The Jordan B. Peterson Podcast - 541. Why We Stopped Progressing | Peter Thiel

Episode Date: April 24, 2025

Billionaire investor and PayPal co-founder Peter Thiel sits down with Jordan Peterson for a powerful conversation about why real progress has stalled. Thiel argues that the last truly groundbreaking achievement may have been landing on the moon—and since then, we've slowed down. He explains how fear, red tape, and over-specialization have made us more cautious and less ambitious. They dig into how society has shifted away from building and inventing, toward digital distractions and endless talk. They also explore what’s been lost as faith and meaning have disappeared from public life. From broken universities to status-driven culture wars, this is a deep and thought-provoking look at the challenges facing the West—and what we might do to turn things around. Peter Thiel is a German-born entrepreneur, venture capitalist, activist, and billionaire who emigrated to the U.S. as a child, eventually settling in California after years of moving between countries. A Stanford Law graduate, he began his career as a clerk and derivatives trader before founding Thiel Capital with $1 million from friends and family. Despite early setbacks, he co-founded Confinity, which became PayPal, launching a streak of ventures including Palantir, Clarium Capital, and early investment in Facebook. Thiel is an openly gay supporter of the Republican party, advocating for both equal rights and certain conservative policies, making his political stance admirably nuanced. This episode was filmed on March 31st, 2025.  | Links | For Peter Thiel: X https://x.com/peterthiel?lang=en Read “Zero to One: Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future” https://a.co/d/fAfeXm8 

So this question of, you know, is there really progress? We used to move fast. We've stopped moving faster physically the last 50 years. We feel like we are in an apocalyptic age. There is a dimension of science and technology. It has a dark dimension and it's, you know, it's a trap that humanity may be setting for itself. Much of the early science was done in the monasteries

that turned into universities. You can think about that as concrete evidence of the underpinning of much of the scientific revolution in terms of at least the offshoots of Christianity. But I think there's something deeper there. It wasn't just the theological metaphysics that drove it. It's something like the Christian anthropology. Okay, so let's delve into this a little bit.

So I had the opportunity to sit down with Peter Thiel today, and Mr. Thiel is probably most famous for the role that he played in establishing PayPal, but he's been a canny investor for a very long period of time. And we didn't actually talk much about practicalities on the business side. We mostly talked about the nature of cultural transformation, because his thought tends in that direction. He's a philosophically inclined person. And our discussion really walks through one of Peter's fundamental propositions is that progress in the material world and not the digital world, let's say, has slowed substantively since maybe the 1960s and that there are deep reasons for that. Some of it is apocalyptic fear of the scientific endeavor. Some of it is this hippie-like desire to look inside. Some of it is apocalyptic fear of the scientific endeavor, some of it is this hippie-like desire to look inside, some of it is escape into a world of abstraction. And so he outlined his

theory of social transformation, which is also deeply influenced by a skepticism about what low-level mimetic envy predicated status games, which I think is a very wise target of skepticism. We walked through his thoughts on social and technological transformation over a couple of hundred years, concentrating more on the last 60, and also began to flesh out a metaphysics that might ameliorate some of that nihilistic pathology and malaise, and that enabled us to at least begin a discussion

about what metaphysical presuppositions are necessary for a society and a psyche to remain, well, not only healthy, but non-totalitarian and catastrophic. So, join us for that. So, the last time we spoke was by distance at ARC, and you said a number of things there that were provocative, and one in particular that I wanted to follow up on. It surprised me, although I think I understand

why you said it, you're dubious about the rate of progress, so to speak, that we're making now. You feel, you seem to feel, I don't want to put words in your mouth, that the most innovative times are perhaps behind us, or at least temporarily so. And so I'm curious about, we've seen these revolutionary steps

forward in principle on the large language model front in the last year and our gadgetry is becoming much more sophisticated there's tremendous advancements in robotics and so how do you conceptualize quantifying progress scientific and technological and why are you skeptical about the benefits or the rate? Well, yeah, there are variations of this that I've talked about for close to two decades at this point. And, you know, the big, and of course there are all sorts of very complicated measurement problems. So how do we compare progress in AI with, let's say, lack of progress in dementia research, curing Alzheimer's, and so, you know, all these different complicated ways of how you weight all these different things.

But there was a sense that the West, the Western world was in this fast era of scientific technological progress where it was advancing on many, many different fronts. And in some ways, it started picking up in the Renaissance, early enlightenment, 17th, 18th centuries, and then probably in important ways accelerated in the 19th, first half of the 20th. And then in some ways, I believe it's slowed down over the last 50 or so years, maybe 1970 or so is an inflection point one could cite.

It doesn't mean it's stopped altogether. One way I've often summarized it is that we've continued to have progress in the world of bits, computers, software, internet, mobile internet, maybe crypto, now AI, but there's been much less progress in the world of atoms. And if you think about university setting, most of the engineering and scientific subjects had to do more with

this physical material world in which we're embedded. I was an undergraduate at Stanford in the late 1980s, class of 89, and it wasn't quite obvious at the time, but in retrospect, almost anything that was in the world of atoms would have been a bad feel to go into physics, chemistry, mechanical engineering, certainly aero-astero engineering, nuclear engineering, people already knew, was kind of outlawed and over by the 1980s. You could still maybe do electrical engineering, which was sort of the atoms that were used for semiconductors. But basically the only STEM field that was going to be a really successful field for people to go into was computer science, which was kind of this marginal, almost fake field. I always have this riff where when people use, I'm in favor of science, but I'm skeptical when people use the word science.

So social science, political science, climate science are called science, but people have an inferiority complex and say deep down, no, they're not really rigorous scientific feels. And something like this was true of computer science in the original day. It was people who were too dumb at math to be in mathematics or physics or electrical engineering and they sort of flunked out into computer science. And weirdly, this was a field that worked and it had a decent amount of impact. I don't think it was, and then it worked on the scale of people building some fantastic companies. There were certainly some important cultural and social transformations that we had as we moved from sort of the industrial age to the information age. I don't know if it's worked that well on, let's say, a broad economic level of well-being. So even if you measure it in terms of material well-being

for people, the millennial generation, the US, is probably in a lot of ways not even doing as well as their baby boomer parents. It's the first time we've had this sort of economic stagnation or even outright decline. And so, and again, the naive view would be that all this progress somehow translates into a more successful economy. It's not the only way to measure things, but it's a sort of a straightforward way to measure things.

