Planetary Radio: Space Exploration, Astronomy and Science - Space Policy Edition: Operation Moonglow and the Global Impact of Apollo

Episode Date: December 4, 2020

Apollo was seen as a triumph of, not for, all mankind, argues Dr. Teasel Muir-Harmony, author of the new book Operation Moonglow: A Political History of Apollo. She joins the show to talk about how this was not an accident, but the outcome of a carefully managed public relations campaign by the United States to promote its interests abroad. Discover more here.  https://www.planetary.org/planetary-radio/1202-2020-spe-teasel-muir-harmonySee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Happy December, everyone, and welcome to the December Space Policy Edition of Planetary Radio. I'm Matt Kaplan, the host of the show, the weekly show more so. I am lucky enough every month to co-host with Casey this Space Policy Edition. Casey Dreyer is out there. He is the Senior Space Policy Advisor and Chief Advocate for the Planetary Society. Welcome, Casey. Hey, Matt. Always happy to do another one of these. They're starting to pile up. Always happy to do another one of these. They're starting to pile up. We've done a few.

I guess because you have this wonderful interview that goes a bit that we're going to forego talking about the current politics. You know what? We're not going to forego it. We're going to just forgive. We're just not. I'll just take a break. Let's just take a break, not talk about US politics. We'll talk about US politics and international politics from about 50 years ago, 60 years ago.

Yeah, I was going to say, we're going to back it up five decades. Yes, to a simpler time. Apollo Collection at the Smithsonian Institution, and is also the author of a brand new book on the international outreach aspect of Apollo called Operation Moonglow, a political history of Apollo. Really insightful, nice complimentary version, you know, or story to tell beyond the what happened in the US. This is what happens outside the US and how the international community engaged with this great feat of exploration. I got to meet Teasel at the National Air and Space Museum once. I was out there interviewing her boss, Ellen Stofan, who right now is chairing the transition group that is looking at space policy for the Biden administration.

Matt, we said we wouldn't talk about that. You're right. I'm violating the rule. But Ellen is such a good friend of the show. And I do want to mention that when we finished recording, Teasel said that she is so busy with chairing this transition group that she's not even checking her email right now. So go, Ellen, go. Lead us into this next administration now. I'm sure that some of the things that she's working on will probably end up as topics in future space policy editions.

The only other thing I want to say, Casey, before we get into this terrific conversation, is that, of course, this is offered as a service of the Planetary Society. And many of you out there, something like 50,000 of you, are members. You're already supporting what we do. If you're not, we sure hope that you will go to planetary.org slash membership and join up and stand behind this show and everything else that the Planetary Society is up to. We also have a year-end campaign underway. underway. And all you have to do to make a one-time donation, be a member as well,

is go to planetary.org and you will see the details pop up right there. Like all kinds of nonprofits, we look to the end of the year for providing a lot of the funding that we depend on throughout the year. This is a great time to let us know, maybe to thank us for the Space Policy Edition and everything else that we're up to. Again, planetary.org is where all the details are. Well, I'd be remiss if I didn't second your plug for the Planetary Society. And it's the end of the year. This is a great time to give a donation or to join as a member or even upgrade your membership. There are higher levels of membership to be on. Everyone says, you know, this is important, but I really want to emphasize this organization lives and dies on its membership.

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That's because we have members. That gives us our whole reason to exist. So first, I just want to say thank you for listening. And if you can, if you're able to, it's a tough year for a lot of people, but if you're able to, please consider chipping in and helping us do this better. I like that description. It makes us sound like the Consumer Reports of Space. That doesn't sound as exciting as I think you want it to be. No, it's a very useful magazine.

I was a Consumer Reports kids, zillions, I think. Oh, you bet. Yeah. Yeah. I read it cover to cover still. So there you go, a plug for Consumer Reports as well. Yeah, free. They get a free one. I think we're ready. Should we get into this conversation with Teasel? Let's talk with Teasel. Teasel, thank you so much for joining me today on the Space Policy Edition.

Thanks so much for having me on. So Teasel, you have a new book. I'll plug it here, Operation Moonglow, A Political History of Project Apollo. I read through it before our discussion today, and I just say congratulations on writing a very readable, interesting book that's really complimentary in the sense that it complements a lot of the story that we talk about

in terms of Apollo, particularly in the United States. I want to start with kind of this fundamental rephrasing or rethinking of the idea of Apollo. In the book, you say that Apollo, in order to effectively advance U.S. international political interests, had to be framed as an achievement of and not for all humankind. Why was this distinction important? Well, in some of the analysis after the first lunar landing on the impact of Apollo on U.S. foreign relations and U.S. position internationally, it was seen that one of the most important impacts was that people around the world felt like participants in the program. And they really not only felt a sense of unity,

but that the achievement was an achievement of all humankind, not just the United States. This was seen as an element in building a global community, that the United States was really becoming an effective global leader because people felt like participants in this American program. And so it's a slight shift from of and for the differences between for all mankind and up all mankind. But one of the objectives was getting people to really align with the United States, individuals around the world, and then also political leaders.

And having Apollo viewed as part of all mankind as opposed to just for suggests that it was, you know, something that was participated in by everyone. And that sense of participation was seen as an important impact politically for the United States. was an important reframing for the United States in the international stage. Maybe even just jump back slightly to pre-Apollo to, I guess, right around Mercury, but coming into the JFK administration. What did the global stage look like that the United States was operating on? And how did that intersect with what is going to be important here about the international framing of Project Apollo? There are a few really important currents taking place at that time. So there's this larger Cold War context, this competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. And it was, you know, in many ways, an ideological competition between liberal

democracy and communism. It was often taking place in the third world, in other nations. And so it was a competition for affecting the political systems of other countries. Now, this was happening at the same time as decolonization and the establishment of new countries. And so as countries were trying to decide which political system to use and which superpower to align with, the Cold War interest became even more potent. And then this was then also combined with this really widespread vision of science and technologies as drivers of progress and national power and prestige. And so demonstrations of science and technology were then also associated with the effectiveness of each respective political

position. And then there's the additional element of the existence of nuclear weapons. And so much of the Cold War was taking place on the psychological battlefield. And so that competition was fought through symbolic gestures, and then also public diplomacy programming. Right, yeah, you don't want to have a direct confrontation anymore, that the cost of that, in a sense, is far too high. And so people or nations, I should say, are more incentivized to look for other, almost like plumage, right? Or kind of some sort of symbolic statement of capability without direct confrontation. Exactly. And there were a number of different approaches at this time. And from anything like, you know, setting up exhibits in other countries to covertly backed coups. So the range was broad, but there was this awareness

that we don't want to resort to nuclear warfare and the risks of that are too great. And so the competition played out in a lot of new arenas. Your book is packed with lots of really nice, small details that add color to the situations. That's an aspect I really liked and enjoyed about reading your book. Something you said really struck with me, and I think to emphasize one of the points you made was, I think the year that John F. Kennedy was sworn in, off the top of my head, something like 16 new countries came into existence. Is that the right number? Off the top of my head, I think it's 18, But yeah, it's very close. It's a big number.

