Theories of Everything with Curt Jaimungal - The Hardest Question No Religion Can Answer...
Episode Date: January 9, 2025As a listener of TOE you can get a special 20% off discount to The Economist and all it has to offer! Visit https://www.economist.com/toe New Substack! Follow my personal writings and EARLY ACCESS ep...isodes here: https://curtjaimungal.substack.com Timestamps: 00:00 - Evil 08:50 - New Testament 15:02 - Stoic Metaphysics 24:51 - The Spirit 31:12 - Books of the Bible 39:24 - John 1:1 47:55 - Jesus 54:14 - Language 01:02:45 - Neo-Platonism 01:08:53 - Self Awareness 01:14:35 - Consciousness 01:18:05 - God 01:19:51 - Spirituality 01:27:36 - Perennialism 01:36:55 - Belief 01:39:44 - Episode Recap! 01:50:50 - Outro Links Mentioned: • Johnathan Bi’s YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/@bi.johnathan/featured • David Bentley Hart’s bibliography: https://amzn.to/3C9vIqA • The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss (book): https://amzn.to/3DOuNMO • The New Testament: A Translation (book): https://amzn.to/427Dzzv • All Things Are Full of Gods: The Mysteries of Mind and Life (book): https://amzn.to/4h525pm • A Conversation Between Iain McGilchrist and David Bentley Hart (video): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vooDJQ3fdug&pp=ygUjaWFpbiBtY2dpbGNocmlzdCBkYXZpZCBiZW50bGV5IGhhcnQ%3D • Curt’s OSV profile: https://www.osv.llc/fellows-grantee/curt-jaimungal-95763 • Michael Levin’s blog: https://thoughtforms.life/ • The Atheist’s Guide to Reality (book): https://amzn.to/4h4U97n • Psychology from An Empirical Standpoint (book): https://amzn.to/3DHRzWA • Iain McGilchrist on TOE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q9sBKCd2HD0 • Donald Hoffman on TOE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CmieNQH7Q4w&t=7139s TOE'S TOP LINKS: - Enjoy TOE on Spotify! https://tinyurl.com/SpotifyTOE - Become a YouTube Member Here: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCdWIQh9DGG6uhJk8eyIFl1w/join - Support TOE on Patreon: https://patreon.com/curtjaimungal (early access to ad-free audio episodes!) - Twitter: https://twitter.com/TOEwithCurt - Discord Invite: https://discord.com/invite/kBcnfNVwqs - Subreddit r/TheoriesOfEverything: https://reddit.com/r/theoriesofeverything #science #podcast #religion #spirituality #philosophy Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
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heard you mention that the problem of evil is the most compelling and coherent argument
against theism, especially in its challenge to the idea of a benevolent
and omnipotent God. So what is the problem of evil? Why is this such a powerful critique?
And then what is your response to said powerful critique?
I see. We are starting at the deep end, or at least the… Oh, the problem of evil is simply the
obvious one, the suffering of the innocent, the pestilence, famine, war, children dying
of cancer, the suffering of all creatures. I have never been able to accept any of the sort of standard arguments from modal logic
or English analytic philosophy regarding materialism. I've never been able to accept the notion that the materialist picture of reality conforms
either to logic or experience, but the argument against belief in at least a benevolent good or God or belief in any sort of rational
order to the cosmos at all, from the sheer suffering of the innocent, from the sheer
darkness of this world I've never taken issue with, I find it the most powerful and to be honest unanswerable riposte to theism, at least as conventionally
conceived. The normal gesture of the religious imagination, of course, is simply to say there's
more to it than we understand. There's a good ending beyond it all. But as Ivan Karamazov argued, given the sheer enormity
of the evils we're talking about and their reality within the present, deferring the justification to this to some presumed eschatological
future doesn't make the cost any more morally bearable. I have no answer to it, to be perfectly
honest. I've never pretended to. I'm caught on the horns of a dilemma, metaphysically, intellectually, I'm a theist, just because I think that the evidence of
reason points in that direction, but the problem of evil, I regard, is irresoluble in the terms
available to us.
What's the difference between the problem of evil and the problem of suffering?
Oh, none. It's two names for the same thing. The notion of evil, I mean, the problem of
evil, I suppose, also encompasses the reality of human malevolence, you know, as moral evil
as well as natural. But at the end of the day, the truth is that as long as a single child has died
of diphtheria in the history of the human race, the preponderance of the argument, the
preponderance of the power of the argument is not one that favors the theistic or at
least theistic platitudes.
Matthew 16.30
For me, problems that I can't solve, they stick in my craw and I think about them as
I go about walks, if I'm at the gym, if I'm laying up at night trying to sleep. This is
an insolvable or insoluble problem. Is this one that keeps you up or is there something else?
Well, I don't know if it keeps me up because I'm a fairly lethargic creature. I can find It leaves me in an uncomfortable position.
I simply cannot make myself become the metaphysical optimist I might wish to be when confronted
with the reality of the suffering of the innocent, it simply exceeds anything my imagination
or my reason is able to overcome. At the same time, in other moments, I'm aware of the beauty
and goodness of things. It could be something like a child at play, or the sight of a dog.
I'm terrifically fond of dogs and cats. But at the end of the day, no, I don't think I'll ever comfortably settle into any state of firm and fervent and contented faith.
So, I guess what I'm looking for is there a variety of things that occupy one's mind,
whether they're positive or benign or problems, and then the problems come of a sort of philosophical
or theological sorts.
So I'm looking for, are there any quandaries or paradoxes that you think about almost on
a daily basis, theologically or philosophically? Well, definitely this one. I mean, you know, this, I think, I mean, not to wax too confessional
here, but right now, you know, I've been suffering from ill health for much of this past year,
sort of unexpected descent of a chronic pain condition. So I'm in pain every day.
And without much assurance of what direction I'm going in.
