrong to call it a
Jewish lobby. But with regard to the American Jews who are in that lobby, I think that really
this is all about nationalism. It's not so much religion.
Many of those Jews who are influential in the lobby are not religious in any meaningful
sense of that term, but they self-identify as Jewish in the sense that they feel they're
part of a Jewish nation. And that in addition to being an American, right, they are part of this
tribe, this nation called Jews, and that they have a responsibility to push
the United States in ways that support the Jewish state. So I think that's what
drives most, if not almost, to all the Jews. This is not to say there's not a religious dimension for some of them,
but I think that the main connection is much more tribal in nature.
So I had a conversation with Benjamin Netanyahu,
and he said, fundamentally, if you're anti-Zionist, you're anti-Semitic.
So the Zionist project is tied to the hip to the Jewish project. What do you have to say to that?
Look, you can define antisemitism any way you want, right? And you can define anti-semitism to incorporate anti-zionism.
And I think we have reached the point where anti-semitism is identified today, not just with
anti-zionism, but with criticism of Israel. If you criticize Israel, people will say, some people will say, you're an anti-Semite.
And if that's your definition of anti-Semitism, it's taken an important term and stretched
to the point where it's meaningless, right?
So when Stephen I wrote the book, wrote the article and then wrote the book, all
sorts of people said that we were anti-Semites. This is ludicrous charge, but what they meant
was you're criticizing the lobby, you're criticizing Israel, and therefore you're an anti-Semite.
Okay. If that's what an anti-Semite is, somebody who criticizes Israel, you know, probably
half the Jewish community, if not more in the United States, is anti-Semitic.
And of course, you get into all these crazy games where people are calling Jews, self-hating
Jews, and anti-Semites because they're critical of Israel.
But even people who are anti-Zionist, I don't think they're anti-Semitic at all.
You can argue they're misguided. That's fine,
but
many of these people are Jewish and proud of the fact that they're Jewish. They just don't believe that nationalism and
Jewish nationalism is a force that should be applauded and you want to understand that in the American context
there is a rich tradition
of anti-Zionism, right? And these were not people who were anti-Semites. If you go back to the
30s, 40s, 50s. And the same thing was even true in Europe. There were all sorts of European Jews
who were opposed to Zionism. Were they anti-Semites? I don't think so. But we've gotten to the point now where people are so interested in stopping any criticism
of Israel that they wield this weapon of calling people anti-Semites so loosely that the term has kind of lost meaning. So I think Netanyahu is wrong-headed to
equate anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism.
Alan Dershowitz was one of the people that called you specifically anti-Semitic. So just
looking at the space of discourse, where's the slither of hope for healthy discourse about
US relationships with Israel between you and Alan Dershwards and others like him?
I think until there is a settlement of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, there's no hope of
putting an end to this nonsense. So these are just uses of terms to kind of cheat your way through
to the discourse. It's shortcut. No, it's the silence people. Right. It's very, very important
to understand that one of the lobby's principle goals is to make sure we don't have an open discourse, a freewheeling discourse about
Israel. Because they understand, people in the lobby understand that if you have an open
discourse, Israel will end up looking very bad, right? You don't want to talk about the
occupation. You don't want to talk about how Israel was created. All these subjects are
ones that will cause problems for Israel. See, just to go to the present crisis, okay?
When you have a disaster, and what happened on October 7th is a disaster. One of the first things that happens is that people begin to ask the question,
how did this happen?
Right? What's the root cause of this problem?
This is a disaster.
We have to understand what caused it so that we can work to make sure it doesn't happen again. So we can work to shut it down and then make sure it doesn't happen again.
So we work to shut it down and then make sure it doesn't happen again.
But once you start talking about the root causes, right, you end up talking about how Israel
was created, right.
And that means telling a story that is not pretty about how the Zionist conquered Palestine.
And number two, it means talking about the occupation.
It's not like Hamas attacked on October 7th because there were just a bunch of anti-Semites who
hated Jews and wanted to kill Jews. This is not Nazi Germany, right? This is directly related to the occupation
and to what was going on inside of Gaza.
And it's not in Israel's interests
with a lobby's interest to have an open discourse
about what the Israelis have been doing to the Palestinians.
Since I would say roughly 1903,
when the Second Alliaw came to Israel or came to what was then Palestine,
right? We want to talk about that. And we don't want to talk about, from the lobby's point of view,
the influence that the lobby has, right? It's better from the lobby's point of view of most Americans
think that American support of Israel is just done for all the right moral
and strategic reasons, not because of the lobby.
When John Mirsheimer and Steve Walte come along and say you have to understand that this
special relationship is due in large part to the lobby's influence, that is not an argument
that people in the lobby want to hear.
The point is you have to go to great lengths for all
these reasons. You have to go to great lengths to silence people like me and Steve Walt.
And one of the ways to do that is to call us anti-Semites. I think the chapter or the section of the
book where we talk about this charge of anti-Semitism is called the great silencer. That's what we call the
charge of anti-semitism, the great silencer. Who wants to be called an
anti-semit? Especially in the wake of the Holocaust. So I want to be called an
anti-semit? Oh my god, no. And so it's very effective. but it is important to talk about these issues in my humble opinion.
And I think if we had talked about these issues way back when it would have gone a long
way towards, you know, maybe getting a two-state solution, which I think was the best alternative
here. It's complicated and I wonder if you can comment on the complexity of this because criticizing
Israel and criticizing the lobby can, for a lot of people, be a dog whistle for anti-Semitic conspiracy theories
that this idea that Jews run everything,
run the world, they're this kind of cabal.
And it's also very true that people who are
legitimately anti-Semitic are also critics of Israel
in the same kind of way.
And so it's such a complicated landscape in which to have discussions. and he's the medic are also critics of Israel in the same kind of way.
And so it's such a complicated landscape
in which they have discussions
because even people like David Duke,
who are, you know, racist,
don't sound racist on the surface,
well, I haven't listened to him enough,
but like, you know, there's dog
whistles. It's a complicated space in which they have discussions because it, I mean,
I wonder if you can sort of speak to that because there's this silencing effect of calling
everybody anti-Semitic, but it's also true that there is anti-Semitism in the world.
There is the size of population of people that hate Jews. There's probably a size of a
population of people who hate Muslims too. Why do they hate out there? A lot of hate out there.
But the hatred of Jews has a long history. And so you have like, you know, rolling stones have a set of great hits.
And there's just a set of great hits of the way conspiracy theories
they can make about the Jews that are used as part of the hatred.
So there's like nice templates for that.
And I just wonder if you can comment on operating as a historian
as an analyst as a strategic thinker in this kind of space.
Yeah. We obviously, when we wrote the article, which we did before the book,
gave this subject a great deal of thought. I mean, what you say just now is music to our ears.
And I'm talking about me and Steve. I mean, I think that, you know, your point about dog whistles is correct.
