The Jordan B. Peterson Podcast - Reality and the Philosophical Framing of the Truth | Dr. Stephen Hicks

Episode Date: November 25, 2024

Dr. Jordan B. Peterson sits down with philosopher, professor, and lecturer Dr. Stephen Hicks. They discuss their collaboration through the Peterson Academy, the case for philosophy on the practical level,the evolution of human thought across intellectual movements and waves, the notion that we see reality through a story, and the danger of getting the story wrong. Stephen Hicks’ writings have been translated into twenty languages, including Portuguese, Spanish, German, Korean, Persian, Serbo-Croatian, Polish, Swedish, Hindi, Russian, Ukrainian, Cantonese, French, Hebrew, Estonian, Urdu, Turkish, and Arabic. He has published in academic journals such as “Business Ethics Quarterly,” “Teaching Philosophy,” and “Review of Metaphysics,” as well as other publications such as “The Wall Street Journal” and “Cato Unbound.” In 2010, he won his university’s Excellence in Teaching Award. He was Professor of Philosophy at Rockford University, Illinois; has been Visiting Professor of Business Ethics at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.; Visiting Professor at Jagiellonian University, Poland; Visiting Fellow at the Social Philosophy & Policy Center in Bowling Green, Ohio; Visiting Fellow at Harris Manchester College at Oxford University in England; Senior Fellow at The Objectivist Center in New York; and Visiting Professor at the University of Kasimir the Great, Poland. He received his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees from the University of Guelph, Canada, and his Ph.D. in philosophy from Indiana University, Bloomington, USA. This episode was filmed on November 15th, 2024  | Links | For Stephen Hicks: On Peterson Academy https://petersonacademy.com/ On X https://x.com/SRCHicks?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor Website https://www.stephenhicks.org/ 

Today I had the privilege of sitting down with Dr. Stephen Hicks, who's a philosopher with a stellar academic career, very good author, and we talked about, well we talked about his contributions to Peterson Academy first. He's taught five courses at this new online university that some of you may be aware of and the rest of you should be as far as I'm concerned. He's taught five courses there and we detailed out the structure of the courses and more importantly and more broadly I would say Described the rationale for studying philosophy because he's a professor professional Philosopher as an academic and so we discussed well the importance of a philosophical education

We discussed the nature of the philosophical endeavor over the last three or four hundred years as it shifted from modernism to postmodernism to whatever is dawning in this new age that's emerging and That constituted the bulk of our conversation and so if you're interested in that and you should be and if you're not you should ask yourself why then Join us that and you should be and if you're not you should ask yourself why then join us. If the answer is no it's because you're unconsciously under the sway of some skeptical philosopher and maybe you shouldn't be so join us anyways for that discussion. So Dr. Hicks it's good to see you again. A pleasure.

Yeah thank you for coming into Scottsdale today. Oh yeah. Much appreciated. So I thought we would start by talking practically a bit about you've lectured, you've done two lectures for Peterson Academy. I've done five. You've done out. Okay, two are out. You've done five. Excellent. Okay, so run through that a bit. Tell people what you're teaching and what the experience was like and what, how you understand the mission of this new enterprise. Why you got involved, all of that, if you would.

Right. Well, I'm a philosopher by training, so my intellectual interest is in what the next generation of good philosophy teaching is going to look like. And we got technological revolutions that we are engaging inage and education has been very traditional and backward minded for many centuries.

So in one sense we are living in an exciting time for what can be done with the new technologies and obviously Peterson Academy is highly entrepreneurial. So I've done many years of in-class teaching, many years of lecturing. I had at my university a Center for Ethics and Entrepreneurship where we did a lot of experimenting with new technologies as things came on, asking what can be done, because in many cases people can learn very well without the presence of a professor physically or and so forth.

So what I'm interested in though, primarily though, is the courses that I have taught over the course of many years, having them in a vehicle that's obviously going to be accessible to more people, but also with better production values and in a way that can't, in some cases, be done even in a good in-person classroom. In philosophy, everything is controversial. A big part of education in life is philosophical education. How many beliefs do I have in my mind?

How did they get into my mind in the first place? Where did they come from? What's good for you? What do you like? What are your values? What do you want your life to be? Philosophy has a reputation for just being abstract. Philosophers love their abstractions, their general principles.

What we want is to be much more careful. But what happens in politics, economics, business, family, religion is because of philosophical ideas. John Locke, Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Karl Marx, Friedrich Nietzsche, they were the great geniuses of philosophy who made the modern world. We're philosophers, for goodness sake. What is philosophy all about? It's about a quest for coming to know true reality.

Now my areas of expertise have been modern philosophy and post-modern philosophy. When philosophers and historians, we talk about the modern era, essentially we mean the last 500 years, which has been extraordinarily revolutionary, not only in philosophy, but in how we do religion, how we do science, how we treat women, getting rid of slavery, industrial, all of that stuff. It's been amazing and philosophy has its fingers in all of those pies and is part of it. So partly what I'm interested in is the giant names in philosophy, right? And they're all giants for a reason. They're all over the map intellectually from Descartes

to Locke to Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche on into the 20th century, what role they have played in making the modern world and then the postmodern world happen and in some cases of course resisting what is going on in modernity and in postmodernity. So the first two courses that the Academy invited me to teach were on modern philosophy. And essentially that picks up right at the beginning of the modern era with the giants, René Descartes, Francis Bacon, John Locke, laying a new foundation, overturning medieval philosophy. Medieval philosophy, again, much sophistication there had been a kind of dominant framework for a millennium.

And in very quick time, things transformed themselves in the 1500s, 1600s, all of those intellectual cultural transformations that we study when we do the history. And that course ends with the death of Nietzsche in 1900, so essentially 1500 to 1900, eight lectures, but also integrating the philosophers with what's going on historically. Because in some cases, the philosophers are ones who make the historical revolution happen as their theoretical ideas are applied. In other cases, the philosophers are responding to what's going on in the culture, what's going on historically, trying to make sense of it and either urge it on or retard

it. Now, the second course picks up in 1900 and it's called Postmodern Philosophy. And the main point of that course is to say that the postmodern thinkers started to react against in a very sophisticated way much of what had happened intellectually in the modern era. And they in some cases were radicalizing it, in some cases wanting to overturn entirely what had occurred intellectually and culturally in the modern era.

And we started to see in philosophy a move to a more skeptical, relativized, even kind of the death of philosophy, the sense that philosophy has for millennia tried to answer all of these important questions about the meaning of life in a culminating fashion. But from their more skeptical perspective, by the time we get into the 20th century, their verdict is philosophy has become impotent and self realizes that it can't, in fact, answer any of those questions, so it should, in effect, disintegrate. So I'm concerned to lay out the pre-postmodern philosophers who are setting the stage for all of this. Here I would name people like Bertrand Russell,

who had a strongly skeptical phase, John Dewey and some of the pragmatists to some extent, Martin Heidegger, and various others, culminating then in thinkers like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, who take it. But also at the same time, since I don't agree with any of them, but I do give them a fair shot and they were trying to get inside their framework and see where they are coming from and why these arguments are so powerful and that we have to take them seriously. Nonetheless, there have been many, as I think of them, philosophers who think the earlier traditions, sometimes the pre-modern, more

scholastic or religious traditions still have some bite and can be repackaged for this postmodern era. Some who think the modern … I've probably fallen into that camp as of late. Well, I think to some extent, yes. So you would be an example of that. Others who think the Enlightenment project has been a great success, even though it had some philosophical errors, those can be tweaked as an ongoing scientific project.

And so I'm interested in also thinkers like Karl Popper and Ayn Rand and Philippa Foote, who are not so skeptical. In fact, they are carrying on the modern enlightenment tradition. Right, right, right. And the idea at the end of that course is that we have a sense of what the philosophical and philosophically informed intellectual landscape looks like in our time, right, bringing it right up to current times and characterizing it as, in effect effect a three-way debate between the moderns, the pre-moderns, and the post-moderns and in one sense we've never lived in better

times philosophically because we have self-conscious, articulate, and very able representatives of all of those traditions operating in our generation. So bringing all of that in an eight lecture series to hopefully large international audience that can access them online. So that's that's been my intellectual mission there. Okay, so I'd like to make a case for everybody that's watching and listening for the philosophical enterprise at a practical level. Regardless, in a way, regardless of whether philosophy can address the larger questions of life,

and I think you have to be in some ways absurdly skeptical to assume axi understand the nuances of the thinkers that you describe, because unbeknown to you, the thoughts that you think are yours are actually theirs. And so it's, people might wonder, you know, what practical use it is to study history. And one answer to that is, if you understand history, maybe you won't be doomed to repeat the more catastrophic elements of it.

But with regards to philosophy, if you don't understand the thought of great philosophers, you have no idea why you, that you think the way you do, why you think the way you do, or what the consequences of that might be. Right? What is the idea that we're all unconscious exponents of some dead philosopher or some combination of dead philosophers. And so, although we don't understand it, we live within not only the conceptual universe these people have established, but the perceptual universe that they've established, right? That they actually have shaped the way that we see the world, the very profound level.