And then when it doesn't translate, my conclusion is maybe it hasn't added up to as much. You know, one of the reasons it's very hard, by the way, to have this debate and even figure out what's going on is because one of the features of late modernity, unlike early modernity, is hyper-specialization. And we have ever narrower group of experts who are experts in their field.

So the cancer specialists tell us they will cure cancer in five years. They've been telling us that for the last 50. And then the string theorists tell us they're the smartest people in five years. They've been telling us that for the last 50. And then the string theorists tell us they're the smartest people in the world. And it's very hard to evaluate these fields on their own terms, which is, it's like Adam Smith had this concept of the pin factory

where you had a hundred different people working in a pin factory. And you can think of late modernity as the pin factory on steroids. We're so hyper specialized, it's extremely hard to have a picture of the whole. And so this question of, you know, is there really progress? Is there not? It's kind of a hard one to get at.

But I think if you measure it in economic terms, there's a slowed sense. If you measure it in this sort of intuitive thing where, okay, we'll just look at a bunch of different fields like cancer, supersonic aviation, just all these different ways, you used to move faster. You move faster every decade from 1500 on, it was faster sailing boats than faster railroads, faster cars, faster planes. We've stopped moving faster physically the last 50 years.

So that's one dimension. And so there's sort of a common sense way that we have stagnation. There is an economic way to measure it. And then there's probably always a political intuition I have on this too, which is that perhaps if you have ideas that are taboo, that you're not allowed to discuss,

my shortcut is to suspect they're simply correct. And so the example I always give is, Professor Bob Laughlin is a Stanford physics professor. I think around 1998, he gets a Nobel Prize in physics. And he suffers from the extreme delusion that now that he has a Nobel Prize, he finally has academic freedom and can talk about whatever he would like to talk about. And there are all sorts of areas that are very taboo in the sciences.

I mean, question Darwinism or question stem cell research or question climate change. These are very dangerous areas. But he picked one that's even more dangerous than any of those three. He believed that most of the scientists, so-called scientists, were basically stealing money from the government, engaging in borderline fraudulent science, where it was incrementalist, not worth much. You know, his area of special, his area of focus was high temperature superconductivity. He told me at one point there were maybe 50,000 papers written in that area

and maybe 25 out of 50,000 had actually advanced the science at all. And I don't even need to tell you how the... And then he started by... Yeah, it was not just the abstract replication crisis. He started by talking about naming people. This person has stole money and this person is a fraud. And I mean, I don't even need to tell you how that movie ended. He promptly got defunded, his students couldn't get PhDs anymore. And so, and then my hermeneutic of suspicion is if you have an idea like stagnation in science, which immediately gets you deplatformed, that's an idea we should take very seriously.

So that's a political intuition I have on this. So I have a few of these different ideas that we've been a lot more stuck. It doesn't mean that there's been zero progress. It doesn't mean that the progress we've had has been uniformly good. It doesn't mean that people's fears about the limited progress we have are unjustified either.

Maybe all these things are actually part of the explanation for why the stagnation has happened. Now, there's a much harder question. And then there's sort of our cultural transformations that one can describe that at least coincided with us and were correlated. How causal they were is always hard to say. But if we sort of think of the Apollo space program

as this last great technological scientific project, there's some sense where July of 1969, where we landed on the moon and Woodstock started three weeks later. And with benefit of hindsight, in some sense, that's when progress, scientific technological progress stopped and the hippies took over the country. And you can describe it in many ways,

but in some ways you can describe it as a shift from outer space, from exploring the world outside of us, to inner space. And there were sort of all these different transformations. There was a, you know, and I would describe, you know, yoga, meditation. I would describe, you know, psychedelic drugs. I would describe, you know, I don't know, incels playing video games in basements. You know, there was all this, this incredible, this maybe continued atomization, the navel gazing, you know, of identity politics

in a way. You know, you could say that, you know, people often lump, for example, they often lump Marxism and cultural Marxism together. In my telling, these are opposites because Marxism at least was primarily concerned about the outside objective material economic realities. And then cultural Marxism was like the shift from Apollo to Woodstock where you just went into the sort of interior world. You no longer were thinking about this outside world. And in some ways you stopped asking these questions

about economic growth and basic economic prosperity. And then that coincided with also with this lack of progress in these things. So I think there were all these kinds of cultural transformations that coincided with this shift. that coincided with this shift. You know, I think the, people often ask why, why this stagnation happened. My standard, or if you agree with this,

and of course people can disagree, you know, how much it happened, but if you agree with me that there's been, you know, a slowing down of progress, that, you know, in some sense, the singularity was maybe more in the past than in the future. If you agree with me that there's been a slowing down of progress that in some sense the singularity was maybe more in the past than in the future. And you always have these questions, why did it happen? And my cop-out answer is always that why questions

are over-determined and it could be sort of our society became risk averse or too feminized or you could say that there was too much regulation and bureaucracy, which is sort of a libertarian intuition I have. But I've come to think that one of the bigger factors that was the sense that a lot of the science and technology was quite dangerous.

It had a, at least in the military context, had a dual use character. And you know, this was, I mean, this was already, there was already some relentless acceleration of this stuff in the late 18th, 19th centuries, Napoleonic Wars, Colonel Colt with the revolver, Alfred Nobel inventing dynamite, World War I, was sort of a break point where the sort of naive, progressive narrative really got undercut. And then somehow you can say that the sort of Baconian science project in some sense

ended, were ended in the Hegelian census, both culminated and terminated at Los Alamos with the building of nuclear weapons. And then again, it doesn't work perfectly, but my telling would be that it took maybe a quarter century for nuclear weapons to really get internalized by society. And then by the 1970s, the energy was, we don't want to be doing this outside world where we're going to build ever more thermonuclear bombs. We want to be piecing out at Burning Man with psychedelic drugs.

We want to, you know, or you escape back to nature through environmentalism. You know, we are, you know, we wanna be in a world not of change, but of stasis, because the world of change has this apocalyptic dimension. Change is change for the worse. That's the sense that gets encapsulated in the 1970s. And so there's a way that the sort of progressive version of science, we try to put the pause

button on it. The places where it's still allowed, you can say, are the most inert. So in a way, the world of bits was seen as incredibly inert because you're not building bombs, you're not building weapons with it. And then of course, even there, there's some sort of way in which the ideas on the internet, maybe they do translate into reality every now and then. What happens on Twitter or X doesn't always stay there.