And one becomes conscious in those situations,
not that this is especially unfair because others, so many others suffer so much. But it does make one
less inclined to be glib about these things. I think it's very easy for us to
place the suffering of others in the back of our mind as merely an intellectual quandary,
so long as it doesn't touch us directly, and so long
as those most immediate to us whom we love are not suffering. Things change fairly rapidly
when one has to deal with suffering at closer quarters, not necessarily because of self-pity, there's always that
danger, but because it gives you a keener sense of how you've failed to take sufficiently
seriously the sufferings of others.
And I don't think I will ever, I mean, I could keep saying the same thing over and over again,
and I'm sorry to be repetitious, but the truth is, I believe certain things,
I believe certain things intellectually, I believe certain things religiously, but I
also think that if there's a way of understanding the price that is paid for existence in this world for the good that we hope lies at the essence
of all things or at the end of all things. We simply do not possess the resources to
calculate it.
I think actually one of the great virtues of the Psalms, to
be honest, is how often they're rather bilious in their attitude, you know, how much of them
consist in complaints to God.
Right.
Yeah.
Yeah, you can read them and they sound like they were written by modern day, well, they
sound like yourself.
It's remarkable because much of the Bible you read and there's plenty of it that's
antiquated.
Yep.
But that's not, it's not a book of consolations and that makes it timeless.
Oh, there's one part, and you know this far better than myself,
there's this one part that says, God, I'm suffering, I'm praying, and all I get is silence.
Where are you? Should I just not believe in you? Or something akin to that or analogous to that.
It's something of a refrain in the Psalms.
David Gordon called you one of the most well-read people in the world.
One-half? Yeah, I'm sorry. groups. David Gordon called you one of the most well-read people in the world. One of?
Yeah, I'm sorry.
That's kind of him.
I'm grateful to have you here, not only for that, but in spite of your health troubles
and your suffering that you've chosen to spend some time with me.
So thank you for that.
I don't know many people who have translated the entirety of the New Testament, so that's
pretty cool.
Let's talk about that.
You once said that we're fools if we think we understand it, referring to the Bible,
and that it's not a unified text.
It doesn't reflect a unified theology.
What reflects are many different reactions to an event of extraordinary mystery and power
to those who are writing about it. Now my question is, what event are you referring to and how should it be read
if it's not unified?
Well, the event I'm referring to is described early on in 1 Corinthians 15, it was simply the experience of the risen Christ. I find
it very hard to get past those verses for any number of reasons. Those are the earliest
accounts we have of not the resurrection, but experiences of these encounters. They antedate the empty tomb narratives of the Gospels. And they have a plain documentary
quality to them that's extraordinarily convincing. It's also the case that it's always been
something of an enigma why it is that Christianity survived the death of Christ, I mean the death
of Jesus of Nazareth, but for some supposition that these reports are based in reality.
When Paul says, you know, he's heard that one time 500 persons at a time had this experience.
And then speaking out of it as his own personal experience coming very late in the day, he
too had had this encounter.
Now, he doesn't talk about an empty tomb.
And the empty tomb narratives in the gospels themselves obviously are contradictory.
I mean, there's obviously a unified tradition there of the
women finding the tomb empty first. But if one were simply going on those stories, they
would seem fairly incredible. But what Paul's talking about is something else. And it is
a very curious thing. I mean, many historians have
acknowledged this, even those who have no stake in theological claims, that all the
other patterns of these messianic movements were great enthusiasm followed by disappointment, followed by dissolution, disintegration.
Here alone you had the movement after the death of its putative founder taking deeper
root and beginning to spread. And even, and I don't think this is purely hagiography because the evidence suggests otherwise,
even many of them being willing to die
rather than to deny that experience.
There was a famous Protestant,
or I should say Evangelischer,
theologian Wolfhard Pannenberg,
who converted to Christianity out of his studies, as it
was a sort of approach to historical science, and that he felt that this experience, this
event was a concrete historical datum that he couldn't get past. Now, that's not an absolute
proof of anything, but it's a compelling one. And as far as I'm concerned, the variety of responses,
I mean, to be perfectly honest, you know, any attempt to claim that there is a single unified
theology in the New Testament simply
requires such a forced reading.
Now, that forced reading is often facilitated by traditions of translation, which somewhat
suppress, somewhat hide what the actual language on the page is actually saying.
Things that are much less definite in the Greek have been, shall we
say, cajoled into conformity with the general picture and the translation. But even then,
it's clear that what we're getting is not a system of belief, not in a final refined
form. But what we are getting from Paul and others is a genuine conviction that something has happened that has altered
the frame of reality and has altered their relation to it. And they're responding to
it in a variety of ways using the theological paradigms available to them or the philosophical
paradigms available to them. And Paul talks about resurrection, he seems clearly to be influenced by, say, Stoic metaphysics
to some degree, for instance.
But it's not a system.
So, you mentioned this word, and I've heard you mention this several times in other interviews,
Stoic metaphysics.
So, what is the relevance of stoic metaphysics?
What is it?
What does it mean?
Well, you see, in a sense, it's kind of anachronistic when we're talking about late antiquity to
assume that everyone occupied just a single school.
As it happens, all of the different philosophical and metaphysical schools seem somewhat intermingled
with one another. Late Platonism had Aristotelian elements, it consorted with Stoic elements,
but Stoicism specifically a school of thought, greatest proponents, that had, in one sense, it did not make any complete and absolute
division between the physical and material, understood spirit as a kind of higher element,
mind as a kind of divine fire, God as a kind of divine fire, pervading all things, understood the cosmic
cycle of existence as one tending towards dissolution and a final great ecpyrosis, so
that there's a structure to history.
Now, it's a cyclical structure in Stoicism.
It recurs over and over again. But within history itself, it has a beginning, a middle,
and an end. And there have been very good scholarly works on how Paul's descriptions,
say of the resurrection body also in 1 Corinthians 15, indicate a leaning towards a stoic metaphysics
of matter and of the body and of spirit.
I mean, we, you know, later tradition talks about things like the resurrection of the
flesh, but that's something Paul didn't believe in.
He meant what he said when he said flesh and blood can't inherit the kingdom of heaven.