And so, if you don't understand that, then you're a puppet of forces that are beyond your comprehension. And that, unless you want to be a puppet of forces that are beyond your comprehension, that's not a very good plan. So does that seem like a reasonable plan? No, I think that's exactly on track. I think a lot of people in our era are more active-minded than people were in previous eras. We have more media, more freedom, more resources to be able to do so. But even the more active-minded people, I think as you are pointed out,

even if you are to a larger extent independently coming up with ideas, it nonetheless is illuminating many cases to realize that there has been a smart person who thought of that before you, in many cases in a more sophisticated form and integrated that with other ideas. So sometimes you can find a thinker who has gone down the roads that you are going down. And most of us don't have time to be active intellectuals. We have our full lives. So anything that we can learn from the philosophers

who've thought through these issues can accelerate our process down that road. And then of course, the other thing is that to the extent that you don't think about these things, what you are saying I think is exactly right. In many cases, we are unconsciously guided in certain directions. Sometimes I think of an analogy to infrastructure.

So all of the roads and traffic lights and lighting systems and so forth. And we grow up with them and we're like the fish in the water. We just take it for granted that we're surrounded by these things. And we have automated operating inside a certain kind of infrastructure system. But at the same time, it is illuminating to step back and think that somebody thought through every aspect of that infrastructure system. And in many cases, I'm being directed perhaps in ways that are not healthy. And how can we make that infrastructure system better?

That's going to take people who are aware that in many cases they are being guided by that infrastructure. So that's a good thing to focus in, I think, too, at the moment. This is where we could have a discussion about postmodernism and modernism and maybe what comes next. So let me lay out a couple of propositions for you and tell me what you think about this. This is maybe the nexus of what I was hoping to discuss with you. So, I'll give the postmodernist devils their due to begin with, and you can tell me what your opinion is about that. So, I think that we are on the cusp of a philosophical and maybe a theological revolution. And I think it's in part because the postmodernists identified the some of the flaws in enlightenment thinking and so

the postmodernists there's a the the fundamental postmodernist insistence as far as I can discern is that we inevitably we by necessity see the world through a story. And so I've been trying to figure out what that means. And the large language model, emergence of the large language models have helped out with that. So imagine that the, and I want you to correct me if I get any of this wrong, the rationalist presumption is that we do see the world through a framework. The empiric presumption is that we derive our knowledge of the world from a set of, in a sense, self-evident facts that emerge in the domain of perception. But there's a problem with both of those notions is the nature of the rationalist framework isn't precisely specified,

and it isn't obvious at all that there's a level of self-evident fact. In fact, I think the data, the scientific data on the neuroscience and the engineering side indicate quite clearly that that's just not the case. That you can't separate perception, let's say, from motivation. You can't separate perception from action because all of your senses are active while they're gathering so-called data. There's no sense data And so I've been trying to wrestle with what that means exactly because one possible

interpretation of the idea that there's no base level of sense data is a descent into a nihilistic or or Relativistic morass and I don't think that's a tenable solution either, not least for motivational and emotional reasons. I think there's a clue to the manner in which this problem might be solved in the fact of the large language models. So what they essentially do is establish a waiting system between conceptions. And so in the large language models, every word, let's say, is associated with every other word at a certain level of probability. So if word A appears, there's some probability that word B will come next. And then if phrase A appears, there's some probability that word B will come next. And then if phrase A appears, there's some probability that phrase B will appear.

And the same with sentences and the same with paragraphs. And there's literally hundreds of billions of these parameters in those models. And what they've done is map out the weight of data points. So, you know, if there's five facts at hand, and I could in principle use those facts to guide my perception of my action, I still have to solve the problem of how I would weight the facts. And you might say, well you don't have to

weight them and I would say well no that just means you've all weighted them equivalently. There's no no if you have more than one thing at hand and you have to combine them in some manner you have to weight them. There's no option and you can weight them all one, but that's also a decision and it's arbitrary. And so instead, even to perceive, we have to weight the facts. And as far as I can tell, a story is a description of the structure that we use to weight the facts. And so that doesn't mean that the facts, that doesn't mean that our perceptions have no structure and that everything's subjective, but it also doesn't mean that the facts speak to themselves,

like the empiricists would insist, or the behaviorists for that matter, you know, that there's a stimulus and then there's an automatic response or something of that nature. So I know that's a bit of a scatter shot, but I hope you can see what I'm aiming at. And I guess I'm wondering, what do you think of the proposition that we see the world through a story, for example? Hello everybody. So, my wife and I are going back out on tour

for my new book, We Who Rest With God. I'm going to be walking through a variety of biblical stories. Now the postmodern types and the neo-Marxists, they think the story is one of power and that is a dangerous story. The fundamental rock upon which true civilization is built is encapsulated in the biblical stories and so I've spent a lot of time trying to understand them. And the point of the tour and the Book is to bring whatever understanding I've managed to develop to as wide an audience as possible All right already we're into heavy-duty cosmology, right, neuroscience, right, history, psychology,

value sets, including motivation issues and so on. Okay, so, right, just hold on to that for a moment. So I'm going to say you're right, traditional empiricism has had problems, traditional rationalism has had problems, and that we cannot accept in post analysis, sort out all of the elements and that's a big part of what the scientific project goes on. But let me start by defending the empiricists for a moment. So what I just did on the table, right? Shocking. Was that Johnson who kicked the stone?

Okay, GE Moore. Moore, okay. Yeah, that's right. But also earlier when, earlier in when he was talking about the ideal. I refute you thus, isn't that the? That's right. Yeah. Right, which is, it's in the right track, but still too naive. Okay.

But just reflect on that experience if we start to try to defend the empiricists for a moment. So I smacked the table completely out of the blue. But for anybody who's listening right or watching, that was sense data. You had no motivational set, you had no story in mind, you had no behavioral preconditions to set for you. There was an experience and you were aware of the experience. Now what you then go on to do with that experience is going to be an extraordinarily complicated

thing, and all of the things that you are laying out are exactly right. So the empiricist commitment, I think, if it's going to be properly done, has to be that there are such things like the smacking on the table and various other sorts of things that ultimately, when we get all of the other things sorted out, and sometimes we have to do this in laboratories where we have isolated all of the variables. There is a residual direct contact with empirical reality. Right, something that's outside the subject. But even there the language becomes very important because we don't want to say that it's subjective, at least as philosophers use the term, because that then is to say it's not in relationship to what is out there. So, again, we have to

get into the technical epistemology very carefully. When philosophers talk about the subject, sometimes they just mean anything that is happening right on the subjective side. But if we were doing epistemology or knowledge, then we say subjectivism means that the terms for what we are calling a belief or calling a knowledge or whatever it is, is set by the subject and the external reality has nothing to do with it. Right. The opposite position then is some sort of revelatory model where the subject has absolutely

nothing to do with it and said just reality smacks that person in the face and, as you put it, the story doesn't need to be told. It wears on its face what the proper interpretation of it is. What I think the proper starting point for any good epistemology is not going to be either of those. So we have to understand consciousness as a response mechanism to reality. It's an inherently relational phenomenon. And you always have to talk about reality and the conscious response to the reality. What very quickly happens in so many

philosophies is people think, well, if the subject is involved, then there's no way for us to be aware of reality. They retreat to some sort of representationalist model or they start going internal and then they start talking about motivations and theory ladens and other beliefs that you have. And once you make that divide, there is no way to get out subject, out of the subject and back to reality. On the other hand, if you try to react to that and say the subject has, can have nothing to do with it because we really think there is such a thing as knowledge, then you try as desperately as you can to erase the subject, right, to pretend the subject doesn't exist, to turn the subject into some sort of super shiny mirror that just reflects things or some sort of diaphanous reincorporation of exactly what's out there happens inside the subject. But that also is an impossible model.

So, what I want to say is the empiricist commitment and historically the empiricists have struggled to work with, work this out. This is the ongoing project. In the early modern era, I think they had very weak accounts of sense perception and that was part of the big problem and I think as you rightly pointed out postmodernism centuries later is the end result of teasing out the sometimes very subtle weaknesses in those very early models. So what I would just say is the first project for empiricists is to argue that there is a residual, right, base level in

contact that can serve as the basis for knowledge and the test for everything else no matter how sophisticated it starts. But that, as an epistemological claim, has to work with a certain understanding of philosophy of mind. You can't do the epistemology entirely in abstraction from some sort of neuroscience, some sort of understanding of the psychology, the relation of the mind to the body, and both of them to reality. And I think the important point here is to see consciousness as a relational phenomenon. And that's a philosophy of mind claim. It's not just...

So let's talk... Let me just say, it's not a shiny mirror that simply reflects reality. It's not a pre-existing entity that has its own nature and just kind of makes up whatever it wants for itself. It's a response mechanism. And all of these other things have to come out of that. Let me just say one more thing. I think we talk a lot about epistemology

and epistemological concerns really have dominated modern philosophy, modern psychology, the modern scientific project. And I think that's fine to do. You should define that for people, epistemology. The theory of knowledge. So we try to figure out, so the ology part is to give an account of something or an explanation of.

