North Korea News Podcast by NK News - Why the US seeks dialogue with North Korea on human rights – Ep. 344
Episode Date: May 29, 2024North Korea failed this week to place a spy satellite into orbit for the third time in four attempts since last year, after a carrier rocket exploded shortly after a satellite launch on Monday night. ...NK News correspondent Shreyas Reddy joins the podcast to talk about what went wrong, and why the DPRK opted to […]
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That's shop.nknews.org. hello listeners and welcome to the nk news podcast i'm your host jacko's wet suit and
this interview is conducted on tuesday the 28th of may 2024 welcome Welcome Shreyas Reddy back in the podcast hot seat. Thank you for having me.
North Korea last night when some people, those who were early to bed were already tucked up in bed,
North Korea tried to launch another satellite, didn't it? Yes, absolutely. So having announced
earlier in the day, well to be honest in the earlier hours of Monday, that it would launch
a satellite sometime this week, it did not take long until North Korea went ahead with this promise.
Much like the last few launches, it pretty much carried out the whole operation on the very first day of the launch window.
Okay, so what time was this last night?
So South Korean and Japanese sources pretty much placed it around 10.44 p.m. local time.
Yeah, so fairly late in the day.
But at the same time, it didn't take long by all accounts.
The satellite to seemingly go up in flames just off the coast of China
as Japanese public broadcaster NHK released a video it captured from the Chinese coast
showing essentially a big ball of orange flame.
And yeah, that was around 10.45, 10.46 p.m.
So like it clearly, so while the launch may have taken place perhaps a few minutes before South Korea and Japan detected, of course, it did not take long for it to go up in flames.
Do we think that that was before separation?
Yeah.
So in fact, even North Korea eventually admitted that it was a first stage engine failure.
And they essentially put it down to it being a failure with what they see as a new type engine.
Or at least in a sense where they're saying they're kind of going with a new fuel
and oxidizer combo.
Now, they haven't specified.
They've essentially just gone with liquid oxygen and petroleum, which experts are looking
at and saying this is likely a kerosene-based fuel.
So it's not a solid...
It's not a solid fuel, no.
And to be honest, for space launches, liquid fuel would usually be better.
But in this case, the big question is, what was North Korea using before?
We have some theories, but no firm confirmation.
And why would it change now, having successfully launched a satellite and put it into orbit back in November.
So why is it changing it now?
Good question.
The successful launch back in November, was that also a nighttime launch?
Yes, that was a nighttime launch.
Is there a benefit to launching at nighttime?
Honestly, nothing in particular.
There will obviously be factors, but more related to weather and other conditions.
And also depending on what they're targeting in terms of where they want to place it in orbit.
That's a big factor.
So, for example, all four launches, three of them having failed, the North Korea has conducted so far, have had the same predicted drop zones for rocket stages. And so what that essentially says
is North Korea wants to get them into a certain orbit, a very similar orbit. The fact that
November's launch succeeded, and this time they still had the same one, says even if it didn't
succeed, they're likely to go for it again and try for something,
if not in the same position, but at least similar enough that they'll likely be photographing the same areas.
Does that mean a geostationary satellite?
So it's essentially a sun-synchronous orbit.
The idea is to keep focused on certain areas.
is to keep focused on certain areas.
Now, the big question is,
how much more does North Korea want to do with its satellite as it builds up a network?
It's quite open by the fact that it wants to build
essentially a small constellation of satellites
to monitor enemy troop movements.
They want to cover different areas.
They want to cover, obviously, different enemies, frankly.
And they would certainly want to be able to capture those areas in different ways as well.
Right now, all they can do is they have one satellite.
That means they're getting some basic images.
Now, assuming yesterday's satellite had succeeded, if it had been in a similar orbit,
they would likely get additional photos of the same area.
Maybe depending on how they use it. They could have gotten slightly more concrete picture of the areas that they're
monitoring, for example, just how you manipulate it to give you a sense of the topography, the
height, etc. But beyond that, ideally, they'd want to place satellites in different orbits as well to be able to maximize their constance capabilities.
How costly would this loss be?
Oh, I mean, North Korea has not exactly got a lot of resources.
So essentially, every single launch they carry out, they are definitely putting a lot of money into it.
Space development isn't cheap.