Look, we went to great lengths to make it clear that this is not a cabal. It's not a conspiracy.
And in fact, in a very important way, the lobby operates out in the open, right?
important way the lobby operates out in the open, right? They brag about their power, right? And this was true before we wrote the article, right? And we said in the article and the book,
and you heard me say it here. First of all, it's not a Jewish lobby, right?
Secondly, it's not a cabal, right? It's an American interest group. And
and the American system is designed such that interest groups are perfectly legal and
some of them are super effective. Exactly. I mean, you hit the nail right on the head. That's exactly right. And, you know,
and it was nothing that we said that was anti-Semitic by any reasonable definition of that term.
And, you know, huge numbers of Jews have known me and Steve over the years. And nobody ever,
ever said that we were anti-Semitic before March 2006 when the
article appeared because we're not anti-Semitic. But look, you've got this interest group, right,
that has a significant influence on American policy and on Israeli policy. And you want to talk about it. It's just important to talk about it.
It's important for Jews, right? In the United States, for Jews in Israel, to talk about this.
The idea that you want to silence critics is not a smart way to go about doing business in my opinion.
If we were wrong, if Stephen I were so wrong and our arguments were so foul,
they could have easily exposed those arguments. They could have gone
into combat with this in terms of the marketplace of ideas and easily knocked us down. The problem was that our arguments were quite powerful. And instead of engaging us and defeating our arguments, they wanted to silence us.
And this is not good, right?
It's not good for Israel, it's not good for the United States.
And I would argue in the end, if anything, it's going to foster anti-Semitism. I think you don't want to run around telling people that they can't talk
about Israel without being called an anti-Semite. It's not healthy in terms of the issue that
you're raising. But I still agree with you that it is is tricky issue. I don't want to make light
of that. You know, I know that there's this piece of literature out there called the
protocols of the elders of Zion. And I fully understand that if you're not careful,
you can come close to writing volume two, the protocol. But I don't believe that we wrote anything
that was even close to that.
And again, I think that a healthy debate
on the issues that we were raising
would have been, not only in America's interest,
but it would have been in Israel's interest.
Yeah, I mean, underneath that all is just,
I wonder why there is so much hate against groups.
Why it's such a sticky way of thinking, not just tribalism, like proud of your country
and kind of hating another country, but really deeply hating, like hating in a way where
it's part of your identity kind of hate. Well, just to make a general point on this issue
in our conversation here today,
you often talk about individual leaders
and the word individual often pops up in your vocabulary.
Yes.
I believe that we are ultimately social animals
before we are individuals.
I believe we're born into tribes, we're heavily socialized, the most important thing is that we are living in the same way as we are living in the same way as we are living in the same way.
And we are living in the same way as we are living in the same way.
And we are living in the same way.
And we are living in the same way.
And we are living in the same way.
And we are living in the same way.
And we are living in the same way.
And we are living in the same way.
And we are living in the same way. And we are living in the same way. religious groups, but the fact is that these tribes often crash into each other and when they crash into each other
they end up hating each other
If you go to a place like Bosnia, right the Croats and the Serbs, oh my god and
then throwing the Bosnia acts
which is the term for Bosnia and Muslims and you know Muslims crow out serves
oh and
the tribes you know
hate each other and
in a funny way that hatred almost never goes away and
I guess there are some exceptions to that if you you'll get the Germans after World War II,
they've gone a long way towards reducing.
I wouldn't want to say completely eliminating,
but reducing a lot of the hatred that existed
between Germans and their neighbors.
But that's really kind of an anomalous case.
I mean, you go around East Asia today and the hatred of Japan
in a place like China, the hatred of Japan in a place like Korea, just not to be underestimated.
So, but I think a lot of it just has to do with the fact that you're dealing with social groups
that have crashed into each other at one point or another. And there are those lingering effects.
And by the way, this gets back to our discussion
a few minutes ago about trying to get a two-state solution
between the Palestinians and the Israeli Jews
now that you have had this horrible war, which is ongoing.
It's interesting to ask, to go back to World War II. Now you said you studied
Nazi Germany in the 30s from a perspective of maybe offensive realism, but just to look at the
Holocaust. It's sometimes popular in public discourse today to compare certain things to the Holocaust.
People have compared the Hamas attack on Israel to the Holocaust saying things like it's
the biggest attack on Jews since the Holocaust, which kind of implies that there's a comparison.
People have made that same comparison in the other
direction. What do you make of this comparison? Is it comparable? Is the use of the Holocaust
have any accuracy in comparisons of modern-day international politics.
Is it possible that you could have another genocide?
Yes.
And I would argue that what you had in Rwanda was a genocide.
All right.
The Holocaust is not the only genocide.
I believe the word genocide is used to loosely today. And as you know, lots of people, and I mean lots of people
who are pro-Palestinian accused the Israelis of engaging in genocide in Gaza, I think with the
Israelis are doing in Gaza represents a massacre. I would use that term, given the number of civilians that they've killed, and the fact
that they've been indiscriminate in terms of how they've been bombing Gaza.
But I would not use the word genocide.
For me, a genocide is where one side attempts to eliminate another group from the planet.
I think that what happened with the Holocaust
was clearly a genocide and that the Germans
were bent on destroying all of European jury.
And if they could have gotten their hands
on Jews outside of Europe, they would have murdered them
as well, that's a genocide.
And I think with the Hutus and the Tutsis, you had a similar situation.
I think with the Turks and the Armenians during World War I, that was a genocide.
But I have a rather narrow definition of what a genocide is, and I don't think there are many cases
that qualify as a genocide. The Holocaust certainly does, okay?
Now, what Hamas did doesn't even come close
to what happened to European jury between,
let's say, 1939 and 1945,
although I date the start of the Holocaust to 1941, if we were looking at it closely.
But let's just say 1939 when they invade Poland.
1939 to 1945, what a must it pals in comparison.
It's hard to believe anybody would make that argument, right?
Yes, a lot of Jews died, but hardly any compared to the number that died, you know, at the hands of the Germans.
I mean, it just, no parallel at all. And furthermore, Hamas was in no position to kill all of the Jews in the Middle East.
Just not going to happen.
But there's also levels of things, you know,
using Germans using human skin for lamps.
There's just levels of evil in this world.
Yes, but you don't see that with,
I mean, that's not what Hamas is doing.
I mean, when we're very clear here,
I am not justifying the Hamas's killing of civilians,
okay, not for one second, but I'm just saying.
And by the way, just to go to the Israelis
and what they're doing in Gaza, right,
as I said to you before,
I do believe that as a massacre
and I believe that's to be condemned,
the killing of civilians.
This is not legitimate collateral damage.
They're directly punishing the population.
But I would not call that a genocide, right?
And I would not compare that to the Holocaust for one second.
I just want to be very clear on that.