Yeah, yeah, a lot of new countries came into existence through this process of decolonization. A lot of reasons for it. But you know, after World War Two, a lot of European nations just didn't have the means. And then you have this revolution of international kind of rights and self determination. And I always think of this in the sense of why Apollo happened. And have the means and then you have this revolution of international kind of rights and self-determination. And I always think of this in the sense of why Apollo happened and kind of why it's different now when we talk about current efforts in space and going to the moon is that our borders are far more fixed. Our political situations around the world seem far more established. But here, that's an incredible amount of churn.

So when we talk about these kind of symbolic behaviors or statements and using science and technology between the Soviet Union and the United States, I feel like the key here is that there was an audience for it, right? There was an active audience that they were competing for as these new countries were coming into existence. Exactly. Whenever I talk about the space race, I always emphasize that it wasn't just between the US and the Soviet Union. It wasn't just the two superpowers competing with each other. It was really competing for and in front of a global audience on a global stage. And that's an essential part of the competition. And there wouldn't have been a space race without that larger global audience and without that very unique geopolitical context where there

was so much happening, so much evolution, so many new countries trying to decide about which political system to pursue and which superpower to align with. And so it's such an important part of explaining why the space race happened in the first place. And this is something I struggle with too, just in terms of my understanding of history. Is this a story that was real, for lack of a better term? Were countries really sitting around saying, boy, I don't know what system is better for my country, but wow, the Soviets just sent Yuri Gagarin into space. Well, I guess I'll become a communist country now. Or was that really a perception, do you think, of the US and the Soviet Union? How effective were these in terms of driving this kind of outcome that they wanted to see at this really kind of real politic level?

As you suggest, it was a much more complicated process than that. And it wasn't like a light switch just on and off or aligning with the US.S. or aligning with the Soviet Union. There was a lot of nuance within each of these individual countries and a lot of contingent factors. And so I think that the way we talk about it and the way that U.S. policymakers were talking about it had a lot to do with this sort of larger grand strategy and fears about what might be possible. And so this idea that the Soviet Union was going to spread influence, the U.S. had to contain it, and that it would be of U.S. interest to lead the world and to have as many countries as possible with political systems that complemented our interests. And so some of this conversation about it, it makes it sound much more simple than it is. And I think that's part of the reason I wanted to look at some of the on- ground exchanges and what this actually meant in terms of individual examples, situations in individual

countries. How was this larger strategy playing out? You start the book with the anecdote of coming or stumbling across this piece of information about, was it in Japan? How many people came to see, was it the Mercury capsule that was on display in Tokyo? Yeah, exactly. John Glenn's Friendship 7 capsule. This use of space, I mean, it wasn't also for nothing. It's not like they weren't just completely making it up. People really did respond to this type of outreach.

So maybe just set that stage in Tokyo so the U.S. would send some of the hardware around the world. And what kind of response would it get? It was absolutely extraordinary. So this is how, the U.S. would send some of the hardware around the world. And what kind of response would it get? It was absolutely extraordinary. So this is how the project started. I was in the National Archives looking through some material and I came across these documents about this exhibit in Tokyo of the Friendship 7 spacecraft. So this was John Glenn's spacecraft. This is the first American orbital flight. The U.S. decided to send it on an international tour.

So it circled the world one more time and stopped in many locations. And in Japan, it drew a huge audience and people would wait in line up to eight hours just to walk by it, which I found absolutely stunning. And it's, it gives you a sense for the level of enthusiasm and how brand new spaceflight was at this time. So this was 1962 and Sputnik, the first satellite was launched this time. So this was 1962. And Sputnik, the first satellite was launched in 57. So just a few years later, and human spaceflight was just one year old. So it was brand new, very, very exciting. But it's hard to think about what might you wait in line eight hours to see, it gives you a real sense of the excitement and 500,000 people saw it in just a few days. And everywhere it went,

it drew just record crowds. It was an incredibly popular tour. And I forget if it was this particular capsule, but you work at the Smithsonian, and I believe it was them who kind of wrote this plea to the State Department that said, please don't let people touch the spacecraft because that'll degrade this kind of fragile, historically important, not really a relic at that point, but item. But they said, no, people have to touch this, right? So people were able to just file by and they would just kind of want this tactile engagement

with something that had been into space, which I found a really interesting aspect of all of this to make it real in a sense. Sending the hardware abroad, I think, was a great way of making it feel more real. And as I was mentioning, you know, spaceflight going from science fiction to science fact within a few years and seeing the spacecraft in person, and you can see its experience when you look at it, you know, you can see its charged surface, that it went and experienced atmospheric reentry. And that's an important part of not only recognizing that it was real, it was really happening, but also what spaceflight might be like and that it was a human was also helpful for relating to the mission. Yeah, the Smithsonian was quite worried at the time what was happening to these artifacts, but people within the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency thought that it was really important for people to connect with these spacecraft and connect with the American Space Program. And that sense of connection was really something they found important to build.

You just mentioned something that I wanted to bring up, the U.S. Information Agency. This plays a really prominent role in your book. And really, I don't think, I don't recall really having seen that in the story of Apollo before. What is the U.S. Information Agency, the USIA, and how did it fit into this concept of this kind of this so-called new diplomacy of the Cold War that emerged during the 50s and 60s? So the USIA was established by President Eisenhower, and it was part of an effort to centralize the United States' overseas information activities. Its mission was sharing information about the United States' overseas information activities. Its mission was sharing information about the United States with the world.