But at the same time, they've also often shown the willingness to prioritize projects that are close to the leadership's goals, particularly military development, weapons, missile, nuclear programs, you name it.
How many failed satellite launches have there been in the last year that we know of? Is this the second or the third? This is the third.
So the first one happened pretty much almost exactly a year ago.
And I think it was May 31st or so last year.
Ah, yeah, yeah. Right, right.
So that was the first attempted launch of this military reconnaissance satellite.
Yep.
The Maligyong one, as they call it.
Now they've essentially, so that one failed.
So did one in August. And then they eventually succeeded in November.
At the end of last year, Kim Jong-un said, we will try to, we are going to launch three more satellites in 2024.
This is the first one.
Why they took five months to do it, to do so, we're not entirely sure.
Possibly because, well well they have been testing
this new engine yeah so it seems there have been multiple tests carried out by looks of it but
clearly it is also not entirely ready lots of speculation at the moment all we can do is
speculate about why they decided to switch the engine, why they decided they wanted to try
a slightly different fuel combo.
Maybe there are benefits to using this kind of engine.
It's cleaner, it's safer.
But also, there's also this other theory going on
that Russia may be offering support.
And for Russia, this is something that is more compatible
with their systems and processes.
So they might have advised North Korea to switch to this form,
and perhaps it just wasn't ready yet.
Okay.
So now satellites are very fiddly pieces of equipment.
You have to build them very carefully.
It's not something you can knock up in another day or two, is it?
No, definitely not.
I mean, it wouldn't surprise me if North Korea has got enough
components stored up that it can put them together or that has backups in place or might already be
developing its next one. Certainly would be. But North Korea, sure, it technically has a week left
on the launch window. It notified the Regional International maritime organization coordinator which is japan yeah but the last few times last two times it failed it did not launch again within that same week so
i doubt it'll do so again right so it'll be a surprise if it gets off another rocket in a week
but it has i mean kim jong-un has said we'll launch three more this year so expect them to
keep coming we just don't know when right yeah. The thing is, depends on what's wrong with what went wrong with this launch. If
they have to go back to a drawing board a little bit, might take them a little while to figure it
out. But at the same time, it's the kind of regime that essentially is willing to push,
shall we say, the scientists to work a little more and accelerate their efforts if it means
fulfilling the leadership's goals. Now, if they're working together with Russia,
maybe that means a faster recovery or a faster working out of what the problem was?
Perhaps. I mean, at this point, we can't be entirely certain what they know and what they
don't know either, because there's been very little information coming out of anyone.
South Korea and Japan and the US are also still trying to analyze what went wrong. Perhaps there will be another hunt for components like last year. North Korea has not said much,
but that also isn't very surprising. The timing was very interesting, wasn't it?
Yeah. This pretty much happened on the very same day as trilateral summit between South Korea, Japan and China, the first one in over four years.
And they announced the launch shortly before the summit, but they did not carry it out until later in the day, which South Korean media speculated may have been out of respect for China, that they wanted to give the Chinese premier a chance to fly back home.
Okay, so he had flown back home before the rocket was...
Yes, he went back in the afternoon.
I see. Now, of course, the trilateral summit wasn't just to talk about North Korea,
but they did talk about North Korea a little bit.
Yeah. And naturally, the satellite did feature on the agenda,
given the launch announcement earlier in the day. Predictably, South Korea and Japan condemned the planned launch, said it's a violation of UN Security Council resolutions.
This was after the announcement that there would be a launch, but before the launch actually took
place. Exactly. So yeah, they said if the launch goes ahead, violation of UN Security Council
resolutions because the rocket would be based on ballistic missile technology.
China took a more muted approach, which isn't all that surprising.
Essentially, calling on all parties to work together and resolve the difference is something
the approach usually takes.
Yeah, that is the usual approach.
Everybody calm down and stay cool.
The fact that one person is launching ballistic missiles that it shouldn't be, that's beside the point.
Everybody calm down.
Yeah.
Yeah.
But there was also some other wording, some other parts of the summit that sort of touched upon North Korea. us agreeing to work together to make positive efforts to politically resolve the Korean
Peninsula issues, which is kind of also similar to how China often phrase it.
So it's more neutral wording.
And that meant, obviously, they also referenced the topic of the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula and the issue of North Korea's abduction of Japanese and also South Korean citizens in the past decades.
So this did lead to a response from North Korea.