Do you think if Israel could, they would avoid the death of any civilians. So you're
saying there's some degree of punishment of collective anger. Oh, they're purposely killing
civilians. This is the iron wall. They're trying to beat the Palestinians in a submission.
Right. There's no way you kill this many civilians.
There's no way you kill this many civilians.
If you're trying to precisely take out a mass fighters.
And by the way, the Israeli spokesman, the IDF spokesman, has explicitly said that we are not pursuing precision bombing
and that what we are doing is trying to maximize the amount of destruction and damage that we can inflict on the Palestinians. And I think this is a major mistake on the part of Israel.
First of all, it ends up being a moral stain on your reputation, number one.
And number two, it doesn't work.
It doesn't work. It doesn't work. The Palestinians are not gonna roll over and submit
to Israeli domination of their life.
So, you know, the whole concept of the Iron Wall,
Gabbatinsky's term was misguided.
And by the way, if you look at what the Israelis are doing, they're trying
to do two things. One is the iron wall, and that's where you punish the civilian population
in Gaza and get them to submit. The other thing that they're trying to do is get Hamas.
They want to destroy Hamas, and the belief there is that if they destroy Hamas, they've
solved the problem. But as many Israelis know, including people on the hard right,
even if you destroy Hamas, they are going to be replaced by another group, another resistance group.
And that resistance group will employ terror.
Yeah, I think you've said that other terrorist organizations have used the situation in Palestine
as a kind of a recruitment mechanism for a long time.
Osama bin Laden made it clear that this was one of those principal reasons for attacking
the United States attacked back and got us into a 20-year war that cost
the lives of millions of people, not Americans, but human beings, and engaged in torture.
No, I think if you look at how we reacted to 9-11 and how the Israelis are reacting to
what happened on October 7th, there's quite a bit of similarity in that both sides, the
Israeli side and the American side, are enraged, right, and they lash out and they go on a rampage. And the end result is not good.
Is there a capacity within Israel or within United States after 9-11
to do something approximating, turn the other cheek of understanding the root of terror is hate
of understanding the root of terror is hate and fighting that hate with not the son naive, but compassion.
Well, I don't think in either case you're going to turn the other cheek.
I think the while some what I mean by that is some limited, powerful military response, but very limited.
Yeah, coupled with a smart political strategy.
Political strategy diplomacy.
Yeah, that's what they should have done.
Yeah, right.
But is there a capacity for that?
Or from your offensive realism perspective, it's just the odds are really low.
From my offensive realist perspective or my realist perspective, that's what you should
do.
My view is states are rational actors.
They should be cunning.
They should think about the strategic situation they're in and choose the appropriate response.
What happens, and this is why my theory is not always correct,
is that sometimes states are not rational, and they misbehave. I would argue in the Israeli
case that it would have been good after October 7th, or starting on October 7th, if the United States had tried to hold the Israelis back and countenance
a more moderate response, a more ruthless, take some time just to think about how to deal
with this problem instead of lashing out. I think given what happened to the Israelis, given how shocked they were, given the level
of fear, given the level of rage, they were going to lash out.
And I don't believe that was in their interest.
I think it would have been made sense to think about it and to think about a smarter strategy
than they're now employing.
And I think, you know, the Americans blew it.
The Americans gave him a bear hug and a green light.
And so it will give you all the weaponry you need and go out and do it.
And I don't think that was the smart thing to do.
Look, in the wake of October 7th, the Israelis had no good strategy.
Right? It's not like there's a magic formula that they just didn't see, and we should have told
them what the magic formula was.
That's not true.
They were, in a sense, caught between Iraq and a hard place in terms of what to do.
But there's smarter things and dumber things, and I think the Israelis lashed out in ways that are counterproductive.
I think going on a rampage and killing huge numbers, this civilians, is not, it's
obviously morally wrong, but it's also just not in their strategic interest.
I mean, because it's not going to buy them anything. And in fact,
it's going to cost them. Because people all over the planet are turning against Israel.
I saw an Israeli think tank today that has been tracking protests around the world,
gave some figures for what it looked like
between October 7th and October 13th,
in terms of the number of protests around the world
that were pro-Israel versus pro-Palestine.
And then it looked at the numbers
from October 13th up to the present and I think the numbers were
69% were pro-Palestinian in the first six days after October 7th 69% and I think 31% take these numbers with a grain of salt
31% were pro-Israel. So I think was 69 and 31
and So 31% were pro-Israel. So I think it was 69 and 31. And since then, since October 13th, if you look at the number of protests around the world, 95% have been pro-Palestinian and
5% have been pro-Israel. And what this tells you is that public opinion around the world
has shifted against Israel.
And if you look at some of the demonstrations in places like London and Washington, D.C.,
it's truly amazing the number of people who are coming out in support of the Palestinians.
And all this again is just to support my point.
It was just not smart for Israel
to launch this bombing campaign, right?
You can make an argument for going after Hamas
and doing it in a surgical way or a surgical way as possible,
but that's not what they did.
And again, my point to you is I think
that this punishment campaign is not going to work
strategically.
In other words, they're not going to beat the Palestinians into submission.
They're not going to finish off Hamas.
And at the same time by pursuing this strategy, they're doing huge damage to their reputation
around the world. Well, I just, yeah, in the wake of October 7th, given the geopolitical context, I think
there's a lot of leverage to be the great ethical superpower that that demonstrate power
without killing any civilians and use that leverage, diplomatic leverage, to push forward something like Abrahamic accords
with more nations, with Saudi Arabia, push for peace aggressively, peace agreements, this
kind of stuff, economic relationships, all this kind of stuff.
And thereby pressure the Palestinian Authority, you know, towards perhaps a two-state solution.
But I think what you're missing here just in the Israeli case is that the Israeli government
is not interested in two-state solution. And you want to remember that Benjamin Netanyahu
who looks very hawkish when you look at him in isolation,
doesn't look so hawkish when you look at him compared to the rest of the people in his cabinet.
Right? He almost looks like a moderate.
He's got a lot of people who are way out to the right of him.
And these people in this, of course, includes Netanyahu, are not interested in a two-state solution.
So the question you have to ask yourself is if you're Benjamin Netanyahu and it's July
7th, late in the day, what do you do?
You're not thinking about a two-state solution.
You're thinking about an occupation that's not going to end and the question is, how do
you deal with the Palestinians?
Given what's just happened
Well, there's people in the cabinet and then there's history and history remembers great leaders and so
Benjamin and Yahoo can look in the streets of Israel and they'll see the protests and think of how history will remember him
And I think a two-stage solution is on the table for a great leader. Well, it was there. Was he the
person who was gonna take advantage of it? I don't think so, but we'll see.
Well, at this point, or the will see, I mean, it's very, it this point is very
difficult. Like you said, 95% now now or whatever the number is of protests, I think
the the window in which Israel has the ears of the world, they can do the the big ethical
peace action towards peace is I think as closed or maybe there's still a slither but it's closed. Or maybe they're still slither, but it's just the slippery slope of hate has taken off.
