The Daily Stoic - Lt. General H.R. McMaster on Strategic Empathy and Seneca’s Contradiction

Episode Date: April 3, 2021

On today’s episode, Ryan talks to Lt. General H.R. McMaster about why leaders must study history and philosophy, his book Dereliction of Duty about the controversial Vietnam war, Seneca’s complicated service for the emperor Nero, and more.H.R. McMaster is a retired United States Army Lieutenant General who served as the 26th United States National Security Advisor. He is known for his roles in the Gulf War, Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. His book, Battlegrounds: The Fight to Defend the Free World, was released in September 2020 and is an overview of the most critical foreign policy and national security challenges that face the United States in the modern age. This episode is brought to you by Beekeeper’s Naturals, the company that’s reinventing your medicine with clean, effective products that actually work. Beekeepers Naturals has great products like Propolis Spray and B.LXR. As a listener of the Daily Stoic Podcast you can receive 15% off your first order. Just go to beekeepersnaturals.com/STOIC or use code STOIC at checkout to claim this deal.This episode is brought to you by Blinkist, the app that gets you fifteen-minute summaries of the best nonfiction books out there. Blinkist lets you get the topline information and the most important points from the most important nonfiction books out there, whether it’s Ryan’s own The Daily Stoic, Yuval Harari’s Sapiens, and more. Go to blinkist.com/stoic, try it free for 7 days, and save 25% off your new subscription, too.Policygenius helps you compare top insurers in one place, and it lets you save 50% or more on life insurance. Just go to policygenius.com to get started. Policygenius: when it comes to insurance, it’s nice to get it right.Today’s episode is brought to you by Munk Pack, Keto Granola Bars that contain just a single gram of sugar and 2 to 3 net carbs—and they’re only 140 calories. Get 20% off your first purchase of ANY Munk Pack product by visiting munkpack.com and entering our code STOIC at checkout.***If you enjoyed this week’s podcast, we’d love for you to leave a review on Apple Podcasts. It helps with our visibility, and the more people listen to the podcast, the more we can invest into it and make it even better.Sign up for the Daily Stoic email: http://DailyStoic.com/signupFollow @DailyStoic:Twitter: https://twitter.com/dailystoicInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/dailystoic/Facebook: http://facebook.com/dailystoicYouTube: https://www.youtube.com/dailystoicFollow H.R. McMaster:Twitter: https://twitter.com/LTGHRMcMaster Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/ltghrmcmaster See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Hey, prime members, you can listen to the Daily Stoic podcast early and add free on Amazon music. Download the app today. Welcome to the weekend edition of the Daily Stoic. Each weekday we bring you a meditation inspired by the ancient Stoic, something that can help you live up to those four Stoic virtues of courage, justice, wisdom, and temperance. And here, on the weekend, we take a deeper dive into those same topics. We interview stoic philosophers. We reflect. We prepare. We think deeply about the challenging issues of our time. And we work through this philosophy in a way that's more possible here when we're not rushing to work or to get the kids to school. When we have the time to think, to go for a walk, to sit with our journals, and to prepare

for what the future will bring. Hi, I'm David Brown, the host of Wundery's podcast business wars. And in our new season, Walmart must fight off target, the new discounter that's both savvy and fashion forward. Listen to business wars on Amazon music or wherever you get your podcasts. Hey, it's Ryan. Welcome to another episode of The Daily Stoke Podcast. Work is really as talk striicively of this idea of pen and ink

philosophers, people who just talk about or study philosophy in the abstract. Most of the Stokes were doers. They were politicians or generals or advisors to kings or world leaders. So my guest today is a man of that mold, a historian, but also a three-star general in the United States Army, a veteran of the Gulf War, Afghanistan, Iraq, a counterinsurgency expert,

and ultimately the national security advisor to the president of the United States. I'm talking about the one and only general HR McMaster. You serve the Trump administration, but I promise you this is not a particularly political episode. We actually nerd out about philosophy and history, talk about Thucydides, we talk about Vietnam, General McMaster is the author of a fantastic book called Daryliction of Duty, which is about

the flaws and the failures of the Vietnam War, the failure of advisors to speak truth to power, to get truth up to the presidency, and some of the ego and the delusions that led to the catastrophic failure and moral atrocity that was the Vietnam War, and the lessons he learned from that, and the experience he tried to bring with that when he was advising the most powerful man in the world, the president of the United States of America. He's the author of two books, as I said, Daryliction of Duty, and most recently, Battlegrounds, The Fight to Defend the Free World. We talk about this great concept in his new book

called Strategic Empathy, which I think is a very still a concept, and as it happens, he and I recorded this podcast over Zoom, which he was recently named to the Board of Directors of. So there's a lot of great insights here about history, but also we conclude talking about Senaika, and Senaika's complicated service for the Emperor Nero. So this is one of my favorite episodes I've done in a while.

I was really looking forward to this conversation. And I can't wait for you to listen to my interview with General HR McMaster. And please check out his book, Daryliction of Duty, and his new one, Battlegrounds, The Fight to Defend, the Free World. Well, I was wondering, are you comfortable telling the story of how you ended up hearing

about the obstacles the way? Yeah, no, I'm fine with doing that. I'm fine with doing that. Yeah. I'd love to hear it. I've got my copies back. I've got all three of your books right there, man. Oh, no way. I love to see it, yeah. But I'll tell. I've got all three of your books right there, man. I don't know.

I love to see you. But I'll tell you, I love your books, really. Honestly. I mean, I think they're great. I mean, I love the kind of the short chapters, man. You know, they're great, you know, bedside books and, and, you know, it's really, it's just a strong, it's a great message for these days.

You know, my daughter is probably 33 now, but she calls her generation to start my orange generation. Hey, will you start my orange for me? Because. Oh, you mean start peeling it? Yeah, start peeling it. Yeah. No, that's, that's, well, I mean, look,

the pandemic has been that it's like, suddenly, you know, I used, look, the pandemic has been that it's like suddenly, you know, I used to eat my lunch at a restaurant every day. And now I'm packing my lunch for the first time and you're making my own lunch for basically the first time in my adult life. It is it is sort of forcing some self-reliance, which which will hopefully counteract some of the the millennial start my orange impulses. Exactly.

Exactly. So how did you end up first hearing about the obstacle is the way someone gave it to you, I'll start my orange impulses. Exactly. Exactly. So how did you end up first hearing about the obstacle is the way someone gave it to you, right? Yeah, so, so, uh, uh, shake tock noon, who's a friend of mine and we worked together on a number of initiatives in the Middle East and beyond. Uh, we, he's, he's an author himself. He's very, you know, actually curious and, and he said, hey, I just, I just read this great book called The Opsicles the Way and I'm going to bring it to you next time.