So while the statement itself was fairly muted and toned down,
the fact that it touched upon these themes, particularly denuclearization,
was something that annoyed North Korea.
So later in the day, the North Korean foreign ministry issued a statement
denouncing the trilateral summit's joint statement
as interference in North Korea's internal affairs.
And particularly taking into account that North Korea last year amended its constitution
to say, well, not last year, before that, two years ago, it's been a while,
to enshrine its nuclear status in its constitution.
And so essentially the North Korean statement said that the word denuclearization
counts as interfering in North Korea's internal affairs and would bring about a regional nuclear crisis.
They said nuclear crisis.
Wow. Okay. So it's kind of indirectly taking a swipe against China too, isn't it, by doing that?
Because China was part of that statement, that muted statement you mentioned.
Yeah, effectively.
And North Korea does not obviously usually take aim at China, and it certainly didn't do so directly.
not obviously usually take aim at China, and it certainly didn't do so directly. But it certainly would not have appreciated the fact that essentially, it's one of its closest allies
seemingly sided with Japan and South Korea on this issue. Although at the same time,
it must be noted that China has in the past, at least had issues, taken issue with North Korea's nuclear activity.
Maybe some others, it may be a little less forceful in stopping other North Korean activities,
but certainly it has never been in favor of having a nuclear neighbor.
No, no. And that may, of course, be why for almost the last seven years,
North Korea hasn't done a nuclear test.
Well, certainly.
But, yeah, I think it's also one of those things that's been speculated for a while, hasn't it?
That fabled seventh nuclear test.
We're coming up in about two years of predictions of when North Korea can carry out that test.
Now, when the launch took place last night, that's what only just a little bit more than 12
hours ago, and the trilateral summit had already finished and people had gone home, have the three
nations made any statements in response to the satellite launch? Well, South Korea and Japan have,
of course, condemned the launch, so has the US. And I think that was to be expected. I think it
might be a while before we start getting more concrete statements,
but at least there has been some initial condemnation from them.
Okay, any final thoughts to leave us with, Shreyas?
Well, I guess certainly it's one of those things
where there's much more we don't know than what we know,
but certainly we're digging into this
and I'm sure others are
digging into this as well. So keep an eye out and we'll certainly have a lot more coming up on
what to make of North Korea's latest satellite launch.
Excellent. Keep watching and keep reading nknews.org listeners. Thank you very much,
Shreyas Reddy, for coming on the show today.
Thank you.
Thank you. on all things ROK. From intricate politics to dynamic cultural shifts, we cover it all.
Tune in every Friday on KoreaPro.org, Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you listen to podcasts. KoreaPro Podcast, insight, not just information. Okay, welcome back, listeners. And today's long interview is with Ambassador Julie Turner,
who was sworn in as the U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues on October the
13th, 2023. Ambassador Turner is a Korea Civil Service employee who has dedicated her career
to advancing human rights around the world. Welcome on the show, Ambassador Turner.
Thank you, Jacko.
Now, I read in your statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations last year that
you were born in Korea and adopted by parents in the United States. Is that correct?
That is.
Now, since the time of your naming as the U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights
Issues, North Korea's Korean Central News Agency has used some very unkind language targeting
you personally. I'm sure you're aware. Earlier this
year, the media called you a, quote, woman of uncertain origin and ethnicity. I think that last
one in particular seems to be a dig at your background. Now, in North Korean writings about
South Korea and the United States, international adoption of Korean children, it's a recurring
trope that characterizes South Korea as basically selling babies to America to make money. It seems personally offensive.
Are you personally offended by North Korea's attacks?
I'm not personally offended.
I see it as recognition that they are acknowledging my taking on this role
and as an opportunity to continue to message to them because they're clearly listening.
Okay, yeah. They're certainly aware of you. It's an unusual way to say,
hello, we know who you are. That's right.
Now, given the very hostile way that North Korea reacted to your naming as a special envoy,
do you think that you will be able to speak directly to the North Korean government or
even visit North Korea during your term as special envoy?
I hope that I'll be able to talk to them. I think that to make concrete change for the North Korean people, that does involve the government taking
action. And so I have been very clear to message to them repeatedly that I'm ready to have a
dialogue about human rights and that that also includes being willing to talk about the U.S.'s own human rights record.