For him flesh and blood are inherently mortal composite realities of the psychical body, which is often mistranslated
as natural body, meaning a body animated, a body that has a psyche or soul or life principle
super added to it. And he foresees this being transformed into a body composed entirely of spirit. So that, you know, it's continuous in one sense, but in another sense, not.
Just a moment.
So a body composed entirely of spirit.
So the way that we think of it, even though we're not supposed to be dualists, but the
way that we think of it in modern times is that there's spirit and then there's matter
and that a body of spirit is just spirit.
Yeah. Well, again, that's a modern sort of Cartesian notion, the notion that the soul
is a kind of ghost in a machine or something. And some people think it has a kind of antecedent
and platonic thought. I think that's mistaken. But in Paul's language, and this is pretty much true of
most of the metaphysics of late antiquity, spirit is not disembodied. That's the wrong
way of thinking. It's more like a higher, a more super eminent, a more powerful element.
It's what angels are composed of, for instance,
or for non-Christians or non-Jews, what gods or demons, the intermediate divinities are
composed of. It is a kind of matter in itself. It's just not the lower matter of mortal existence below the sphere
of the moon, which is susceptible to genesis and decay.
So they don't talk about you having spirit? Because when someone says you have this, it's
as if it's like a purse or a backpack. It's something you have and you can also not have
it. So talk about the, you know, use that language well.
There's not a single consistent grammar here.
You can speak of in this life having spirit, having more spirit or not.
There are many from the sort of things we call the early Gnostic schools may or may not have had this notion
of the psychical body or a psychical man as being entirely devoid of the element of spirit.
You certainly get language of that sort in the epistle to Jude, which suggests that there
are those who are purely psychical.
Again, it's often translated as sensual man or animal man or whatever, but it was a psychical not having spirit.
But that's often, again, translated as not having the Holy Spirit, but that's not what
the Greek says.
So again, there's not a single systematic vocabulary or grammar at work.
But when we try to think of this in terms of either even
the later medieval notion of disembodied intelligences, I mean, Thomas Aquinas thought of angels
as being disembodied intelligences with no kind of material substrate at all, either ethereal or earthly. And so each angel is its own species because he's
a very much an Aristotelian and what individuates form or species is matter. Well, that's not
the way late antiquity thought. They just really didn't have that notion. And of course,
in the modern age, we have this radically Cartesian notion that Descartes gave us this picture, he more than anyone else, of body and soul
as two qualitatively different things, only body, the material body is an extended substance, a race extensa, and mind is simply race, kajatans, mind or soul, and
never, though the two meet, never, never should they be confused with one another. They're
entirely different. That's not the way Paul is talking in 1 Corinthians 15.
How much can we read into 1 Corinthians 15 if it was just two or three lines?
How can we tell the entire, not entirety, but a large portion of Paul's metaphysics
just from three lines if it wasn't mentioned in other places?
Well, it is mentioned in other places more elusively, such as when he talks about the
Outer Man and the Inner Man.
If you look at that, it's clear that he's,
or he talks about body and flesh,
flesh and spirit rather, being in tension
or being at odds with one another.
He's speaking much more literally about,
we tend to take the word flesh there
and make it into a moral category or something,
but also in 1 Corinthians 15, these are not vague,
and it's not just two or three lines,
but it's maybe seven or ten lines. He is giving an account of the resurrection body in which he is
very specifically denying that it's flesh and blood, a psychical body, one that's animated by
animated by soul and insisting that it's a body of spirit, a summa pneumaticon. And explicitly denying that flesh and blood can inherit the kingdom of heaven. These aren't
vague phrases. So again, Paul is a stoic. that would be a mistake. But it was a very influential school
of thought, I mean, you know, in its time. And it was also the one morally most consonant
with Christian thought. I mean, Paul is a cosmopolitan in the sense that he believes
that in Christ the divisions of peoples have disappeared. And he's quite happily a citizen of the empire using its apparatus in order to spread the
gospel.
And he has no desire to maintain divisions of identity, he thinks in the event of Christ, whatever this event is he's reporting,
its ultimate significance in terms of human community is that there is this body in which
there is neither Jew nor Greek, free nor slave, man and woman or husband and wife, even, you know, depending on how you translate
that. And Stoicism was very much, the ethos of Stoicism was that of cosmopolitanism. It
was of, you know, trying to, without absolutely abolishing, radical thought was very difficult
in the first century, for instance, but, you know, break down the
distinction between slave and master and barbarian and civil, and to proclaim a sort of universal
family of humankind, a cosmopolis, a city of the cosmos, as opposed to just say Rome, and
its emanations of power. So in many ways when Paul speaks morally,
not merely metaphysically, but morally, you can see that if there's a pagan school of
thought most consonant with the gospel he's proclaiming, it's definitely Stoicism.
Help me and the audience who are modern people, not necessarily do list, but help us understand
how the flesh and blood can't inherit the kingdom of heaven or the kingdom of God, but
the spirit can, yet at the same time, the spirit is not wholly different than flesh.
Well, is it wholly different from flesh. Flesh, in Paul's language, sarx, is a sort of animal
constitution which of its nature, certain things you have to understand, it's intrinsically
mortal. And for Paul, remember, salvation is from death. I mean, in the Age to Come, he doesn't, he nowhere talks about heaven and hell.
He talks about a renewed creation, Age to Come, of life as opposed to being lost to
death. the final judgment or the final Christ, the eschaton, is the creation of a new age beyond
the reach of death, which means it's not a creation still in which we would be bound
to flesh and blood, but have a body of a totally different kind, the sort of body that angels have. I mean, you know, even in the gospels, we have Christ
speaking of the age to come, we will live as the angels in heaven. Well, we tend to think of that,
again, very vaguely, but it could, I mean, if he's speaking to Pharisees and what we know of pharisaic religion suggests this is the case. What he is literally
saying is that in the life of the age to come, we will be physically like the angels. And
that means, and again, if you're working within the realm of late antique cosmology, that means also
a certain liberty from purely terrestrial limitations, because angels can live above
the sphere of the moon in the ethereal heavens.