Most of the time it stays there. So it feels like it's this extremely angry, intense conversation, but every now and then it still translates to the real world. So the internet, you could say, was allowed because it was sort of a safe space. It was a place where the sort of violence could be contained. And then even there probably,

not totally, and even there people felt it was like maybe too much. But yes, the sort of apocalyptic background of late modernity where every microaggression has the potential to escalate to Armageddon, is in the background. And again, I don't like the stagnation and the risk aversion and all these responses, but there's a part of it that I think is understandable. So it sounds to me, now that you've clarified that, it sounds to me, and correct me if I'm wrong, that what you're grappling with is more of an attempt

to account for where we are now and how it's different from let's say the post-war period or maybe even the Enlightenment to the post-war period. Like things have shifted radically. And it sounds to me like what you're outlining is a, what, it's an attempt to characterize the nature of that shift, perhaps even more than an attempt to deny the idea that there's any progress.

You said yourself when you were laying out your argument that it's very difficult to measure progress, but it's also undeniable that many, many things have shifted and we're not where we were, let's say, well, 10 years ago, probably, and certainly not 30 years ago. Well, I would say we are broadly progressing more slowly than we were 100 years ago.

We are still progressing in some dimensions. There may be still too fast and too scary for people, but the big thing that has shifted vis-a-vis, let's say the world of 1913, pre-World War I, is that we feel like we are in an apocalyptic age, that there is a dimension of science and technology that it has a dark dimension and it's a trap that humanity may be setting for itself.

And I don't like Greta and I don't like the full precautionary principle, but her argument that we have just one planet isn't entirely wrong. And so- So you see this shift in part as a shift from the ethos of progress, the prior assumption of progress. I don't wanna abstract it too much.

It is actually, it's the specific nature of the progress that happened. It is we got thermonuclear weapons. We are powerful enough to affect the environment. I'm not sure whether, carbon dioxide is the most important dimension, but there are probably a lot of dimensions where the environment can be impacted in very radical ways. We can probably build very dangerous bio weapons. Maybe that's even what was going on in the Wuhan lab. We can, there are dimensions of AI

that are potentially violent and very dangerous. And you don't have to necessarily believe all these sort of weird pictures where it's this super intelligence that's somehow completely disembodied and is going to kill every last human being on the planet. But there are natural ways to combine it with weapons technology that feel unsettling. So just a simple example is that you know we have we have these this drone technology that's that's again a new form of technologists that's come to the

fore in the in the conflict between Russia and the Ukraine and and the you know it's the and you have a human in the loop but the the human can get jammed. And so the natural fix is to put AI on the drones and turn these into more autonomous weapon systems. And that's, you know, that's- Seems inevitable. That seems like the natural logical thing to do. And then even I as a, you know, pro tech person have to say I find that somewhat unsettling. Okay, so let me lay these ideas out again and summarize.

So one of the threads that you were developing was, we'll do two at the same time. One was that the scientific process in terms of physical reality, maybe in your view, peaked in the 1960s. And then you could imagine that there, you kind of outlined two maybe reasons for that. One was fear of the apocalyptic consequences

of that technology, and an escape into various forms of abstraction. So some of those abstractions were psychological abstractions, inner journeys, but some of it also was escape into digital abstraction. And then you also made a case that the avenue for exploration in the digital realm was still open. And so maybe we could understand this.

And then in the digital realm, and then some ways, even these escapes weren't full escapes. So AI, yeah, that's a, it seems to be just about bits, not atoms, but then if you combine it with a drone, you know, the AI comes back to the physical world. Yeah, well, we can, we'll get back to that, back to the overlap. But so you could imagine that, okay, so the scientific approach, the method, produced an explosion of technological consequences. Many of them were dramatic in the physical world.

There was kickbacks against that. One of the kickbacks was the apocalyptic element. The other was the turn away from spirituality, you might say. But then there was also the counter position that always develops in any after ever any revolution is that things get tangled up in red tape in weird ways like the scientific Hmm. I was just in Uzbekistan, you know, and they developed a pretty sophisticated industrial economy in the last five years and part of the reason that they could do that was because There was nothing in the way right because Uzbekistan was kind of devoid of impediments to radical entrepreneurship

in the aftermath of the communist default. Now, you could imagine that for a good time, the scientific method was so powerful that it was producing revolutions nonstop, and the legal and bureaucratic frameworks were lagging it. And so they caught up quite remarkably by the 1970s and that left the digital space still open. And it is kind of a free for all space, right? So the way you're telling the story, this is, it has too much of this timeless

and eternal character. This is just what always happens and progress. Well, that is what I'm wondering. Whereas the story I want to tell has more of a one time and world historical character to it, where it is, you know, there were lots of inventions where, you know, people figure out, you know, cures for diseases that didn't say, okay, now we have to take a step back and cure fewer diseases. It actually encourages you to double down on that and do even more. Or we have all these machines that replace humans in factories.

And yeah, there's some downsides to it, and there are labor problems with the Industrial Revolution and there's a lot of pollution, but on the whole, the good way outweighs the bad. And there was no big regulatory counter movement in Victoria. Okay, let me make a count, for example. But then we get to something like thermonuclear weapons, and that specifically has a very different character. It has a really different character.

And probably, I don't know, by the 1950s and 1960s, you know, baby boomers get, you know, you're a kid, you get brought up on Dr. Seuss and not on adventure stories. And it probably changes childhood education. It changes the way we form and develop human beings. And so, yeah, and then it, and it leads to a society where, you know, science and technology no longer have quite have quite of this former valence.

There's always sort of an interesting big picture history question of how much science and technology, you know, were they, how they were entangled with Christianity in the West? And were they sort of, they were somehow entangled, but was it meant as a compliment where, you know, you, you know, you're sort of encouraged to understand God's creation.

And this is sort of a way that it's, you know, it's a fulfillment of a furtherance of this. Or was it meant to be a substitute where it was an alternate way to build heaven on earth without requiring God? And radical life extension was sort of an important part of the early modern project. It was Benjamin Franklin, Condorcet,

all these people thought that you could perhaps indefinitely prolong human life. And so I think early modern life was a way that you could perhaps indefinitely prolong human life. And then, you know, and, and, and, and so I think early modernity, you know, it wasn't the only thing that a lot of complicated things going on, but a lot of it had, had sort of an anti, anti biblical valence.

And you could say that 17th and 18th century scientists, and again, this is where I think someone like Francis Bacon needs to be interpreted as a hardcore materialist atheist. And it is, we need to stop religion because it's slowing down this wonderful scientific progress. And then I've had this Bacon discussion with a number of people lately, and they all think, no, no, that can't be right.