In this case, it's the Greek word episteme, right, for knowledge. When do I really know something? We have all kinds of beliefs kicking around, but there's a difference between imagination and fantasy and perception and… Falsehood. That's right, and just having been conditioned to do certain things. So how do I really know that I know something? And when should I say that I don't really know something and developing self-consciously what the standards are for good knowledge.

And this involves some reflection on sense perception as we're starting to talk about now, a good understanding of language and grammar, logic, and then when we start talking about stories and we say stories do in some sense inform us and we can really learn about the world through stories. What's the place of narrative in a proper epistemological framework? So we've been thinking through those things very systematically. Now that though is where the language of empiricism and rationalism and various kinds of synthesis and skepticism that says we don't actually have any knowledge. All of that language is epistemological. But I think we can't do epistemology in isolation. We always have to do it in context with

metaphysics. That is to say we have to also be talking about the nature of reality. So we want to say... That's an ontological question. That's right. Yeah, what's the furniture of the universe, so to speak? What's real and what isn universe, so to speak? What's real and what isn't real? So the question is, any time I want to say, you know, this is true or this is real, or this is a fact, right, or whatever, that's to make a claim about reality. And then the follow-up claim always is, well, how do you know that?

So you're making the claim, but you're also making a justificatory claim. So reality, and then broadly speaking, when we try to say things about what's true about reality as a whole, then we are doing metaphysics. You know, the special sciences say we're studying physics or chemistry or biology, but if we can step back and say, are, for example, space and time features of the universe as a whole. Is the universe eternal or infinite in various dimensions? Does a God exist or not? Those are all metaphysical questions. So to come back to, and this is just the one more point that I wanted to make, is that all of the things that we talk about, when we start talking about sense perception and forming concepts and grammar and logic and stories and statistics, all of that has to work right from the beginning with doing some philosophy of mind.

That is to say, what is this thing that we call the mind? And one of the things that early modern philosophy, now this is 1400s, 1500s on into the 1600s, was simultaneously struggling with was understanding the human being. And if, for example, you have what was common for many centuries, let's say a dualistic understanding of the human being, that the human being is a body but also a soul or a physicality plus a spiritual element. And these are two very different metaphysical things, right? One is subject to corruption and the other is in principle eternal.

And that they have, you know, different ontological makeups, different agendas, different ultimate destinies. Then on the metaphysics side, you know, how do those two come together? How do they work together? how do they work together, how do they fit together, what's the proper understanding of those two? But that metaphysical understanding of what it is to be a human being will shape how you think about epistemology right from the get-go. So if you are, say, an empiricist and you want to say, well, we started in, say, the

physical world and I have a physical body with physical senses and there's a causal story about how those interact with each other, but somehow I have to get that across this metaphysical gulf from the physical to the spiritual so that my mind, which I think of as being on the spirit side of things or on the soul side of things, can confront it and then do various things that we think we're going to do with our minds, our reason and our emotions and so forth. And that metaphysical gulf, if you can't bridge that gulf metaphysically, is going to cause you problems epistemologically. And so one reason why

we end up in postmodernism a few centuries later I think is not only going to be because the early empiricist theories had problems, the early rationalist theories had problems, various attempts to overcome them like Kant led it to problems and so forth. It wasn't only that there were epistemological problems that worked themselves out and led to dead ends, but at the same time we were struggling with the metaphysical problem as I'm thinking of it,

the mind-body problem. And once we said, or once we were starting from the perspective that ideas are non-physical realities or stories are non-physical realities or stories are non-physical realities and they're in a mind and we're conceiving of that as something separate from the physical world, as a non-physical world. It's very difficult to try to find how that then relates back to that physical world. So I would say in your field, for example, where you come out of professional

psychology, it's interesting that professional psychology only came on board in the late 1800s. And so we say, you know, this is the mypotted history of your discipline. We have the early Freudians and the early behaviorists both coming on board in 1900. And one of the things that they're both trying to do is to say, well, finally, we can start to study the mind scientifically. We can have a science of the mind. But what they were reacting against was still in the 1800s was the idea that the mind somehow didn't fit into nature.

It was an extra natural thing. It was a ghost in the machine. And the fitting of the ghost in the machine, we don't have a theory that works this out. And both of them were of course reflecting on Darwin and Darwin's more robustly naturalistic understanding of the human being that we're going to see the mind not as a ghost that's in the wet wear or in the human being, that we're going to see the mind not as a ghost that's in the wet

wear or in the biological wear, but as some sort of emergent phenomenon or a byproduct. But only when we stop thinking about the human being as a ghost plus a machine, to use that metaphor, or a spirit plus a body as two different things, as much more of a naturalist inter-grid, then we start to think that we can do psychology scientifically. Now, the Freudians and the behaviors, I think they were both disasters in various ways. And useful, yeah.

Yeah, but nonetheless, yeah, they were genius, but this is, again, the early steps of science. But what they are starting to do, though, is say we're not going to study the human being, we are going to study the human being, we are going to study the human being as part of the natural world. But notice that this is now into the 1900s and psychology is a very new science. And this is already 300 years after modern philosophy had been taken over in a sense by the epistemologists and had worked their way into a very skeptical form

So my hope is if we were talking about where the future has to go You know psychology has been online for a century now since a little more than a century now extraordinarily complex stuff as as we all know but we're making progress there But I think it's still early days, and what the psychologists work out has to be integrated with newer and better epistemology. It has to be an epistemology that integrates the best from the empiricist tradition,

the best from the rationalist tradition, and so on. So that's my summary story of how we ended up where we are, and why I'm not a thorough going skeptic on any of these issues. I see it as an ongoing scientific project. I think the people that we've brought together on Peterson Academy too, are at the forefront of that attempt to integrate.

And so that's one of our, you might say, one of our educational themes as we move forward is to continue that investigation. John Vervecky, I would say, is somebody who's on the forefront of that on the psychological and neuroscience side. So let's go back to your demonstration of primary sensory input, right? Just hitting the table. So I'll outline a neuroscience approach to that. So, you know, you might think

that you perceive and then you evaluate and then you think and then you act and that's like the causal chain. But none of that's exactly correct because even when you're responding to a primary stimulus like that, so to speak, there's a hierarchy of neurological responses that are operating more or less simultaneously. Now I'd say more or less because you do have reflexive action. So I think the simplest way to understand this is to assume that what you're detecting as a consequence of the slap that you delivered to the table is a patterned waveform. Let me just interrupt. Are you talking about my experience of that or your experience of it? Both. Because I came in with a pre-intention in that case.

Yeah, I was... And yours was a different passive surprise response. Let's get to that. Well, so exactly. So at one level of analysis, it's the same stimulus, let's say, insofar as it's an isolatable sound that you could record and duplicate with a phone recorder or something like that. But then, as you said, the fact that you come to that experience

with different expectations colors it. And so there is a way to think about that. I think the best way to start to understand it is to think about the pattern. So there's a waveform pattern that propagates in the air, which is the delivery system obviously for the stimulus and then there's an auditory pattern now When your nervous system receives that pattern it doesn't go to one point place and then another place and then another place and then another Place in a linear progression. There's some of that but what happens is that the pattern is What happens is that the pattern is assessed simultaneously by multiple different levels of the nervous system, right? So the most primary level would be spinal. And there are very few connections

between the auditory system and the spinal response system. And so for example, if I was on edge or uncertain about you or about this circumstance and you hit the table in that manner unexpectedly, one probable outcome is a startle reflex. And a startle reflex is a variant of a predator response. It's of a response to predation. And it's basically auditory signal onto spinal cord mapping. And the initial phase of the startle response is you could say it's pre-conscious and it's pre-emotional.

And the reason it's pre is because the time it takes for the signal to propagate onto the spinal receptors is shorter than the time it takes for the signal to propagate even to spinal receptors is shorter than the time it takes for the signal to propagate even to the emotions. And you need that. So for example, if you're walking down a pathway and out of the periphery of your eye, you detect a snake and you have really good snake detectors,

especially in the periphery in the bottom part of your vision. It's different in the top part, by the way, because there are more snakes on the ground than there are in trees. If you take the time to move your eyes, the center of your eyes, so that you can see the snake, and then you evaluate the snake emotionally,

by the time you've done that, the snake's already bitten you. It's too long a time. Whereas if you use these peripheral receptors that map right onto your spine, you can jump before the snake strikes, hopefully. Cats can do it by the way, about 10 times as fast. Well, we're pretty good too, as it turns out. Yeah, but not as fast as cats, but fast enough to often escape from snakes. And so you get

this first level response that's almost entirely reflexive. That's what the early behaviors were discovering too, when they were talking about stimulus response. Like there are somewhat automatic response systems that are very primordial and basic that do almost a one-to-one mapping of sensory pattern onto behavioral output. Very few in very few neural interconnections and the disadvantage to that is that it's a rather fixed response pattern and the advantage of is it's super fast Okay, so now the same pattern propagates up So imagine the pattern propagates down on your spine and you can adjust react very quickly another part of it propagates into the auditory cortex or the visual cortex and that's what you see with and Those are actually dissociable. So there are people who have a phenomenon called condition called blindsight