We can't, but this is the thing that's hardest, perhaps, for late modern people to grasp is that the
distinction between the metaphysical and the physical is not as pronounced in late antiquity
as it is in late modernity.
That there's a sense in which, yes, you know that God's transcendent, at the same time,
there's a sense in which God's true heaven is the Empyrean above the fixed stars.
And in a sense, and when Paul talks about thrones and dominions and powers in high places,
he literally means these sort of mutinous angelic sort of beings who spiritually but
also in a sense physically separate us from God on high and that Christ
has made a way through the heavens and has conquered these powers. So there's still
a kind of place with the cosmological and the spiritual or metaphysical are as yet not clearly distinguished from one another. Obviously,
we live with very different cosmology, you know. And, you know, again, does that mean that this was all a pathetic illusion? They were bound to an antique picture
of reality that has been superseded? No, but it means that they're thinking in the terms
of their time to express this otherwise inexpressible experience of salvation in the risen Christ.
You personally, David, when you're thinking about the Bible or you're looking at the world,
do you have to switch your cosmology?
Do you have to switch your philosophy such that you diminish the distinction between
metaphysics and physics or physical, sorry, and adopt a stoic or a
more stoic metaphysic?
Or do you now because you've studied this and you've thought about it for so long, it's
natural to you and instead what you have to do is you have to switch to speaking to someone
like me who would require an analogy to say, okay, is this like flesh?
And then you heat it up and that becomes more
spiritual because it's on the same continuum, but it's temperature.
I don't even know if it's a continuum. I mean, I think flesh and blood are genuinely abolished
for Paul. How that then is a transformation rather than an exchange of one body for another.
I don't think Paul ever works out exactly.
I mean, he sees it as sort of like a seed, as he says, you know, it's sown a psychical
body, it's raised a spiritual body.
So in some sense, it's a continuity and a transformation.
But in that continuity, something is definitely shed. What he does not believe
in is a resurrection of the flesh. Now, we have one verse and one verse only in the Gospel
of Luke in which the risen Christ says, I'm flesh and bone. I'm not a spirit using spirit
there as it was also used in late antiquity just to mean a ghost, a phantom. So again,
the New Testament doesn't present a single picture.
For the most part, it seems to me,
at least the epistolary materials are closer to Paul
than to anything else.
But I'm not claiming, again, what I would say
is that the experience is very hard to deny,
that something happened.
How the persons of that time understood the experience was of its time and was various,
but it's quite possible for something to be very real and very concrete and still elude
single uniform expression.
But today, if we had this experience, we might very well be thinking in more Cartesian terms,
you know, or we might not.
I mean, you know, we might be thinking in terms suggested to us by modern physics with some sort of transformation into another kind
of corporeal frame made of light or something.
The imagination can only accomplish so much and conceptual models have only so much applicability. But what's important to
me is that we not misinterpret the original text for two reasons. One, just for the sake
of intellectual honesty. If we're not going to acknowledge that Paul means what he says, you know, and
say, oh, well, no, he believed in the body of flesh and blood being raised up, but, you
know, made immortal and all that, then we're just, you know, refusing to acknowledge that
his language doesn't conform to a lot of the later theological language of Christianity.
But the other thing is, to me, there's a kind of healthier intellectual hygiene in seeing
and recognizing the plurality of perspectives in the New Testament because it teaches us
not to be either fundamentalist, but not to think that dogmatically we understand and
know. It reminds us that the event compels us perhaps,
but it's not something that anyone has ever been able to understand with an absolutely
exhaustive and convincing language or model to work from.
So David, as a Christian, when you're trying to make sense of the Bible, do you give different
books different weights of credence?
So for instance, you would say an example that Mark was written first, therefore, what
comes in John is likely embellished with a poetic undertone.
And so I'm going to, if I'm supposed to take a literalist frame or a more historical frame
or whatever frame you may want to take, you're going to evaluate Mark differently than you
do John.
And there are disputed epistles, so I'm not going to put as much weight to them as I would
say 1 Corinthians. Well, with the pastoral epistles, Timothy and Titus, there are things that are disappointing
when you compare them to Paul's authentic epistles, and then there are things that are
quite encouraging about it. So, you know, it's a matter of sort. Well, I don't, I mean,
it was to say that Mark came first is not to say that it's, I
mean, assuming, I mean, we're pretty clear, it's probably the earliest of the gospels,
but that doesn't mean it's any more accurate or trustworthy than the others. It establishes
a narrative framing of Christ that's then taken up in Matthew and Luke. So Mark is part of what gives us the other two synoptics,
and that's a framing of Christ's ministry in certain terms and in a certain way of indicating
who he is. Even then, Mark lacks the logium material, the sayings of Christ that actually
give us any firm sense
of say his moral teachings for that. You need to go to Matthew and Luke to get a better
sense of what the tradition there says. John is clearly from a completely different ambit.
It is a theological commentary on Christ, but doesn't even make the pretense of being
an historical narrative in the same way, except when it does, you know, and suddenly you get very
particular information given about Caiaphas, say, or something, whether it's true or not.
I don't know. Again, as I say, when it comes to the credibility of the claims Christians make, that one chapter in 1 Corinthians, chapter 15, has a force that's unique to my mind in the New Testament in terms of credibility.
Other than that, since I'm not looking, I mean, I don't regard scripture as an index of dogmas. I don't really think in terms of how to weight it. I believe that—and
when I say the event of Christ, I don't just mean the resurrection. I mean his presence and time and his teaching and all that, is indicated,
is elucidated to a great extent. And then there are great layers of interpretation of
it, as in say John's Gospel, that are precious perspective on it, but that by themselves, if they're not part of this sort of polyphonic
testimony would not be as compelling or as convincing. Because to be honest, Jesus as
he appears in the Gospel of John, is not an attractive figure in the way he is in Luke,
say. He's not an attractive figure in the way he is in Luke, say.
He's not as attractive?