Bacon was just the somewhat heterodox Christian. And because in late modernity, where we find ourselves, again, it's complicated to describe what's going on culturally, but in late modernity, it's the atheist liberals that are anti-science at this point. And so if you think about Hollywood- Much to Richard Dawkins' despair. Yeah, you have to think of Richard Dawkins as a representative of early modernity.

He's like a fossil from before 1789. He's the last of the Enlightenment. He's the last, he's a fossil from before 1789. And Greta is more representative, or you know, everything about the Hollywood atheist liberals, the movies are all about technology that doesn't work, it's scary. And so to the extent, the way the anti-Christian argument gets made

in late modernity is that it's, yeah, it's God's fault, but this time it's God's fault for putting us on this whole dangerous project in the first place. And it's like, yeah, it's God's fault, but this time it's God's fault for putting us on this whole dangerous project in the first place. And it's like, yeah, it's like the lines in Genesis, you shall have dominion over the earth. And so in the 17th and 18th century, the Christian God was blamed for slowing down the scientific technological project.

In the 20th and 21st century, the Christian God gets blamed for starting it up, starting it speeding up, keeping it going. And so the invariant is the Christian God always gets blamed. But the fact that it's the exact opposite tells us something very interesting about how this is transformed.

Now that's interesting, because you're making the point that two opposite arguments are making that are both directed towards furthering Nietzsche's death of God, let's say. So then that begs the question, what's the actual motivation? The only point I'll make is that we're, again,

we're in a very different place with science and technology than we were in the 17th, 18th century. 17th, 18th century, I don't think people would have said, yeah, we're gonna make all this progress and then there's gonna be a lot of pushback and it'll get regulated. I know the thought was we'll make a lot of progress

and it'll be so good that it will actually then accelerate and it will smash religion even more and then we can go even faster and it'll go even better and it's going to have this sort of unraveling accelerating effect and then in the 20th, 21st century we make, you know, we make the opposite argument as there are some things in this project that have gone somewhat haywire. Okay, so let's pick up on the religious thread for a moment. I've been trying to understand the relationship between Christian Europe, let's say, and the dawn of the scientific age for a long time. So let me outline something for you, and then I'll turn back to exactly what you said.

So it seems to me, I mean, much of the early science was done in the monasteries that turned into universities. And so there's certainly a trail from Christianity through the monasteries to the universities. And so you can think about that as concrete evidence of the underpinning of much of the scientific revolution in terms of at least the offshoots of Christianity, but I think there's something deeper there. And so I've tried to make this case with Dawkins, for example, not least after he called himself a cultural Christian. So it seems to me that for science to get going as a motivational project,

there are some assumptions you have to make that aren't scientific. So there are axioms before the game gets going. And I think they're faith-based axioms. One is that the cosmos is intelligible, that it's intelligible to the human mind, and that diligent investigation of that intelligibility produces an increment in knowledge, both conceptual and practical, and that that increment in knowledge can be good if the point of the knowledge pursuit remains encapsulated in something like the underlying Christian ethos. And then I would say that fractures in a way,

perhaps fakes a turning point, where the point of knowledge is good. And so, I think that's a good point. And I think that's a good point. And I think that's a good point. something like the underlying Christian ethos. And then I would say that fractures in a way, perhaps Bacon's a turning point, where the reliance on of the scientific endeavor on these metaphysical presuppositions is questioned or like when I presented Dawkins with that argument, he just waved his hands over and he said he doesn't have any metaphysical assumptions underlying his brand of science.

And I think that that is what the more radical Enlightenment French Revolution types thought is that no, we've escaped from the underlying religious ethos. The problem with that is, it seems to me, and I think this might have to do with this apocalyptic kickback, is that once you un-mour yourself from the underlying ethos, which is even the ethos that defines what constitutes knowledge and progress itself, then the Luciferian element of the scientific endeavor can begin to loom extremely large. Well, again, let's start with the early Let's start with the early modern history. And I'm always a sort of hardcore Girardian, this great thinker, intellectual,

sort of somebody's Christian polymath that I studied under Stanford in the late 80s, 90s, and influenced me tremendously. And, you know, these things are, again, very complicated intellectual history questions, but certainly one intuition that's odd about your telling would be that you would say that, you know, we had sort of a law centered monotheistic tradition,

also in Islam, also in Judaism. And if we say there was something about Christianity that where this really came and was not in the Islamic world that you got the scientific revolution, for example, it suggests that maybe it wasn't just the metaphysics, not just the theological metaphysics that drove it, but something like the Christian anthropology. Girard was fond of always saying that

people focus too much in the Bible on what it tells us about God. There must also be something it tells us about man. Yeah, okay. on what it tells us about God. There must also be something it tells us about man. Yeah, okay. And certainly the Girardian intuitions that one of the things is always that, there's this really big problem of violence

and scapegoating that in some ways, some sense Judaism and then Christianity, it's the same story. It's the same story of sacrifice, but it's told not from the point of view of the violent communities, told from the point of view of the innocent victim. And there's a certain way where it sets in process this gradual, this dynamic revelation that has,

that leads to this sort of gradual unraveling. And there are, and as you stop believing in scapegoats, you're forced to come up with other explanations and that includes science. So for example, you can ask, why did the witchcraft trials come to an end? And the atheist scientific explanation is, we got science to prove that witchcraft is impossible.

And I don't think that's even been proven in 2025, because we don't know everything. Maybe it's a lost art that's been lost. Maybe, you can go to a bookstore in Berkeley, buy a book on how to be a witch. There's not a lot of difference between placebo effect and magic. But then the Gerardian alternate story

of why the witchcraft trials ended were that at some point people realized that the sort of collective scapegoating in some ways was, it was like a version of the death of Christ. The witches were not absolutely innocent like Christ, but they were relatively innocent. It was a community that went crazy.

And then once you know that the witches are innocent or are relatively innocent, then you steal yourself and force yourself to find natural explanations. If you don't think that it was, I don't know, the Jews that poisoned the wells in the Middle Ages, eventually... Or some devils or... Eventually, or this was during the Salem witch trials, there were these competing sermons

on Sundays. And, you know, the initial ones were sort of that, that, yeah, these women were, had made a pact with the devil, but then the way it got reconstructed, because it was right afterwards that the witchcraft trials ended, and people sort of realized pretty fast,

they kind of collectively lost their minds. And the alternate one was, you know, the devil had entered the whole community and possessed all of Salem. And those were the sermons you gave in the aftermath, the witchcraft trials. And then in that sort of a context, maybe science was also a way to find, you can steal yourself to find natural explanations. When you're in an archaic thing, scapegoating is always an explanation. It's a, this person did this, that person did this, it's that person's fault.