Hmm, so if you ask these people if they can see they tell you no, but they still respond Well, if you hold up your hand, for example they can guess with more than 90% accuracy which hand is up and it seems to be because There's it's their visual cortex that's damaged and not their retina. And a lot of the vision pathways into the brain are still intact, but not the one that mediates conscious vision, which is dependent on the visual cortex. But they still have kinetic perception with their eyes. So one of the things I'm doing when I watch you is that I'm picking up where your body is located and I

mapping that onto my body and so if I'm seeing you with blindsight with your hand up like this I'll have a sensation in my body that corresponds to your body position and I can read off that So it's not exactly vision because I'm not seeing you but it is a form of vision and it's even more sophisticated than that so if you take these people with blindsight and you show them faces that are angry or afraid and you Assess their galvanic skin response, which is a change in Sweating basically that's associated with Emotional arousal they'll respond differentially to emotional faces, right? Even though they don't know that that's blindsight That's part of blindsight. And so when you hear or see something that pattern is being assessed at

Multiple levels of a very complex hierarchy and it's not just bottom-up because those that hierarchy also feeds backwards So for example by the time you're an adult Most of what you see is memory. You just use the sensory input as a hint to pull up the memory. That's also how you get habituated to things. You know, when you see something for the first time, it's got this glow of novelty, this numinous glow of novelty. And what happens is that you, and that's complex and difficult to process. And then as you become accustomed to it,

and you build an internal mental model, you replace the perception with memory because that's faster. The problem is, is that the memory that you see is only the fractional meaning of the phenomena that's relevant to the encounters that you had. It shuts everything off and it de, what would you say? It takes the magic out of the phenomena that's relevant to the encounters that you had. It shuts everything off and it D, what would you say? It takes the magic out of the world.

As you replace raw perception with memory, you take the magic out of the world. That's a reasonable way of thinking about it. That's why there's a novelty kick, for example. And so the reason I'm bringing this up is because even that relatively straightforward demonstration that you made, that sound, that seems self-evident, it's you said right off the bat that there was a level at which both of us experienced that quite differently. You experienced it differently because you knew you were going to do it. It came as a surprise to me. That surprise was moderated by the

fact that I know you, I know your profession, I know your professional status, I know the purpose of what we're doing here, I know the probability that what I know about you indicates that you would do something that was surprising or dangerous, which is very, very low. So even though it was unexpected, it's bounded in its significance by all of that knowledge. And you might say, well, that's independent of the sense data, but it's not like that's a very tricky thing to establish, right? To get that independence, to figure out, well, what's the raw sense data and what's the interpretation

gets worse than this. You can train dogs to wag their tail when they receive an electric shock. They're happy about it. And so you think electric shock, that's pretty basic sense data. It's like, yeah, yes and no. If you reliably pair a shock,

now it depends on the magnitude of the shock, obviously. So there are some boundaries around this, but you can train a dog to be excited about the receipt of an electrical shock if you reliably pair it with a food reward, because the a priori significance of the electric shock might be pain response, right, indicative of the potential for physiological damage, because that's approximately what pain is. But if you associate it with the receipt of a reward, then it takes on a dopaminergic cast, which means that the shock becomes indicative of the receipt of a reward. And that's a positive emotion phenomena,

and it can override the shock. It's also the case that if you take animals like rats that are pretty intelligent, you put them in a cage, they'll deliver electric shocks to themselves randomly just because they're bored. And so they'll, and horses will do that as well. Now, as I said, it's magnitude dependent. Humans too. Yeah, yes, well, of course people do that.

People do that par excellence. And so all of these, it's very difficult to specify a level of analysis where there isn't an interpretive framework simultaneously active as the raw sense data makes itself manifest. Now I mean your demonstration was very, what would you say, it cut right to the chase, because a sound like that is, you might say, is not subject to an infinite number of interpretations, right? There's something there, but it's always nested, it seems to be that it's nested inside a hierarchy of interpretations, a very high-level hierarchy of interpretations. Let me say, all of that is great, all of it is beautiful, all of that is directly relevant. So to tie that back into what our philosophical intellectual predicament is now, if we want

to say postmodernism as a skeptical project that's given up on everything versus those who see it as an active ongoing project that we're learning more and more that's given up on everything versus those who see it as an active ongoing project that we're learning more and more that's going to give us a better and better epistemology. All of that is great. So I'm a kind of empiricist, but what I would say is that everything that you have said was in the early days of empiricism not known to any of the empiricists. So in many cases, they had very crude understandings of what memory would be, what reflex would be, what emotion would be.

But perception was? Yeah, perception, right, and so forth. And so naturally, then it makes sense that they're trying to insist that we actually are in contact with reality at a basic level, but then very quickly they are speculating about what's going on in all of these other areas and their theories are faulty and it's the weaknesses of those theories that then lead people to start to say, well, empiricism is a failed project instead of seeing it as an ongoing project. The other thing I would say, actually there's two other things, one is as you described the process, you say out there there's a slap, there are sound waves, we are making

realist claims. There really was a slap, there really are structured energy patterns and we really do have in our ears or in our hands receptors that are in place that respond to some energy patterns and don't respond to other energy patterns. And all of that we are making reality claims and we're saying that then there are causal processes that go on inside the physiological system of the human being. Some of them, as you say, are operating in parallel, they have feedback loops right then and so forth. I think I'm a very minimal empiricist on this, is to say that empiricism only insists that there really is a reality.

There's a nexus of... Well, there is a reality and it has these patterns that we're not making up those patterns and we're not imposing those patterns on the reality. Instead, what we call our sensory receptors is an array of cells that if there are certain structures in reality, they will respond. But they're not making up those structures in reality. So my nose, for example, has no- Or at least sometimes they're not making them up.

Okay, but the sometimes comes later. Yeah. Okay, and we can come to that. So my nose, for example, has all kinds of chemical structures out there. It doesn't have a pre-existing theory that out there in reality there are dead rotting things, right? It's just that if I happen to encounter dead rotting things, then certain chemicals will be laughing, and then my nose will respond and things will happen in a certain way. That's

important, whether you say what our noses are doing is kind of imposing a structure on an unstructured reality, And that takes you down the skeptical road versus- Yeah, the nose is a particularly good example because- Right, versus saying that the structures are there and what we have are just latent reception structures, that if those structures happen to be present, we'll be responsive. And that thing is all that the empiricists are saying.

Now, all of the other stuff where we say okay The background set I came to the slap with a background set you came to With a with a different background set and we started to say what all goes into that background set That's where philosophy starts to be well. No, that's what I think that's where philosophy is is important And we guys as philosophers I think articulate well where philosophy is important and we, as philosophers, I think, articulate, well, we have reason, we have emotions, we have memory, and there is something that physiologically goes on. You know, I have a body and it's all worked out, and that it's going to articulate the

main capacities or the main faculties, but I think at a very general level. I think the philosophers have to work hand in hand with the neuroscientists and with the psychologists because, and this is my complaint about early modern philosophy, it's not a very strong complaint, but that they were trying to do philosophy of mind and epistemology 300 years before we knew anything about neuroscience, and 300 years before we really knew anything about psychology. So it's a lot of failed experiments right along the way or failed theories along the way. The other thing though I would want to say is as we go on to develop what I think will be a better understanding of the mind, both epistemologically and metaphysically, is that we stop turning

virtues into vices as I think of it. So to say, for example, that we have, and then you talk about the base level, that the slap happens or there's something moves low to the ground and there's a direct automated, something that you didn't think about didn't feel about connection to the spine and your body reacts in a in a certain way. I want to say that's a good thing that has happened to human being that we have evolved certain automated physiological responses to certain kinds of sensory stimuli rather than turning that into a vice, right,

or a bad thing, and seeing that as, oh, well, if the human being has certain automated reflexes in place, that means we have to go down the road of subjectivity, that we're not really responding to reality and so forth. Or if we say we have emotions, right, which we do have emotions, and I think emotions are positive, they certainly have an important role in our evaluative structure figuring into our overall understanding of the meaning of life. And we also know that sometimes we

can use our emotions the wrong way, let them use us instead of using them. So emotions come with pitfalls, but rather than, as many early epistemologies have done and said, well, we have emotions, and emotions are on the subject side of things. So the enemy of reason. That's right. And so, yeah, that's so they're irrational and return something that is a very valuable tool in human psychology into the enemy of human psychology. You know, you see that a little bit with the evolutionary psychologists who claim that because we evolved for a substantial period of time on the African plains that our emotional

and motivational systems are no longer properly adapted to the modern world. It's like, I find that that's a variant of the argument that you just laid out and that it also has the echoes of that rationalist, some variance of rationalism, that proclamation, that emotion is the enemy of reason. It's like emotions are unbelievably sophisticated. They're low resolution and they're quick They're not as quick as say spinal reflexes But they're faster than thought and they're also broader than thought and they also enable us to evaluate when we don't have enough information to think and they they have their pitfalls like everything human

because nothing human is omniscient. And so we're going to make errors. But the idea that there's a fundamental antipathy between the emotional, the id, let's say in the ego, that because that's a variant of that psychoanalytic theory, that is a misunderstanding of the way that the nervous system is integrated. Okay.