Well, I mean, there's very little of the – you see very little, with the exception of the
story of the woman taken in adultery, which of course isn't actually originally part
of John.
It probably was a free-floating tradition that would fit better in Luke.
But you see very little. At times you do. I mean, you see the humanity of Christ
weeping at the grave of Lazarus and all that. But most of it is taken up with discourses
and very, you know, mystical discourses and a very pronounced language of judgment, you
know, of discrimination, you know, you're children of the devil, it's light
and darkness. Christ in the Gospel of John, we see him not in his aspect as the moral
teacher of Matthew and Luke, but in the aspect of God or not? And there, you know, it's sort of a – the
gospel is making a theological comment about God entering time in a way that separates separates light from darkness. But we hear very little about feeding the poor, about
caring for the sick, about visiting the prisoners. We think of the Jesus of John in those terms
because we're thinking of Jesus as he's presented in the two long synoptic gospels. And that's
necessary. You need this counterpoint. You need to see the
historically concrete figure who emerges from the sayings attributed to him and from the
story of this man who comes out of Galilee into Judea speaking on the behalf of the poor
and the excluded in order for that light of judgment that you see in John to be something
more than just a terrifying and to be honest, somewhat incredible myth.
Now let's get to something controversial.
Unlike this, yes. So let's get to something controversial. I don't like this. So speaking of John, John, the first part of John, the Greek is often rendered in the
beginning was the logos or the word and the logos was with God and the logos was God.
Now I just brought up this cup here.
There's an event that I went to called O'Shaughnessy Ventures.
They fortunately gave me a grant
to work on something. And over there, someone else was given a grant. His name is Jonathan
B. I'll put a link to his channel on screen and in the description as well. He was telling
me, Kurt, in that verse, there's in the Greek, there's something called pros, yeah. Yes, right, right. And it implies that it implies a moving toward or a facing.
And that connotes something that's distinct.
So most Christians think of Jesus as God, not just an aspect of God, but as God.
And sometimes they'll even pray to Jesus.
But this to me suggests that Jesus is not God.
Now in your translation, again I'll put the link on screen to your work, you do a similar
translation except God is in capitals and then at one point God is in lower case.
So walk us through John 1.1. Well,
in Arginio logos, che logos proston theon in,
che logos theos in,
or in, I'm trying to remember the order there, but it's actually,
theos logos in, come to think of it, it's a god, the word was or something. But
it's not the word there. And I say a god because the actual distinction in the verse that,
or at least that the verse seems to honor, although again, structures of predication
have ambiguities in Greek. But a theos, or ho theos as you'd say in Erasmian Greek, the God is generally the privileged
term for God Most High in the ancient world, and this is a convention in pagan and Jewish
and Christian thought. And for Christians, I mean, I honestly believe the New Testament, Otheos, always means God in the sense of
father, right? But when it says the Logos was God or God was Logos, the article is missing.
There's no article. And the word God had a much greater elasticity in the antique world.
It could be used, you'll find even, say,
church fathers using the term when they're speaking of saints.
John of Damascus will speak of saints as they, you know, God. And of course, angels became angels were originally gods within
a pantheon, within an Israelitic pantheon. And so here what you're having is an assertion Not of necessarily co-equal identity, but of continuity.
It's still saying the logos is God, but it's not equating it there, equating the logos
there with God most high.
Still here the issues begin to arise.
And this is quite common right up through the fourth century
in Christian thought that's still a very strong, what's considered an orthodox strain of thought,
small o, especially in the East up until the Council of Nicaea and after for a long time
afterwards as a kind of what would be called a subordination, essentially, that God misties
God in the proper sense, the Father's. And then the logos is defteros
theos. And you find this, say, in a Jewish thinker like Philo, but also Christian thinker.
You can read, say, Eusebius before Nicaea gives you a pretty clear notion of what many
believe to be Orthodox Christianity, which there's not a co-equality. There's a
continuity, but it's vague. It can even, in the case of, say, Arianism, the sun can be
seen as created, and there's a kind of ambiguity between the notion of creation and generation.
Gnima and Gnima are spelled slightly differently. That said, and the reason for this notion of a secondary God is that
God properly is so transcendent that he can't enter into direct contact with finite reality.
Therefore, he generates his word, you know, or his secondary God, the angel of mighty
counsel, the king, the chief of the angels to govern creation and to deal
with the lower world. And then the spirit would be maybe God too, but you know, and
there's a reticence about this right up to very late, several centuries along, ever to
use the term Otheos for anyone other than the Father, okay? And yet, in the Gospel of John, though you have that in the prologue, in chapter
20, the apostle Thomas, when he speaks to the risen Christ, doesn't – people think
he actually touches Christ, rather Christ invites him to touch, but he doesn't. Instead, he falls to his knees and says, o curiazmo che o theazmo, o my Lord
and my God. And there, he seems to be addressing Jesus as o theos, as God most high. Now, this
is extraordinary. The Gospel of John also is full of statements like, he who has seen me has seen the Father, I and
the Father are one. So while the prologue of John seems to maintain this distinction,
this distinction in other ways is breaking down and then climatically in chapter 20,
which is probably the original ending of the gospel before that beautiful dream-like chapter 21 was added,
goes so far as to address Jesus as Otheos,
God most high. And this is the debate going into the fourth century.
Is this an honorific?
Is he saying this to proclaim that just how high Jesus
has been raised in the esteem of
the heavenly powers due to what he has accomplished, or is it a statement of who he is eternally?
And I could go on a great length of what happened at Nicaea and after.
I mean, of course, there is the issue of imperial pressure, the newly Christianized Emperor Constantine wanting
some sort of uniformity of confession. But it's also the case that there's a very real
line of reasoning going on there that what had happened in Christ and what happens in
the Spirit is real union with God, God the Father. And such union is impossible, is something that can't be
accomplished by a lesser agency or by a spirit. So if we believe this, if we believe Otheos
really is present in Jesus, and now Jesus is really present in the Holy Spirit in sanctification
and sacrament, then there has to be inequality. In some sense, you're
always dealing with God himself, you know. And that's how the later confession finally
coalesced, finally reached its convictions about what the proper language of the Trinity
is. Still, it would be wrong to falsify the New Testament and pretend that
there's a fully developed Trinitarian theology there. There simply isn't. And, you know,
in the prologue, you're still very much in the world of late antiquity in which there's
God Most High and then a secondary, Adepthoros, who is in some sense the reflection of God most high, but
who has turned toward the Father as the priest leading the liturgy of creation.