And when you say those explanations won't do, maybe you're forced to do scientific explanations. So there are all these different threads one can stress. I wonder if that was also- to do scientific experiments. So there are all these different threads one can stress. But I think you have to always ask this question. What was specific about the Christian message that really enabled this? You know what I mean? I think there was a way the Jewish context

was extremely learned and people, I don't know, if you compare the Talmudic abilities already in the Middle Ages to understand the Bible, to read it, it was as good or better than anything anything that the Christian scholastics were doing. anything that the Christian scholastics were doing. But somehow it never really got a part of society to orient in this other way. So again, it's obviously a complicated history.

Well, so one of the things you pointed out there that's very interesting is that Christianity, the rise of Christianity destroyed the pagan world, and that's a great mystery. But one of the epistemological consequences of that was the notion that deities weren't widespread. That idea had to disappear, you know, the Romans had gods for their archways, right? So there was an idea that there were invisible spirits, so to speak, that were operating behind the scenes, that were, could easily be interpreted as causal mechanisms. But you can imagine then, I'm also trying to integrate

this with what I learned from Jung, you can imagine that as the world's desacralized at the pagan level, and the kinds of interpretations that you just described are no longer tenable, right? There are these invisible agencies, some of them personalities that are operating, that isn't working anymore. That gets all aggregated into a monotheistic deity and the magic gets pulled out of the world. See, Jung also pointed out that as the Christian revolution transpired, the alchemical mythology started to become widespread and that there was an idea that developed that there were mysteries lurking

in the material world that had redemptive capacity. And so you could imagine that as the spirits are taken out of the world, the suspicion, you already said this, the suspicion that there are other causal forces at work starts to make itself manifest in at least the imaginations of people who are on the cutting edge. And so I wonder if that's a, is that an inevitable consequence of the victory of Christianity over the pagan world? Because it gets desacralized, merely because everything that's divine gets united into a single figure.

I think it was somewhere in Karl Marx, where he says that all social criticism starts with a criticism of religion. And then the Christian addendum, I would always say, was that Jesus Christ was the first person to actually do that, really, and started that whole process where you can think so much of it was calling into question the social institutions, the religious institutions, in a way deconstructing them. And there's something about this that is, you know,

I think is true. I think there is something about it that has an unraveling character. And I don't think you can go back. We can't go back to these pagan institutions once they have been deconstructed. And, you know, maybe the gods get re-characterized as demons or psychosocial phenomena.

Or unconscious manifestations. But that doesn't sound like the way you really bring Zeus back into the way it would have been understood by the average person in ancient Greece or something like that. But yeah, I think, one of the other dimensions that, I mean, Girard, it was sort of this combination

of literature and anthropology, but also there was always a psychological dimension to Girard and the psychological intuition in Girard is that there's something about human beings being imitative that's very deep, very important, you have something like, it's something like, I believe it's in Aristotle, men differs from the other animals in its greater aptitude for imitation.

Yeah, it's a huge difference between us and other animals. And then you could say, this is like, you know, and of course Darwinism says our closest relatives are the apes and the apes, they ape, they imitate. And so we differ from the apes and being more ape-like than the apes. If you sort of combine the Aristotelian and the Darwinian one, that's kind of a very, very strange thing in a way. And then the problem, you know, the good thing about imitation is this is how culture gets transmitted, this is how

you learn language. Without imitation, nothing like the sort of cultural edifice that we have would work. And then the thing that's dangerous is it's not just on a representational level, it's not just on the level of ideas that people imitate, it's also on the level of desires of things they want. And when everybody wants the same thing, this becomes this incredibly, incredibly violent thing. And then in Gibara's understanding, the point of, or a major point of a lot of the laws,

divine laws in these archaic societies was to in some sense stop imitation. Okay. To prevent imitation. The job you do will be the same job that your father did. If your father's a baker, you will be a baker. And this creates a guild system where you don't have this sort of free market competition between everybody and it all goes, everybody's at everybody else's throats and then somehow, what's happened in late modernity in Girard is that as these

institutions have unraveled, there has again been this freedom to imitate like we did before we had anything cultural at all, before we had invented, when the apes hadn't yet invented religion or these sacred structures that somehow channeled the violence. And then, and so in late modernity, it's again, the mimesis is,

it's what makes our society dynamic, but there are no natural barriers and that's also, you know, we can give it an apocalyptic dimension or, you know, and again, there are ways it doesn't fully spiral into thermonuclear war all the time, or hasn't yet, but it has this super open-ended dimension where it can go in all these different ways. There's probably, again, we're throwing out a lot of different ideas here. There probably is something about the loss of the transcendent,

where if you have some transcendent reference, you're not in a mimetic competition. So- Yeah, okay, I wanna return to that. And so one of the intuitions Gerard always had on the 10 commandments is that the most important were the first and last on the list. The first commandment, you know, you should only worship one God, there's one God above you, that's who you worship. The 10th commandment is the one about,

you know, not coveting the things that belong to your neighbor, not being too your neighbor's ox, wife, this whole set of things. And it's basically when you stop looking up, you start looking around. And when you look around too much, it's not a wisdom of crowds, it's a madness of crowds. And then that is- That's the envy issue. And then that is sort of where, again, we're not even talking about what to do about this,

but this is just sort of a- Well, kind of. Looking up is partly what to do about it. As a description, I would say there is something about late modernity, a society that's not dominated by a supernatural being that's sort of, you know, it's atheist, the liberal atheist society we live in is one where people look around a great deal. It's a lot of very unhealthy status competition games that end up driving it.

You know, and that would be sort of a Gerardian description of this world where mimesis is far more out of control than ever before. Don't think we can go back, but there are all these ways, it's frustrating, unsatisfactory. It may be apocalyptic, but that's a way to, again, understand this history. And it's in some ways, downstream of Christianity, it's downstream of these things being revealed.

In some ways it's the opposite to it. Because one of the questions, if you ask Gerard, you have this theory about mimesis and there are all these bad forms of mimesis. We have the wrong role models. And then isn't it just, okay, you should be less mimetic. Yeah, no.

