Ottoman History Podcast - Ottoman Armenians and the Politics of Conscription

Episode Date: October 3, 2018

Episode 382 with Ohannes Kılıçdağı hosted by Sam Dolbee Download the podcast Feed | iTunes | GooglePlay | SoundCloud The history of Ottoman Armenians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Ottoman Empire is inevitably in the shadow of 1915. In today’s episode, we explore new approaches to this history with Dr. Ohannes Kılıçdağı. We speak in particular about the hopes that the empire’s Armenian citizens attached to the 1908 Constitutional Revolution, which were high indeed. On the basis of research utilizing Armenian-language periodicals from across the empire, Kılıçdağı explains how the Armenian community enthusiastically embraced military conscription, and how this phenomenon connects to the theme of citizenship in the late Ottoman Empire more generally. We conclude by considering what use there is for history in the politics of the present. « Click for More »

Next, on the Ottoman History Podcast, we'll talk with Dr. Ohanis Kalicda about the history of Armenians in the late Ottoman Empire. We'll discuss new approaches to this history that acknowledge the weight of the genocide, but also examine the broader social history of Armenians in the empire. What was there just before the genocide? Ohanis' research is on military conscription of Armenians after 1908, when fighting for the Ottoman Empire became a marker of citizenship for the empire's various communities.

His research reveals perhaps unexpected commonalities between these groups. One can find almost no difference, discursive difference, between a Turkish Muslim intelligentsia intellectual or an Armenian intellectual supporting military service. They used same language. In closing, we'll talk about

what history means for Ohanis on a personal level. Dealing with history and writing history is an act of emancipation. Stay with us. It's the Ottoman History Podcast. I'm Sam Dolby. Today, our guest is Dr. Ohanis Kalicta, who is a visiting postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University's Center for Middle Eastern Studies. He has a PhD in history from Bozici University,

and today we'll be talking about his research on the Armenian community in the late Ottoman Empire. Ohanis, thanks so much for joining us today. I thank you for letting me be part of this such a great project. You're very kind. So to start off, I wonder if you might situate our listeners in terms of the Armenian community of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century. How many people are we talking about? Where do they live? Major political players? Yeah, I mean, although there are different numbers in terms of population, when we say Ottoman Armenian community, as educated guests, as an educated guest,

we can say that we are talking about more or less 2 million people, 2.5 million people. Of course, this number differs to 19th century and early 20th century. In terms of political actors, Early 20th century. In terms of political actors, until late or middle 1880s, there was no political party in the modern sense of the concept. But the Armenian Patriarchate in Constantinople and the prelates sent by this patriarch to different locations of Anatolia were the main actors, political actors. And, of course, until 1850s, the story is long, but let me try to summarize it. From 1750s to 1850s, there was also a group called Amira, mostly located in Constantinople. Some of Amira's had origins from Eastern Anatolia, especially Eyn or Agan in Armenia. And these people, I mean, Amiras were either sarrafs, bankers, or high-level technocrats, bureaucrats, or merchants. So these people, Amiras I mean, had strong close relations with state circles. And this group of people used these ties, these relations with state circles, even with sultans,

to establish their power on Armenian community. So, I mean, for a century, from 1750s to 1850s, Amiras were also one of the important actors. Although they were very powerful within community, they were weak vis-a-vis state because every Pasha, I mean Mustafa Rechid, Ali, etc. every Pasha had a banker, had a Saraf with whom he worked in financial matters to organize financial affairs. But you know, whenever one of these pashas had trouble within the state, same in a similar way, his sarraf also got trouble.

In this way, some amiras lost their fortune, lost even their life, etc. But again, to cut the long story short, beginning from 1830s, their power within Armenian community started to be challenged by a coalition, by a coalition. And when we say modern intellectuals, we mean those young people who went to Europe, different universities, etc. where they got familiar with these modern ideas of liberty, equality, etc. And actually this coalition of esnaf and modern intellectuals started, as I say, started to challenge Amira's authority within the community. And actually, they succeeded to tumble down. Of course, this was not the whole sole reason of the demise of Amira's. It had other reasons related to the tax system of Ottoman Empire or entering of European bankers and banks into the Ottoman financial market, etc. These are other reasons.

But from 1850s or 1830s on, other actors, as I said, start to come to the stage. So we see the political playing field widening to some extent. Meanwhile, especially in the second half of 19th century, what to be called later Armenian question started to emerge. And when we say Armenian question or when it is set in literature Armenian question, it usually refers to the situation of Armenians in Anatolia, especially in Eastern Anatolia, but not exclusively. Again, very briefly, those people, I mean Armenians in Anatolia, had some serious problems.