Did I hear you earlier say that you could read it as saying Jesus, which is the Logos,
even though it says the Logos, but so the Logos was a God instead of the Logos was the
God? Yeah. Because there's a missing article,
you said?
Interesting.
Pete Yeah. But I think, but I mean, the thing is, again, we can't think about that polytheistically
though. It would mean a divine being, a divine, but it's saying more at the same time.
Jared Or you also mentioned angels could be thought of as gods from before, but not in Apollo
Theses.
Pete Slauson
The earliest dominant Christology is what scholars call angelomorphic. I mean,
it was thought to be, and this remains part of the discourse very late in the Christian tradition,
that Jesus is also the captain of the angels, so to speak, the leader of the heavenly hosts.
And there was this notion of the defteros theos as the koryphaios, the one who leads
the heavenly choirs and their liturgy of praise.
And so he's turned, he's the one alone who's, because a priest, well, except in the Novus Ordo, but generally speaking, a priest has his back to the people
because he's leading the liturgy, everyone turned towards the mystery of God, right?
And this is certainly how a lot of the early, how the Christians well into the fourth century
and after were thinking that he uniquely is the highest of heavenly beings,
the angel of mighty counsel, the highest of the angels, and also the unique son of the
father, and is leading the heavenly liturgy.
This language falls away later as it becomes very much superseded by the formal language of Trinitarian dogma. This
is controversial not because the scholarship is controversial. I want to point out, even
people of impeccable orthodoxy scholars have known this.
I mean, they've known that Arius was not some strange,
curious anomaly, that he was simply an extreme expression
of what was regarded by many as the orthodoxy of centuries.
And there's a reason why after the Aryan controversy,
the controversy continued with the Enomians and others.
There were bishops and priests
still committed to this older view that they thought was the correct view.
It was the Nicene party that was proposing a new grammar, you know, even a new word,
homo-ocius, consubstantial.
It's not in scripture and it wasn't in previous Christian usage.
But to this day, you say the people, even theologians or people who do Christian
philosophy, but who don't study Christian history very closely and don't know late antiquity
very well, think that you're saying something, you know, that's just an opinion. It's not.
I mean, it is the hard and fast data of the time. And again, as I say, you can read, you can see the change occurring in Eusebius. You just read him before the Nicene Council on who
Jesus is and then read him after and there's been a change, you know.
Yeah, I also don't see it as so straightforward that Jesus himself identifies as God. Now,
in these examples, there's John,
which is the first part is just some narrator saying that Jesus is God, and then there's
Thomas who says, my God, as well as my Lord. But also, when you see anything majestic,
you go, my God. To me, it's just not so obvious. And also-
Oh, yeah. Well, it could be a fervent expression of praise of God.
I mean, that was one of the arguments of the past.
Yeah, that was among those who said, well, that, you know, that he's not addressing Jesus.
And how can you tell because it's not in the vocative.
He doesn't say, Kyriamu, Kytheamu, you know, so it could be, it could be either.
I love that I'm speaking with you, that you know the Greek inside and out.
Well, you kind of need to, if you do some of what I do, you need to know some Greek.
It helps.
Yeah, and also Jesus said, when you pray, you go to your room, you shut the door, so
you do so in private, you pray to the Father and our Father who are in heaven.
Right.
And another point he said.
You're still in Matthew now.
Yeah, and another point someone said, who is good?
No, someone called Jesus good, he's like, no one is good but the Father.
And if you ask for anything in my Father and in my name, which it seems to me like he's
pointing out a distinction between himself and the Father.
Yeah, there's one who is good. There are two different versions of that verse. There's
the majority text and the critical text. But anyway, yes, the point is, it seems to be
saying, yeah, in John, however, again, you do have statements that, again, I don't attribute
to the historical Jesus one way or the other. I'm just saying in John, you have theological statements already emerging, which I and the Father are one.
Now again, what is that oneness? What is that unity that he, when he's praying in Gethsemane,
that he had with the Father before the ages? Well, you're not going to get a single answer.
And the early church didn't have a single answer. And you've got to remember that when the Council of Nicaea was convened, as yet there was no
notion of church councils as having some preeminent and indisputable doctrinal authority. That
too is an emergent phenomenon in Christian history. It's not something, it's okay, well, we better
call our first infallible council. That's not what was going on. But definitely, Constantine
wanted a clear single voice emerging from what was becoming an institutional support of the Empire.
Now, speaking of oneness, I prepped for conversations weeks in advance quite extensively.
So unfortunately, I can't give you the source of this quote that you said.
And in fact, I'm paraphrasing it, so it's not even a quote.
But you said that life, consciousness, and language are the same.
Now, I can imagine
how consciousness and life have a tie. However, what would be your definition of language
such that it's the same as consciousness?
Oh, now we're shifting into my recent book. You see, now I take off the theological, biblical
hat, put on the philosopher's hat, I guess,
the mantle.
Well, this is about physics, philosophy, and consciousness.
Yeah, yeah. Well, I mean, I take several hundred pages of that book to explain what I say here is less than satisfying. But I believe that life and consciousness both
examined phenomenologically but also logically exhibit a kind of intentional structure,
intentional in the philosophical sense. I don't mean in the psychological sense, but, and that language too is nothing but intentionality and that
the existence of language and of language using beings is every bit as mysterious and
exhibits the same causal structure.
But also that you can, in a sense, analogously speak of language in terms of, or you can
speak of mind and life, both in terms of language, even in the obvious sense that life has an element of transcription and hermeneutics
involved between one phenotype and another. And I think we've known for more than 70,
80, maybe, you know, going on quite, getting near the century mark,
but at least since the time of Barbara McClintock's experiments with Mays, we have a much firmer
sense of the sort of intentional systems within intentional systems, right up to say, like,
those sort of experiments.