There was a fair amount of propaganda and public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy involved in that. At that time, for Eisenhower and later Kennedy and Johnson, even Nixon seen as an important effort of the U.S. government. So it was the largest full-service public relations organization in the world. One of the directors, Edward R. Murrow, liked to compare it to the cost of a Polaris missile, which I thought was a pretty effective way to do it, and that the whole agencies, the workings, which included libraries around the world and press offices at embassies and programs that teach English and distribution and production

of documentary films and the Voice of America program and the distribution of books and magazines and exhibitions. All sorts of activities cost less than one single Polaris missile. It was this large effort to win the hearts and minds of the world public, spread American culture and values around the world. It was part of the larger Cold War competition for hearts and minds and larger geopolitical influence. The USIA was responsible for sharing information about the American space program abroad, and they worked closely with the State Department to do that. But one of the reasons I think that that material hasn't been drawn on or hasn't been part of the story is that it's a different archival collection. And it's not as much represented in the NASA archival material.

But there's a rich, rich wealth of sources in the U.S. information archives about these overseas activities, especially relating to spaceflight. overseas activities, especially relating to spaceflight. I think we'll get into this in a bit, but something that strikes me about the USIA is that it's not just a place that's producing content. It's a distribution system, right? It's in place around the world to provide information to local newspapers, to local press, to provide translations of various things. So it's not just that they're in Washington, DC cranking out propaganda films or something like that, but they have a distribution system.

And I think that becomes really important later on in the story. But before we get there, I still want to dwell a little bit in the early 1960s when this concept of space as a national prestige and symbolic demonstration of capability was kind of in its most influential peak of understanding between the two superpowers. You talk about this concept of the new diplomacy, I think, is that the right term? And how that drives this broader idea of what it means to compete non-militaristically, but for national security. Why don't we just touch on that a little bit? Because again, I think it sets the context for why the USIA and then Apollo and the other space efforts in the 60s become so critical to that

effort. Sure. Yeah. So this concept of a new diplomacy was articulated by Henry Kissinger in 1955. But it was part of a larger conversation that was being had among many people who were thinking about power at that time. And so Kissinger had been invited to discuss the future of U.S. strategy with a group that was organized by Nelson Rockefeller, who was advising Eisenhower at the time when it came to basically public information abroad and psychological strategy. But he articulated it really well. And so I like to use this as a way to sort of set up this understanding of this context that the U.S. decided to pursue satellite development within. And so basically, is the recognition that this combination of factors, this sort of new international environment with nuclear weapons and the Cold War really heightened the importance of psychological strategy. And in particular, things like symbols

and rhetoric and ideas and images had a new political potency. And it was also very, very important to engage with international publics, especially because of mass media and how that revolutionized the influence of the public on international politics. This is like the hearts and minds concept begins to form. Would you say that's an accurate way to summarize that? Exactly. Yeah. And a clear articulation of some of the tools that are involved in it. So especially the importance of the media revolution. And you'll see that with something like the moon landing that is televised. And that's a really important

part of that history. So it ties into that as well. So as space age begins, the Soviet Union, I'd say probably takes the lead then and using this almost the same idea, right? This kind of new diplomacy to promote itself through the Sputniks. And then, of course, with Gagarin's first flight, it's not like this is a US only attitude, right? This is a purposeful, propagandistic opportunity from the Soviet Union to say, this is how great our capabilities are.

I don't know if it's right to call it a great irony of this moment, but I do find it interesting that both the US and the Soviet Union decide to differentiate each respective political system with the same types of demonstrations. So they both turned to space flight to demonstrate what's right about their respective political systems. It's an interesting approach. But starting out with the Soviet Union, there was this incredible sensitivity and awareness to the political power and of prestige and the role of spaceflight within impacting the USSR's standing in the world at that time. You point to, I mean, there's real public polling behind this, that this wasn't just a perception on the US side. There was a real slip. I mean, this goes back to Walter McDougall

talked about this in his books. There was a real increase in understanding, I should say, of the Soviet Union's technological superiority or perception thereof broadly throughout the public in Europe and other countries. So this had a real effect, like the symbolism, while being a symbol was really effective, or it seemed to be at the beginning of the space age. And it's interesting, as you pointed out, like how space temporarily kind of occupied this place of this universally accepted signifier of capability that was so effective. And it maybe has something to do with that. These are individual missions. So there's a thing that we could wrap our heads around

or that it's visible. You can listen to it or see it going overhead in a satellite. But this idea that everyone agrees is important. And then that was the big debate I recall among the Eisenhower and then JFK was, do you engage the Soviets on their own terms in the space race? Or is there something else they can do to compete and demonstrate another way of technological superiority? And it seems like there wasn't. I remember JFK talked about, can we do desalinization as a way to one up the Soviets

in space? And nothing else at the time seemed to be able to offer that same punch as space exploration. One of the reasons I think that they settled on that idea was this public opinion polling. And the USIA was instrumental in that and testing the temperature of global public opinion, both through individual polling, as well as the collection of newspapers from around the world and compiling that. And that was submitted to both Eisenhower and Kennedy regularly. And it became very, very clear that this was going to be sort of the measuring stick for the efficacy of political systems, that this was going to be the way that a lot of people were going to judge whether or not the Soviet Union was both technologically and scientifically powerful,

but then also even more broadly than that, whether or not communism was an effective political system. John F. Kennedy addresses Congress in 1961 on the topic of urgent national needs. And of course, this is where he first publicly calls to pursue moon landing through the U.S. space program. But you make a point out there were other, these are needs, plural. What were the other national needs that he articulated in the context of Apollo? This was a long address. And if you've heard any of it, you've probably heard less than five minutes of it. And it was actually about 30 minutes long. And so it was a much broader address. And the way he set it up was very much with this Cold War context and the importance of the third world within his understanding of what the United States had to do and what the nation's urgent national needs were. And so he talked about the lands of the rising