It's quite depressing to watch.
Yep.
I agree 100%.
Unequivically depressing.
Well, you know, of course, as you talk about the role of the US involvement, is of critical
importance here for the United States.
And the argument you make is that we should not be involved in Ukraine, at least to the degree
we are, we being the United States, and we should not be involved in Israel to the degree
we are, because it's stretching us too thin when the big geopolitical contender in the 21st century
with the United States as China.
Is that correct, Samarie?
Yeah, I think just on Ukraine, we should not have pushed Ukraine to join NATO.
And once the war started, we should have worked over time to shut it down immediately.
March.
Yeah.
March, right?
And you remember, by the way, not to go back to Ukraine in great detail in the fall,
early fall of 2022.
The war starts February 2022.
There's March 2022, which we've talked about, which is in negotiations.
In the fall of 2022, I think it was in September, the Ukrainians had one, two major tactical
victories, one in here, Sahn and the other in Harkeev.
And at that point in time, General Milley, who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, said, now is the time to negotiate, because this is the high water mark for the Ukrainians.
Milley understood that things were only going to get worse.
And the White House shut Milley down and said, we're not negotiating.
So we have blown a number of opportunities here to head this problem off at the pass.
But that's my view there. And with regard to the Israelis,
my only point about Israel is that it would be better for Israel and better for the United
States. If we, the United States, were in it was in a position, the United States was in
a position to put pressure on Israel from time to time. As Steve and I say in the book,
we should be able to treat Israel
like a normal country, right?
The fact is that countries sometimes do stupid things.
This includes the United States and Israel.
And if Israel is pursuing a policy
that we think is unwise,
we should be in a position
where we could put pressure on Israel.
That's our argument.
But anyway, we goofed both with regard to Ukraine and with regard to the Middle East.
And we're now up to our eyeballs and alligators in both of those regions.
And as you describe my view, this is not good because the area of the most strategic importance for the United States today is
East Asia and that's because China is there and China is the most serious threat the United States faces.
Do you think there will be a war with China in the 21st century?
I don't know.
China in the 21st century. I don't know. My argument is there will be, there is right now, a serious security competition. And at the same time, there is a real possibility of war. Whether or not we
avoid it is very hard to say. I mean, we did during the Cold War, we had a serious security competition from roughly 1947 to 1989.
And we thankfully avoided war.
Probably came the closest in 1962 with the Cuban Missile Crisis.
But we avoided it.
And I think we can avoid it here, is it for sure?
No.
You've said that China won't move on Taiwan militarily,
in part because it's, as you said, amphibious operations are difficult. Why will China
not move on Taiwan, is in your sense, in the near future? Well, it's because there's this
body of water called the Taiwan Strait, which is a big body of water and getting across water
is very difficult unless you can walk on water.
So geography still has a role to play in the 21st century?
Oh, yeah, I think geography is very important. Big bodies of water really matter.
Yeah.
In an ideal world, you'd like to the pacific ocean between you and any potential
adversary, you know, 6,000 miles, 6,000 miles of water hard to get across. If you're a country
and I'm a country and there's land between us, I can take my Panzer divisions and I can go
right across the land and get into your country or attack your country. And you of course can take
your Panzer divisions and come across that same piece of land.
But if there's a big body of water between us, your Panzer divisions can't go across the
water.
And then the question is, how do you get them across the water?
And that's very tricky.
And in a world where you have lots of submarines, and you have lots of aircraft, and you have missiles that are land-based
to can hit those surface ships,
it is very, very hard to attack across a body of water.
And all you have to do is think about Normandy,
the American invasion of Normandy, June 6, 1944,
coming in on Omaha Beach, right?
Oh boy, it was really difficult. But there is a growing asymmetry of military power
there that even though it was difficult. That is correct. So I guess that is correct. So I was just thinking of a conversation with Elon Musk and he says that, you know, China is quite serious
about the one China policy.
And it seems inevitable that Taiwan will have to be,
if you look at this pragmatically in the 21st century,
it seems inevitable that Taiwan will have to be a part of China.
And so we can get there either diplomatically or militarily.
Like, what do you think about the inevitability of that kind of idea?
When a nation says this is a top priority for us,
what do you think about them meaning it?
And what do we do about that?
There's no question it's a top priority for them, and there's no question they mean it.
But it's also a top priority for us not to let them take Taiwan.
Why exactly?
Because it's an important strategic asset.
Many people will say it's because Taiwan's a democracy,
but that doesn't matter that much.
It's because of two strategic reasons.
The first is that if we were to let Taiwan go,
it would have usually negative consequences
for our alliance structure any stasia. To contain China, we need allies.
We have an alliance structure. And our allies, Japanese, South Koreans,
Filipinos, Australians, they're all counting on us to be there for them. And if we say,
we're not going to defend Taiwan, the Chinese attack, they're going to say,
I bet if the Chinese attack us, the Americans won't be there for us.
So it would have a damaging effect on our alliance structure, which we cannot afford, because
containing China is a wicked problem.
It's a powerful state.
You're getting to this before when you talked about China versus Taiwan. So that's the first reason. Second reason is
you want to bottle up the Chinese navy and the Chinese Air Force inside the first island chain.
You don't want to let them get out into the Pacific. You don't want them dominating the waters of East Asia. You want
to bottle them up again inside the first island chain. And you can only do that if you control Taiwan.
You don't control Taiwan. They get out into the Philippines, say, into the Pacific and the Western
Pacific and cause all sorts of problems. Well, you saying all that, you've also said the center of humiliation, Japan and the United States are a source of that
humiliation for China. Don't you think they see the other side of that?
Absolutely. And in the interest of avoiding a world war. I guess the question is how do we avoid a world war? It doesn't seem like
the military involvement in the conflict between China and Taiwan is the way.
Well, I don't want to... There's no good answers here. I'm just saying...
There are no great answers. Which is the the less bad option.
I'm just saying. They're hurting over there.
Which is the less bad option.
Well, what you want to do is you want to make sure that you deter China from invading Taiwan.
You want to avoid a war.
You and I are in complete agreement on that.
We don't want a war, but we want to contain China.
We do not want to let China dominate Asia.
That's what the Americans are principally concerned with here.
And it's with China's neighbors are principally concerned with here. And it's with China's neighbors are principally concerned,
but this includes the Japanese, the South Koreans,
the Filipinos, Australians, and the Taiwanese.
They don't want, and we don't want China to dominate the region.
So we have to contain it.
But at the same time, and this should be music to your ears,
we not only want to contain
it, we want to make sure we don't end up on a shooting match with the Chinese, because
this could be disastrous.
So you have to have a very smart policy, you have to build powerful military forces, and
you have to make sure you don't do anything that's provocative.