How convincing they are, you can debate.
But let's say Michael Levin's at Tufts and Xenobots and the power of life.
For curious listeners, I've spoken to Michael Levin four times on this channel.
Each one is linked on screen and in the description.
The topics include consciousness, bioelectricity, intelligence, emergence, and even the nature of reality itself.
Much like this conversation, so if you enjoyed this conversation with David Bentley Hart,
then I recommend you check out this interview on screen here with Michael Levin.
I'll also be speaking with Michael again in person at some point soon,
so please leave your questions for both David for the part two,
and Michael for whenever I speak with him again in the comments below.
You can debate, but I'm going to say Michael Levin's at Tufts and Xenobots and the power
of life to engineer organic systems towards solutions that are not simply provided by a prior template, but that require kind of
hermeneutical plasticity in the cell and gene editing.
But there's also a sense, you know, when you think about what is language, I mean, as intentionality, as a,
every time you make a statement, if it's a coherent statement,
there's an antecedent finality.
If you're gonna talk like an Aristotelian,
there's a final cause, right?
And there's a sort of formal cause.
And it's that semantic intelligibility
that determines the material substrates of sounds
or words on the page, just as there's a semantic level of intelligibility that determines the material substrates of sounds or words on the page,
just as there's a semantic level of intelligibility, arguably, that determines the way the material
ingredients of organic life or the working of conscious processes in the brain operate. And that always, you know, the curious thing
I think, when you think about it, when you actually allow for the reality of intentionality,
and there's a reason why the most radically eliminativist models of mind and of life want to do away with intrinsic
intentionality is impossible as that is to do.
I mean, it's something like Alex Rosenberg denying that, you know, anything has ever
been about anything else, which he writes a book about.
And it's because the moment that you allow intentionality and intrinsic existence, even in language,
which is baffling enough, I mean, there's an argument in the book against the notion
that language can be a purely emergent phenomenon from purely pre-linguistic origins.
Too complicated to recapitulate here. But nonetheless, immediately you realize that there's always a kind of, that in addition
to the physical space of consequence in which things unfold, there's a noetic space in which
the final, the end and the beginning are both co-present in a sense, they exist in a sort
of hermeneutical or noetic
space. I think this is why like neoplatonism is a sort of an almost natural reflex of the
mind the moment it grants intentionality, why you find a very similar metaphysics in
India in putting aside issues of cross-pollination and all that. And then of course the unity
of that noetic space, you're going to think, well, even that
unity itself has to subsist in some sort of higher unity, some true simplicity, some pure
source that holds things together as one and yet many.
And so you posit sort of the one, the tohen of Plotinus.
But definitely I think that the more deeply you think about it, mind, life, and language
do all pose the same problems to the materialist reductive process, or project rather, sorry. And the purpose of that recent book, All Things Are Full of Gods,
which is a long book, is to give the reductive project its due. I mean, there's a voice in
there, it's written as a dialogue, and Hephaestus is allowed to argue for it at great length. But I mean, the purpose of the book is to show that again and again, the project does
not explain this irreducibility or does not reduce this reducibility adequately.
And it turns out to be the same problem, the same irreducibility in mind, in life, in language.
All things are in a sense, intelligible discourse insofar as they have structure that has any,
I know we're not, teleology is the thing we're supposed to avoid, and yet it's the thing that's almost
impossible to avoid, at least even as scientific method, even when we're denying it any ontological
purchase, we're using it methodologically, and that raises questions of its own.
You know, to understand evolution, you're always asking, what was this good for?
And then you can say, but of course, all we're really talking about are serial attrition and an evolutionary process.
But that's a supposition. You know, if a method illuminates,
why does it illuminate?
Well, two thoughts occur to me. One is Brent Hano's thesis, if I'm pronouncing that correctly.
I wanted to know if your association with consciousness and language relies on that.
But then you also said something else that's interesting I want to explore.
So I'll just say it and we can explore it later.
You mentioned that neoplatonism is a natural consequence of allowing for intentionality,
something like that. I don't know how that is the case, so I would like to hear more about that.
So-
Well, as for Brentano, I take it you mean the thesis that intentionality is the mark
of the mental.
Yes.
Right? Yeah, I believe that when, again, phenomenologically, you can't separate intentionality from consciousness,
from rationality. The notion that you can have consciousness without intentionality, I think,
can be dealt with pretty brutally, but fairly. The tendency in Anglo-American philosophy of mind
has been sort of divided and conquered
for years.
If you can just isolate one thing like consciousness and say that's the hard problem and if you
could solve that everything will fall into place, I think is an illusion that they're
all the hard problems and also that when mind acts, it always acts in concert.
The things that we want to pretend are separate faculties are in fact just phenomenological
dimensions of a single unified act that can't be dissolved.
And that's part of the reason why we don't have a satisfactory model of mind is because
we're trying to compose it from parts that we've abstracted from the whole, but in fact the whole has
to exist in its totality for the parts to exist.
So yes, the, you know, Brentano's understanding of intentionality, I differ from him in certain
aspects of it, but yes, and also his reflexive nature, the
fact that to be conscious is to be conscious of being conscious.
So that's not just intentionality is directed towards an ever more transcendental end point
that's always eliciting conscious and volitional and rational and intentional acts, but also
that intentionality requires
this ground of consciousness that's always founded upon itself that I don't think can
emerge from a composite material basis.
Again, an argument too long to rehearse here.
As for the remark about Neoplatonism, well, I mean, I think it's just that I think if you play to this, I mean you have the one which generates noose or mind
in its pure aspect, which is just self-reflection,
whereas the one has a kind of super-intellections.
It's not reflected.
And from this, the lower aspect of psyche or life or soul.