people. He was referring to Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. And there was a battle taking place and the U.S. had to steer the global revolution. It was setting up this context that was very, very important for the U.S. to be somewhat interventionalist and to engage with the world. And then he also talked about the importance of things like these information programs, public diplomacy, national security, some domestic as well as international programs, some national security, some domestic as well as international programs, helping support the economies of other countries as a bulwark against communism. And so he runs through this whole list of initiatives that the U.S. had to undertake in order to not only secure the country,

but then also to secure the position of the United States internationally. And then at the very end, then he introduces Apollo. And when you look at Apollo in that context, it really makes it clear that it was part of Kennedy's larger grand strategy at that time, and that it wasn't something that was pursued in isolation or just because of interest, but it was part of this larger strategy that Kennedy was pursuing that he thought was essential for the U.S.'s position within the world at that moment. I think this is one of those critical takeaways from your book, and I think just about Apollo in general, is that from the beginning, Apollo was seen as a tool of this international competition for global influence or against communism,

however exactly you want to frame it. You have a nice quote in your book saying that human spaceflight wasn't done for the innate human thirst of exploration or an economic incentive. It was politics, or precisely you said that particular geopolitical moment where global superpowers competed for global leadership through demonstrations of technological superiority. I think we just can't emphasize that enough, maybe, that we can't get away from that as being the inciting role of what became a very inspirational human exploration endeavor, but it was done for these very practical and, at the time,

very immediate purposes when, again, in that context of national needs, Apollo was kind of the capper to these other areas of interest. The book that you're, again, that you're kind of, you're addressing this as a fundamental issue. Do you feel like that part of the story has been forgotten, particularly in the United States, that ironically, even though it was kind of pitched as this international success of a, like, we all did something that has actually been now seen as more of a triumph by the United States? I think so often when I when I speak to people, there's sometimes surprise that the United States sent humans to the moon for reasons beyond science. I think there's a lot of expectation that it was primarily about scientific exploration. And there's a lot of emphasis on

how we got to the moon, I would say, as opposed to why. Although some of the fundamentals of the politics have been established, there's some great work on that. John Logsdon's work is really fantastic in that, and Walter McDougall as well. Other people have touched on this, too. done on looking at how it played out on the ground and evaluating Apollo throughout the decade in terms of foreign relations and its role within foreign relations. And so not only is it important, I think, to recognize and to remember what inspired Kennedy or what the initial rationale for lunar exploration was in 1961, but to then also understand how it impacted

foreign relations and how that played out and the evolution of its role throughout the 1960s. Do you think people tend to downplay that now? Because, I mean, the world is just so much different now, when we look back, it's almost hard to place yourself in that situation. But do you think maybe there's this idea that that almost sullies what should be seen as some grand, pure, scientifically motivated piece of exploration? Why do you think this gets downplayed? Sometimes I do hear this concern, like, oh, it's just empty, you know, just a symbolic gesture. And it would take away from some of the meaning of Apollo. But I would really counter that because I think there's a lot to be said for a program that is focused on peaceful exploration, that's about demonstrating values of a country in a peaceful way. And also the prioritization of the

international community, the U.S.'s relationship with the world. And a lot of what motivated this program was improving the United States' relationship with the world. And a lot of what motivated this program was improving the United States' relationship with the world. And I think there's great value in that as well. And so just because Apollo was in many ways a political program and it had the other elements to it as well, and that's important, but I don't think the politics or even this connection to symbolism diminish in any ways the significance, the meaning, the importance of that program, either at that moment or even how we remember it today. Yeah, I mean, I think it's important to have that part of the story because if we don't understand

where it came from, people may just be constantly disappointed that we don't have Apollo again, right? And people always kind of want very badly to see why don't we just do it again? And it's like the fundamental conditions are just so different. We have to understand why did it happen in the first place. And governments of any nation generally don't open their pocketbook to that extent, just for feel good stuff, right? It has to be meeting some very intense and urgent national need, as JFK would say. I'd like to move forward now that we've kind of established that Apollo is happening in this context of this new diplomacy, this outreach to the world, this competition in a sense for these new nations that are forming.

Throughout the 1960s, and going back to kind of what the USIA is doing around the world, there is then a concerted and very intensive effort to share the successes in space with people around the world. You highlight in your book kind of a couple of examples of this, starting with, we already talked about what was it, the fourth orbit of John Glenn's Mercury capsule. But then they start sending astronauts around the world and Gemini with the Gemini astronauts and then obviously the astronauts from Apollo and so forth. What was driving these efforts and what were they trying to get out of them? Why did they pursue these where they did? But also, how do they contrast to what the Soviet Union was doing at the same time, who also was launching cosmonauts into space and doing, you know, successive space first throughout the particularly the early 1960s? space and doing, you know, successive space first throughout the particularly the early 1960s. Initially, there was some wariness about sending American astronauts abroad, and there was concern that it would be seen as just an empty propaganda gesture. So it wasn't until the mid 1960s that they changed that policy and decided to send the astronauts around the world.

And they were seen as sort of great embodiments of Americans as ideal ambassadors for the United States at that time. They were encouraged to be scientific representatives. So there was a lot of concern that they would be seen as far too political or that they would just be traveling for propaganda. And so the emphasis was placed on sharing scientific information and having less scripted speeches and things like that. And there was a lot of hope that the astronauts would be able American effort in space, which did a lot to increase the sense of participation of people around the world in the American space program. Got to take a quick break. Casey and his guest, Teasel Muir-Harmony, will be back in moments. Hi, this is Jennifer Vaughn, the Planetary Society's Chief Operating Officer. 2020 has been a year like no other. It challenged us, changed us, and helped us grow. Now we look forward to a 2021 with many reasons

for hope. Help us create a great start for this promising new year at planetary.org slash planetary fund. When you invest in the Planetary Fund, your year-end gift will be matched up to $100,000 thanks to a generous member. Your support will enable us to explore worlds, defend Earth, and find life elsewhere across the cosmos. Please learn more and then donate today at planetary.org slash planetary fund. Thank you. You discuss a few examples of the United States needed to place tracking stations all around the world in order to be in constant communication or relatively constant communication with assets in orbit. That brought up a number of issues with nations that had just decolonized or been freed from colonization. That was an interesting aspect