On Taiwan, for example, the last thing you want is for the Taiwanese government to declare
its independence
because the Chinese have said, if Taiwan does that, we'll go to war.
And of course, we don't want that.
So my view is you want to smartly build up your military forces and you want to do everything
you can to contain China and at the same time not be provocative.
So a big component of that is making sure your military, the US military is bigger than the Chinese military?
Not necessarily. It's an interesting question.
A lot of people think that to make the Terrence work, right, you have to be able to beat the Chinese,
and therefore you need a much bigger military. And I don't think over time that's possible, right?
I think it's probably not even possible now to beat the Chinese in a war over Taiwan
or in a war in the South China Sea.
I think what you wanna do is make it clear to the Chinese,
either that there will be no winner.
In other words, you don't have to win,
but you wanna make sure they don't win.
Okay, it's a loose, loose proposition
if they go to war over Taiwan or what have you.
And if you can't do that, right, you think that they're so powerful that they're ultimately
going to win.
You want to convince them that victory would be a peric victory.
In other words, they would pay a God-awful price to win the war.
You follow what I'm saying?
So excuse me, the best strategy for deterrence is you win. China loses. Second best strategy
is a stalemate. Nobody wins. Third best strategy is they win, but they pay a God awful price.
And the fourth possibility, which you don't want, is they win quickly and decisively.
you don't want is they went quickly and decisively, right? If that's the case, then you don't have much deterrence.
What is a world with China as the sole dominant superpower look like?
I mean, a little bit underlying our discussion is this kind of idea
that US is the good guys and China is the bad guys.
First of all, you know, dividing the world to good guys and bad guys seems to somehow miss the nuance of this whole human civilization project we're undertaking.
But what does the world look like?
Where China is the dominant soul superpower in a unipolar world.
I don't tend to think of the world in terms of
good guys and bad guys as a good realist.
I think that states or states, they're all black boxes.
I don't discriminate between democracies and autocracies.
But having said that, I am an American.
And as an American, I'm interested in the security of my country, the survival of my country.
So, I want the United States to be the most powerful state in the world,
which means I want the United States to dominate the Western Hemisphere.
I want us to be a regional Hegemon, and I want to make sure that China does not dominate Asia the way we dominate the Western hemisphere
It's not because I think we're the good guys and they're the bad guys
If I were Chinese and I were in Beijing and I was Xi Jinping's national security advisor
I'd tell him what we got to do is make sure we dominate the world or
dominate our region and then do everything we can to undermine America's position in
the Western hemisphere, right? That'd be my view. So I guess you could say, I do view the
world in terms of good guys and bad guys, because I'm an American.
And I'm more like us and them. Yeah, it's us. That's a nice way to put it. Yeah, it's us versus them.
Not so much good guy versus bad guy. Is it possible to have a stable peaceful world with a good balance
of power with where it's China and US as superpowers? You know, it's a bipolar world. No longer unipolar.
Yeah. Okay. So you're hypothesizing the world where they dominate Asia. Yeah.
And we dominate the Western hemisphere.
Yeah.
I believe there would be a great deal
of security competition,
intense security competition
between those two super pedalers.
The definition of intense matters here.
So it could be small,
small military conflicts
or it could be extremely large unstable military conflicts.
Well, conflict, let's use the word war.
Okay.
So I distinguish between security competition and war.
And what I'm telling you is you'll have an intense security competition where there's
no shooting, where if there's shooting, it's mainly proxies that are doing the fighting, much
like the Vietnam War, right? Or you could have a case where one of those superpowers was
involved in a war against a proxy of the other superpower, Korean War, I think the Korean
War, the United States fought the Chinese who were allied with the Soviets at the time. But a war between the United States and China, just like a war between the United States
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, that's what you really want to avoid.
So I think you'd have an intense security competition, right?
You'd have wars involving proxies of each of those two superpowers.
And you would probably have some wars where one of the superpowers was involved in a proxy
with the other super, one of the other superpowers proxies.
So it seems likely then, if that's the case, then it would be Taiwan as the proxy and
US fighting China through the proxy of Taiwan.
Well, yeah, well, that would assume the United States,
but you want to remember,
your hypothesizing the situation
where China dominates Asia.
Oh, it already has dominated.
Yes, it's already dominated Taiwan.
I see.
We, we, what do you find the proxies?
Well, really?
The Middle East could be a good case.
Oh, wow. A person case. Oh, wow.
A Persian Gulf.
Oh, boy.
And then our discussion of Israel becomes even more
dramatically.
Well, Israel gets involved.
I think in this scenario, if you're talking about a US
China competition, right, and you're talking about the
Middle East, I think it's the Gulf.
It's the Saudis, the Iranians, the Iraqis. It's the oil.
Don't you think it could be Israel versus Iran with some very 1984 kind of dramatic
partnership of Iran, Russia, and China versus United States, Europe, and Israel?
I think that's possible. Yeah. I think that's possible. Yeah. Now that I
I mean, I hadn't thought about it until you said it, but yeah, I think that
that that is possible. Is it is not terrifying? Yeah. Well, that you know, in
your scenario, we're trying to already dominate Asia and we dominate the
Western hemisphere. I think you start talking about where the most likely places
that the United States and China go head-to-head
or fight through proxies.
I think it is the Gulf for the Middle East
and the scenario that you posit.
I mean, one question I have, I don't know about you,
but for me, unlike with the Soviet Union,
and I know I was born there, but even outside of that, the cultural gap, the loss in translation,
the communication gap between China and the United States seems to be much greater than that of
United States seems to be much greater than that of what was the former Soviet Union and the United States.
I see two cultures intermingling and communicating as one of the ways to deescalate future
conflict.
It's an interesting question.
I mean, it is sort of an abstract theoretical level. My argument is that great powers act according
to realist dictates and they understand those realist
dictates and that can lead to cooperation
or it can lead to war.
It depends.
I would say just in the case of the Soviets, a lot of people described the Cold War as an
ideological competition above all else.
It was communism versus liberal democracy or communism versus liberal capitalism, whatever.
I actually don't believe that.
I believe the Soviets were realists
to the core. I believe Stalin was a realist par excellence, and that ideology did not
matter much in Stalin's foreign policy. And I believe if you look at Soviet foreign
policy after World War II, you know, throughout the Cold War, they were realists to the core.
And I think in those days, the Americans were realists, right? A lot of liberal ideology
floating around out there, but the Americans were realists. And I think one of the reasons you
avoided a shooting match between the United States and the Soviet Union from 47 to 89 was because
both sides I think understood basic balance of power logic.
US China competition is somewhat different.
First of all, the Chinese are realists to the core.
I've spent a lot of time in China.
I basically have rock and roll. I'm basically a rock and of time in China. I basically have rock and roll.
I'm basically a rock and roll star in China.
The Chinese...
You got a big deal in China, I love it.