They did not have any security of life, property, and honor. In the sense, I mean, as their property had been exhorted by, I don't know, sometimes by Kurdish tribal leaders, sometimes by other Kurdish people or other immigrants, Caucasian or Balkan immigrants, etc. Not only properties, but I mean women, abduction of women or abduction of other movable properties were very frequent. Also, these people were double taxed. On one hand they paid a tax to the central state and secondly they paid another collection of let's say tax to these local despots let's say local aahs etc. They, I mean Anatolian Armenians, repeatedly tried to solve these problems by giving petitions, writing to petitions to both Armenian patriarchy

or, let's say, to the central government, etc. Even in 1860s, some delegates from Erzurum, if I remember correctly, from Erzurum and one visited capital, I mean personally, to express their complaints. But in the end, they were jailed by state officials. So what I'm trying to say is that all their efforts to solve these kind of problems I mentioned became in vain. Eventually, in the 1880s, some other group of Armenians started to think that this struggle should be continued in other ways, including some armed resistance, etc. So this was the beginning of the establishment of Armenian political parties. First, Armenikan party won, but later also in 1888, establishment of Huncak party in Cenev. in 1888, establishment of Hınçak Party in Cenev,

and in 1890, establishment of Armenian Revolutionary Federation, which is known as Taşnak Sütun, in Tiflis. So these parties started to follow, as I say, different ways. I mean, armed struggle as a solution of this problem. Again, to cut it short, these parties were discontent with the Hamidian despotism, but there are some non-Armenian opposition also to Abdelhamid. So eventually, they tried to have make a coalition, these Armenian and non-Armenian actors, etc. All these coalitions of Ottoman dissidents in 1902 and 1907. So eventually, again, fast forward, in 1908, at the end of a military,

if you like, uprising in Macedonia, as you know, in 1908, Abd al-Din had to restore, re-announce the constitution and the parliament. So I want to hold off for a second on talking about the post-1908 period. And I want to hold off for a second on talking about the post-1908 period, and I want to take a step back. You have a chapter in a volume edited by Zofinar Deryan, Tolga Chora, and Ali Spahi, and we actually have a podcast with Zofinar and Tolga about this project,

and we'll have citation details on the website. And as I understand it, the project's exciting because it represents a new approach to Ottoman history by taking a more comprehensive approach to what they call the Ottoman East. And I wonder if, you know, you gave us this really masterful description of the history of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in about six minutes. I wonder if you could take a step back and reflect on how people have told that history before, and how this group of young scholars is taking a new approach. Usually, provinces, I mean, east, when we say provinces, of course, in terms of Armenians, we largely mean eastern provinces, but not exclusively. Let me underline once more because, let me have a parenthesis here, because there were some important Armenian communities, for example, in Adapazarı or in Konya or in Trabzon. So although we mean eastern provinces mainly, but not exclusively, coming to your question, in writing Armenian history and of course dealing

with this issue of genocide historians Armenian or non-Armenian have tended to ignore provinces these provincial cities etc either they concentrate on the genocide or they concentrate on Hamidian time Hamidian massacres, etc. Of course, let me say that Turkish denialism, let's say, this is, I think, the right phrase, Turkish official denialism, let's say, because there are some Turks, but Turkish official denialism of genocide has been one of the important reasons to, let's say, neglect

because the Armenian genocide became a very hot political issue and more truly its recognition and denial became a very strong hard political struggle political debate which let's say covered all these let's say academic more academic questions all these, let's say, academic, more academic questions. And people tended to ignore also what was there just before the genocide. What were people talking about just before the genocide in the provinces? I mean, I say in the province mainly, not exclusively, but genocide happened in these provinces so the literature is in need to integrate these sources so tell it so to tell a history that we all know ends in genocide yeah but but but not to have it totally encompassed by genocide right yeah but to talk about what's there. Even in order to understand genocide, how it happened, why it happened,

I mean, we should look at what was before socially, politically, culturally, what was there before the genocide. How was the relations between Armenians and other neighboring communities just before the genocide. But because eventually genocide was a central project but implemented in local localities. And of course these relations between Armenians and other communities played a significant role in its implementation. Imagine that if there hadn't been any problem between Armenians and the other communities, like Kurdish, Muslim, etc., Turkish, would have genocide be happen? I mean, that's one of the subtle motivations of my dissertation.