It should very much be a dialogue, an exchange of views.
Rather than one way.
That's right.
My goal here is not to point the finger or wag my finger at the North Koreans.
Plenty of people doing that already.
That's right.
My goal is to, as I said, bring about concrete change that improves the welfare
and the lives of the North Korean people. Now, have you or your office sent a letter to the
DPRK special mission to the United Nations that's in Midtown Manhattan, or perhaps dropped off a
bag of bagels with the security man at the front door? A bag of bagels, that sounds good. But I
have repeatedly, and I've done a ton of media engagements, including with various news outlets that broadcast into North Korea, have repeatedly messaged my willingness to engage in a conversation.
Okay. But they have that office right there in New York. Do they open the door? I mean, do they answer phone calls? cause? Well, I think based on the names that they've been calling me, it doesn't seem like
they're super receptive right now. But I think the important thing and what I plan to do is to
continue to be persistent and to continue to message and engage in whatever ways I can.
I understand that in years gone by, they were susceptible to, well, welcome to invitation to
a steak dinner at their favorite steakhouse in Manhattan. So that may be a way to go in future. Now, your missions, as I understand them, are to support human rights
in the DPRK, promote accountability, and improve access to information from the North Korean
people. This is what I got from an article or a press release. Have I missed any of the major
legs of your tasks? So I'm going to tick off my five. Working with like-minded partners and allies, which includes by advocating for things like increased access to information, working with partners and raising the refugee issue, as well as helping to build out better supports for refugee communities, the North Korean diaspora
community, if you will, around the world, promoting accountability and promoting concrete change,
calling on the North Korean government to reform various laws like the three evil laws that they
passed during COVID. And then the last area is an area that is relatively new to my mandate,
but one that has been very important to my work over
the last few months since I've been in the position, which is the engaging with the divided
families community in the United States. One of the things that I've sought to highlight,
and part of the reason for my visit to Korea this week, is to talk about the impact that North
Korea's repressive policies have had on families,
not just North Korean families, but families globally.
And this is the divided families community, people that have been separated since the
Korean War, who can't pick up the phone and call their brother or their sister or are
living without any knowledge of what happened to their mother or their father, whom they were
separated from. But also the detainees, abductees, POWs here in South Korea, who are also separated
from their loved ones without forms of communication, without contact, without answers,
as well as Japanese abductees. And I had the opportunity to visit
Tokyo earlier this year, where I also engaged in a number of meetings focused on abductions.
But I think that this is an important area of trilateral cooperation for the U.S., ROK,
and Japan, but also one that, given the age of many of the impacted communities, it is critical that our governments work together
and continue to reach out to the North Koreans to try and resolve.
How is it possible to actually make an impact on human rights within North Korea
while outside North Korea?
There are a couple of ways,
but I think one of the things that I've been most focused on, or one of the,
I think, outcomes that I've seen is when the international community is hyper-focused on a
particular issue, we do see the North Korean government making changes to their behavior.
Years ago, there was international focus on forced abortions in North Korea.
And I've heard anecdotally from North Korean refugees, women in particular, who noted that when they were detained in a repatriation center after being forcibly returned, that they had actually heard from some of the guards that the government didn't want them forcibly aborting babies anymore.
And so they sent this one woman home to have her baby.
Now, unfortunately, they sent her home thinking that they would kill the baby after it was born.
So it wasn't quite the policy shift that we were looking for,
but it was a policy shift that did create an opening for her
because when she was released to go home to have the baby,
she was able to escape a second time
and was able to make her way to the ROK after that. I think similarly, we've even seen reports
recently about with the new focus on North Korean overseas workers and the conditions that they work
in, which the US government and others have called forced labor, that suddenly the government is issuing new orders to some of their overseas worker supervisors to change the conditions under which some of those workers work because they're very keenly aware of the international criticism and focus and the implications that may have on their ability
to stay overseas. Are there also external factors that make helping human rights within the North
Korean border harder, such as sanctions on cross-border trade? And I'm not talking about
sales of missiles or import of luxury goods, but sales of things like fish or textiles? You know, I think the tools have to be used as a package, right?
And if we're looking at sanctions independent of the international pressure
and the specific kind of change that we want to see,
then it does get a lot harder to produce the outcomes that we want.
When it comes to overseas workers and sanctions, we are also using sanctions as a tool to improve human rights and to address the issues of forced labor.