The Chinese are my kind of people.
They're realists, right?
They speak my language.
It's the United States that is not very realist.
American leaders have a very powerful liberal bent
and tend not to see the world in realist terms.
I believe, by the way, just going back
to our discussion of NATO expansion,
I think our inability to understand
that NATO expansion was anathemat to the Russians,
was doing large parts of the fact that we just,
during the unipolar moment
didn't think of international politics from a realist perspective and didn't respect anyone who
thought about international politics from a realist perspective. Those various American administrations
starting with the Clinton administration and put their realist hat on, they would have understood
the NATO expansion into Ukraine was not a good idea.
But we had this thoroughly liberal view of the world that dominated our thinking.
And it's kind of way somewhat since we've moved into multi-pilarity, but not completely.
And this makes me a little nervous, right, to pick up on your point.
I mean, the United States is thinking about the world
in ways that are somewhat different than the Chinese who are the realist par excellence.
So that's fascinating. So the Chinese are pragmatic about thinking of the world and
as a competition of military powers, all the ways in which you describe the realist perspective. So that, I mean, that's a hopeful thing, right?
If we can achieve stability and a balance of powers
through that military competition.
Yeah, I actually think that's right.
I think if the United States,
just let me talk a little bit about the United States
to get at the issue you're raising.
If the United States pursues a smart
containment strategy, given what you just said, and I said about the Chinese, I think we
will avoid war. The problem with the Americans is it's not just the liberalism. It's the
possibility that we will pursue a rollback policy. In other words, during the Cold War,
we pursued containment. It was whenever anybody talked about American grand strategy towards
the Soviet Union's containment, containment, containment. We now know from the historical
record that the United States was not only pursuing containment, it was pursuing rollback.
We were trying to rollback Soviet power. To put
it bluntly, we were trying to wreck the Soviet Union. Okay. And I would not be surprised moving
forward with regard to China, if the United States pursues a serious rollback policy. And
so you're saying throughout history, United States was always doing that. Oh, where's that from?
Why can't we respect the power of other nations?
Because they may be a threat to us.
Well, I mean, you don't respect the power of other nations.
You fear the power of other nations.
Well, fear and respect are next to our neighbors, depending on the neighborhood you're living in.
But I just mean it could be very counterproductive to try. Because
if you can empathize with there, if you assume they're rational actors, you try to roll back,
we'll create, would lean into the uncertainty of potential conflicts. You want to avoid the uncertainty of potential conflict. Caution, right?
Well, yes and no. But look, your point is you want to empathize. You want to be able to
put yourself in the shoes of the other side. Yes. I agree 100% but with that, right? It's
very important if you're first class strategist to be able to do that. But at the same time,
there is this competition for power taking place. And what
you want to do is maximize how much power you have relative to the other side. And the
other side wants to maximize how much power it has relative to you. So you have this
competition for power, right? That's taking place all the time. And that's taking place
at the same time
you wanna have empathy
or you wanna be able to put yourself
in the shoes of the other side.
So those two things kinda go together, right?
It just feels less threatening to build up your thing
versus try to hurt the other person's thing,
the other group's thing.
Right, but if you build up your own power, you were building up your capability to hurt the other person's thing, the other group's thing. But if you build up your own power,
you were building up your capability
to hurt the other side.
But I guess you don't ride all the saber.
Just work on manufacturing sabers.
Well, that I agree with.
I think that the United States
wants to make sure it has a big stick in East Asia for purposes of
containing China and avoiding a war.
Again, I want to be clear, I'm not advocating that we start World War III.
But the point is you want to have a big stick and you want to make sure that you don't
overstep your bounds in terms of using that big stick.
This is the danger with rollback, right?
You get to aggressive and you precipitate a war, right?
And you also just have to be very careful what you say.
And to go back to your favorite argument, you want to be able to have empathy or put
yourself in the shoes of the other side.
Because if you do something,
you want to think smartly about what that other side,
how that other side is going to see your action
and how they're going to react.
Right.
And mostly focus on the carrots.
Have a giant stick laying around,
but never mention it.
Just focus on the carrots.
Occasionally you have to mention the stick, right?
No, everyone knows the stick is there. There is some truth in that right? I mean yeah
But you know and words matter a lot it feels you know this
Current President Biden is meeting with the Xi Jinping and I think the words exchange there are really important
I have a notion the leaders can stop wars just as much as they can start wars
Well leaders matter. There's no question about that.
No question. But just on on rhetoric,
you want to remember that Putin has on more than one occasion,
very subtly rattled the nuclear sword. Oh, yeah.
And it has been very effective. Yeah.
Because Joe Biden has paid attention and Joe Biden wants to make
sure we don't end up in a thermonuclear war and thank goodness he's thinking that way. So all
Putin has to do is mention the possibility of nuclear war just to go back to Taiwan, you know,
a switch areas of the world. If you're interested in containing China and you're interested in
deterrence, and let's go back to those various scenarios where the Chinese win, we win, Chinese
win, but they do it at a costly, at great cost, one can argue that that discussion that I laid out before it didn't take into account nuclear weapons.
And all President Biden or any of his successors has to do is just very subtly rattle or employ
the nuclear threat.
And just sort of remind the Chinese that, you know, you start a war over Taiwan,
it could easily escalate into a nuclear war. You want to understand we both have nuclear weapons.
And if either one of us is put into a desperate situation, we may turn to those nuclear weapons.
And all by the way, Xi Jinping, you want to understand that we're out here in the water and using nuclear weapons
in the water, it's not that...
So the same as using nuclear weapons on land.
So we may very well use them.
I'm not saying we will.
But anyway, a little saber rattling.
Yeah, right.
Let me just zoom out on human history.
What makes empires collapse? And what makes them last when they do?
When you look at human history in your sense, think about the United States perhaps as an
empire.
I don't view the United States as an empire.
So do you empire is a thing that seeks expansion? Possibly.
I think it's a country that incorporates different regions or areas around the world into
sort of a giant sphere of influence without incorporating those territories actually into the state itself.
So you had this thing called the British Empire and it controlled areas like India, North America,
and Kenya, just to pick a couple instances at different points.
Singapore would be another example.
Australia would be another example.
So these were all entities that were part of the British Empire, right?
And the United States has taken a stab at Empire after the Spanish-American war, for example, with regard
to the Philippines and Cuba and Puerto Rico.
But we never got serious about it.
There's never been an American empire.
This is not to say the United States is not an incredibly powerful country that goes
all around the world building military bases and stationed in troops here and everywhere. But we're not running an empire the
way the British empire was run or the French Empire. So the question for me is
why did those empires go away? What the British Empire go away? If you ever
look at a map of the world in 1922,
after World War I, it's truly amazing how much of that map
is controlled by Britain.
They had a huge empire.
And it's disappeared.
Probably by far the biggest in terms of area empire
and human history, I think so.