So, okay, so let me run something else by you. Since we've laid out this, I want to run a proposition by you, and it's sort of a variant of the meme theory, although it takes into account the idea that so-called memes, abstractions, compete across historical and evolutionary times. So imagine this. So this is memes in the Jordan, sorry in the Dawkins sense. Yeah, so imagine that there is this level of sensory input that is as close to corresponding with objective reality as we can manage and then imagine that that's interpreted within this hierarchical

framework that we described. Levels of abstraction that rise up to ineffability, essentially. That would be something like the meaning of the fact that you hit the table in this particular context, right? Okay, so now imagine you've got this, imagine that every level of that hierarchy and the totality of the hierarchy competes across evolutionary time. So one way of grounding our thinking in data is to assume that all of what we know emerges from raw sense data. But there's another way of thinking about it, which is that the data is interpreted within a hierarchical framework that's full of feedback loops, right? And

there's variant forms of those, those upper level hierarchies. But those forms compete across time. And only, and the more successfully they compete across time, the more they become instantiated physiologically. That's a Baldwin effect selection mechanism. The higher order interpretive structures that produce the best reproductive outcome across time are more likely to become automated at an instinctual level. Emotions would be like that.

They're not as automatized as spinal reflexes, but they're quite automatized because the sets of emotions that human beings have are very similar. Anger, fear, surprise, joy, etc. Everyone feels those. When and where is different, but the fact of the emotions is the same. So then imagine that this is something like the domain of iterable and playable games. So imagine that there's a variety of different interpretive frameworks that we lay upon more basic sensory data, but that a relatively small subset of those interpretive frameworks has the capacity for sustainable improvement. So you could think about this, think about this in the context, let's say, of a marital relationship, right?

There's a very large number of ways that your marriage can go wrong, like an indefinite number of ways that your marriage can go wrong. But then there's a constrained number of ways that it will go right. And that's because it's a difficult target. Imagine that the specifications are something like, for your marriage to be successful, the micro routines and the macro routines have to be such that you're voluntarily okay with them and your wife is voluntarily okay with them.

And they bond you more tightly together across time. And this would be the optimal situation. As you lay them out together, they improve. Okay, and so you can imagine that as the basis for an optimized contractual relationship of any form. But then you could also imagine that the number of variants of the way that you can treat each other for all of those conditions to be met would be low.

There's a very small number of voluntary playable games that are iterable across large spans of time that improve as you play them. Okay, so then you'd get an evolutionary pressure as well on the domains of possible philosophy, right, that they'd fill up something like a space. And that seems to me to be reflective. It's weird because that's also reflective of an empirical reality, but it's not the

reality that's associated with basic sense data. It's more the fact that there is a finite number of complex games that are voluntary playable and that improve. And that's also a fact, right? I mean, and that would be, I think that's partly why there are patterns of ethics that tend to emerge in many different cultures, even independently, right? It's, it's, and that also makes a mockery in some ways of a really radical relativism. It's like, it's not that the value space, the philosophical space isn't relativistic because there's a finite number of interpretive frameworks that actually have anything approximating

productive staying power. And that is reflective of something like the structure of reality. It's more sophisticated reflection than the basic sense data. And so, see, I'm saying this because I'm trying to mediate between the postmodern claim that we see the world through a narrative, which I think that's true. I think all the neuroscience data points in that direction.

And then you might say, well, any old story goes then. It's like, no, just because we see the world through a story doesn't mean that the stories themselves aren't constrained by empirical reality in its most sophisticated sense. And it also doesn't mean that the stories, even though their stories fail to correspond to reality. Okay. That's extraordinarily rich, everything that you're laying out there. Let me just start with one thread to pull out. I do not like the language that says we see reality through a narrative. I understand the attraction of it.

I can make a more technical description. No, no, no, no. If we just start with that formulation. I think that is, I think that's a dangerous formulation. I do think the postmoderns are on board with that. But notice what it says. It says there's a we, there's a me, and then there's a narrative, and then there's reality out there, and that I have to go through this narrative.

Yeah. Like a screen. That's right. And it might be, it might have some chinks in it, it might be opaque. But also what this narrative is, it has got a huge amount of stuff built into it. All kinds of background expectations and theories and slippery terms, right, and so forth. What I would say is, to use this language, is that narratives are things that we use to see reality if the narrative is true. So sometimes narratives get reality right, sometimes narratives are wildly on the basis. Yeah, that's in keeping with this idea of competition across time.

That's for sure. But rather than seeing the narrative as a screen or as an obstacle or an intermediary, it itself is a tool. It's a state that our psychological conscious apparatus is in when we are relating to reality. That's if we get it right. Okay. But if we mess it up, then it does become something that we try to see reality through, and we're in a problematic situation.

Okay, so let me reformulate the description, and then let's see if that rectifies that problem, and then let's see where we can go with that problem, because I'll object to your objection and see where that goes. So I would say a narrative is a description of the structure through which we see the world, right? That's a different claim.

So, because it's not a narrative until I tell it to you. But then you've dropped reality out of the picture. Well, that's exactly why I wanna have this discussion, because I don't want it, I think it's very dangerous, it's kind of obvious, to drop reality out of the situation. But you're right that the danger of the postmodern formulation is, which is that we see the world through a narrative, let's say, is exactly that, is that the reality drops out of the equation. There's nothing but the text, let's say. Now, like if there's a competition between narratives for their functionality, let's say,

reproductive and otherwise, that would go some way to addressing that problem, because there'd be a Darwinian competition between narrative structures that would prioritize some over others. And so, but the description part, the idea that it's a description is relevant. So imagine that wolves in a pack, at a perceptual level, the wolves distinguish the rank order of the wolf that they're seeing.

They do that extremely rapidly. Highly social animals are unbelievably good at that. And so the story of the dominance, the story of the hierarchy of the wolves is implicit in the perception of the wolves. And if you describe that, it's a story, but it's not a story before it's described. It's whatever a story is before it's described. It seems to me like it's something like the weights in a neural network returning to that idea is that there are certain facts, let's say, that present themselves to us that are much more heavily weighted. And that's axiomatic, it's built into the system.

And those would be facts for, imagine that evoke emotional response very rapidly. They're weighted and that weighting has a biological element and a cultural element. That's not a story, but if you describe that, that's what a story is. The scientist who's studying the wolves is creating a story.

That's right. No, not really, I wanna say constructing a story. Yes. Or it's a story about something that's not happening mediated through stories in the wolves. Yes, right, and for the wolves, it's a pattern of behavior and a pattern of perception. Yes. It's not a... So imagine this is when you go to see a movie, you take on the

weighting, the value structure of the protagonist. Now, human beings are very good at that. Like, we look at each other's eyes and we see what people are attending to, and we watch their patterns of attention, and we infer their valuation and their motivation. We're unbelievably good at that. And that's what you're doing when you're going to a movie. We watch how the protagonist prioritizes his attention and his action, what his priorities are, and you infer from that the perceptual structure that, well, that's the question.

Does it bring some facts to light and make others irrelevant? And if so, is it a screen? Like most of the world we don't see, most of the world is screened out from our perception. Some of that's biomechanical, I can't see behind my head, but some of it is I'm looking at you so I can't see the faces of the cameramen right now, right?

So that's a that's a choice that's dependent on my determination of how to focus my attention. Now the fact that I'm prioritizing you, I can see your face, I'm using the foveal center of my vision, and I can't see these guys because they're in my periphery. That's kind of like a screen, right? The place where it's most open is this central point of vision. Over here it's obscured and over here it's just gone completely. So now you objected to my characterization because you said, you know, observer, screen, reality, and you didn't like the proposition of the intermediary screen. Yes.

And I know the screening idea isn't exactly right. But on the counter side, we have this problem. Some things are central to our perception and other things are peripheral. And that's dependent on our values and our patterns of attention and our actions. So, well, I'm curious about what you think about that. Well, I think you're putting two kinds of examples out on the table. They're going to be related. I think the first one where we are looking at a human being, say an actor on a screen,

putting ourselves in that person's shoes and reading the world. I think that's very extraordinarily complicated. And I think the interesting thing there is going to be, while you say that we humans are very good at that, the interesting thing is going to be how much of that is learned because it does seem to be a highly fallible process. I know I don't want to get too personal here, but there will be lots of times I've been in social circumstances and I think I'm pretty savvy about reading people but I'll be with my with my wife and she will say you know after we've had a conversation with someone boy did you notice how you

know upset that person was about blah blah blah. Women and their interpersonal perceptions. So there may be you know sex gender differences that are going on but also at the same time to say that I couldn't learn how to do that. So when we say people are very good at that, I think that's true, but we still have to epistemologically unpack everything that goes into what makes us good at being able to do that. I think that's going to be a very, very sophisticated story.

But then the other example, it takes us back to perceptual cases, where you're talking about, are you looking at me or me looking at you, and we're also aware that we're in a room, that there are other people in the room who are filling and so on, but getting right down to issues of, if I choose to focus on one thing, then it is true that everything else goes— Pales by comparison. focus on one thing, then it is true that everything else goes. Pales by comparison. Yeah, that's right. And Pales is metaphorical.