And some of that comes through different provisions that the U.S. government has under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act,
which also, similar to the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, has a rebuttable presumption, which means that any good made wholly or in part by a North Korean worker is banned from
import into the United States because it is assumed to be made with forced labor.
In doing so, we are engaging with the private sector as well as consumers, talking about supply chain due diligence, which overall helps raise the standards of labor conditions across the board, not just for North Korean workers, but also helps other workers in the PRC. But that does require this multi-pronged effort, and so not pursuing any sort of
activity in isolation from others to think about it as a holistic package.
Now, to help the most basic human rights, so the right to eat, the right to be clothed,
the right to have a roof over your head, some say that humanitarian aid should be given to
the DPRK without conditions or international monitoring. Does the United States agree with that principle?
I think monitoring and access is a critical component of ensuring that the aid is getting
to those that are most vulnerable, which is at the end of the day who we're trying to help.
which is at the end of the day who we're trying to help. We're not trying to line the pockets or to help bolster the wealth of the elites that we are thinking about children, the elderly,
pregnant or lactating women, persons with disabilities, any of these populations that
would traditionally fall into a marginalized population category.
And we can only ensure that that aid is getting there if we have the access that we would expect anywhere else in the world when delivering aid.
And so making sure that when assistance is going in, that it is going in and being distributed consistent with international
standards. Now, the United States has had a special envoy for North Korean human rights
issues since August 2005. Do you see signs of improvement in North Korean human rights that
you can point to that are specifically related to the U.S. having a special envoy?
So I think if we're going back to when this
position was initially created, there have been a number of things that have happened in the North
Korean human rights space, including the 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry report, which was
really both groundbreaking in terms of UN investigatory mechanisms, but also really important in the
comprehensive and real meticulous documentation that they were able to do looking at North
Korea's human rights record across a range of topics and rights areas. In addition to that,
rights areas. In addition to that, I think that, well, that particular report also brought the North Korean government out in a way that they had not really engaged in the multilateral space
before. They were sending top foreign ministry officials to Geneva, to New York to talk about their own human rights record. Since then, there have continued to
be UN resolutions, both at the Human Rights Council and at the General Assembly in New York,
that have been passing by consensus. It's one of the few country-specific resolutions
in the human rights space that passes by consensus
annually in both Geneva and in New York. Even last August, with the UN Security Council open session
on North Korean human rights, that session was held without a procedural vote, which is pretty
significant. I think across the board, the consensus in the human rights space
is pretty clear. I think, though, that in terms of engagement on the issue of North Korean human
rights, it feels a little bit like North Korea is content to talk about more or less, let's say,
relatively speaking, low-hanging fruit disability issues rather than, for example, prison camps or
punishments. These are areas that North Korea generally rejects any and all attempts to talk about.
And that's why I wonder to what extent it's possible to talk about accountability with North Korea.
So I don't want to discount disability rights or women's and children's rights as important areas
where we should also be talking to the North Koreans, looking for progress and engagement,
because those areas of rights also open the door to other areas of rights and also are an important
population, right? And this goes back to my point earlier about making sure that we are focused on
supporting marginalized communities in North Korea. And so I think if
those are the areas in which they're willing to engage, then we should continue to look for
opportunities to engage there. They have been messaging and they have taken steps to reform
their disability rights laws. And I think there would be support on our side to start a conversation on disability rights with the North Koreans.
To your point, though, on their unwillingness to really confront those civil and political liberties and the more egregious human rights violations and abuses like the political prison camps. I will point back to the anecdote I shared before about forced abortions.
Even if they're unwilling to confront them in the same way, that there is at least an
acknowledgement that they're drawing more attention to themselves, negative attention
to themselves than they probably want.
And so they are making adjustments.
I've similarly, similar to the anecdote on forced abortions, have heard that when there was a significant focus on public executions, that they were very keenly aware that the international community was very focused on public executions. And so they made slight shifts. Now, again, not the shift that we wanted and that they shifted from public executions to secret executions. But that demonstrates to me that they are paying attention to what's going on in the international space, which gives us an opportunity to be very clear about what kind of changes need to be made. On the accountability front, this is important not just in the short term
for helping to bring about an end to the abuses, but this is also important in the long term for
truth and reconciliation purposes, for dealing with impunity in the long run, ensuring the rule of law in North Korea. At some point, the North
Koreans and the international community are going to have to wrestle with this issue of how you hold
those that are most responsible for human rights violations in North Korea accountable.