I think that's right.
It almost has to be.
Yeah, right.
It's crazy.
Crazy, yeah.
And then no longer, no longer is the case.
Now, let me clear, the Americans have wielded
maybe even greater influence than Britain did
when it had its empire,
but I don't believe we have an empire
that bears any resemblance to the British empire.
So the question is, what happened to that British empire?
What happened to the French empire?
What happened to the Belgian empire?
What happened to the Dutch empire?
These were countries that had colonies all over the planet, the Dutch East Indies, right?
Vietnam was, you know, French in Do China.
Where did those empires go?
Two factors finished them off.
Number one, nationalism.
Nationalism became a very powerful force in the 19th century.
It began to rear its head in the late 18th century.
It became a very powerful force in the 19th,
and certainly in the 20th century.
Can you explain nationalism here?
Nationalism is the idea that these different nations
that were part of the empire, like the Canians,
wanted their own state, nation state.
This is my point about the Palestinians, right?
This is Palestinian nationalism.
What is Zionism?
Zionism is Jewish nationalism, Jewish nationalism.
Think of theodore Herzl's famous book. It's called The Jewish nationalism. Think of theodore Hurtzels' famous book.
It's called the Jewish state, nation state,
think of the word nation state.
That embodies nationalism, nation state,
Jewish state, Palestinians want their own state
to state solution, right?
Can't beat the Palestinians into submission, right?
The Indians wanted their own state,
the Pakistanis wanted their own state, the Kenyans wanted their own state, the Pakistanis wanted their own
state, the Kenyans wanted their own state, saying a poor wanted its own state. Oh, the Americans
wanted their own state. This is called the American Revolution, right? So that's the first
reason. Nationalism that these empires disappeared. The second reason is that from a cost-benefit
analysis, they no longer made any sense. And it was
the coming of the Industrial Revolution. Once the Industrial Revolution comes, an
empire is basically an albatross around your neck. I would argue that the British
Empire was an albatross around Britain's neck in most of the 20th century. Some of my
friends disagree with that and think there were all sorts of benefits from the British Empire. But you want to remember that in the 20th century, the three countries that really were powerful
were the United States, Germany, and the Soviet Union. Those were the big three. Did any of them have an empire? No.
That's a good car, aren't you? In the industrial world, you don't need an empire,
right? What you need is a powerful manufacturing base. Well, the cost-benefit analysis
is different before the industrial revolution. There's been many empires. There's no question
that empires came and went, right? Yes, right. And, or if it was just look
at the British and the French in the seven years war, 1756, the 1763, the British win,
they get Canada, right? And that's why, you know, Quebec, Montreal, all these big French-speaking areas, and now part of Canada, right?
So borders change, and countries got established, the United States being one.
And remember, South America and Central America were once completely dominated by the Spanish,
and in the case of Brazil, the Portuguese.
But they all, in the 19th century, the Portuguese, but they all in the 19th century got their
independence, right? And what I'm saying to you is in the 19th and then the 20th century,
there were two forces that were really driving the train, one is nationalism, and then the
other is the industrial revolution, which changes the cost benefit analysis. Almost too crazy of a question, but if you look, let me calculate, let's say 500 years
from now, and you, you, you, John, your share of the somehow travel through time and are
in a bookstore looking at the entire history of human civilization in a single book,
what role does US play? Like what's the story of US over
the next 100, 200, 300 years? Is it a big role, small role? Well, that's a long time. If you
asked me, let's just say the next 100 years. Yeah, that's okay. That's still tough.
That's still tough.
But actually, I think we're in excellent shape.
And here's the reason, going back to the beginning
of our conversation, you asked me about power.
And I told you, the two principal building blocks of power
are population size and wealth.
Okay?
And therefore, you want to look around the world and you want to look at what you think
the demographics are of countries like Britain, the United States, Iran, China, Russia, pick your country moving forward.
Right?
What are the demographics look like?
And how wealthy are those countries likely to be?
Well you discover very quickly, and is it almost every country around the world is depopulating
over time?
Right?
Russia is going to be much smaller. China Russia's gonna be much smaller.
China's gonna be much smaller.
100 years from now than both of those countries are.
It's best we can tell.
United States, American women are not having lots of babies
these days.
No question about that.
But we have immigration.
We're an immigrant culture.
You're a perfect manifestation of that. You're a perfect. We're an immigrant culture. You're a perfect manifestation
of that. You're a perfect, you're now an American. That's wonderful. We need more people
like you, right? So when I hear Donald Trump and others arguing that immigration is a terrible
thing, this is ridiculous. Our immigration is what made us great, right? It's when my
relatives came over in the middle of the 19th century from Germany and Ireland, right?
That's fascinating, like, you know, because there's been a huge concern
America and other developed nations are not having enough children, but you you just made me realize
In the long arc of history the United States has gotten really damn good
at integrating immigrants and helping them flourish. The whole diversity of the dynamics
of America. There's a machinery of integrating other cultures.
Yeah, just very quickly on this. Sam Huntington's book, Who Are We?
Which in many ways I love that book, but it has one fundamental flaw and a number of people told him beforehand that that flaw existed and he didn't fix it.
But Sam argues in the book that we have large numbers of Hispanics in this country, and we're doing a very poor job of integrating
them into the mainstream, and they're not becoming Americans.
And because many of them are concentrated in the southwest of the United States, unlike
other ethnic groups that were spread out all over God's little green acre, we're going
to have this cohesive group of Spanish-speaking Americans, right, who
we're going to want to break away, and the United States is no longer going to be, you know,
a reasonably coherent nation state. He's wrong. All the evidence is that Hispanics are integrating into the American mainstream more quickly and more effectively than the European
economic, the European immigrant groups that came starting around 1835.
If you look at immigration from Europe into the United States, leaving aside the original wasps who came over and founded the place. The immigrants start coming in large
numbers in 1835 and we really don't shut the door until 1924. Right? Starting, this is a crude
overview. Starting in 1835 and running up to about 1885, it's mainly Germans and Irish. That's
why Germans are the largest ethnic group to ever come to the United States and the Irish are right behind them.
These are the European ethnic groups we're talking about.
Then starting in 1885,
polls, Jews and Italians start coming, right?
And the Germans and Irish keep coming.
And this is why Ellis Island is opened.
I think it's 1893.
Ellis Island is open because Castle Garden in New York, which
had handled all the previous immigrants coming across the pond. Castle Garden couldn't
handle them all, so they opened up Ellis Island. That's why somebody like me, I can't find
my distant relatives' records in Ellis Island because they came through Castle Garden,
right? Whereas lots of Jews, I know, lots of Italians, I know, they could find their relatives records
in Ellis Island because they came to Ellis Island.
The point is you had all these immigrants who came in roughly between 1835 and 1924 when
we shut the gates.
There's the only time we've ever really shut the gates in a meaningful way, right?