And he did. He brought it to me next time. And he had it marked for me on the pages that he thought were most relevant to the problem sets that we're working on. And so that's how I became familiar with your work. And I really enjoyed it. And you know as well as the Eagles the enemy and now the lives of the Stoics you know so I'm a big fan. It's so incredible to me because I also have had the unique opportunity of meeting him. I met him through Robert Green who wrote the 48 laws of power that he's obviously a huge reader and so he sort of reaches out to authors, I guess. But it was a surreal experience for me to go to Abu Dhabi and meet him because there was something, you know, sorry, they drove me in. I went to his palace, and it was all very modern. And this is this sort of stoic thing.

He was all very modern. You know, it's this beautiful house. He has these TVs everywhere and cutting edge technology. There's nice cars parked out front. I also felt something very timeless where it's like you're literally meeting a member of a royal family. He's just soliciting artists and intellectuals the way that a prince might have done 500 years ago or a thousand years ago.

I must have been a feeling you've got as you traveled around the world meeting these sort of heads of state. On the one hand, we're in the 21st century. On the other hand, very little has changed. I think that's right. And in these countries, the power structures are quite different. But I think it's great that someone who's in that position of influence is intellectually curious, right? I mean, the danger is when

do you have a desperate right who thinks, hey, I know everything already, right? And I know what's good for my people and it's just really determined to keep himself and power. So I think you know, I think that UAE has been kind of a force for good in the region in large measure because the leadership there, a shake-talk noon, but also Mohammed bin Zayed, is they're very engaged, they're always talking to others and listening to others. Yeah, it's interesting when I was writing live of the Stokes, I was looking at some of the early Greek Stokes, and it was interesting their relationship with these sort of kings and princes that they were advising.

There was, the idea of like, oh yeah, a leader has to be informed and a leader has to be intellectually curious is again, this thing that people have been wrestling with for 2000 years or more and how unique. I mean, Marcus really is being one of the only sort of philosopher kings that ever existed. Just you would think that, you know, being powerful would go hand in hand with being intellectually curious, but it's probably the exception rather than the rule. Yeah, I think that's right. I think a lot of people who get into positions of power, do so in a way that demands self promotion, that demands, at least portraying themselves as

extraordinarily knowledgeable. But it's really important that a leader be intellectually curious and be humble to know that nobody's omniscient and when you're dealing with this certainly complex challenges and also when you're trying to take advantage of opportunities, you need kind of interdisciplinary approach. You need to bring people together to help understand the complex problems and what the possibilities are. Yeah, there's a great quote from Epic Titus where he goes, it's impossible to learn that which you think you already know. And as I've talked to CEOs and leaders and politicians

over there, I've sort of set a version of this, which is if you think you know everything, in a sense, if you think you know everything there is to know, in a sense you're right because it becomes impossible for you to learn anything else. And so it's kind of this self-fulfilling prophecy where if you think there's stuff left for you to learn, you're also right and you can continue to grow and learn.

And if you think you know everything, which I think a lot of these sort of intuitive by the gut leaders sort of go almost probably come out of the womb thinking, that's also a self-fulfilling prophecy because they're not open to learning or being proven wrong in any way. Absolutely.

I mean, this is why I think the study of history is so important, right? Because I think the study of history is in many ways an exercise in humility because you recognize that nobody has everything figured out, right? And you understand better the complex causality of events, the human aspect of problems and life experiences

that defy any kind of predictive ability, right? So I think that's why I'm not, you know, no surprise that a historian would advocate for the study of history, but of course. But I think the study philosophy and the study of history both But of course, but I think the study philosophy and the study of history both are mentally important. Or leaders. Yeah, I was thinking about that quote from your friend

and colleague, General Mattis. It's in, it's in Carl Sinekios. He says, it's not just that you have to read. He's like, if you haven't read hundreds of books about your domain of battle or industry or specialty, he says you're functionally illiterate. And what I liked about that is it's sort of raising the bar. It's not like, oh, I read one book or I scanned a few reports about something.

It has to be this deep, sort of immersive experience and something to, I'm sure, you're sort of lifelong study of the war, but specifically the Vietnam War, you're probably just, you're not only still unearthing things about it, but you're understanding of it is probably still relatively early. Like as you deep dive in these subjects, you realize that you're really only on a shoreline of kind of a vast ocean of potential understanding of this topic. Right. And what history can do is it can help you ask the right questions. And I think it can help you think in ways that allow you to employ historical analogies, but I think you have to do that as well with a degree of caution and

humility because no situation is exactly the same. But I think you can at least avoid situation is exactly the same. But I think you can at least avoid making some of the same mistakes. And I read about this in battlegrounds about how I took with me, you know, into the White House, a determination to at least make different mistakes than those that I had written about during the period in which Vietnam became an American war. Yeah, Bismarck says, you know,

any fool can learn by experience. Let's learn from the experiences of others. I think if you're not sort of starting at least where everyone else left off, what you're doing is making unnecessary mistakes for the second time. Right. Absolutely. Exactly. You seem like a pragmatic reader, though. I saw a quote from you in an interview, and I think you were cribbing a professor of yours, Exactly. You seem like a pragmatic reader, though. I saw a quote from you in an interview,

and I think you were cribbing a professor of yours where you said, a historian doesn't read book. They, you said historians don't read books. They use books. Walk me through how you think about books in that way. Yeah. Well, I think that really gets to the point that I was going to make when you mentioned the general Mattis quotation. It's not enough just to read books, you have to read books purposefully. And I think if you're reading books purposefully, what you're trying to do is to kind of solve a problem or to deepen your understanding of a particular issue. And then when you engage with the book and then you can place that book in the context of other books that are related to that subject, that's when I think you begin to develop knowledge. The knowledge

that is necessary to make wise decisions and knowledge that is necessary to consult with others and to do so in a way in which you ask the right questions. And so I think reading purposefully is immensely important. I mean, some books are more conducive to this than others. If I'm reading a book on a historical topic or a contemporary challenge to international security, I typically try to break the book, right? I read the introduction, I read the conclusion, I read the first and last paragraphs of each chapter

and then if a chapter really interests me, then I dive into it, you know, and I read the whole thing. Now, of course, you know, when you're reading Tolstoy, you read it from front back, you know, let's skip around. But I think reading purposefully is key and I think that's an important skill. When I was taking a staff course on my way to graduate school and I went to the library at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and I signed out these VHS tapes for a speed reading course hosted by Dick Cavitt. And, I'll play it's the best and best when it's all I ever made. You know, because of course, I mean, a graduate student history, you're doing a heck of a lot

of reading. Sure. And if you can read purposefully and efficiently, I think that helps. I find this particularly true for like philosophy or if I'm trying to read some like Greek play or like let's say someone, you know, hears that, you know, history of the Peloponnesian War might help you understand the jostling between the United States and China. You know, don't just go buy that book off the shelf and think you're going to read it if you've never read some work of ancient history before.