where you said that the U.S. was able to kind of use this more peaceful aspect of the space program to establish a physical presence in a lot of these new nations under the guise of, again, this kind of peaceful scientific exploration. Did that specifically drive kind of the decisions of how and where they placed tracking stations? Or was it just kind of a useful tool based on the actual physical need of where they needed to put those. The tracking stations are this fascinating combination of factors because there are the technical reasons for the locations of the tracking stations around the world, just to service the missions, right? And then there's also this interest in having presence in these countries around the world. But then there's sort of a pushback. And because the U.S. needed to have tracking stations located around the world

beyond its own territory, there had to be a lot of negotiation and work done. So public relations work done to ensure that the stations would be accepted and not perceived as sort of an informal attempt at empire. There are fascinating stories from each of these individual locations of the effort and a lot of effort that had to go into ensuring that they would be welcomed at the various locations around the world. Is that, do I remember correctly, they sent astronauts to some of those countries, again, like almost as a, not as a payback, but as an acknowledgement that they were trying to do additional outreach to the population there to demonstrate the scientific aspects of these,

the outreach aspects of these. Exactly. So countries that had tracking stations would be first on the list of priorities for all sorts of information activities. So the astronaut tours definitely, as well as exhibits. So they were a high priority. And it was seen as really important to foster these relationships, as you might guess. Places like Africa, for instance, Nigeria or Madagascar, those were top priority for all sorts of information activities related to spaceflight because they hosted American tracking stations in their countries. to spaceflight because they hosted American tracking stations in their countries. So what was the Soviet Union doing as their own version of this at the same time? We know that they were sending Yuri Gagarin did a tour around the world. So what was the contrast between their approach to international outreach with their space program versus what the U.S. was doing? So there was a concerted effort by the U.S. government to differentiate the presentation

of the space program internationally with what the Soviet Union was doing. And so especially early on, there was quite a difference. The Soviet Union was not sending their spacecraft around the world. They were not sharing details about the hardware and instead focused on sending astronauts on tours. But they had a similar type of communications information infrastructure and efforts with radio programming and placing of newspaper articles and things like that. So it was a similar type of effort in those regards. But the emphasis was much more on focusing on humans like Gagarin as opposed to spacecraft. And part of that comes from this concern about sharing engineering information

of Soviet spacecraft with the world, especially because the early design of the spacecraft, the astronaut had to eject and the craft itself crashed into the ground. And so there was some concern that that might not count as a successful space flight. That information was concealed for quite some time and in turn information about the design of the spacecraft. And so the U.S. leaned much more into sharing technical information with the world. It was a demonstration, at least the way people thought about it, as being open, focusing on the science and the engineering seemed more apolitical and so therefore could serve the political interests of the country much more.

At least that is how it was interpreted by members of the U.S. Information Agency. So that was one of the major differences. It is interesting, though, because both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were also doing counter propaganda of each other's programs. And so Soviet news sources would downplay American accomplishments and vice versa. As this was happening throughout the 1960s, culminating, of course, in the Apollo flights, this type of space outreach, again, it seemed to be very popular. They were getting huge crowds for both the astronauts and the hardware going around the world.

But it was also seen as a useful counter-narrative for some really significant issues that were happening at the US in the same time, notably the civil rights movement and the perception of the United States in particular countries in Africa. And then also, of course, the growing kind of calamity happening in Vietnam. So how was space used in a sense to try to purposefully, not necessarily cover up a change the subject away from these issues? Space was used a few different ways. One, one sort of straightforward way was that, you know, this idea that if there's a space mission, that it would make the front page of the newspaper. And so that coverage wouldn't be of the Vietnam War, for instance.

And so just displacing other news, more negative news, was seen as quite positive. They kept track of that. For Africa in particular, the U.S. sent African-American trained space lecturers around to different countries to lecture about space and to also demonstrate some of the opportunities within the United States. There's a lot of concern that American civil rights were painting a very bad picture of the United States, especially in Africa. And Africa was a continent with many, many new nations at that period in time. And so it was a priority region for the United States. And so sending these African American lecturers there was part of that programming. Edward R. Murrow, who was the head of the U.S. Information

Agency during the Kennedy administration, even pushed to have NASA include African American astronauts. But there was a bit of pushback on that. But as the head of the USIA, he really saw it as an important part of demonstrating the values of the United States to the world. And that in places like Africa, it was important to demonstrate that the United States was an inclusive nation with opportunities for everyone. their part that they would say, oh, we need to send these scientific ambassadors out to these African nations, while at the same time having zero diversity in the astronaut corps, right? And generally, I mean, there were some at NASA as we've begun to learn, I think, in the last few years, more of those stories.

But I mean, in terms of the astronaut corps, that was, it's like, was that even a level of awareness in terms of what Edward Amaro was talking about, I know there's significant pushback within NASA itself, but it just seems like the fundamental irony of this is that there were serious problems that they didn't even try to deal with. Yeah, especially. So they were also in exhibits in Africa. They also, you know, wanted to show pictures of African-Americans working on NASA. And I think that was a challenge in the early 1960s because of the makeup of the workforce. But I mean, I think there's a lot to this idea that the astronauts were talked about as ideal Americans or these this group of men represent America. But they're all first of all, they're all men. They're all white. They're all about the same age. There are so many characteristics about them that were very, very similar, so much

so that with the Mercury astronauts, they actually have them take their pictures in alphabetical order lined up because there was concern that it would be hard to tell them apart. Newspapers would label their names incorrectly. So they made sure to take pictures of them in alphabetical order. So there was a lot of similarity between them. And so the idea that they embody an American or what we think of as an American, I think it was really problematic. And it points to a lot of some of the tensions existent in trying to portray a country in this type of way or pursuing this type of symbolism and the image of the country that the United States was trying to project abroad through the Apollo program and what was happening domestically. You know,

they weren't exactly a match. And I think that explains some of the limitations of the impact of Apollo on U.S. foreign relations long term. We're starting to get to the end of the 60s, and we kind of hit the two big successes, the international in terms of international awareness. Apollo 8, first circumnavigation of the moon, and Apollo 11, of course. I'd like you to just discuss a little bit about Apollo 8, focusing on the famous Christmas broadcast from the crew. Obviously, we're all familiar with that because we experienced it, but that didn't just happen by accident, right? There was this enormous effort and amount of planning that had gone into making sure the world could follow what was happening on Apollo Live by organizations like the USIA.