And then of course, this is just the nature. You can maybe choose your role model, you can choose Christ, but you can't choose not to be mimetic. That's by the way, that's the Ayn Rand answer, where in Atlas Shrugged, the bad people are all the people who imitate. They're the second handers. They're the people who don't know what they want

and just copy everybody else. And then the really great people are the unmoved movers. They're like Aristotelian gods. They're not influenced by anybody. And it's all from within. But they're united by the same ethos across the entrepreneurs. But the Girardian critique of Ayn Rand would be people like that don't exist. We all grow up deeply in a social context.

There's a developmental human, developmental part to human biology. You know, Ayn Rand doesn't like to talk about children because children are, you know, incredibly imitated and for both good and bad, this is just the way we are. But so, yes, Gerard's answer was never that you could get rid of mimesis or anything like this. Yeah, no, that's not gonna happen. Or even that some kind of psychological approach

would be that you talk about your memetic stuff with your therapist. That might make it worse, right? Because you'd focus on it even more and then you'd conclude, as in so much therapy, it gets marketed as self-transformation and it crashes out as self-acceptance and then you'd probably just conclude, I'm just a really memetic person, I can't help it.

It degenerates into self-worship. Into self-acceptance, let's say. Yeah, I wish it stopped there, but it doesn't. And then I think Gerard's answer would still be something like you should just go to church. Okay, so let me pull apart. I'd like to talk to you about sacrifice, and then again about imitation.

I'm gonna start with imitation. So the psychologist that I know best who is most conversant with the ideas that you put forward is Jean Piaget. And Piaget prioritized imitation as much as Girard. But Piaget's view didn't concentrate so much on the violent aspect of it. He didn't concentrate so much on the violent aspect. He didn't concentrate so much on Yeah, I think it was the way I believe was sort of this somewhat optimistic You know just positive societies progressing through imitation Yeah, well he what he wasn't concerned precisely. I would say with notions of

progress from an economic perspective like Piaget's notion was that it's very much like Girard's, you know, is that the way that we organize ourselves socially and psychologically is through imitation. And so Piaget concentrated, for example, on games. And so his counter to Girard, but without invalidating Girard's point, by the way, is that-

But he was before Girard, right? Yes, he was. Yes, definitely, definitely. And so Piaget's point was that we actually organize ourselves into social hierarchies with imitation. Yes. We, when children, for example, when they're three or four, so for example, you can't do this till you're three.

Yes. This is how it works developmentally. If a little boy asks a little girl to play house, she has to agree. And then what they do is they reciprocally imitate one another in relationship to a goal. Okay, now, so the goal in that situation is to abstract and model the domestic environment.

But then there's a higher order principle that regulates that, which is that in order for it to be play, both of them have to be voluntarily in accordance with the aim, and they have to be learning dynamically. Okay, so now your point, I think, was that, so now imagine a world where there's an indefinite number of these imitation predicated games, because there is an indefinite number of them. Now, what I think happened in the religious framework, particularly in the Christian framework, that that multitude of games, each of which is potentially a little Tower of Babel, is organized underneath a higher order principle.

Now you said that Gerard's answer was you implied aim up, but you also implied go back to church. Now, see, let me just finish one thought. So imagine that there are metagames under which imitative games could be organized. Okay, one metagame would be power. Another metagame might be hedonistic self-gratification. The Christian metagame is voluntary self-sacrifice.

Right, that's a radical reshifting of the metagame territory. And I think it is irreplaceable. And I think it has to be embodied and not propositionalized. So the pagan world, the Roman world, the Greek world, they were essentially predicated on power and hedonism, right? If I could, then I had a right to. And if I could impose force on you, then I was the better man. And that was inverted in Christianity. But it was inverted in a way I think that matches maturation. I mean, your point seemed to be that the imitative

capacity can go dreadfully wrong if the games degenerate into envious status competitions. And the other point, I think, was that they will degenerate into envious status competitions unless they're oriented towards something transcendent. So then the question would be, what would that transcendent orientation be? orientation B. Well, let me see. There's many different threads here, but I would say Girard would reference people like Piaget and said that they underestimated imitation massively, they whitewash it. It's, if you ignore this all important,

the runaway violence dimension and things like this. Yeah, well, Piaget was not a psychopathologist, right? He was a study of normative development. Yeah, yeah. And then I think Girard intuition was much more that, you know, in some sense, the so-called normal case is the less important one. And it's the extreme case. It's where, you know, it is the less important one. It's the extreme case.

It's where, you know, it's the madness of crowds. You know, that's an extremely important case. Fair enough. It's not, and you know, and PSJA also wasn't an abnormal psychologist. PSJA would have been like Malcolm Gladwell, in the wisdom of crowds. The crowds are wise because they imitate each other

and this is how a lot of stuff works. Right, but he didn did bind it by the necessity of voluntary play, right? That's an important- Destructure, all these ways, we're still within some structure, but you could always say this is a basic difference for enlightenment, rationalism, and biblical revelation

is, you know, in the Bible, the crowd is always wrong. The crowd is always crazy. It is mad. It's, you know, the Tower of Babel, it's in part, it's the unanimity. The Israelites in the desert. It's the unanimity. And enlightenment rationality, it's always, you know, democracy is good. The more people vote for something, the more rational it is. Although, you know, at some always, democracy is good, the more people vote for something, the more rational it is. Although, at some point, you get 99.99% of the people who vote for something

and you're in North Korea. And so, it's a very important question. When do you go from wisdom of crowds to the madness of crowds? And I think- Yeah, that's a very important question. And I think the Zhewardian, and I would say Christian intuition

is that it happens much sooner and in a much more representative way than you think. And this is, yeah. So that's sort of one dimension. I don't know if I would anchor it as much on sacrifice though as the key feature. And again, this is one of the places where Gerard argued

that it's Christianity was, and Gerard's telling is anti-sacrificial. It is a move away from sacrifice. All these theories about the substitutionary atonement of Christ's death. But even if we go with a sort of traditional theological- Is it a movement away from the sacrifice of others? Well, it is Christ's death is supposed to be the last one.

He, Christ made the sacrifice, so we do not have to make it. And then, yeah, you can say it is a sacrifice of others versus the sacrifice of self. You could say that, but you could say, the way Gerard would put the stress would be that you refused, it's not there was some virtue in Christ sacrificing himself.

It's not like some, I don't know, some enlightened, some sort of silly hero saying, please let the lions come and eat me up or something like that, giving some sort of dramatic announcement. It said Christ at Gethsemane, it's still praying, please let this cup be taken away from me. It is, so it is, it's not,

this is a wonderful necessary thing to do at all. It's quite the opposite. But you could say it is the refusal to sacrifice others that characterizes Christ. And we're not willing, you're not willing to resort to violence, you're not willing to call down all the angels from heaven to stop the crucifixion. And so it's a refusal to sacrifice others.