What I like to do is I read the Wikipedia page first and then I read articles about it. You got to get the basics of what's happening first, so then you can really understand what's going on. And then I also think, and I'd be curious as a historian, how, like when I read, I tend to skip over lots of dates and place I don't worry about pronouncing names. I just wanna get to the point. I want to get the message. I want to use it. I'm not trying to impress anyone.

Yeah, hey, Ryan, this is why I really like your books. I mean, you make your you make philosophy and store philosophy relevant and accessible. And other authors do that, I think, well, on other topics. Like you mentioned the Peloponnesian Wars, Don Kagan's one volume of that is brilliant, or his essay on it in the book called on the origins of Warren prospects for peace, right? He's an ancient historian who wrote a multi-volume history of the Peloponnesian War, but like who's going to read that these days? Not that many people. But so I think looking around for books like that to provide the context and you know, you know, we're talking about Don Higginbotham, one of my advisors, you know, who said, you know, who said HR historians don't read books, they use them. He also had a great line when I finished my written exams in history for the, for the doctorate and he said,

he said, congratulations, you now know more history than you will ever know. He said, he said, congratulations, you now know more history than you will ever know. And again, what he was basically saying is, hey, don't worry about the knowledge, right? The specific knowledge of facts and dates and so forth and personalities. But really what a degree in history should do is teach you how to think. And how to think in maybe the way that Sir Michael Howard, who was a great military historian, just passed away last year, he said that you should study history in width, depth, and context, right? In width, so you can see really the change in continuity, because I think history is largely

about change in continuity. As the historian Carl Becker said, memory of past and anticipation of future should walk hand in hand in a happy way, right? And I think oftentimes we neglect continuities in our experience, the human experience. I think I'm sure you see this with the applicability of stoic philosophy today. And we think that everything's new, right?

Everything's, everything we encounter is a novel sort of experience. And then he said to study in depth, in depth, so you understand the complex causality of events. And as he describes it, the tidy outlines of history dissolve, and you see the real effect that emotion I have on history and the course of human events. And then he said to study in context, in a broader context of if you're studying war, the relationship between

war and society, in this specific form of government, the need to sustain popular will in a democracy, for example. So I think that the study of history teaches us more than anything else, how to think, rather than what to think. Got a quick message from one of our sponsors, and then we'll get right back to the show. Stay tuned. Hey there listeners,

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Yeah, I was with that quote from your professor saying, you now know more than you'll ever know. I wonder if part of that, and I have you curious if this is true in your experience, it's sort of, you had this broad understanding of the sweep of history. So you kind of know where things are located. And then when specific things happen, then you can go, I need to go deep dive into this. For instance, when I was writing stillness, I decided, oh, you know what might be, like I was trying to think

of a leader, a moment where a leader had been particularly sort of still, but in a very sort of crisis high moving situation. And so I was like, you know what, I've read about the Cuban Missile Crisis before, now I'm going to go do a deep dive in context of that to find out what I need to know. So do you find yourself referring back doing deep dives in the limits of? Yes, yes. And whenever I'm writing about something or thinking about something, I'm pulling like three or four different books down.

Because I'll remember, I remember, I think I think this has been yet in this book or this book really has a good framework for understanding this complex issue. And I noticed that, I noticed that you're writing too. I don't know if it's, uh, ego is the enemy or obstacles away. You cover Elyse's grant and use you. He used a couple of Indians about, you know, him getting a photograph taken, I remember. And like, you know, the glass crashing around him, I thought about this because you're talking about stillness. But then all these other examples in his life where he

was, you know, he was sort of, I think, you know, a little bit fatalist, you know, and, and, and, and was sort of unflappable in very, very, you know, what others would regard as, as harrowing desperate situations. So, and, you know, I love that approach to, you that approach to leadership, right? I mean, I, I don't know, I think you might write about Ramul too. I used to teach him. I taught a symposium on the North Africa campaign as part of military history course at Todd West Point. And I think with distinguished him more than anything else is where others saw only difficulties. He saw possibilities, right? And with our regiment in Iraq, the third Army Calvary Regiment in Iraq in a very difficult area with a lot of violence and it was a base for Al Qaeda in Iraq, we had a big sign

in our command post, right? Where are the opportunities and how do we exploit them? And that was the question to ask all the time. Because you know bad things happen in combat, Ryan. But what you want to try to do is to understand how what has just occurred and be turned to your advantage. Yeah, speaking of Ramo, to go to the idea of like you sort of know where stuff is located, he had that that fingertip feel. I won't do the German word because I'm terrible at pronunciations, but finger sensing a fuel is what it is. Yes, he had that fingertip feel

for how things were gonna go. And I think the more you read, the more functionally literate you become, the more you have a fingertip feel for where the right quote or anecdote or piece of data or a campaign to study to help you with whatever the obstacle you're currently experiencing is. Absolutely, and this can be very practical.

I read about this in the conclusion of battlegrounds, because I tell the story of when I was leaving to go to the White House quite unexpectedly, right? The president hired me on, you know, President's Day in 2017 after an interview of Mar-a-Lago. And flew back on Air Force One. I didn't live in Washington. So they flew me on an aspirator craft back to my house.

I packed a bag and I went to work the next day. The West Wing of the White House. But my future son-in-law was visiting us. And I was pulling all these books down off my shelf to take with me. He was like, hey, what's going to be packing clothes instead of books? Why are you taking all these books with you?

And I said, well, whenever, you know, I take on a new job, I try to learn from the experiences of those, you know, who had that responsibility previously. Sure. And I told the story about to my son-law who was in the 75th Ranger Regiment at the time. I said, you know, before our unit deployed to desert shield and then desert storm, this is 30 years ago now Ryan, I'm getting really old man. And I read about the North African campaigns and then really strangely, our executive officer, kind of John Gifford, he's cleaning out the office of the executive officer, which is always a mess in any military unit. The executive officer has

all the stuff like that. It's soft. He flies this paper, like crumpled up like in the back of the back of the drawer, you know, and it's notes on combat actions in Tunisia and North Africa by major general, uh, Harman and Ernest Harman. And, and, um, it was like a resettistone for, armored desert combat, you know, and, and it was all the lessons that he had learned in command of the Second Armored Division. And you know, technology had changed and so forth, but the basics had changed, right? And there were these just, there were these insights that seemed kind of simple, right? But he would say that, you know, armored battles into desert are one by the side that shoots first, okay?

But it gets the first shot in, right? That's kind of good. He said a good, a good, in engaged and armored battle, has about eight to 10 plays that they can execute immediately, you know, and together. He emphasized the fire distribution and control, all sorts of other things.