It seems to me that in terms of actually engaging North Korea on human rights,
that the approach followed by Great Britain,
that of, number one, diplomatic recognition of North Korea, coupled with mutual embassies in both capitals, and critical engagement at the same time, it seems to be more effective than
the longstanding US policy of not diplomatically recognizing the DPRK, while at the same time
talking at or past it. Now, I know that you're not into the
finger wagging game, but that's a longstanding tradition. So perhaps you're bucking that trend
there. But is that a fair characterization that in a way you're trying to fight a boxing match
with one arm behind your back because that recognition isn't there? So all you're doing
is talking to North Korea about the negative things. I think there has to be a process to
get to the point where you can have the establishment of diplomatic relations. And there, I think in achieving that,
we do need to just get to the table. And this goes back to not just on human rights,
but more broadly, the US has and continues to message that we are prepared to get back to the table without preconditions with the North Koreans.
And then we can look towards the future of what's possible.
North Korea doesn't seem too keen on coming to any table right now.
And I think that's right.
And that's why, one, we're going to keep messaging so that they know that the door is open.
We're ready.
And that's as far as we can go. It takes two to negotiate. It takes two to dance. However,
you want to characterize it, we're here and we're ready. But also, I will say that even if we get
back to the table and we're talking that that doesn't mean that the U.S. government is going to stop talking about the most egregious abuses.
The U.S. government is able to multitask, and we do it with a lot of partners who we have varying types of relationships with.
Some are treaty allies. Some are new or emerging partners.
We can talk about expanding economic cooperation. We can talk about security relationships while also talking about frank conversations on human rights, to try to find ways for progress
while also having conversations about other bilateral issues.
Now, in previous interviews talking about accountability and North Korean human rights,
you've mentioned the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Now, is that declaration,
it's something from, let me see, the 1949-ish? It was a United Nations project. Is that something that should trump national
sovereignty when a country is found to be in breach of that declaration?
So I think the thing that makes, I should also say, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
is a non-binding document to begin with, but it is rooted in the understanding that
these are universal rights, that they are fundamental freedoms that every human is
entitled to. And so I think at the end of the day, it's not an issue of whether or not it trumps
state sovereignty, because it's not about states.
It's about individuals and individual rights. Last year, your colleague, the U.S. ambassador
to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, said in an interview that, quote,
there are tools and mechanisms within the international system for doing that. And she's
talking about accountability. That's the that that she's referring to. And I think she may
have been hinting at the International Criminal Court. Now, some have explicitly called for North Korea's
leaders to be prosecuted at the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The ICC is, of
course, a court that the United States is not a member of. And this week, US President Biden and
Secretary of State Blinken have both condemned attempts by prosecutors at the same ICC to lay
charges against Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel because of what's happening in Gaza at the moment. So is it feasible to imagine a day when leaders
of North Korea are in fact put into a court of international law when the U.S. isn't really
in favor of such international criminal courts necessarily?
Well, there are a range of international accountability tools that would be and are available within the context of North
Korean human rights. And the ICC is one of those tools. But I would also point to a pending case
that the Gambia has brought against Myanmar at the International Court of Justice, the ICJ.
There are also hybrid court mechanisms, such as the extraordinary
chambers of Cambodian courts, which was used to hold Khmer Rouge leaders accountable.
And there are other domestic mechanisms that could be explored, and also non-judicial forms of accountability that
are available as well. And so I think in the North Korea context, we should be looking holistically
at the various mechanisms and find the one that's the right fit in the North Korea context because
there are different jurisdictional and very technical legal reasons why one may be a better
fit than others. I think the other piece of this is it's very important that civil society groups,
governments, both think about continued work to document the egregious human rights abuses that
are happening in North Korea so that there is a baseline store of data that can be used to
initiate an investigation that could potentially lead to a criminal prosecution. But also thinking
about ensuring that survivors, North Korean escapees, North Korean diaspora, North Korean
defectors, however we want to define that
community, or even abductee family members, detainee family members, all of these people
that have been impacted by North Korea's human rights abuses, that their voices are integrated
into that accountability process and that they have an opportunity to share their views into what accountability would look like for them.