Although genocide is not my direct question, One of my motivations is to understand the conditions and situations before the genocide and to put some extra light accordingly on the genocide. So that's why I concentrated as a material on Armenian provincial periodicals published after 1908. So I want to ask more specifically about that. published after 1908. So I want to ask more specifically about that. And so maybe we'll rewind now to when I had to stop you from getting excited and talking about 1908. And it's appropriate that you were excited about that, and that I was excited about that. Because 1908 is an exciting time, right? And so one of my favorite stories about the excitement that accompanied the reinstatement of the Constitution in 1908 is an anecdote with which

Bedros Dermatosian begins his book. And it's about a celebration of the revolution in Cairo at an Armenian apostolic church. And the famous Muslim intellectual Rashid Rida is in the crowd. And the crowd gets so excited that they take Rashid Rida on their shoulders, they bring him up to the front, and he embraces the Armenian up to the front, and he embraces the Armenian bishop at the front of the church, and everyone cheers. So it's this great moment of happiness. And in fact, in your article in the edited volume, you say that Armenians perhaps were the happiest of all about the reinstatement of the constitution and about parliament being set in motion again. So what makes people so happy?

First of all, I mean, that scene, that picture, let's say, was very frequent at the time. You can observe all different cities, more or less similar pictures, similar scene there. I mean, lots of people were getting put on people's shoulders, jubilating, shouting these principles of, let's say, fraternity, equality, liberty, and, of course, justice, etc. They add justice as a fourth principle. And, you know, the answer of your question, again, is related to this term justice. Because the Hamidian period for Armenians was especially a hard one. Yes, Hamidian regime was despotic for all, all people, but for Armenians, it was also a very bloody period. Not only they were politically suppressed, but they were also

annihilated. You know this in, let's say, infamous massacres of 1894 and 1996, the number of victims, Armenian victims, has been given around 200,000. So the Hamidian period in the heads of Armenian people was especially a dark time. Even by, let me use one of the Armenian authors in the periodicals, it's a demonic period for Armenians. So naturally, 1908 came as a relief for them. And they thought that, initially at least, they thought that this was a new beginning. This would be a final end of all the evil deeds of the Hamidian period. And they said that Armenian people deserved this more than any other community because they were or they had been suppressed more than any other community during the Hamidun regime. Also they said that Armenians deserved this because they, especially Armenian parties, they fought, physically fought against this despotism. So they deserve this, let's say, victory. Especially

Armenian Revolutionary Federation, Taşnak Sütü'n, its officials, I mean, depicted themselves as a partner of İttihat Terakki or whatever, young Turks, in this victory. So they say that through our struggle, through our fighting, that today we established again constitution and parliament. So that generally speaking, this was their mentality at that time. So as you alluded to, especially in Eastern Anatolia, there are very specific issues, especially dealing with property, right? And Jenna Klein's written about this in the agrarian question. So much of your research has been about the provincial newspapers. So thinking about all these different places. So to what extent are the things people are excited about or happy about? To what extent do they differ according to place? Are people excited

about different things in Istanbul than they are in Diyarbakır? Of course, it differs whether you are an urban middle class Armenian or an Armenian peasant. If you are a middle class urban Armenian, let's say, most probably you will be very hopeful of the new beginning period. You will think that all these problems will be solved and Armenians started to be treated as equal citizens, etc., etc. But if you were an Armenian peasant living in a remote village, most probably you would be trying to understand what was going on. Most probably you heard some news coming from remote places that there was again some revolution, etc. from remote places that there was again some revolution etc but most probably you were hesitant you were prudent and as i say trying to understand what's going on and of course you observe your immediate environment and you i mean as an peasant try to understand whether there is a concrete

change in your treatment by kurdish as or let's say officials in the state officials in your treatment by Kurdish or let's say officials in the state, officials in your locality, etc. According to my observations, let's say, for a certain period after the revolution in June 1908, these attacks against Armenians and to their properties stopped for a time. Of course, it's debatable how long, how many months, etc. It may differ from region to region. But for a while, everybody, I mean, since not only Armenian peasants, everybody was trying to understand what's going on there in the capital. Out of this psychology, let's say, those attacks were calmed down for a period. But maybe one year, in some places less than a year,