But, you know, there's one saying, if it takes a toothpick, use a baseball bat. So, yeah, if you bump up, in other words, to gain the initiative or an ascendasy of fire, the Rommel papers read that way as well. Very practical solutions or Rommel's earlier book, Infantry Attacks. And so I think it's really important to study the past, not just because it makes you more knowledgeable in the general sense, as I mentioned, and the ability to ask for a question. But sometimes it can really help you in a very practical sense, prepare a team to compete. And I think that applies in business as well as it does

in the military. Yeah, I would say sort of for whoever is listening, it doesn't matter what you're doing, what's just happened in your life. You've just gotten married, you've just lost someone you loved, you've just been drafted to play in the NBA, you've just been elected president, you've just made a million dollars,

you've just lost a million dollars. Somebody has written a book about that exact thing, right? And probably someone who did it right, has written a book about it, and somebody who did it wrong, has written a book about that exact thing, right? And probably someone who did it right has written a book about it and somebody who did it wrong has written a book about it and then historian has written about it in context and to not avail yourself of that knowledge because you're going to figure it out on your own is not just arrogant but but masochistic in my opinion. Right, right? Absolutely. Absolutely.

Yeah, I mean, what is the, what is the, uh, gosh, I think you already mentioned the Bismarck quotation, you know, about learning, about learning from the past and, and, uh, and I think that it is arrogant though. I mean, the people who say, hey, all I need to know, man, is what is my, my own experience. I mean, how, that's, that's pretty darn arrogant, right? And the ego is the enemy, Ryan. What's that? Sena says, you know, to study philosophy

is to annex all the ages into your own. And I think that's what we're doing is we're trying to go the wisest people who ever lived have experienced something like this before. What do they figure out? Maybe they got it wrong, but we should at least start with their basic understanding of the problem and speed things along if we can.

Absolutely. And I think that if you don't have that historical knowledge, you're at a severe disadvantage, a significant disadvantage. And I think an example, I mean, an example that I read about in battlegrounds is this idea of a revolution in military affairs in the 1990s. It was really based on the premise that, hey, really, really, really this time, the next war will be fundamentally different from all those that have gone before it, right?

It's going to be fast, cheap, efficient, wage from standoff range. And the language associated was so heubristic, right? Everything was dominance. Yeah, full spectrum dominance, dominant battle space knowledge. And then these catch phrases like rapid decisive operations. That sounds great, doesn't it? I mean, if you're not for that, what do you for you for ponders and decisive operations, right? I mean, so it was really a setup. This orthodoxy in the 90s was a setup for the frustrations that we encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. And it was all because we were biased in favor of change and not cognizant enough of the

continuities, continuities in the nature of war. Yeah, I read Lawrence Friedman's book and it's called The Future of War. I don't know if you read it, but he wrote that great book strategy. And he was sort of looking at how every generation they thought things have fundamentally changed and are different. And how naive that assumption turns out to be every single time. I used to call it the vampire fallacy, it's because you can't kill it. It's just coming back. And it's modern day, the modern day manifestation of this vampire began with strategic bombing

theory in the early 20th century. And it just appears in a new guys about every 10 years. I don't know what generation of warfare we're up to now. I think it's this generation warfare, it's this generation. And each one of these generations comes with, you know, a few new buzzwords, you know, but it's really the same argument.

And the kind of newities that they neglect are kind of four fundamental kind of news about war. War is an extension of politics, right? Okay, so you think that's kind of like the, that's like the Geico commercial, right? I think everybody knows that. Yeah, but what it really, what that really means is, hey, you have to orient all of your efforts,

military, diplomatic, economic, to achieve a sustainable political outcome, unless it's just a raid. War is human, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and, and and, and, and, and, and, and and, and, and and, and and, and and and and, and and and and and and and, and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and and to sit at these identified 25, 20 years ago to be your honor and interest. War is uncertain because if it's fundamentally interactive nature, there is no such thing as women here progress in war. And then war is a contest of wills, right? As the philosopher of war, Carl von Klausel would said in the 19th century, you know, that winning in war

means convincing your enemy that your enemy has been defeated, right? And I think we have violated all of those not-newities or neglected all of them in the recent wars that we've engaged in. And for people who are listening who are not soldiers, I would argue that those points you just raised are as much true in life and in business and in sports too. And that's why ordinary people should study the history of war and the history of politics and the sort of grand campaigns of the past because as different as they are,

what you're seeing is fundamentally human beings doing what human beings do, and there's lessons you can derive and apply to whatever it is that you're doing. Absolutely. Carl Becker was a great historian, I already quoted earlier about the memory pass in his patient of the future, walking hand in hand in a happy way. He gave a great speech for the American Historical Association in the 1930s. And the title was Every Man a Historian. And of course, he would have said today, Every Man a Woman is a certain historian. But what he was essentially saying is that history is important to everybody because it's really just the record of things said and done, right? And that record can inform our decisions and help us help and reach our experiences.

So there's two things that you brought up. One, the idea of sort of convincing your enemy they lost and then we talked briefly about the Cuban missile crisis. To me, of all the concepts that are applicable out of battlegrounds, the biggest one, the sort of one that I think obviously makes sense in a geopolitical sense, but make a lot of sense just as a human being going through the world. Talk about this idea of strategic empathy, which is not just what do I want, not just what do I want, but what does my enemy want, and how is my enemy going to think about what

I'm doing, and how does that enemy want? And how is my enemy going to think about what I'm doing? And how does that interplay with what they want? And to me, the Cuban Missile Crisis is the sort of apotheosis of that happening where Kennedy was the first one, the first American president in quite some time that was able to take the advice from his military advisors, think about it politically, and also just think about it as a human level, what is the guy across the ocean who also has this finger on the nuclear button? What is he thinking? And what's he thinking about? What Kennedy's thinking? And that struck me as just strategic empathy at its highest and most life and death. It's an extremely important concept.

It's a concept that has its roots in Sun's Su's observation, right? That, hey, if you know yourself, you'll want to have the battles. If you know the enemy, you'll know half the battles. If you know, neither you'll lose everything, right? So, but historian named Zachary Shore wrote a great book called A Sense to the Enemy in which he develops this idea of strategic empathy. And it's essentially viewing these complex challenges we're facing from the perspective

of others, and in particular, as you mentioned, are rivals and adversaries in our enemies. And what he also argues for, and what I argue for in the book is to also pay attention to the emotions and the aspirations and the ideology that drive and constrain the other. The problem with the lack of strategic empathy would describe a strategic narcissism as itself referential, first of all.