So if we're going to try to then unpack the metaphor, I think we would say we focus and unfocus. And then we can give descriptors of what the state of unfocus is and what the state of focus is. And I would prefer using that language to the language of screen, because screen really is something that is in the way. It's a thing itself. That is another obstacle.

So how about higher... If there's a dressing screen between the two of us and I'm dressing for privacy, the whole idea of the screen is that it's blocking. Right, so the metaphor is too simple. Sorry, that would be different from, and I think a better metaphor would be to say to filter. And I think sometimes our sensory apparatus are engaging in filter.

They're just attending to some things and not attending to other things. But a filter is different from a screen. Okay, so I have- And also, but also just to stay on this one issue here, the issue of focus and unfocus, I think, is not... it's not a filter either. I have a metaphor for you. Tell me what you think about this. Well, I've been thinking about this a lot because I've been studying Old Testament stories.

And I think the tabernacle in the Old Testament is a model of perception. Okay, so tell me what you think of this as an analogy. Better than screen and better than filter. Okay, remind me what element of the tabernacle. I will, I will. I'll lay it out. Okay, so the tabernacle, at the center of the tabernacle is the Ark of the Covenant, right? So there's a center point and it's sacred, okay? And if I remember correctly, in the early ceremonies

that were associated with the tabernacle, the High Priest was only allowed to go into the Holy of Holies, the center, once a year. So there's a center, then there's a structure of veils around it, so that there's a centre, then there's a structure of veils around it, like so that there's a centre, and then it's veiled, and then outside of that is another veil, and then outside of that is another veil, and then outside of that is another veil, and then outside of that of the community and the center is the, what would you say, the point of focus, the fundamental point of focus, and then the significance of the periphery is proportional to the distance from the center. Now the reason, there's a variety of reasons

that I think this is the right metaphor. It's partly because... So it's a metaphor for what? For object perception. For any perception. For any perception. It's so... and here's partly why. So I was referring to the visual system, for example. So the way your visual system is constructed

is that at the very center, every cell in the center of your vision is connected to 10,000 neurons at the fundamental level of analysis. Okay, and then each of those 10,000 is associated with 10,000. It spirals up exponentially very rapidly. But the foveal tissue in the center of your vision is very high cost. It takes a lot of neural tissue to process it, and it takes a lot of energy. A lot. If your whole retina was foveal, your head would be like alien sauce. Eagles have too fovea, by the way. They have extremely sharp vision. And so now you're, because high resolution vision is expensive, you can move your eyes and you dart this very high resolution center around. And so every time you move your eyes

and you do that unconsciously because they're always vibrating, and consciously because you can move them, and in consequence of emotion as well. So if you hear a noise off to the side that startles you you'll look and that's unconscious lots of things direct your visual attention but everything you look at has a center dead center where everything is extremely high resolution and then it's surrounded by lesser and lesser spheres of resolution until at the periphery, there's nothing, right?

Okay, so like out here, if I just hold my hand steady, I can't see it except as a blur. If I move it, I can see the fingers. So out here, I can detect movement. That's how dinosaurs saw, by the way. Dinosaurs frog still. They can't see anything that isn't moving. They have vision like our periphery.

So out here, because the tissue in the periphery of my vision isn't very highly innervated, I prioritize movement because my assumption is if it isn't moving, I don't have to pay attention to it. You know, it's a default assumption about what's ignorable in the world. And you live in a dynamical environment. Right, exactly.

And so if you're going to prioritize peripheral vision, the priority is if it moves, look at it, otherwise ignore it. Okay, so every perception has a center and then a gradation of resolution until it fades out into nothing. And that tabernacle, as far as I can tell, is a model of the perceptual center. It's a model of the community center as well, but it's a model of perception as such. So that's different than a screen, obviously. Well, you do have these veils that you construct.

That's true, that's true, that's true. And it's, you see, and the veil, the veil idea is an interesting one because the perceptions we have in the periphery are nowhere near as intense as the perceptions that we have in the center. And so these perceptions, one way of thinking about them is these perceptions, peripheral perceptions, are veiled out here behind me.

They're veiled so intensely you can't even see them, but the veils are graduated. So it's, well, so you tell me what you think about that. Yeah, let me try a different, I don't want to use the tabernacle example, I'm not as familiar with it, but suppose you think of the difference between a place, let's say you're walking through, this is an example I heard from another philosopher, you're walking through an unfamiliar neighborhood, right, at night, and you think it's a slightly dangerous neighborhood, right? And so what you're trying to do is take in as much as you can. Yeah.

And so the language that comes to me more naturally is the language of a field. It's like a magnetic field or electric field. Yeah, the phenomenologists like that idea. Yes, that's right. And in that case, what I'm trying to do is not focus on any one thing in particular, like I might when I'm reading. So then I'm using my visual

attention, I'm focusing on this particular thing, or I'm an artist and I'm trying to catch the, do the glint on the eyeball for the finishing cut. So my eyes are wide open and I'm concentrating and I'm trying to do this and everything else is in the field. But that I think is co-extensive in terms of how our perceptual faculty works is if I am in the bad neighborhood at night and what I've tried to do is just expand my attention to encompass this whole field so that if anything moves in that entire field,

then I can zoom in on that. Okay, so that's a good objection. That's a good objection. So that if anything moves in that entire field then I can zoom in on that. Okay, so that's a good objection. That's a good objection. I guess I could make that initial analogy more sophisticated because I would say then that the tabernacle structure, center and periphery, is characteristic of explored and familiar territory. You're making a case that there's a different perceptual mode in unexplored territory, and there is. So birds have a prey eye and a predator eye. And the predator eye acts like the painter that you described who's focusing on one thing, because you zero in on the thing you're after. The I'm prey eye, so that would be the bird's, the other eye is scanning in exactly the way

that you described, deprioritizing the center, amplifying the input from the periphery because, yeah, and that maps onto the hemispheres. So the left hemisphere does the perceptual mapping that you just, this is in right-handed people, the left hemisphere does the focal perception that you described that this is in right-handed people. The left hemisphere does the focal perception that you described that's detail-oriented and that deprioritizes the periphery.

And the right hemisphere does the opposite. And you know, and that's, I suppose you could say at a biological level, that's because it's eat or be eaten, right, in the most primal possible way. And so there's a perceptual system for things you're going to eat, and there's a perceptual system for things you're going to eat. And there's a perceptual system for you might be on the menu. Yeah, exactly.

Right, right, right. And yeah, so that's, see, the thing that's so curious about that and that you just highlighted is that the ceremonies for taking possession of a territory that are anthropologically specified, it's usually driving a stake or a central point, a flag, a standard, a staff into the ground. That signifies camp, right?

Or it signifies the possession of that territory. That establishes a center with a set of peripheries and with foreignness at the, you know, at the edge of the periphery. And that does establish a certain kind of perception that's associated with security. So the tabernacle style of perception would be the perception that's associated

with explored territory. That's exactly right. That's the perception of order. Order is where the things you want are happening. That's a good way of defining order. And chaos is where you don't know what will happen when you act. And there are two different perceptual mechanisms for those. And so the the second one, the danger one, the unexplained one, the foreign territory one, is there's less filtering and

there's less specification of center. Because you don't know what's important, right? You're walking through that dangerous neighborhood, it's like you're on alert, and you don't know what's insignificant. That's part of being on alert. So there's no identifiable center, and that's a high stress situation. Yeah, yeah, okay, okay.

Now where I think it immediately gets more complicated, and you psychologists know more about this than I do, is even if we stay with those examples, the question about what happens automatically and what is under our volitional control is another dimension that has to cut across. Even if we grant that in both cases, whether I'm focused or whether I'm diffused attention, I'm aware of reality in some sense. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It is true that if in either of those cases, if I'm the artist focusing on the particular

dot and my child suddenly screams, then I will involuntarily or automatically lose that focus and go to attend. Yeah, that's been quite mapped out neurophysiologically. Right, that's right. The Russians did a very good job of that starting in about 1960. Yeah. Sokolov was one of them and a woman named Vinogradova and they were students of a neuropsychologist named Luria. They mapped out what they described as the orienting reflex and that's exactly what that is. It's like you're focused on a task and something of pragmatic import. Yeah, yeah of implicit significance

Detract distracts you from your goal and you do you so there's a hierarchy of gradated responses that are part of that or is right flex but then even I think another interesting case would be you're the Artist and you know that sometimes your kid cries out and screams, but you've given yourself a signal. You know, I'm angry at my kid right now. He's been a brat. Yeah. I'm going to ignore him when he screams. So I'm focusing exact same scenario. Kid screams.