What went into this and what was that public reaction like, starting with Apollo 8 and then we'll move on to 11? Part of the planning involved making people aware that the mission was coming up. This was true also of Apollo 11, increasing awareness, working with journalists around the world, even training journalists, bringing them to the United States so that they could go to their respective country and speak about Apollo. There were the creation of exhibits and pamphlets and so all sorts of efforts sort of on the ground around the world to make people aware that it was going to happen and to get people excited and engaged. There was also effort to ensure that there would be

a live television broadcast to quite a lot of the world. Apollo 8 was a little more limited in 1968, but a satellite importantly went up shortly before it, which allowed more coverage. And then the USIA also made sure that people could listen to the broadcast on radio through the Voice of America and the translation of that coverage in many, many languages so people could follow along. So there was this huge communications infrastructure side of it. And then also the astronauts were made aware that their mission would be followed by a huge portion of the world population, the largest ever at that time. And so they had to think through what they were going to do in space that would be historically significant and to really mark that moment. Part of that included bringing television equipment with them aboard so that people could follow along. And then Frank Borman was told that he

was going to be up there doing a television broadcast on Christmas. And so we should say something appropriate. So he consulted with the science advisor from the USIA who consulted with another friend. And they came up with this idea of reading from Genesis in large part because it was seen as having universal relevance as much as possible, that it would connect with people who weren't just Christian, but beyond that, because Genesis was more representative of more people around the world. I'm still struck by how little guidance the astronauts get. It's like, you'll be up there, say something good, and we kind of leave it up to them. It was not a highly scripted or controlled process. They really gave a significant amount of freedom to these astronauts to be themselves, really, in that situation. And that was interpreted as more effective. With the Soviet Union, a lot of what the astronauts said was very scripted.

And actually, Yuri Gagarin's first report on his mission was entirely scripted by someone else, and he memorized it. It was a very different approach, USIA and NASA and the State Department really encouraged the astronauts to say things in their own words because they saw that as potentially more effective. So Frank Borman, the commander of Apollo 8, he could have actually said anything at that moment that he wanted to. And he decided to approach the science advisor because he wanted guidance. But I think Neil Armstrong's words on the moon are a great example of that, that it's almost, I think it is sort of surprising when you think about it, that that wasn't scripted,

but that's an important part of the larger strategy to the role of Apollo within U.S. foreign relations is that the astronauts are going to be sort of most effective when it comes to its contribution to U.S. foreign relations, if they speak for themselves, if they are themselves, if they really represent these American values of openness and freedom. I just want to emphasize again, this aspect of this ground game, in a sense of this really basic levels of getting the word out throughout the world through the USIA. I think you said something like hundreds of thousands of things were printed and maps distributed and press releases written and use the local press and use

the local customs and try to put Apollo in that context to try to be relevant. This seemed like just this massive undertaking. Something again, that really struck me from your book was that going back to this first question that I asked in terms of this interview, which was this framing of the Apollo program, and landing on the moon ultimately with Apollo 11 as being an everybody success as a success of humankind versus a success of the United States. That was very intentional. Can you talk a little bit, where did this come from, this idea of intentionality, of downplaying the nationalistic aspect of this to the broader world?

I almost can't imagine that happening today, with this idea of people should thump their chest about doing a nationalistic thing. Why did that come out, and how did that end up setting, in a sense, the successful framing of this? Because that was the framing ultimately embraced by everybody. So part of that came from the experience overseas of many of the public affairs officers who were working to promote the US space program abroad and observing how people reacted to different types of programming. And whenever programs like documentary films that were being showed really championed the United States or showed the American flag, the response in many locations was people might roll their eyes or

just think it was too much. And so one of the important elements of public diplomacy is listening. As I mentioned before, that includes polls, public opinion polls, which were an important part of the USIA's work, but also sort of reporting back on how effective this programming is. What are people interested in? Is this tone off? What is going to resonate with people? And so the approach, the tone, the framing was refined over time. And a lot of it had to do with observing what was effective and what was not effective internationally. And public affairs officers really realized that whenever the space program was put in this context of American exceptionalism, American accomplishment, it didn't resonate as well. And they made it very clear that everyone knows the Apollo program is an American program. We don't need to emphasize that part. And when we downplay it and when we

be more, when we're more inclusive with our language and our images, and when we talk about the meaning and the significance and, you know, using phrases like for all mankind at that time, we're a way to demonstrate that inclusivity. And that was much more effective. I mean, people were much more receptive to that message. And so the presentation of Apollo in this programming evolved over time because of that listening and that observing by Republican Paris officers. Ironically, then more effective as U.S. propaganda, essentially. And that may be propaganda is too strong of a word, but just it more effectively did the job of what that international new diplomacy wanted it to do by lowering,

by being less obviously kind of jingoistic, it became then more receptive, received, I guess, more effectively received. So it's an interesting lesson in terms of the maturity of that effort at the time of how they were putting this together. And then, of course, again, the immense amount of work to just get the word out. And I like that there's a little story in there about how they had to move, I think, an old communications satellite into position because a new one failed so they could get this live coverage around the world.

So there's this whole infrastructure that was set up to enable the live following of ultimately Apollo 11. world. So there's this whole infrastructure that was set up to enable the live following of ultimately Apollo 11. After Apollo, I think we get to the kind of the title of your book, Operation Moonglow, comes from, at the time, President Richard Nixon, leaving on this global diplomacy tour, literally right after splashdown of Apollo 11, right after the astronauts got back safe. This must be, you know, obviously, it's important you consider it like this kind of key aspect of the book if you name the book after this tour. So what was Nixon's tour, Moonglow? What was it trying to do? And how did Apollo