Let's move on to improving access to information for the people within North Korea right now.
Now, the DPRK government in Pyongyang has made clear on a number of occasions,
and with its laws that it's passed in recent years, that it does not want information,
including news, cultural products, music, basically any data from outside,
coming into its borders without first going through some kind of filtering or censorship mechanism.
Is that your understanding?
Yes, and I think right now, I mean, as we saw with the passage of the so-called three evil laws
over the course of the last few years, that there is a hypersensitivity to this influx of foreign
information that's making its way into North Korea. Yeah, now the government of Pyongyang,
sometimes it labels the infiltration of external information, spiritual warfare,
sometimes psychological warfare. It may even have said, I wasn't able to find the direct quote,
but it may even have said that such activities are tantamount to an act of war. And it certainly
reacted or threatened to
react violently in the past, such as in 2019, when it threatened to shell the areas where
citizen groups in South Korea are sending leaflets into North Korea. So I'm just wondering, given
that, that context there, is it maybe best to avoid sending in information to outside North
Korea that is, you know, unsanctioned? Should the United States be involved in such or support such activity? Increasing a population's access to independent information is critical to creating
an informed citizenry. And I think at the end of the day, an informed citizenry can be helpful
in creating a more secure, peaceful, and prosperous environment for North Koreans,
but also regional stability in Northeast Asia. And I say this in that, you know, having information,
good, credible information about something as simple as the weather for the day can help people operating shops in the marketplace determine prices for umbrellas for the day,
or just also whether or not they're going to have a busy day at the market or a slow day at the market. Informed citizenry helps economically build prosperity in terms of stability and security.
And informed citizenry is also able to better interact with their government.
The government is also better able to interact and understand the needs of the people and to provide and meet the needs of the people.
and to provide and meet the needs of the people. And so, again, at the end of the day, having your citizens have consistent access to credible and independent information
and being able to share full range of viewpoints, having podcast conversations like this one,
are essential to that peace-building process.
But the historical context is a little bit murkier.
I mean, at least until the mid to late 1960s, the United Nations Command, led by the United States,
was producing and sending leaflets into North Korea, not to provide information on weather,
but as part of something called Operation Jili,
not to provide information on weather, but as part of something called Operation Jili,
where they were seemingly made with the intention of causing people in the DPRK to lose faith in and perhaps rise up against their government. The South Korean government continued the exact
same production, I believe it was until 2000, when Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il agreed not to
do that anymore. So I can understand perhaps why the North Korean government looks askance at any
efforts to send in information from outside as a threat, as a potential, you know,
fomenting or stoking mistrust or even revolution. I think, one, that's part of the reason why I'm
being very specific in talking about access to information, access to independent information,
right? This is not a
psychological warfare campaign. This is very specifically increasing access to independent
sources of information that aren't available in North Korea. There's also, I think, an issue of
demand, right? The North Korean people are information hungry. And if there was not that demand, then a lot of these efforts would not be going anywhere anyway.
The radio broadcasts, for instance, USB drives, a lot of the information that is getting in that the North Korean government has begun its crackdown against is not necessarily the leaflets,
right? It is much more the influx of K-dramas, right? Which is essentially where the Pyongyang
dialect law comes from. You know, this fear that South Korean slang is going to take root
in North Korea is because there is this demand right now from North Korean youth
to be able to watch the same television shows that are popular around the world.
Yeah. You mentioned earlier the Commission of Inquiry report on human rights in the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea. That report came out more than 10 years ago. Much has changed,
but also much is still the same. Does the United States at this time support the notion that a new commission of inquiry is necessary? pages of it. The U.S., along with a number of other governments, did just recently co-sponsor
a resolution in Geneva at the Human Rights Council that did call on the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights to write a comprehensive update to the COI report,
essentially, covering the last 10 years. And so I think we do want to make sure that we are keeping
our understanding of what's going on in North Korea fresh and updated. We also want to make
sure that we are continuing to document the work that the COI did didn't end in 2014, because North
Korea's human rights violations and abuses didn't end in 2014. The commission at the time did say that crimes against humanity have occurred and are ongoing.
And we don't have any reason to believe that they've stopped.