Yeah. I register it. My reaction is quite different. I stay focused. That shows you how malleable even that's relatively low-level Instinctual responses are that's right. Yeah, there was that's going to be a backfeed loop. Yeah, exactly. Exactly Well, that's and that's part of the consequence of the higher order brain centers Feeding like there isn't a primary level of perception that has no top-down modification

it's even the the primary visual cortex, say where your fovea meets the visual cortex for the first time, is tremendously innervated by multiple... Well, so here's an example. So when you look at a object, when you look at a pen, for example, let's say that constitutes a visual pattern, it's represented on the retina as a pattern It's propagated along the nerves then it branches out one of the places that information ends up quite quickly is the motor cortex so when you see Almost all the objects that you see in the world you see because they're definable in terms of the action you take in their presence so like when you see this pen, the grip motion

that you would use to use it is directly disinhibited by the sight of the pen. And that's part of the perception. It's not like you see the pen and think about its use. That is not how it works at all. You see its use directly. And so that's another thing that's very strange about object perceptions. Like you don't actually see objects in the world. What you see are tools and obstacles and well then there's all the things you don't see. And the tools and obstacles are defined in relationship to your goal. So you know your goal for example, the one or the example you used is you're not happy with your child.

So the goal there has shifted from respond to distress cries. It's shifted from that, which might be the default, right to certain probability that distress cry is false, right, or manipulative, therefore ignore. Very different interpretive framework, very different social landscape, and capable of modifying even almost the base level perception, you'll still hear the cry. I mean, I guess that would be even curious, is like, if your child is, it's highly probable, if your child is likely to emit distress calls that are false, my suspicions are you'd be less likely to hear that, to actually hear it, not only not to respond to it, right,

because you'd have built an inhibitory structure that says, well, despite the instinctual significance of that, it's irrelevant. Right, right. Highly likely. Yeah. To come back to like your Penn example and the issue of as sophisticated cognizers, when we are perceiving the world that we have their use function kind of built into the... Perception. Yeah.

I'm going to put that in quotation marks right now. Yeah. Right. And then the action that's going to be embodied in that use also in many cases seems to be built into the perception. I think if we unpack that more, there's still going to be a very sophisticated set of learning we have to do about what is built into the physiological system and the psychological system at birth and how much of it is learned. Because I don't think we want to say that even in the 21st century where we come into

the world born with kind of a precognized understanding of pens and how to use pens. We probably have a precognized understanding of pens. Right. And how to use pens. We probably have a precognized understanding of tool. I don't even know if we have that. Instead, I think we just, we have a certain physiological structure that, right? And a certain conceptual structure that's built on that, such that, and it's going to be very flexible and amenable to different environmental circumstances to adapt to and conceive of things, whatever their intrinsic properties as potential tools.

Yeah, well, a lot of that- So let me just try another example to get to, because I liked the earlier movie example and the male-female difference. One thing that comes up in couples is how they learn to be tuned to each other's voices and the sound of their own voice. So couples who before they met each other would go to a loud party and they would be talking to each other. Yeah, that's a really good example.

Yeah, that's right. And you know, there's just, there's just noise and it's, it's a big decibel level, right? But then once they become couples and they have heard each other say their name, say Jordan, Steven, or whatever, they can be in a relatively loud party separated across the room, and the guy's wife says, Steven, and he can pick that out of that incredible restroom of sounds. Well, that's what you do if you're in a restaurant that's bustling with conversation. What's so remarkable is if you're sitting with someone and there's conversations everywhere, you can tune yourself so that you hear the person that you're sitting beside, you hear

them, but then you can turn your attention to a conversation beside you and it will prioritize that or you can turn your attention to your own thoughts, right? And it is this, and I would say that's something like the imposition of that tabernacle-like structure on that, on that plethora of potential interpretations. That's what the postmodernists would point out. There's an infinite number of potential interpretations in a restaurant that's bustling with conversation. It's like fair enough, but you prioritize one. That's what it means to pay attention to it, right? Is that you prioritize it. You make something a center. You make everything else a periphery. Then you learn to do that automatically, right? If with practice. I think we, maybe the best example of that

for literate people is the fact that you can't see a word without reading it. Yeah, because you've automated certain things. That's right, you've automated it. Exactly. So that centers now built into the perception. What the postmoderns do is that they take what I think is a virtue. We can automate all of these things, and we can learn to detect various things and focus on this, that, and the other thing. All of which are great strengths of the human consciousness, and they turn them into negatives, they turn them into vices.

So what they say is, right, an interpretation then becomes in their language, because they've already got an epistemological theory, a negative epistemological theory, as something that is necessarily subjective. And the idea for them then is that somehow if we were going to be actually aware of reality and not through this interpretation, we would have to not have any interpretations at all that somehow reality would just have to stamp itself on our minds without any endearment or any new actions. Or what they will then do is to say, you know,

I can choose to prioritize this right over that in my visual field. They will say and that and they're right to say this, that's a value judgment. I think this is more important now. Yeah, this is more important over that. But then by the time they start using the words of values, they're coming out a very sophisticated negative case value of theories that say values are coming out of very sophisticated negative values of theories that say values are just Subjective and have nothing to do with any sort of external reality. So for both of them It's on the cognition side and on the evaluative side that they're deep into Subjective territory and so those then become negative words for them instead I think and this is my only hope as a philosopher, I think philosophers have a very small part of this project,

just attending to the language that we're using at the foundations of cognition. Right, use all of these metaphors of screens and filters and tabernacles and visual fields and so on. That's where we have to get that sorted out because we don't get those foundations correct, then we're going to be messed're going to be going to be messed up but yeah come back. Okay well so two two things there so you pointed to the fact that the postmodernist description of the subjective but tell me tell me

what you think about this see the postmodern insistence despite the fact that they claim that there's no uniting metanarrative which is a specious claim in my estimation, because I don't know where the uniting ends if everything's a narrative. There's uniting narratives at every level of analysis, but more than that, their proposition, at least implicitly, has been that the narratives that we do utilize are predicated on power. That's part of the reflection of the subjective. It's like I'm prioritizing in keeping with my desire to exercise power. And by power I don't mean ability to maneuver in the world, I mean force and compulsion.

And that what we have in the postmodern world is a battleground between different claims of power and that's all there is. I think the weakness in that, first one weakness is that it's a confession rather than a description, but the other one is that power games are not iterable and productive and improving across time. They're self-defeating. And so you can play a power game and you can win short-term victories with a power game, but it's not a sustainable

Iterable medium to long-term viable strategy, you know that Franz de Waal for example, the primatologist studied chimpanzees So, you know we have this trope and I think it's a consequence of Marxist influence on biologists that the hierarchies of chimpanzees for example, which are masculine hierarchies in the main are of chimpanzees, for example, which are masculine hierarchies in the main are predicated on power. You know, the alpha chimp is the most powerful tyrant and he dominates all the others. That's why he's reproductively successful. DeWalt showed very clearly that there are alphas who use power, but they have short range,

fractious communities, and they're extremely likely to suffer a premature, violent death. Right, so it is a niche in that you can force compliance, but the stable alphas that DeWall studied were the most reciprocal male chimpanzees of the troop. They made the most lasting friendships. And so that's a whole different model of

the mediation of attention, let's say, than one that's predicated on power. So do you think it's fair when you're assessing the postmodern corpus, philosophical corpus, you talked about the subjective element, where do you think the claim that, the postmodern claim that power is essentially the dominant narrative, where do you think that fits in with this

claim with regards to subjectivity? Yeah, that's a good question. I think the postmodern use of the word power is another example of turning a virtue into a vice. I think power properly conceived could be coextensive with our ability to get stuff done. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And our cognitive powers, right,

if we have a good healthy epistemology, right, should be augmented to enable us to survive and flourish better in the world. Mm-hmm, even cooperatively. That's, yeah, no, that's exactly right. But then, if you, however, are skeptical, if you do start with the epistemology, all of the postmoderns do come out of an epistemological training. It's a striking fact, the big name postmoderns, so we mentioned Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, Rorty, right, and the others.

They are all PhDs in philosophy. They're all doing heavy duty work in epistemology at their graduate and doctoral level work. And that does come to become the foundation. And because of the time that they are working in, middle part of the 20th century was an extraordinarily skeptical phase for philosophy, the revealing theories and paradigms that everyone had been excited about had collapsed at that time. So they came of age. Now, what that then is to say is, if you don't think that human beings can know the world as individuals, then you don't think of developing your reason, developing your capacity for logic, for rationality, for understanding is the most important thing about human beings. So what then is it to be a human being? And to the extent that you

devalue the human cognitive apparatus, then we are going to become closer to chimps. And then the social models that are prevalent about how we think chimps are going to become closer to chimps. And then the social models that are prevalent about how we think chimps are going to operate in the world are going to become more predominant. Or even lower than chimps, baboons. Yeah. Who are even less- Yeah, it's more of a baboon model. Yeah, it might be. But-

Yeah, yeah, yeah. Fractious fascists. So I think this though shows the absolute importance though of these cognitive issues that the psychologists and the philosophers are trying to work out positively. Because to the extent that we can show that we have cognition, that it is efficacious, that it is competent, that our brain, mind is an enormously powerful tool and if we learn to use it well, we will survive and flourish better as individuals and socially we'll start to work out the win-win positive some social things otherwise we will sort of regress socially and evolutionary to chimp and baboon kinds of kinds of

levels. So that regression becomes the use of power as the meta-narrative that the postmodernists hypothetically abandoned. That's right. They're all left with it. That's right. That's what they're left with. You're getting rid of human cognitive power as a positive thing. Then you ask, well, what's left? If it's not the case that I think my human cognition, my mind, puts me in touch with reality,

and that I can work out reality, and that your cognition puts you in touch with reality, and of can work out reality and that your cognition puts you in touch with reality and of course maybe we're initially focusing on things, we have different frameworks, but that we nonetheless have the cognitive tools to talk about these things, to do the experiments, to, you know, I can visit what you've experienced. To take each other's position. That's right. In service of some higher goal.