all these attacks resumed. So things changed pretty quickly. Yeah. But I want to pause before we get to things getting bad. Let's relish the good moments for a little while, perhaps. To what extent can we talk about assimilation in this context? Because sometimes people talk about the promises of the revolution and the CUP as recreating Ottomanism in a way as being open to everyone. And, you know, I'm thinking about Michel Campos'

work on Palestine. And I'm also thinking in your own work, you have this really wonderful quote from someone, K.H. Sinanian from Erzurum in 1909. And he writes, all nations give their life. So referring to all the nations within the Ottoman Empire, all nations give their life, but not their language. So the idea was that we should all still be able to speak our own language. Yeah. I mean, this assimilation is very very important these armenian circles were very sensitive about assimilation as i say for them preserving their armenian identity was very important although they were supporting the ideology of Ottomanism. Their understanding or their version of Ottomanism was a kind of political identity, not a cultural one, not, let's say, a national one, but as a political identity.

It's a citizenship. It's a basis for citizenship. Yeah, it's a citizenship. It's a kind of relation between people and the state. So they were very, very sensitive about assimilation. And as caution or measures against assimilation, they proposed two kinds of autonomy. One is communal autonomy.

The other is regional autonomy, ademi merkeziyet. I mean, communal autonomy can be found more or less in millet system. It's a different chapter, it's a different discussion, what was millet system, etc. But more or less, we can say that communal autonomy was not something new, but they were very sensitive to protect, to preserve this communal autonomy. When we say communal autonomy, we mean autonomy in educational affairs, in civil affairs, etc. And, of course, preserving language at schools, etc. is one of the important parts of this communal autonomy.

And, besides that, they also supported regional autonomy, Adem-i Merkeziyet, as other, like others, maybe Muslim, Turkish, again, circles like President Sabahattin, etc. So, although there were different parties, Armenian parties, different circles, etc., I can say that all these parties unanimously were supporting regional autonomy, Adam Merkeziyet. I didn't come across any Armenian political actors supporting centralization, supporting Turkification, etc. Although they were Ottomanist. And I don't know, maybe this can be helpful to understand. can be helpful to understand. Frequently, they referred United States and Switzerland as successful examples of decentralization, adem-i merkeziyet.

So take that Ottoman Empire, they say could be like this, successful examples of decentralization, or of course they do not use that at federation, something like that, but they use this adem-erkizyat and decentralization. So, okay, let's get back to things going wrong, perhaps, right? In 1909, we have this attempted coup aimed at restoring the old guard.

And then, of course, we have the Adana massacres? Just I said previously, especially you were urban middle class Armenian or if you're an Armenian politician, intellectual, et cetera, you were very helpful, you're hopeful, I said, until 1909 April Adana massacres. It came as a real shock to Armenian people because, you know,

this is something psychological because they had thought that the revolution would end all massacres for Armenians would end all calamities for Armenians it was hideous it was very horrible horrible because you know within two weeks within this such kind of short time according to some guess or numbers, 20,000 Armenians were massacred, were killed. So it was a heavy moment for them. But interestingly enough, almost all Armenians, not only, I mean, Tashnaks, because at that time they were political allies of Daed Teraki, but not only them, but also other Armenians, Armenian circles,

attributed to Adana massacres to Abdülhamid. And they taught that and they articulated that this massacre was the last intrigue by Abdülhamid to end the revolution. So for them, there's still hope in some ways because the villain of the story is not the revolution. It's Abdülhamid. Yeah, it's Abdülhamid. As far as I observe, there was not any considerable blame to Ittad Teraki

because of revolution, but they criticized state circles and Ittadist people of being very slow in punishment of these, let's say, perpetrators of Adana. Or they accused them of being not serious in this issue to end all these reactionary movements. Because in their eyes, Adana was a result of a reactionary movement organized by Abdulhamid. And they said to the state officials and to the Ittadis people, you should be very definite, very hard to cut all these reactionary routes and movements. But eventually, as perpetrator of Adana, they put Abdulhamid at the center of these events. Of course, it's debatable to what extent they were right or wrong, but this was their perception. And relatedly, although Adana was a shock, it was not an end for them. I can show you many articles

written in this provincial press, Armenian press, saying that, I'm quoting, don't be hopeless. The new regime, parliament, etc. need time. Everything will be good. Everything will be fine. I mean, you can find such kind of articles, written in this psychology, in this, let's say, expectation, even after Adana message. in this, let's say, expectation even after Adana Mesek. So there's a sense of perseverance, it seems like. And I know some of your research is on military conscription. And this is something that it really changes what this institution is in the wake of 1908. Maybe could you explain how this changes and what that means for Armenians?