enable that to occur versus just a normal diplomatic tour by a US president? Nixon's tour is so appropriately named. And the expectation was that the enthusiasm for the moon landing and the wonderful sort of glow that it lent the United States at that time would be effective for him to advance some of his new foreign policy initiatives. entered office, he was really concerned about the U.S.'s role in the Vietnam War and then also its relationship to China. And these are two areas that he really wanted to affect and change. And so he saw lunar exploration as a great opportunity to help him advance these interests. So he named this diplomatic tour that he went on after the moon landing Operation Moonglow. But I think it applies well more generally to how spaceflight, how the Apollo program, sort of the reflective glory of that, how it boosted other areas of US interest, how it contributed to US foreign relations and sort of added a glow to the country, I guess you could say. How long did that glow last? So you mean you had goodwill in general, like everyone, and then there was a follow up tour by the astronauts

themselves, the giant step tour, I guess it would be that they were all around the world in this rapid succession. Did it fade? Or is there a quantifiable metric by which the US felt like it benefited from this? So beyond just feeling good, was it just temporary? Or did something really happen from the international beneficiary of this Moonglow? So one of the problematic things about public diplomacy is it's really hard to evaluate impact. That's been just one of the issues all along. I'll preface this statement with that. And also that people who worked at the USIA were well aware that the moon landing, the impact of it would fade with time, that it wasn't going to entirely change everyone in the world's perception of the United States. It wasn't going to win the Cold War. There

were, I think, very, very sober expectations for the potential impact of the moon landing. But there was a lot of excitement about how much impact it did have. The USAA put in a lot of effort in the weeks following the moon landing to ensure that the effect would last as long as possible. And part of the effect that they saw to be the most potent or most important was the sense of vicarious participation in the moon landing, the sense that it was of all mankind and not for all mankind. I will say that when I travel, when I get to meet with people around the world, there is quite a bit of enthusiasm still

for the moon landing. A lot of people who are over the age of say 55 or so have a story to tell. And I've heard some incredible stories in other countries of people's experience with the first lunar landing. And there's still a lot of excitement and goodwill because of that. Now, Apollo was competing with other things, and there was a lot of criticism at the time of the Vietnam War in particular, U.S. race relations, all sorts of other things. So I don't think that

it completely dominated everyone's view of the United States or of liberal democracy in relationship to communism. But it did offer something that most people saw as quite positive. And so in that way, it was an important contributor long term to U.S. image around the world. You did have a quote from Richard Nixon at dinner with the Apollo 11 astronauts. And he may have been a sheet or two to the wind when he said this, but he made some claim of like meeting with some other head of state he hadn't been able to get a meeting with was worth the cost of the moon program. Did it open doors diplomatically previous that there weren't before? Richard Nixon believed that it did. And I think that all the presidents who served over the course of the Apollo program really focused on its role within foreign relations and how it could help their administration's respective interests. And so I think there are lots of ways to talk about,

you know, Apollo and its role in foreign relations. But this was this was a major emphasis. So for Nixon, it was so important for him to get this meeting with Ceausescu from Romania, his Operation Moonglow tour. It helped us advance these other interests. But I think when he says, you know, this meeting was worth everything we paid for Apollo, I mean, it was a bit dramatic to say that. But it tells you a lot about how he was evaluating spaceflight and why a president might invest in that scale of a program. A fascinating detail that I had not known was that the first direct discussions with the North Vietnamese at a high level with U.S. diplomacy happened during the Moonglow program in France with Henry Kissinger. Yeah, it's an interesting connection and a great story. I mean, it seems like it's out of a novel or something, but part of timing Operation Moonglow, when they timed it, this diplomatic tour, Nixon and Kissinger were really aware that it would provide an opportunity for Kissinger

to go to Paris to officially report on Nixon's tour. But while he was in Paris, then he can meet in secret with a representative from North Vietnam. So he was able to do that. That particular meeting didn't end the war or anything like that. But it did open this important line of communication, which really did impact then the trajectory of the Cold War and US relations with Vietnam. You paint this picture of Richard Nixon Nixon and just really just reveling in this moon glow of Apollo 11, 11 meeting the astronauts, sending him around the world,

benefiting politically, doing his victory lap around the world. But then they just stop effectively, right? This doesn't enable more great feats of human exploration to keep happening. As you well know, Nixon went and ended the Apollo program under his watch and only would fund a much more minimal human spaceflight program after that. And so I was kind of left with this question about if Apollo was such this international hit, if it was so effective in representing US soft power and prestige and influence, how could that then not be used to justify a continued program at that level to continue making these firsts? Or was it just really seen as a useful temporary tool of foreign policy and not much more than that? less and less priority within presidential administrations. And so during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, it was prioritized quite a lot and seen as quite critical to larger U.S. grand strategy. Public diplomacy's role within foreign relations was beginning to

wane. So that's one of the factors. I think it's also hard to see what type of follow-on program you could do to Apollo that was in any way fit within the budget. So there was a lot of hope that we would be going to Mars next. That is on such a larger scale than lunar exploration, as we know well, and especially in conversations today, it would have required a huge, huge investment. And this was at a time when the US was already spending a huge amount on the Vietnam War and other huge issues at the time, as well as this interest in pursuing detente and improved relations with the Soviet Union made the space race sort of a less appealing thing to invest in. So space on its own terms, although it could have had an impact, I think, in terms of foreign relations, even without

space competition, like a space race, that was an important part of motivating Kennedy, at least initially, to pursue that lunar objective. And there wasn't a similar kind of motivation for something like Mars exploration, which I think would have been the most clear next step for, you know, what do you do after landing humans on the moon that has Was there a similar Operation Moonglow or a giant step tour of Apollo 12 or 14 or 15, 16 or 17? Was there diminishing returns from follow-on missions in terms of foreign outreach? International interest in the Apollo program was more sustained than it was domestically.

And there was more enthusiasm for 12 and 13, 14 internationally than there was in the United States. And there were more diplomatic tours. So after Apollo 12, it was the bullseye tour because this was the mission with the pinpoint landing. And after 13, there was a tour. So there was still quite a bit of interest, but doing something for the first time that really attracted a different degree of attention. And the first moon landing was a changed human experience. Humans for the first time landed on another celestial body and half the world stopped what they were doing to follow that flight. Those are unique events or a unique event.