That's right. And that we can work all of these things out to, in effect, have an agreed upon understanding of the nature of reality. Then if that's not what's going on, that cognition is about trying to use our minds to understand reality, reality starts to drop out of the picture. And what the postmoderns then do is either say, well, I make up my own reality, that's what's going on here, or some of them are more passive, all of the influences of more environmental deterministic understandings of human beings.

What we call learning and cognition is just being conditioned by your environment, your social upbringing, right, and so on. So again, we don't have an autonomous... The dominant patriarchy. Yeah, or there could be any sort of social structure from their perspective. But that then means that what we are interested in is primarily social relationships. It's not me in relation to reality and other people are part of reality, so I have to work that out. But rather, the assumption is that I am inextricably molded by and shaped by my social reality.

And so, the dynamic between us socially is the thing that comes to be. And the word there that becomes most important is the power word. It's a kind of social power. So... That tilts them towards that social constructionism. Oh yeah, absolutely. Well, yeah, it's the social construction theory that leads them to have that social understanding of power. But the power for them cannot be the positive sum kind of power that we're talking about, because that understanding of positive-sum power depends on, we can figure out the way the world works and do science and technology and make the world a better place and empower ourselves. We can learn better nutrition to make our bodies more powerful. I can understand that you're a rational person, and you can understand that I'm a rational person,

so I have to treat you a certain way, conversationally, socially, and so forth. So, all of the positive, some social stuff is going to come out of that. But the postmoderns have cut all of that away. All you're left with is beings that are conditioned and trying to recondition each other in a social world that is totally social world. And what they then call power just is

the influence or tools, including the tools of language that are now understood as having nothing to do with the nature of reality but as being socially constructed themselves. And tools of power. That's right. And so it becomes then necessarily a zero-sum socially influencing and controlling game, and they reinterpret everything in terms of that. Okay, so I think what we'll do is stop there. We've come to the end of the time for the YouTube section. I'd like to

continue this discussion on the daily wire side, but what I would like to talk about with you there is Power in service of what? Yeah, right because there has to be unless you I mean you could hypothesize that power in itself is a Desirable good, but then you have to define power in a way that would make the desirability of itself evident Alternatively you have to say that you want power for a reason. So I want to talk to you about that. Very good. Get your thoughts on that. That can take us back to the Peterson Academy courses too. Okay, yeah, yeah, yeah.

Yeah, well you, that, maybe we can close with that too. You had, you've taped three additional courses. I've done five courses, yes. Three are in post-production, two are in our life. Okay, and what are the three that are coming up? One is on modern ethics. So what has happened in the modern world is it has become more diverse more global more multicultural and more Critical in some ways of traditional models that have come down to us. So it's a much more wide open

world what's interesting about the modern world is how Little we have what I think of as kind of a homogeneous culture where everybody by and large on the same philosophical religious. That's the collapse of that meta-narrative. Yeah, that particular meta-narrative went away. And so we have a huge number of people trying to work out what is good, what is bad, what's right, what is wrong, what's the meaning of my life, how should we organize ourselves socially. life, how should we organize ourselves socially? So what I did was chose eight

completely different but extraordinarily influential modern moral philosophers and devoted a lecture to each of them. So it goes back to people like David Hume wrestling with the is ought problem and Immanuel Kant with his strong duty focus, John Stuart Mills, utilitarianism and so on in through the 20th century up to very contemporary times. So that's one course, modern ethics. And all of these people are giants, they all disagree with each other, but that's the contemporary landscape within which people who are doing serious thinking about morality need to position themselves. The other two courses are 16-letter lectures in total, but it's called the philosophy of

politics. And here what I'm interested in is obviously we have political science, we have political theory, political ideology, practical day-to-day understandings of politics, but what I'm interested in is the philosophers' contributions to those debates. And one of my background assumptions is that a lot of times when people disagree about politics, they're not actually disagreeing about politics, they're disagreeing about something more fundamental.

Something more fundamental. Yeah, yeah. They're disagreeing about something more fundamental. I think that's become evident to everyone. That's right. And in many cases, it doesn't get brought to the core. So I don't want to talk about the recent election, but really it's about culture, more fundamentally and not about many particular issues and underlying culture. And both the other courses are dealing with that. Right.

So one though picks up with the French Revolution, which is perhaps the landmark event in European or at least continental European history, why that political revolution happened, and there's a lot of philosophy that matters there, but then also an important theoretician, Edmund Burke, and a launching of a kind of modern conservatism in response to that. But then we go through all of the big name philosophers who have pronounced influential on politics. So we go through Hegel and Marx, and as we get into the 20th century, we talk about the

fascists, Mussolini and Gentile, who was a PhD in philosophy, and Heidegger and the National Socialists, Friedrich Hayek, John Maynard Keynes, and that one ends with World War II. So French Revolution to the World War II. The next course picks up at the end of World War II and the Cold War, and it starts with Rand and Robert Nozick. At the height of the Cold War, how can we defend some sort of robust liberal capitalism in this context? So, it starts with them, goes on to John Rawls. We also talk about James Buchanan, who won the Nobel Prize for Public Choice Economics. We also do some international,

economics. We also do some international, because we're living in a global society, that cliché and so on. But the Islamist revolutions and the philosopher, the Egyptian philosopher Sayyid Qutba, whose brother was a professor of Osama bin Laden, extraordinarily influential. Ayatollah Khomeini had Kutba's works translated into Farsi before he became Ayatollah. We go to Russia and the rise of Putin and the role of the thinking of Alexander Guggen in that framework as well. And then we end that course with a contemporary version of conservatism, Roger Scruton's meaning of conservatism, which came out a few years before he died.

So the idea here is to say these are the big name political theories you need to know, but they're all big name ones because they have philosophical bite behind them by some very deep people and integrating that with the history in each case how some of them are urging history in a certain direction or trying to make sense of major events like French Revolution or the Cold War or or the attacks right so if people Watch all the courses that you have offered so all five of them all the courses that you have offered, so all five of them, they're going to get a pretty decent overview of the major thinkers of the last 500 years

in the philosophical, ethical, and political realms. That's my ambition. Yeah, that's a good deal. That's a good deal. I wanna watch those courses. There's lots of things that you're lecturing about that I don't know about. I'd like to know the nuances.

I'd like to know the details. So yeah, so I'm very much looking forward to that. So, well, thank you very much for coming to Scottsdale. A real pleasure. Yeah, it's great. And it's great to have you on board on Peterson Academy too. So it's good.

And I think we'll talk too on the daily wire side, a little bit about the perils, pitfalls, and opportunities of online, highly produced online education. Cause I'd like to get some of your opinions about that too. All right, so we'll do that. Thank you very much, sir. Oh, I should give this to you too.

So yeah, this is my new book, which is coming out on the 19th. And so we have a message with God. And so I'm making a case in this book fundamentally that, well, we talked about the relationship between story and perception, but I'm trying to explain in this book why the notion of sacrifice is the central story

in the biblical corpus, making the case that sacrifice is equivalent to work and that sacrifice is by necessity the foundation of the community, that those two things are so tightly associated that they're equivalent. There's no difference between sacrifice and community. They're the same thing. So anyways, I'd like to hand that to you.

All right. I will dive into it. Thanks, man. Yeah, yeah. Well, I'd certainly be interested in your thoughts on it as well. And so it's coming out very soon. And I tried to make sure that everything that I wrote in it was hopefully justifiably, theologically and traditionally, but also scientifically. Like I wanted the stories to make sense at both levels of analysis at the same time. So, you know, that's a tight triangulation, so to speak, but, and who knows if it's successful, but that was the rule of thumb. So anyway, it's very good to talk to you today. A pleasure.

So yeah, and I'm looking forward to our continued collaboration on the Peterson Academy side. Me too. All right. So all of you watching and listening, you can join us on the daily wire side. We're going to talk about two things. We're going to talk about the practical and hypothetical future of online education.

And we're going to talk about the relationship. What would you say? The, the, the value of power from the postmodern perspective? Why would people be interested in power? You might think that's self-evident, but Lots of things that appear self-evident aren't at all on more detailed analysis. So You can join us for another half an hour of that discussion if you would Thank you to the film crew here in Scottsdale today and my producer Joy Holm for putting this together. She's been working extremely hard on the set side

and the production side and you know, the podcast is improving in quality quite dramatically in consequence. So we've got all sorts of new things lined up for you in the very near future. There'll be some announcements on that front very soon. Thank you very much for your time and attention today. Thank you very much for your time and attention today.