But, and then, yeah, maybe in some context, And so it's a refusal to sacrifice others. But, and then, yeah, maybe in some context, you have to lay down your life, your friends, there are things like that that happen. But I think it's much more, you know, the anti-sacrificial intuition. And you have this already in, you know, a number of the Old Testament prophets, I think Hosea, where it's, you know,

God desires mercy and not sacrifice. You know, so it's, you know, and then these are sort of, in a way you can think of the Old Testament law as a sacrificial set of laws, centered on the temple. And we have this sort of elaborate set of sacrifices. And then, you know, in some sense, Christ replaces it with, love the Lord your God with your heart and mind

and love your neighbor as yourself. And then pay attention to the moment. And then we could say, and then he says he's not getting rid of the Old Testament law. Yeah. But if you just do those two things, you don't need any of the Old Testament law anymore.

You can even eat bacon and pork. Right, right, right. And which was a really, really bad thing to do under the Old Testament law. Okay, so let's delve into this a little bit. I wanna make this psychological and sociological as well as theological. So it strikes me that

one of the radical characteristics of human beings, we talked about imitation, that's certainly one. Another radical characteristic is the willingness and ability to make sacrifices. So let me define that for a minute, and then we can see how it goes astray as well. So the more immature you are, the more your attention and behavior is under the dominion of biological systems that have narrow short-term gratification as their focus. That could be rage, it could be hunger,

it could be temperature regulation. A two-year-old is a collection of unruly, competing short-term motivations. It takes 18 years for the cortex to develop. And you could think of the cortex as an inhibitory structure, so that's kind of a Freudian model, or you could think about it as an integrative structure, and that's a better model. Part of Piaget's model is useful in that regard because we integrate within the confines of

imitative games. But there's more to it than that. So as you become more mature, this kind of a definition of maturity, you focus more on the tomorrow and next month, the next year. So your temporal span of apprehension increases, and you regulate your behavior in the present in relationship to the future, that's a sacrificial move, because you're sacrificing immediate gratification for the stability of the future.

And then there's another side. Let me push back on just that description. Is it a sacrificial move or is it a rational move? Because there's some way in which, you know. I think it's both. It's both. It's rational once you can see the future. Right.

But it's sort of very, to the extent it's rational, it may not be that sacrificial. You know, you save money in order to buy a house. Right, but I don't imagine it. But I don't imagine it, but I don't think you believe that people can regulate that with mere rationality. Like it has to be deeper.

I would say part of that regulation of short-term impulse that's so limbically driven, mere rationality won't do the trick. And the rationality itself would have to be encapsulated within a concept of what actually constitutes rationality. So because like I could ask you What's worth sacrificing your short-term pleasure for now the pleasure speaks for itself, right? There has to be something that you're giving that up for when you work For example that you regard as worthwhile and it isn't also clear to me that that's a purely rational move

Now there's one more sacrificial element. It's like as you mature, it becomes less and less about what the motivated sub components of you want now, and more about how you find harmony in competition and cooperation in social groups. So, for example, one of the things children have to learn between two and three to be social is to take turns. And that's also a sacrifice because the default is, it's always my turn. That's what it is like for non-social animals, for example.

Man, this is where I want to push back a little bit. Push away, man. Where, I don't think you tell a two or three year old this in the language of sacrifice. And- No, you probably act it out for them. It's if you don't take turns, something bad happens- You won't have friends. And you won't have friends.

Or the kids, the other kids tell the kids that. Yeah, there's some very pretty fast, immediate consequences to it. And again, you don't say it's rational, but it's sort of, you learn- Evidence-based. To do these things. And then the place where I'm uncomfortable

with using the sort of language of sacrifice is that, the evidence-based non-rational part of it, if that's all we have left, I wonder whether those are the sacrifices that we should make. For example, I'm gonna give lots of examples, but there's always a question about, what should be done about academia? I'm gonna give lots of examples, but, there's always a question about, what should be done about academia?

They're not, all the conservative academics are being expelled, it's so hard to do this. Right here. And there's sort of a, there's a version of a debate I've had with a lot of right of center people over the last 20 years, where it's, well, we just, you know, we need to just train more people with PhDs

and then they have to keep trying to sneak into the system and have to somehow break in. Yeah, right. And I, there's sort of a lot of reasons to think that it's hard to do or might not work, but the way I push back on it is, There's sort of a lot of reasons to think this is hard to do or might not work. But the way I push back on it is it strikes me as an irrational kind of sacrifice. And so from the point of view of a young person who is going to be a right-wing academic with

a PhD and will be completely unemployable, that's not a rational sacrifice they made. It's a very foolish choice that perhaps this language of sacrifice confused things. And then the non-sacrificial move is roughly like what you yourself did with the University of Toronto, wherever you were, where it's at some point, I am not putting up with these silly sacrifices they're making me make in academia. I'm not sacrificing my mind, or I'm not playing by all their silly rules.

And I think that was the correct thing to do. But again, I would describe it as the anti-sacrificial move. The sacrificial move would be, you know, you have a tender position there and you might be, you know, you have a tender position there and you might be unhappy about it, but you know, for the greater good, you have to stay there. Okay, so there were things I wasn't willing to sacrifice

to stay there, there's no doubt about that. But I would also say that- And I think those were irrational things that you should not have sacrificed. And I think you made totally the right decision. But I would describe it as, the way I would describe it, and maybe this just shows how the language of sacrifice is confusing, but I would describe it as,

you refused to make the sacrifices that were demanded of you because they were silly, irrational, crazy. In relation to what? See, that's the issue, because I think that's true. In relation to things that, again, maybe can't be fully rationally defined, but in relation to some of the alternatives you could do in relation to maybe even something as stupid

as what you found hedonically enjoyable, right? It's using, again, did you find it enjoyable sitting on silly faculty committees as a tenured professor? It's ironically enjoyable, right? It's, again, did you find it enjoyable sitting on silly faculty committees as a tenured professor or did you find it boring? And it wasn't fun. The boredom wasn't fun. And it's not the only reason to leave.