And this is what made America great.
Right?
All these people, and they made lots of babies.
Right?
So in some sense, make America great again means getting in, getting more immigrants in.
Well, we opened the gates again in 65.
Closed them in 24, opened them in 65.
I'm oversimplifying the story here because we didn't completely shut them.
We almost completely shut them in 24, opened in 65. I'm oversimplifying the story here because we didn't completely shut them. We almost completely shut them in 24, opened in 65. And we've had huge numbers of immigrants
flowing in. These immigrants who have been flowing in since 65 are not Europeans. They're
not mainly Europeans. They're mainly Hispanics and Asians. If you look at those Hispanics and Asians, they're integrating into the American
mainstream at a much faster and more effective clip than was the case with those immigrants who came in
in the 19th century and early 20th century. The Irish, oh my god, you know, they were treated
horribly. There's a book, a very famous book that's
been written called When the Irish Became White. Just think about the title of that book. There was
discrimination against all these groups, right? And the worst discrimination, of course, was against
Chinese Americans, right? But we've gotten much better. And what we should do moving forward is redouble our efforts to integrate immigrants into the
American mainstream, you know, Hispanics, you know, Asians of all sorts.
Because the fact is that America is rapidly reaching the point where it's not going to be an all-white country, right?
I have five children and two of my children are, I was a generation Z, Gen Z. Gen Z is the last
majority white generation, right? Subsequent generations and not majority white. So for anybody who's bothered
by this, I'm not bothered by that, but for anybody who is bothered by this, they better
get used to it because Americans aren't making enough babies that we can continue to grow
population wise in a robust way. So we need immigration and we're
an immigrant culture. And this is a great virtue. It has been a great virtue over time.
It should be a source of hope, not worry. That's my view. That's my view. And America, when it works,
is a place that is very attractive to immigrants, and immigrants
can do very well here.
And then the real key moving forward is in marriage, right?
And you have a huge amount of it in marriage, right?
Somebody was telling me not too long ago that the highest in marriage rates in the United
States are among Asian women, Asian American women, Asian women, and
Anglos, right?
And I say wonderful.
And great.
Yeah.
No, the more love is the fastest way to integrate.
Yeah.
Well, you don't, what you want to do is you want to eliminate difference, right?
You want to eliminate difference, right?
It's like, you know, people who say I'm an
anti-Semite, right? I have two grandsons who Adolf Hitler would have thrown into a gas chamber.
One of whose first name is John and middle name is Mirschimer. Right? Yeah. This is what you want. Yeah.
Right. Steve Waltz wife and his two children would have been thrown into a
gas chamber by Adolf Hitler. This is what you want. You want intermarriage. Now there
are a number of people in some of those groups, especially among Jews who don't like intermarriage.
But they've lost because I haven't looked recently at the data among, for intermarriage rates among,
basically secular Jews, but it used to be around 62 percent.
Large numbers of Jews marry Goiam.
And they've lost because of intermarriage.
Intermarriage helps fight tribalism, destructive kind of tribalism.
Exactly.
Calling me an anti-Semite. They haven't met my grandsons, my son-in-law, nieces that I, a niece that I have, nephews
that I have, brother-in-laws that I have, Jewish, right?
Come on.
And then this gives a really nice, hopeful view of America.
Is the integration of different cultures, different kinds of peoples? That is a unique property of America as the integration of different cultures, different kinds of people,
that is a unique property of America. Yes, but just to go back to where we started, it was not smooth
in the beginning. All things are rough in the beginning. All things are rough in the beginning.
What advice would you give to a young person today about how to have a career that can be proud of our life that can be proud of.
Well, I think it's very important to make sure that you do something in life that really interests
you. My mother used to use this phrase, floats your boat. You want to do something that floats your
boat or to use another one of my mother's phrases. You want to get up, you want to do something
where you get up out of bed in the morning
with a bounce in your step, right?
So I think that, you know, if your mother and father
want you to be a lawyer and they're pushing you
to be a lawyer and you don't want to be a lawyer,
you want to be a policeman, be a policeman, right?
Don't do what other people want you to do.
Because it's very important to find a job and occupation
that you really love.
The second thing I would say, and this has to do
with your point about humility,
you wanna think about the humility,
Ubris index.
My friend Steve Van Ever, who teaches at MIT,
he and I invented this concept, we call it the Ubris index. My friend Stephen, ever who teaches an MIT, he and I invented this concept. We call it the Ubris
humility index. And you want to have healthy dose of humility, but you also want to have a healthy
dose of Ubris. You want to think you can change the world. You want to think you can make things
better for yourself. You want to take chances chances. You wanna think sometimes that you know better
than other people do.
Ubris is not a bad thing, but at the same time,
you have to have humility.
You have to understand that a man or a woman has his
or her limits, and you wanna listen to other people.
You wanna be a good listener, right?
So always remember the importance of the Ubrus humility index and the importance of having
Healthy doses of both
Ubrus and
humility
Speaking of humility your mortal like all humans are do you ponder your mortality?
Are you afraid of it? Are you afraid of death?
I'm not sure I'm afraid of death. I don't want to die because I enjoy life so much.
I'm having too much fun. I'm having too much fun. I'm having too much fun. But do I find what I do interesting and gratifying?
I do.
I just love what I do.
And I love studying international politics.
And I love being intellectually curious
about all sorts of subjects.
I'll talk into you about this and that.
I mean, this is really wonderful. And I often tell people, you know, thank goodness I'm only 28 years old because I do try to behave like I'm only 28 years old. But I am well aware of the fact that
as my mother used to say, nothing is forever. And that includes me. And when you're 75 going on 76,
you understand that you have a limited number of years left.
And I find that depressing.
Because I've been very lucky.
And I feel like I've won the lottery.
And I'm very thankful for that.
And I'd like to make it last for as long as possible. But I do understand
that, you know, nothing is forever. Yeah, the finiteness of things. Yeah. You never think that
when you're young. I mean, you know, you think you're going to live forever and you're just not
going to get all I never thought this would happen that I would become 75 years old
Well, you you got you got so much energy and boldness and fearlessness and and and excitement to you that
I'm really grateful to see that especially given how much I'm sure you've been attacked for having
Bold ideas and presenting them and not losing
Yeah, not losing that youthful energy is beautiful to see. Thank you.
Not becoming cynical.
Jonathan, a huge honor to speak with you that you give me so much time and so much respect
and so much love.
This was a really incredible conversation.
Thank you so much for everything you do in the world for looking out into the world and trying to understand it and teach us and
Thank you so much for talking with the silicate like me. This is my pleasure. Thank you so much. I thoroughly enjoyed it. Awesome
Thanks for listening to this conversation with John Mersheimer to support the spot guess please check out our sponsors in the description and
Now let me leave you with some words from Plato. Only the dead have seen the end of war.
Thank you.