And the next time you do it, it's obviously not going to have the same kind of resonance, even if there are variations from mission to mission. So there was interest. The interest was more sustained, but it still didn't have sort of that level of impact of the first moon landing. I wonder too, one of the reasons why maybe from a U.S. foreign outreach

or international outreach perspective is that with Apollo 13, it was reminded that this is kind of a double-edged sword too. Like failure may also have a significant negative consequence in terms of US capability. Did that have an effect? Obviously, Apollo 13 came back successful and that turned out to be a great, in a sense, PR opportunity for NASA in the United States. But should failure have actually occurred, and Apollo was just extraordinarily risky, do you think that would have undermined their goals in terms of what they were trying to achieve? I think failure could have potentially undermined the goals.

But if you look at the case of the Apollo 1 fire, which was a horrible tragedy and three people perished, the decision was to be open about that and to share that information with the world. And that was interpreted as something positive overall. So there was a lot of sympathy around the world for that tragedy. People expressed respect for the United States to decide to share that information, not hide flaws or not hide mistakes, but instead work to fix them. If that's any indication, the failures would have been well-received as long as the country was open about them and worked on fixing them. So it probably was even less of a potential blow to prestige than one might think. Early on, there was a lot of concern about that, but I think it

was handled quite well with Apollo 1, and I imagine it would have been handled in a similar way if a future mission had failed. Nothing could quite compare with landing on the moon for the first time. But has there been anything, maybe not even in space, has there been anything in the global sphere that has compared to Operation Moonglow or the Giant Step in terms of that universal appeal that any country, not just the United States, has been able to use to its own benefit to extend, improve relations with its international partners? I can't imagine going to the International Space Station would generate the same kind of interest, even though, ironically,

there's actual international collaboration, right? We had all this international feel-good and this idea that it was all pitched as this, we did this with Apollo, even though it had no international collaboration. And actual international efforts to explore space seemed to receive far less attention for doing so. Has there been anything comparable to this? And then why do you think that we haven't been able to, or people haven't responded to subsequent efforts in space in the same way, even as the doors have been opened to some degree.

I can't think of anything comparable. It was an unbelievable moment in history when you have half the world's population, every continent, you know, people stopping what they were doing the middle of the night. It didn't matter. They were tuned in on their televisions or on their listening to the radio to follow that mission. And that, that experience, it's hard to know how anything could inspire that many people to focus on it, to pay attention and, and also to prioritize experiencing it together. That was a big part of the first lunar landing is everyone recognizing that this is something we're doing as the world together. We're watching a human on the moon. I don't think there's anything that has followed that could be similar to that. But it seems strange that the ISS would seem to receive so much less attention from a global audience, despite having so much more global engagement with it, that there are many more avenues for international participation. There's

actual astronauts from Europe and Japan and other parts of the world that fly on the ISS that you didn't get with Apollo. So has there been any kind of similar global appreciation of even though it's not as big of a kind of moment of landing on the moon, but the actual contribution is there? Has that ever seen any sort of resonance? Well, I think you bring up a great point. And it really points to the important role that the US Information Agency played in Apollo.

So having this huge communications infrastructure that was promoting spaceflight around the world at the time, sharing these stories, ensuring that they were appearing in newspapers and producing films. And the USIA was even in places where there weren't movie theaters. They would have these vans, these trucks with screens, and they would project space films for people outside. I mean, the level of effort that went into promoting the American space program in the 1960s around the world was a huge contributor to this global audience that watched the first lunar landing and is an important part of that story. And so we don't have that same

level of investment in communicating stories about the American space program or the International Space Station and a lot of the important work that's going on there. And although there is some infrastructure that does that, there is public relations, there is coverage of those stories, it's just not on the same scale that it was in the 1960s. And part of that is not only, it's not just a story about spaceflight, it's also a story about U.S. investment in soft power and public diplomacy. Dr. Teasel Muir-Harmony is a historian of science and technology, a curator of the Apollo spacecraft collection at the Smithsonian Institution, and the author of

the book we just talked about today, Operation Moonglow, A Political History of Project Apollo. Greatly enjoyed the book. And Teasel, thank you so much for joining us on the show today. I thought that was a really interesting discussion. Thank you so much for having me. That was Casey Dreyer, the Senior Space Policy Advisor and Chief Advocate for the Planetary Society, with his guest for the December Space Policy Edition, Tiesel Muir-Harmony. Great conversation, Casey. Thank you very much for that. Oh, of course. And thank you to Tiesel for being here. Always fun to dive into the history of space.

And Apollo, it just reminds you just how rich and deep that story is and how much is, I think, really yet to be told, not just in the US, but globally. I enjoyed that and hope everyone else enjoyed listening to it. Yeah. And I suspect that there'll be a few people, and I'm among them, who are now intrigued and will want to take a look through the book because that conversation was so, not just deep, but broad about all these implications of Apollo, some of which are, I'm sure, still with us today. Anyway, great conversation.

Casey, we'll be talking again in the new year, in 2021. Let's hope it's a little better of a year for everybody than 2020 was. But lots of exciting things to look forward to, right? Not, you know, obviously we'll have a new administration, new space policy, but James Webb Space Telescope will launch. Well, should I knock on wood? Should I cross my fingers?

Yeah, I think so. It's scheduled to launch. The Lucy mission is scheduled to launch. I believe the DART mission to impact an asteroid is scheduled. There's a ton of missions happening next year. Boeing Starliner should launch humans for the first time if everything goes to plan. Might see a launch of Starship from SpaceX. Oh, my gosh.

It's going to be a great, exciting year for space and so many things in terms of politics and policy to discuss. We will dive into that, I guarantee you. You left out the red planet. Three new arrivals in February. Oh, yeah, that. The three missions, the flotilla of Mars spacecraft, one of which my wife works on. I should remember that one in particular.

That's coming up in February and throughout the spring. That's going to be incredible. The first of the extended Mars Sample Return Universe missions begins its work next February. Join us, therefore, on the first Friday in January and the first Fridays throughout the year.

And join us at the Planetary Society. Once again, that pitch at planetary.org slash membership and our year-end campaign underway for those who want to go the extra mile. We hope that you have enjoyed this program and will continue to enjoy it just as we have. Happy holidays, whatever your holidays may be, to all of you. And the very happiest of New Year's, as Casey said, we sure hope it'll be a better one than 2020. Casey, thanks.

We'll be talking to you soon. As always, Matt, happy to be here. Take care, all. Best of success and Ad Astra. you