And it doesn't acknowledge the agency or the authorship over the future that the other has. And this is why I think we fall into some of these cognitive traps of confirmation bias and optimism bias and self-delusion really. And we see this playing out, I think, in Afghanistan, for example, today, right? We're, we didn't like the enemy that actually we were engaged with there. So we conjured one up and made some assumptions about the enemy. And then our leaving Afghanistan

a way that's empowering our enemy and disavantageing really those who are trying to fight to preserve the freedoms that the Afghan people have enjoyed since the end of Taliban rule in 2001. Yeah, I see this with artists and writers and entrepreneurs too, where because these things sort of, I think tend to select for a certain amount of ego, right?

You're the person says, I should be a famous artist or I should be president or I should be a powerful general. There's a certain amount of ego that attracts you to these jobs, but that ego is so dangerous because your thing now depends on your understanding of the audience, of the enemy, of the media. You know, you're having to be filtered through all these things. And so if you don't understand, if this is all about you and you are living in this sort of reality distortion field, you're just never going to be successful no matter how brilliant, powerful, well-armed you are, because fundamentally it's not about you.

The other person has a say in what happens, too, whether that's Vietnam or the buying public or the stock market or public opinion. They have a say in what happens and you have to understand that. Right. And in you, a person's ego makes them vulnerable as well to manipulation, right? Yes. It's pretty easy to push the buttons to somebody who's an ego test, right? You can do that through your sick offence or by raising the prospect that the individual

might seem weak, you know, unless they do fill in the blank. The other way that I think ego makes people susceptible is the way that I've seen really the Pakistani Army leadership manipulate American leaders for way too long, right? I mean, this is, you know, this is serial, you know, self-delusion and, and, and, you know, I think what I've seen them do is they just convince each one of these leaders, hey, you will be the person. You will be the person who's going to convince me to change. Right. My behavior, right? And just work with me a little bit longer, right?

Just continue to give us more aid, be patient with us because you're really the one that's going to fund a million changes in relationship. And I've seen a number of people fall for it. It's really, what is this? It's serial goalability. Got a quick message from one of our sponsors, and then we'll get right back to the show.

Stay tuned. Yeah, well, you sort of, you can't con an honest man, you know, the saying, and I think an egotistical person is complicit in fooling themselves because they want whatever it is that you're selling them to be true, even though fundamentally it's not. Absolutely. Yeah, exactly.

So, when you think about this strategic empathy, it's not, you're not saying like, oh, you never do, you never put yourself out there, you never try, you never exert your will, it's just, I think you're saying you have to understand the facts on the ground and you have to understand how these things relate to each other. That's right, right? And what strategic empathy does is it helps you understand the facts on the ground and you have to understand how these things relate to each other. That's right. And what strategic empathy does is it helps you understand the challenge you're up against better. It helps you compete more effectively.

It allows you to challenge what are oftentimes implicit assumptions that underpin policies and strategies. And because they're implicit, and despite their flaws, they go unchallenged, right? And so I think it's, for example, I think one of the more stark examples is this assumption that China having to welcome into the international economic order would play by the rules and as China prospered, it would liberalize its economy

and liberalize its form of governance. Well, that completely neglected, really. But with the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party and the emotions and aspirations that drive the party leadership. So I think by viewing the competition that we're in with this authoritarian mercantilist model that the party is promoting, you know, that by viewing it from their perspective, you then are able to craft a much more effective

policy and strategy. Yeah, and just because something is good for the country as a whole, you have to think about how does this affect the individual decision makers who are currently in power, and what the fantasy that you wish to be true is often at their expense. So I think this is a key point in the 48 laws of power to key point in

one class, which obviously it's acidities. You have to, to me, what the core of strategic empathy is, is understanding what the self-interest or the incentives acting on the person who's on the other side of you is. Absolutely. Yeah. A great example is the Kim family regime in North Korea, right? The only the only hereditary communist dictatorship in the world, right? And so the two approaches that we've taken to North Korea over time have been the sunshine

policy, right? The sunshine policy that the idea that an opening to North Korea, I mean, how could they be against that, right? And they've got a, you know, the people are destitute, their economy is failing, you know, opening up will enrich the people. But of course Kim sees this as a disaster, right? Because it's a gulag state. It's a state in which he tries to insulate the North Korean people from reality and he's and subjected them to systematic brainwashing, right?

I mean, the worst threat to him is that North Korean people would think on their own. And the other approach has been one of strategic patients, right? This idea that, hey, if you just wait long enough, right, I mean, that's the impossible state that's going to collapse. But this is, you know, this is, again, I think wishful thinking. I mean, the, you know, the Kim family regime does have a pretty tight grip on power based on the mechanisms is put in place to prevent any, any really organized opposition to the regime. So it is, it is important to view, you know, to view competitions, complex problems and challenges as well as opportunities from the perspective of others. And then to,

and then to maybe list assumptions. I think a good example of this is about three weeks ago, four weeks ago, whenever, just before the end of the Trump administration, and in the middle of this, you know, of this, this horrible, you know, spectacle, murder, spectacle, and the attack on the Capitol. So, I didn't get much press, but the administration declattified one of the foundational documents to the Indo-Pacific strategy. And what that strategy began with was a discussion of the assumptions that on which previous policies were based, now were demonstrably false and then and then posited a set of of of alternative

assumptions. And and I think it's a great example of the application strategic empathy to this competition with China. And I think this is an approach that it has tremendous bipartisan support as a result. And and I think we'll carry on across multiple presidential administrations. Well, that idea of questioning assumptions to me also is very philosophical, right? I think when I look at your work about Vietnam, what you really see is, you know, multiple presidential administrations

refusing to question the obviously failing or flawed assumptions right in front of them. And if you wanna look at it a sort of history on repeat, that's also the history of humanity. It's we make an assumption about something. And instead of re-examining it in, you know, continually in the light of new evidence, we stick to it, we cling to it,

despite all evidence to the contrary. Absolutely. And I think it's really important to try to put in a process to compensate for these flaws, right? And what I did is, National Security Advisor and I described this a little bit in the conclusion of the book is, you know, armed with, as I mentioned earlier, the recognition of what was wrong in Vietnam, we put in a place a different meeting, you know, for the principles committee of the National Security Council. This is the president's cabinet, who are relevant to a particular problem

or any issues of foreign policy or national security. And this framing session really just aimed to ensure that we understood the nature of this challenge to our security and our prosperity and then to first understand it on its own terms, to identify what vital interest were at stake, to craft an overarching goal and more specific objectives, but importantly, to list out the assumptions on which we think a strategy or policy should be based. And then we listed what we saw were obstacles to progress and opportunities to exploit.