For Armenians, as I say, revolution also is the beginning of their equal treatment as equal citizens. And being accepted into the army or being conscripted into the army was one of the important requirements and indicators of this equal treatment. And especially Armenian political circles, intelligentsia, were very well aware of this fact that they encouraged Armenian people to be conscripted into Ottoman army. And of course, they used some, this is very interesting, they used some Armenian nationalism, Armenian nationalist discourse, in order to make Armenian people Ottoman soldiers. This is very ironic, but this was the situation. Of course, they also used this very well known of honor,

very well known of this masculine identity, masculine honor, because, you know, there is a strong relation between man and being man and being soldier. So, I mean, Armenian intelligentsia and political leaders try to use this kind of discourses in order to encourage Armenian youth to become Ottoman soldiers. It strikes me this is an interesting counterpart to Larna Ekmekciolo's argument. And she's been on the podcast previously talking about her book, Recovering Armenia. And she makes this point that it was women who were expected to protect the nation in the wake of the genocide. And so she Bu konuda, bu genocide yaşanan insanların genocide yaşamak için güvenilmek zorundalar. Bu gençlikte işbirliği gösteriyor.

Bu konuda, bu gençlikte işbirliği gösteriyor. Bu gençlikte işbirliği gösteriyor. Bu gençlikte işbirliği gösteriyor. almost no difference, discursive difference, between a Turkish Muslim intelligentsia, or an Armenian intellectual supporting military service. They used same language. Not only political circles, I mean Armenian parties, but Armenian clergy as a man of religion, they, and after 1908, especially in 1909, when still there was a debate of whether non-Muslims should have been conscripted on that year or should be postponed, etc.

Even in 1909, Armenian clergy were very strongly supporting military service of Armenians in Ottoman army. You can find almost very, let's say, militaristic expressions coming from the mouth of Armenian clergy. They say that as Turkish parents, now we should give our sons to the Ottoman army. They do not belong to us anymore. I mean, sons, they do not belong to us anymore, but they belong to the fatherland, Ottoman fatherland. Let them die if it's necessary. And let us take our part of honor in this endeavor. We are not spectators of wars anymore, etc. etc. This kind of propaganda, let's say, language can be heard from the mouth of both Armenian political parties and Armenian clergy.

And so you mentioned that the discourses are very similar between, let's say, Armenians and Ottoman Muslim Turks. And any other nation. Even beyond, yeah. So Greek Ottomans are saying similar things. In other contexts, in French nationalism, in German nationalism, you can find millions of examples of this kind of expression. I have a question about something that maybe articles weren't written about at the time, which is people who maybe didn't want to go into military service. I'm sure there weren't many headlines saying military life is boring and dangerous,

and we would prefer to avoid it. Actually, especially in 1909, 1910, 11, you cannot find or it's very difficult to find such pieces in the press, let's say, having negative treatment, having negative remarks about military service. But of course, military service is not something desirable by any rational man. So naturally, there were Armenians and others deserting from army. But my previous statements was about political leaders, be it civil or religious. But on the other hand, there were some people, Armenian people, who were actually responsible of implementing or doing this service. Of course, some of them complied, some of them deserted. And if you ask me, the real question is why people complied when they are called for military duty.

On the other hand, nationalism and nationalist historiographies distorted our view so much that... That we think it's a normal thing. Yeah, I mean, desertion became, let's say, an anomaly. But if you ask me, desertion, I mean, running away from military service, is something that every clever, smart, rational man should do. We should ask otherwise. We should ask why people complied, why people consented when they are called. Why did the Armenian people comply? Why did the Armenian people consent when they were called? So I'm trying to understand in my case why the Armenian people military service to be accepted as citizens, as equal citizens. So, in other words, this was their sincere opinion, this sincere, let's say, attitude toward military service.

And especially this is also true for Armenian leaders, let's say, intelligentsia. On the other hand, there is also another important detail here. It's military exemption tax. Until 1909, non-Muslim males had to pay an exemption tax from military service. And the trick here is that this tax had been paid not only by those males at the age of military service, but by all, from one year old to 70 years old. In other words, this tax was a communal responsibility, was a collective responsibility. military service became compulsory for non-Muslims, only between certain ages, between 20 and 23, males would go to the military service. And the others, of course, would stop paying tax.