And so making sure that we're doing a good job of continuing to identify perpetrators of human rights abuses,
identify perpetrators of human rights abuses, to be able to have credible information about what specific abuses are happening is really important. And so we're very much looking forward to seeing
the OHCHR report when the update is done. Is this now your third official visit to South
Korea since being named the U.S. Special Envoy for North Korean Human Rights Issues? I think it is. Generally speaking,
without giving too much of your schedule away, what kind of groups or officials or individuals
do you meet with on these trips to South Korea? So I meet with a range of groups when I'm in South
Korea, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Unification, various civil society groups, academic institutions, student groups.
I also make it a priority to meet with refugees and escapees here in Seoul.
On my last visit, I was able to go to Hanawon.
This visit in particular is focused...
For our listeners there, Hanawon is the North Korean refugee settler retraining center where
they spend, is it three months now?
Yes.
Three months to get information on how to live in a capitalist society like South Korea.
So learn a bit of English, learn how to drive a car, learn how to open a bank account,
practical things like that.
So you're able to, which it's highly secure because it's run by the National Intelligence
Service and you're able to enter and have a look around.
So Hanawan is actually run by the Ministry of Unification.
But guarded by the National Intelligence Service, if I understand correctly.
Not everyone could just walk in there. It's quite a secure facility.
I think I don't know the answer to that, but I was able to visit the last time. This visit or this trip, I'm largely focused
on meetings that are tied to the POW detainee and abductee groups that I mentioned earlier,
and also participating in events and conducting meetings that are focused on linkages between international peace and security and human rights. and other actions that both businesses and governments can take to make sure that we're
not complicit in the use or exploitation of North Korean workers.
Now, there are fewer North Korean people able to leave North Korea now than before the pandemic
because of the increased border security. Does that make your job harder?
Yes, in a lot of ways, because it makes it harder to get credible information about the
human rights situation. And it's important that when we are talking about North Korean human
rights, that we be able to verify the credibility of the reports that we're getting. And so with
fewer refugees and escapees getting out, we have got to look at other more creative ways to fact check verify and to better understand
the situation in North Korea. Now there was a gap of about seven and a half years from the end of
the term of the previous US special envoy for North Korean human rights issues and your confirmation
is it possible to pick up where Ambassador Robert King left off in January 2017 or have you had to
start from scratch effectively? So I don't think that I've had to start from scratch, because even during the gap between
Ambassador King and myself, there are lots of different components of the State Department
of the U.S. government that are focused on North Korean human rights. We have our Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. We also have our...
Which you've worked at.
That's correct. As well as our Office of Korean and Mongolian Affairs, which has a human rights
team as well within it working on these issues with the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor. We have our Office of Global Criminal Justice. We have our Office of Religious Freedom.
Many different people who are diligently and passionately working to advance human rights for the North Korean people.
The other piece, though, that I will say during that time, the situation in North Korea has changed a lot.
And so particularly during the COVID period and and unfortunately, not for the better. And so
during that gap, while we've had other people working on these issues, and the US has had a
very consistent North Korean human rights policy, there were enough changes that coming into this
job, I was coming in at a time where we were needing to rethink a lot of the things that
we're doing, like access to information programs. How do you get information into North Korea if the trade routes are non-existent
now because of the border closings? And so trying to think creatively about new ways to tackle
this problem within this new context in a post-COVID environment.
Last question. If anyone from North Korea is listening right now to this podcast,
you never know, what would be your message to them?
I think two things. One, I will say to the people in North Korea that we see you and that we are,
see you and that we are, there are many people around the world that are actively advocating for change that will help improve your standard of living, your day-to-day lives.
And to the North Korean government, I will again reiterate what I've said time and time again.
We're ready. I want to engage in a conversation, I think, for both sides. I'm sitting down at the
table talking about expectations, talking about human rights, talking about perspectives on human
rights is important. And so I hope if anybody is listening to this, that we will be able to
find a way to work together to improve the lives of the North Korean people.
There you have a great place to end there. Thank you very much,
Ambassador Julie Turner, for coming on the NK News podcast today. Appreciate your time.
Thank you.
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Ladies and gentlemen, that brings us to the end of our podcast episode for today. Our thanks go
to Brian Betts and Alana Hill for facilitating this episode and to our post-recording producer genius, Gabby Magnusson,
who cuts out all the extraneous noises, awkward silences, bodily functions,
and fixes the audio levels.
Thank you and listen again next time.