And it just stopped there. We didn't talk about, in the first part of this meeting, what are we going to do about it? We talked about the framing. You know, this is what people call design thinking, but you're the framing of this challenge. And everybody had a chance to comment on it. And then we said, okay, what are your ideas then? If you agree now with this framing modified based

on the discussion, how do we integrate our efforts to all elements of national power and efforts of like-minded partners to overcome the obstacles and take advantage of the opportunities? Then you get kind of a high level discussion about how to integrate diplomatic efforts with military efforts and intelligence

and law enforcement and economic efforts and so forth. And that was, I think, immensely important, Ryan, because you know what we do is we rush to action a lot of times, right? And we don't really understand the nature of the problem. And then therefore, we confuse activity with progress. Yeah, I had the historian Tom Rex on the podcast a couple of months back and his book, First Principles. Obviously I'm familiar with the concept, but

I think the concept there is really important both politically, personally, which is how often are you going back to First Principles and going, hey, what do I believe here? What are my assumptions? What's my understanding of the underlying facts here? And then making sure that you measure what you're doing, the actions you're taking, the things you're thinking about, the policies you're developing, making sure that it's consistent with those first principles. Absolutely.

And I think it's important because these things can kind of take on a life of their own. To subject these assumptions, and to also subject any kind of metrics you come up with, measures of effectiveness that you come up with to kind of a routine assessment, right? So this doesn't happen in government have much, but we set up a schedule for it.

And I think by successor dismantled all this, so it doesn't exist anymore. But who I think had more confidence, maybe it is own ability to provide advice rather than a process to give interdisciplinary perspectives and best advice across the department's agencies to the president. But I think you have to set almost, of course, events can happen that cause you to reframe and shout your song. But I think it's worth it to put a mark on a calendar and just say, okay,

every six months, I'm going to return to these assumptions and to look at these metrics and to put a system in place to do that. Well, that goes to that idea of stillness. How often do you have time in your life for reflection, for questioning, for, you know, sitting down and thinking about what you think? And I think a lot of us are so busy. We're going so fast that we don't, we go, I don't have time to read books. I don't have time to have this interdisciplinary discussion.

And it might be true you don't have time, but I assure you the consequences of not having time are going to cost you a lot more time that you don't have. Absolutely. You know, one of the one of the fun parts of the jobs and after school advisors, they got to talk with all the previous natural school advisors. And one who was gracious enough to visit me and I think in my first week on the job was Henry Kissinger, you know, and I asked him a question, Ryan, I said, how did you find time to read and to think

and think more deeply about the work that you do in this position? And he said, you know, in that accent, he said, in this job, you cannot. He said, he said, in this job, you cannot. He said, he said, in this job, you will not create any new knowledge, you will consume the knowledge you already have. Interesting.

But, you know, I didn't find that to really be the case. He was saying that, I think tongue and cheek, you know, but I, you know, I was, I was, I had the opportunity, obviously, to have wide-rigging discussions. I think it's the way you structure your day, right? So instead of you sitting at the end of a big conference table and saying, okay, I'm ready to be briefed,

I mean, set it up like a discussion. Do it around a round table. And I think oftentimes too, in government especially, people have meetings. They meeting each other to death. Well, how about a working session? Like, how about some whiteboards around here?

How about instead of sitting around a, and like a relatively sterile conference room with people putting up PowerPoint slides, why don't we have a collaborative workspace where we can maybe write some papers and advance, share them, discuss them. You know, I mean, I think that the way that we structure interactions is really important.

I think that one way to do it, like when I was in the job, I would walk across to the executive office building where each of the directorates were housed out of the West Wing and meet in their own spaces, right? Where they're more comfortable and have discussions that I think were immensely helpful to me. And I think to them as well, right? Because then I could share with them the presence priorities and what I think how we are to prioritize our efforts to craft a new policy or to react to a series of events in a particular region. When my philosophy is you don't find the time, you make the time. And if you don't make it,

it's not going to happen. One of the other books that I connected with Sheik Tanun about was Cal Newport's book Deep Work, which he said he reads on a regular basis. He was telling me, he has like a room he goes to that's almost pitch black, no interruptions. And it's where he sets aside time to think and reflect and do the task that require deep concentration because if the leader is not doing that, if the leader is not taking time to think big picture, who do you think is doing it, right? It's not the people below you.

That big picture thinking isn't going to filter up to you. Right. And as you know, I mean, if you're writing a book, Ryan, I mean, you can't do it like in in half hour increments. You know, I mean, it takes a period of long contemplation and you know,

I'm you're making me feel guilty now because I'm kind of failing at this. So I'm working on another book. And since battlegrounds has come out, I mean, I've been talking about battlegrounds so much. I need to put my I need to really get into like the, and deep work space myself, right?

And, and, and start really kicking off into this next project. But, but you're, I think you're right. And, and what you do, I think when you, when you do deep work and you think, and you're more contemplative, you start to make connections that you otherwise would miss, right? And then, and certainly, I think what you do is you, you begin to discern opportunities. Because I think you do see the obstacle first, right? And then and certainly I think what you do is you begin to discern opportunities

because I think you do see the obstacle first, right? And it takes thinking it takes imagining how others can be brought in, you know, and how you can approach obstacles from a different angle or different perspective or make the obstacle irrelevant to you. And so I think that you're right. I mean, this is what we're missing in this electronically connected world. I mean, we are more connected to one another electronically than ever before. But I think this didn't from one another emotionally,

psychologically. And we don't have the kind of discussions like we're having. I mean, who has that these days? It's all sound bites and reaction to, well, it was always reaction to the last outrageous thing that Donald Trump did. I don't know what we're going to do now, right? So I think it's all about sort of superficial, you know, breaking news that is never really breaking news anyway. breaking news that is never really breaking news anyway. And it's people sitting around tables talking at each other in a very superficial way. I really think, gosh, I worry about the younger generation. I hope that they're reading and thinking and discussing philosophy and history.

No, it's funny. If you and I connected, we said, hey, let's get on the phone and meet each other. We would never have an hour long conversation like this. We talk on the phone for 15 minutes. And it's really though these sort of in depth philosophical discussions. Kato famously would have these big sort of philosophical dinner parties. I've met Peter Tio a few times. He sort of has these, he brings these people in and he just has, you know, a six hour dinner

conversation. And I think that's really where you can, you know, obviously you wake up in the morning and you work on whatever you're supposed to be working on, but it might be an idea that comes to you at dinner, an idea that comes to you at the gym, or an idea on a walk with a friend that unlocks whatever it is that you're struggling with. Right. Absolutely. And you know, I'll tell you what I've found.

I don't know how it is with you, but these ideas come to me and I think, okay, I'll remember that. I don't remember. I've got to write it down. I've got to get better at that. You know, I've got to get better at that. So I've been paddle boarding here lately,

so I need to bring a waterproof... Waterproof, no bad with me. You got a quick message from one of our sponsors, and then we'll get right back to the show. Stay tuned. I had a question for you. We were talking about this idea that, you know, whatever position you're in,

someone's been in that before. And then we were talking about some strategic empathy. I'm curious. So one of the things I'm fascinated in with stoicism, and obviously I can't go back and ask the stoics, but, you know, Senna, because this fascinating figure to me, because here you have this incredibly wise, thoughtful, virtuous, disciplined person who gets the, you know, he gets the call. He's asked to serve his country to advise the future emperor. And for a while, it goes well.