So for them, I mean, for those males, let's say older than 23 years old, it's rational to support... There's a real financial benefit to it. Yeah, because they would stop paying a tax. They would be relieved an additional financial burden. So a part of Armenians, let's say, most probably supported military service because of this motivation. And there is a third option. Maybe some of them complied because they did not have any other feasible option. Maybe, let me say that maybe they were not courageous enough to escape. They were not

bold enough to escape. You know, sometimes, even today, runaway from military service requires more courage. Of course. And so I wanted to ask, because you've not only done research on military conscription, you have also been part of military conscription yourself. Has that shaped how you think about this in any way? It's not something peculiar to me. Every male, at least on the paper, is responsible for military service in Turkey. And since I'm a citizen, so I was also responsible for that. Actually, I wrote my dissertation or I started my research before my military service, but that five months in barracks made me understand better what is military service. Why should people run away from it? Okay, so not academically, let's say, but I think

as a personal experience, my military service maybe made me understand better these conditions, these psychological conditions of serving in an army. And by the way, let me say that this is not something related to Ottoman history, but for the sake of clarity, I didn't have any, let's say, peculiar difficulty, personal, peculiar to me, etc. Let me clarify that. Just military service in itself is terrible enough. me, etc. Let me clarify that. That just military service is in itself is terrible enough. Yeah, sure. So I had another question. In addition to your articles and research as a historian, people might know you because you're a columnist for the Istanbul

newspaper Agos, which is a bilingual Turkish Armenian paper. And people might also know it as the paper for which Kran T was the editor-in-chief when he was assassinated in 2007. And so I wanted to ask you about the writing process for your columns and does that feel different than your historical research? Do they bleed into one another to some extent? Usually they blend into each other but of course writing a column has some more difficult points, but sometimes it's easier. For example, in terms of references, etc. You may be more relaxed when you write a column. People might not be checking your footnotes.

As a technical style, it doesn't allow you to give the thousands of footnotes that you have a very limited space. Just you refer by name as Salmi, Sam Dolby says, et cetera, et cetera. So writing a column, it's more flexible. It gives you a more area of maneuver. And of course, you know, there is a general understanding that academic writing should be dry or very technical. But, you know, in a column it's even desirable

to have a more, let's say, funky language. Maybe that's this juicy language. I like it, that language. Because in academic pieces, you look to be very serious. You know, this is a huge question, of course, is, you know, what does history do for the present? I mean, I'm not asking you to answer that entirely here, but you're doing this in a way, right?

Absolutely. Finding a way to make stuff that's sometimes dry and boring and academic, make it relevant to someone who's reading the paper on the bus. As you say, this is a huge question to answer. But let me try to answer in a brief way. This may differ from historian to historian. But for me, at least, dealing with history and writing history is an act of emancipation. It's an act of emancipation because history has been used as a tool of oppression. This might be by states, by, I don't know, different circles, but especially countries like Turkey, history has been used as an

tool of, instrument of oppressed people to cut their possibilities. Let me use this phrase, to steal their memory. So for me, writing history is to open these alternative ways of living and alternative ways of being and to remind people what they are made to forget. Especially again in nationalist historiographies, it has been stated in such a way that what we have today is the sole possibility. But for me, writing and dealing with history is to show different possibilities lost in the past. In other words, we are not bounded with what we have today. Things might be different today. If we can show this, this means that future might be different.

There are different possibilities of future. Dealing with history, if you ask me, should make someone understand that there are different ways of going. There are different ways of future. For me, then, writing and dealing with history is a political act. And if you ask me, I couldn't see an alternative. Writing history or dealing with history, but not being political, is not possible. Just maybe it's entertainment. It might be entertainment. And I accept that being entertained is a very legitimate motivation. But again, I don't understand dealing with politics

and at the same time trying to avoid politics, trying to, let's say that I'm a historian, I'm not a politician. You are my friend, even if you are aware or not. If you are historian, you are within the politics. There is no, I think, any possibility. Well, Ohanas, on that note, I want to thank you so much for joining us. Your words about history as a tool for reminding people what they've been made to forget is a powerful one and it's gonna stick with me for a long time so thank you so much

for joining us thank you for giving to this episode of the Ottoman History Podcast. We'll have a bibliography posted on our website, ottomanhistorypodcast.com, where you'll also find links to some of the other podcasts we mentioned in this episode. We also encourage you to join us on Facebook, where we have over 30,000 listeners. That's it for this episode of the Ottoman History Podcast. Until next time, take care. Thank you.