Maybe it's not a sufficient reason, but from my perspective, it's a good partial reason. So I was- There were probably a lot of things like this that added up. I was unwilling to sacrifice my tongue. And so what I sacrificed was my job and my clinical career, so I could keep my tongue. But there's a Christian element to that too, because the Christian insistence is that the truth-oriented word establishes the order that's good. And so, but I don't think we can escape

the sacrificial language, because I had to give up my job, both of them, I had three, because I had a private business. I had to touch that. But again, I don't wanna make this too aggrandizing to you, but I think what you're doing is far better, far more important now. I'm certainly not unhappy about it. So if you had sacrificed your job

and you were completely unemployable and had no economic prospects, you could describe it as sacrificing your job so you could express yourself, but if nobody's listening to you, that might be a pretty irrational thing to do again. And so it was, I think it was, yeah, it's rational for you to focus on reaching

a much larger audience for you to do all these things. And I think those were good decisions. You didn't let, let's say, the moralizing left-wing people in academia get to you. You didn't let their value system control you. Their value system is that, you know, there's nothing more important than academia. This is the world that really matters.

This is where you have to fight the battles. He said, no, you didn't let that morality control you. So I would describe it as Christian or maybe Nietzschean, but anti-sacrificial, what you did in a very good way. Yeah, yeah, well, I understand what you're saying. Then the meta layer would be, this is where maybe just the language of sacrifice is often more confusing than helpful. Well, I think it also, to some degree, it likely stems from your saturation in the Gerardian view,

because you can correct me again if I'm wrong, you're likely, and especially given what you said about Christ's sacrifice making further sacrifices in some ways unnecessary, your view is going to be to concentrate, it seems to me, on the more pathological end of the sacrificial process. I think the terminology can be confusing because I would say, what I gained was far greater than what I lost. Now, that doesn't mean that what I lost was nothing because it wasn't nothing and it took a fair bit of reconstruction to make things work.

And so you could say, well, if you gain more than you lose, is that truly a sacrifice? Now, the biblical stories are replete with paradoxes like that, because the most intense one, obviously, is what happens with Abraham and Isaac, because God calls on Abraham to sacrifice his son, and Abraham is willing to do so, but the consequence of that is that he gets his son back, right? And so that points to the ambiguity of what constitutes a sacrifice. I want to push back on all of these things. Yes, I will confess to being an unreconstructed Girardian, and there were probably ways Girard

modified his views more than I have. And so he probably, towards the end of his life was more open to sacrifice. And I stick with the Girard of the 70s and 80s who is more categorically skeptical of it. You know, I think, let me do an alternate cut on one story. And there's one of these Bible stories. And I always think one needs to interpret

the Old Testament through the New Testament. This is sort of the, this is sort of again, a Christian bias I have, that it doesn't fully make sense on its own. You need to interpret it through, in the light of the new. And so there's a passage in the New Testament, I'm not gonna, I don't know the verse memorized, so there's a passage in the New Testament, I'm not gonna get the verse, I don't know if the verse memorized,

but it's basically where Christ says one must have faith like a child. And then there's, it's again, you can think it's like an abstract thing, but maybe it's again, we should always think more concretely. And the concrete question I would have is, is there a faith of a child that's being highlighted as especially noteworthy and worthy of emulation?

And I think there is in fact, one child whose faith gets described in the Old Testament and we never seem to talk about it. And it's Isaac because as they're going up the mountain, you know, Abraham tells Isaac this fictional story that maybe God will provide something else and you know, that's what might happen. And then Isaac just believes that.

Abraham believes he has to make sacrifice. That's the delusional faith of an adult who's read too much Kierkegaard or something. And Isaac's is the true Christian faith that God will figure out a way where the sacrifice doesn't need to happen. God is not a violent God. The violence doesn't come from God.

He's a loving God. And there's a way to do this without sacrifice. And I'm always, what I find so odd about the Abraham Isaac story is that we've written endless amounts has been written on the faith of Abraham or Abraham is seen as the iconic person with faith. And it's again, linked to a certain conception of sacrifice. And yet we have the line in the New Testament

where Christ tells us to look at the faith of a child. Maybe you can come up with a better example. I think the concrete one is Isaac. And- And it is interesting that it's not written from his perspective, the analysis. We get enough of Isaac's perspective implicitly in the story, but it's all the reviews, all the,

when we talk about, you know, whose faith should we emulate? Yeah, the theologians, the philosophers, they always tell us you need to emulate the faith of Abraham. The way I understand Christ, I understand him to be telling me to emulate the faith of Isaac, which I think is very different and maybe also very different on this question of sacrifice.

There always are questions, how one interprets the Christian account. I believe in the physical resurrection of Christ, both as an event that happened historically, but also as a promise. And in some sense, following Christ, there may be all sorts of bad things that happen to you, but it's a rational trade for saving your soul and for having eternal life.

And so if you think of it in the context of saving your soul and eternal life, we can call that a sacrifice, but it has a very different character. Right, that's why he says this yoke is light, which is a weird thing to say when it's an invitation to the cross. But you have to, you know,

the non-sacrificial way I would say it is, yeah, if you believe in a literal, you know, eternal life, that's one sort of thing. If you think these are just some sort of Jungian archetype story, then you end up with much more of sacrifice, quasi-sacrifice as a really high value. But that's why I would always interpret the Orthodox Christian message as very anti-sacrificial,

very non-sacrificial. very non-sacrificial. And maybe, I don't like the word rational, but just you're making a good choice, a wise choice. Okay, okay, got it, got it. Okay, so I'm gonna stop us here. So this is what we're gonna do on the Daily Wire side. All you watching and listening know we do an extra half an hour.

I want to continue our conversation about the faith of a child, but I also want to ask you why you think, if you think it's true that you are temperamentally inclined to focus on the dark side, and I'd like to know what the consequence of that has been, because that's something we actually share in common. You know, unlike Piaget, I'm a psychopathologist. Yes. He was a developmental psychologist, and I've always been interested in the extreme case.

And so I'd like to talk to you about this faith issue that you just described. I'd like to talk to you a bit more about Christianity, and I'd like to talk to you about what it is you think that it is about you that's focused you on that, on the more apocalyptic and dark edge of things. So all right, so everybody who's watching and listening, well, this part of the conversation has come to a halt. And thank you for everybody here in Scottsdale for making this possible and The Daily Wire. We're going to continue for another half an hour on The Daily Wire side with the topics that I just described.

Thank you very much for coming to see me today and to talk. We obviously just barely got going. Just started. Yeah, but it's a good start and we've got another half an hour and maybe some time in the future. So thank you so much. Thanks for having me. Much appreciated. Thanks everybody for your time and attention. Music