He's, his student seems to be interested in learning. He writes them these wonderful essays. They talk. Sena is this sort of guiding, calming influence at the beginning of Nero's reign. In fact, almost like the first five years of it, historians have very little to complain about. But then it starts to go off the rails. have very little to complain about. But then, you know, it starts

to go off the rails, he stops listening to the advice. And so historians have long speculated, like, why did Seneca stay? Why didn't he leave? You know, was he the adult in the room or was he complicit, right? There's all these sort of questions. As someone who's been in a similar position, what do you think is going through Seneca's mind as he watches the, as he watches's been in a similar position, what do you think is going through Sena Kuzmain as he watches the, as he watches Nero and as he evaluates his own career prospects and culpability? Like, what insights can you give me about the past from your experiences in the present? Sure. Well, this was, this was a big, you know, issue with, you know, some of my friends.

When I was going to go into the Trump administration, these are people who are adamantly against Trump. These weren't people in the military. They're people outside the military, it's in academics and so forth, people that I've known for years. Some friendship's I lost actually. But I think it begins with really understanding

what your role is. So for me, I sw, I, you know, I, I swore to support the Defense of the United States when I was 17 years old, when I entered West Point. And I took kind of the extreme position of never voting. I just never voted Ryan because I followed George Marshall's example of not doing so to keep that bold line between the military and partisan politics. So I view Donald Trump as the fifth commander and chief I had served under. And I thought if I had the opportunity to help the elected president make better decisions

by running an effective national security process, by staffing him effectively, by giving him the benefit of best advice and multiple options developed from across to departments and agencies, that that was a good way for me to have a bonus round in my service to the country. So, that's what I endeavor to do.

And, of course, this is a disruptive to many people, a very offensive leader who did not read the ego as the enemy, I don't think. I'm not sure you read read many books at all. And, but, you know, I understood what my role was, right? Nobody elected me, right? I still was a three-star general in the army, a loose-hand-trailing army. And so it wasn't my job to make policy. And if I did, if I was kind of the adult in the room who tried to block the president from something the president was lawfully, you know, could lawfully do us the chief executive or as a commander chief, then I was undermining the sovereignty of the American people, right? Because only the president and the vice president in that executive branch are really directly accountable to the

American people. And if we believe that sovereignty lies with the people, then those who assume the role of trying to manipulate decisions consistent with their own agenda, or of obstructing, like this is the anonymous writer of obstructing the president's decision to policies, they're actually undermining the Constitution. So I think understanding of role will be the way I'd answer that, but then also I made the assessment. I made the assessment of am I making a positive difference? Right. And and and and and and and and am I being asked to do anything

that's unethical or you know, a leo. So if the answer to the first one is yes, and the second one is no, I was going to continue to serve because it was my duty. It's my duty to serve. And and I had really this benefit, as I mentioned, of writing dereliction of duty, you know, the book about how

why Vietnam became an American war. And one of the curious things I found through historical research is that during the period in which Vietnam became an American war, many of Lyndon Johnson's advisors concluded, hey, we have to tell the president only what the president wants to hear. Right.

Because he was basing Vietnam decisions based on his domestic agenda. And he saw Vietnam principally as a danger to his domestic goals. But also because they concluded, hey, I've got to maintain my influence with the president. Right. Well, of course, begs the question, right? If you're not telling the president what you really think, what good is your influence? Anyway, so I never held back, right? And so there

are people who thought that that was, you know, full hearty or, you know, that I didn't have the emotional intelligence to know that President Trump didn't want to hear some things I was telling him. Of course, I knew that. And I didn't draw on long, long briefings. I tried to have really succinct, given him, you know, succinctly the perspective that I thought was necessary, like, hey, Mr. President, if we put tariffs on all of our allies, you know, that's counterproductive, because if we shoot all of our allies to get the China, China wins, you know, I mean, so, but maybe that wasn't maybe what he wanted to hear, but it was my duty to tell him that, and not just, and just as what I thought, but what the advice was

or the best analysis from across departments and agencies or government and maybe from some of our like-minded partners abroad. So hey, I knew I was going to get used up, Ryan, but in a very stoic way, man, I was at peace with that, right? I was like, okay, you know, when I'm finished, I'm finished. And the way I left, you know, I had a frank conversation with him and I said, hey, I think I'm used up here with you, you know, and I want you to succeed. But I don't think I'm your guy anymore.

You know, when are we going to do this? Right. And so it was, it was, you know, it was a mature conversation. I wasn't in there Ryan. Like, I think a lot of this goes to base motivation in life, right? I mean, I wasn't there to get another job. In fact, when I took the job,

I decided I was gonna retire as a three star general, right? That was gonna be my plan that year in 2017 anyway. And I said, hey, I'm just gonna, you know, even if I'm offered, which I was offered to compete for four separate, four star jobs, I respectfully declined to compete because I decided I'm just going to retire at the end of this and go as long and as hard as I can. And then, hey, when I've done, I'll try to help my successors succeed. I think the president was actually kind of surprised when, you know, I knew that he was going to call me that

afternoon to tell me that he had selected John Bolton, right? And I said, hey, Mr. President, I want him to succeed. What is he coming on? I'll serve till he comes in and we'll have a smooth handoff. And I did everything I could to make that happen, spent time with Ambassador Bolton, so forth, and set up all sorts of briefings for him. Because I think if your ego is under control, Ryan, right? You realize, hey, these jobs, right?

You're duties, you're responsibilities. They're much bigger than anyone individual, right? Yeah. And you hope the president gets that as well. You know, I don't think President Trump actually got that memo, you know, on that. But I think, anyway, started going on about it. You got me thinking, obviously. But there are those who said, you should never have done it.

I would still do it again today. I think his behavior became more and more aberrant after I left. Not that I was putting a cap on it. I think it was just a natural evolution of his presidency, beginning with kind of the Helsinki conference, and then lots of other aboriginal activity in denying the outcome of the election, the reinforcement of conspiracy theories and so forth, and false claims of widespread fraud and then encouraging this assault on the Capitol.

So I can really only talk about that first 13 months. No, I think what I'm so fascinated with with Senaika is that life is complicated, right? It's easy to be the philosopher academically. It's easy to be, perhaps even just in the more contained world of your industry or in your case, the military. But then the rubber has to meet the road where we have to do these things in the real world. And there's a fascinating book called Dying Every Day about Seneca and Nero's Court by James Rom, who's a writer I love.

And you know, he's just talking about, you know, was Seneca motivated by selfishness or selflessness? And it's probably different parts on different days. And I think, you know, human beings are complicated and we find ourselves, I was offered a job as a spokesperson to a cabinet secretary, and I'm big not a Trump supporter. And what surprised me was even that I considered taking the job, right? And that's, I think that's also where some of these first principles, and you said, the base motivations, why do I do what I do, what motivates me? You know, and so you can evaluate these opportunities and dilemmas as they come along. Yeah, well, you've read about this thing. When you're pushing up a chapter on on on deal beings, being part of something bigger than yourself, right?

Yes. And use Admiral Stockdale, who's a hero of mine, who I got to know. In fact, one of my fondest memories was being in the hot tub with Admiral Stockdale. Wow. It was a Vietnam work conference, you know, and as you know, he had been severely tortured. It was always in pain. And so I went down to work out in the hotel gym and he was in the hot tub. I said, I'm not missing this opportunity. So I jumped to the hot tub with them at a long long conversation with them and got to know them a little bit better over the years. But, but yeah, I mean, talk about, you know, applied philosophy. He's a great example of that. Well, I mean, even backing up from his time as a POW, he was, from what I understand, had very few illusions about the, the righteousness of the Vietnam War. He witnessed

the Gulf of Tonkin incident and sort of sought for what it was. And yet there he was flying missions over Vietnam and then shot down and taken prisoner. And so there did seem to be the ability, you could say it's philosophical or the opposite if I guess it depends on where you come down of his ability to compartmentalize his personal feelings from his sense of duty. Yeah, absolutely. And I think the question asks is, what is your sense of duty, right?

And of course, I think one of the great gifts of our democracy is that we do have a say in how we're governed. That all of us, I think, can apply a corrective, well-short of revolution, just by voting, or demanding better from our political leadership. Then I think another great gift is that our military does swear allegiance to our Constitution, right? And I think that we saw that our democratic institutions and processes put to a stress test in this past year. And I think we came out pretty strong. And I think that we had an adjudicative

process within the judicial branch of government, mainly at the state level, to adjudicate any of the claims of, you know, of, you know, of false results or or or corruption in the election process. And then, and then you had, you know, you had, I think, some key leaders, you know, in both parties show some effective leadership. I think McConnell speech, you know, the day of the assault on the Capitol, I think was very powerful, as was the vice president's behavior and response to it as well. So, anyway, I think that there is a sense of duty that can transcend this vitriolic partisanship we've seen. And I think it's really important that we appeal to that ourselves and in our communities, that we discover the ability, you know, that we, that we, we discover the ability to empathize with one another and to have meaningful civil discussions about, about the issues that are important to the future of all of our children and grandchildren and, and, uh, and I think we demand that kind of

a civil discourse from our political leadership as well. Yeah, and one last thing before you let you go, one of the things I've been talking to people about is, you know, people go, things I've been talking to people about is people go, why didn't the Republicans in peach or why didn't so-and-so take this stand? Or why doesn't so-and-so just do this? And there is truth to that. As voters, we have to hold people accountable. And as you said, officials swear an oath to protect

and to serve. But I think as philosophers and as students of history, we have to study these things with one thing in mind, which is how do you apply it in your own life? So, it's so easy to go, why didn't these spineless officials do X, Y, or Z? To me, what I want to take from that is, how often do I risk my job for matters of principle? How often am I willing to say things that will make me unpopular with friends or family? How often am I willing to do a thing that I sense is my duty, even if it comes at a great expense to me,

personally, professionally, physically. I think at the end of the day, we have to study Seneca or the dilemma you were talking about in your life or what's happening on the news and say, this is all great theoretically and historically, but how am I applying these lessons in my own life? Absolutely.

And then also to think about, you know, what is in our power, right? I mean, it was in our Aristotle who said it is only worth discussing what is in our power, right? And I think it was it was an Aristotle who said it is only worth discussing what is in our power, right? And and I think what we have to do, we all have a role in this. We all have a role in, I think, you know, arresting this destructive interaction between identity politics or whatever you want to call it and bigotry and racism, right? And I think with the stoke philosophers can teach us

as well as they can teach us more about our common humanity and help us understand better, even though you're not even supposed to say this anymore, that what defines you is much deeper than the pigmentation of your skin, for example, right? Sure. And so I think that the stoke philosophers philosophers can help us become better people and then also it be a source of strength for our society.

Yeah, that's right. Instead of decrying what you see happening in some other state or on the news or this sort of general global or federal trend, it's also like, what are you doing in your neighborhood? What are you doing with your kids? What are you doing in your house and in your relationships? Right. I mean, are you outraged about inequality of opportunity and the soft bigotry of low expectations

and racial barriers to be able to realize the American dream? Hey, you know, boys and girls club. I mean, all sorts of ways to get involved, you know, that that can make a real difference in real people's lives, you know, I think that's the great strength of our country is that we have this entrepreneurial spirit. We have this, you know, this individualist experience that we have can be, you know, it can be, there are disadvantages to it, right, especially when you say, hey, just wear a mask, man, we have to throw it. But there's an advantage to this, right?

That we ought to maximize, right? This idea that we can all make a difference. And we have this great benefit of living in aocracy, where we have freedom of speech. We live on a rule of law. We have to fear somebody breaking down our door without cause. Partners away somewhere, you know, we,

we have the ability to change, you know, our, our lives, people around us in a positive way. I love it. Yeah. What can you do in your life with your decisions and as, as Epic Tita says, what can you do with the matters that are up to me and disregard the matters that are not up to me? Right, right. General, thank you so much.

Hey, Ryan, thank you. I'm a big fan. I'm telling you. I've got, I'm just going to show you. Look, you got a great, good reader. You go see that to me. I'll school the way tabbed, tabbed. Oh, I love it. And it loves its stocks, man. So I'd like'd be with you. Thanks for making philosophy so accessible. And I think reading your books, I think, can enrich people's lives. So it's great to meet you. And I look forward to continuing the conversation at some point. I totally agree.

I'm a fan of your work. And thank you for doing the unpleasant work of trying to apply philosophical ideas at the highest levels of government and power. Thanks Ryan. Take care. Thanks. We'll talk soon. Thanks so much for listening. If you could leave a review for the podcast, we'd really appreciate it. The reviews make a difference and of course every nice review from a nice person helps balance out.

The crazy people who get triggered and angry anytime we say something they disagree with. So if you could rate this podcast and leave a review on iTunes, that would mean so much to us and it would really help the show. We appreciate it and I'll see you next episode. Hey prime members, you can listen to the Daily Stoke early and add free on Amazon Music, Hey, Prime Members! You can listen to the Daily Stoic early and ad-free on Amazon Music, download the Amazon Music app today, or you can listen early and ad-free with Wondery Plus in Apple Podcasts.