And I think that when you think in these terms,
when you realize that if you go back the other way,
say, and you look at life and you look at soul or mind,
or you look at logos, see the language,
and you find yourself unable to get away
from the intentional structure,
then you allow
for the future to be a real cause in the present, right?
For that to be the case, for there to be this integrated intentional reality, there has
to be, and again, I'm not proposing a particular ontology of it. I'm simply saying structurally, you have to think that there's a noetic space, noetic
realm in which beginning and end are present to one another.
You know, that, that, that if I'm going to say, why doesn't it have to be a sentence? Two plus two equals four. I'm granting my
ability to make that statement, to communicate it to you, to think grants that the four and
the two plus two in that noetic space are already indissertably connected to one another, causally, consequentially.
And then of course you ask yourself the question of what allows for unity at all in the many,
you know, because how is that noetic space one? And you begin thinking in terms of a
profound simplicity of unity, a sort simplicity, a unity, a sort
of ontological unity, a trans-finite unity, even that traverses everything, that allows
everything to be both this, not that, and yet altogether, everything. So all I meant
was that Neoplatonism has a kind of natural plausibility
to a mind that's thinking in these terms
about the structure of life and mind
and why it's really not until the modern period
that sort of a purely mechanical notion of nature
really gains wide purchase.
I mean, early schools of Greek thought like democratists
you early schools of Greek thought, like democratists and the notion of certain aspects of fabricarianism. But these are boutique schools and even they have a kind of unfinished quality to them
that admits of ambiguities. It's only really the mere modern period that we were able to create
for ourselves the notion of mechanism and to do away with a different notion of the
causal structure of reality in part because intuitively a mechanism doesn't make much
sense to us until we make it make sense to us. And even then it's never to my mind managed to produce a purely coherent ontology.
Now there's a strain of Buddhism, one of the oldest schools of Buddhism called Theravada.
And there's a particular state called Neroda Samapati.
And it indicates that you can have awareness without self-awareness.
It's like a bare consciousness event.
So does that not contravene that every conscious experience needs to be one of self-consciousness?
That indeed you can have consciousness without the I know that I know. Theravada is just one school of Abhidhana or Dharma Buddhism that persisted in Sri Lanka.
And later Buddhist, you know, sort of condescendingly called Hinayana, lesser vehicle Buddhism.
But yeah, no, I just, I mean, I simply believe that it's,
how can I put it,
as a truth about making, you know, having a propositional claim about the self,
it's true to an extent, but otherwise,
I would say that it's false
as far as the actual consciousness goes.
That there is always, to be conscious at all
is simply to be conscious of being conscious.
There's a kind of paradox in it.
There's a kind of what would be an infinite regress
if we were talking about a material reality underlying it.
be an infinite regress if we were talking about a material reality underlying it. And there's no way of consciousness actually to be conscious without that sort of reflexive
dimension in it. I think Brenton knows, Seamus Husserl, very good on this.
And so, depending on how you interpret the early Buddhist claim, depending on that, I
would give it limited or no credence.
So, if consciousness is always directed at something, so that's intentionality for people
who are wondering what the heck is this word that keeps coming up over and over.
It's aboutness, so you direct it, you're directing.
So if consciousness is always intentional, directed at objects, but that object is always
self-conscious, do we get an infinite regress? If you're conscious of X, you're
necessarily conscious of being conscious of X and you then have a consciousness or you're
conscious that you're conscious of being conscious of X.
It would be an infinite regress if you're thinking of this in terms of composite
of distinct forces. Sure. And that's the problem with trying to reduce it to material
causes.
It's a problem trying to reduce it to sort of a purely neurological or material base
because then you will be sort of in this infinite modular regress of. But if consciousness simply is this simple act of self-reflexive awareness, an infinite
regress is a specter that can be chased away pretty quickly because what you're doing is
you're confusing categories.
You're thinking in material composite terms about an activity and an agency that simply is what it is.
It's like saying, well, what illuminates the light?
I mean, it's not a real regress.
It would be though, and therein lies the problem with the materialist reductionism or one of
many problems with the materialist reduction of consciousness.
What about pre-reflective experiences like being in the zone or flow states where you
have awareness and you don't have an explicit self-awareness?
Well, I mean, I think that it depends as a psychological state, yeah.
The psychological state of here I am, David Hart having this experience at this moment can recede.
But being in the zone or just, you know, in that flow of action, there's still, in a sense,
probably a purer reflexive consciousness. You're just purely aware of awareness.
You're just purely aware of awareness.
The finite and changeable preoccupations of the empirical self, the psychological self,
fall largely dormant,
but only to give way to a more immediate sort
of reflexiveness.
It's never, it's not like in those moments of flow,
you're in a coma, you know, quite the opposite.
There's an immediacy of experience that's over what,
that, oh, you know, when the dancer becomes the dance,
you could say that she or he is also becoming
the consciousness, the dance becoming conscious of itself rather than the psychological self
remaining preoccupied with itself for those moments.
It's an escape from that sort of psychological limitation. But it's certainly not an escape from awareness of awareness of awareness.
If all consciousness required self-consciousness, how could it be that consciousness came about
in the first place?
Would the first moment also need to somehow include self-awareness?
Yeah, no, again, I'm not talking about
psychological sense of identity.
Self-awareness, just being like this moment of consciousness,
knowing itself as conscious,
may not take a very hard and fast propositional form.
But yeah, I would say the consciousness does not emerge
from the pre-conscious.
It, so to speak, descends.
It fashions life, it fashions organism,
and as soon as there is life,
there's already mind and consciousness of some kind.
How that is within the structure of life,
I'm not gonna pretend to understand exhaustively,
but I think that consciousness
is not an emergent phenomenon,
but a super, well, superintending, superforming.
I don't even want to say supervening because that can be mistaken for a specific sort of
school of thought that I don't agree with either.
Yeah, I don't believe that consciousness is ever
a fragment of consciousness.
It's never just sensitivity or something.
That if it's mind, then it's this integrated act
that cannot emerge strongly.
That is the important thing, strong emergence,
meaning emerging as something from a material basis
or from a lower basis that has no other source
and yet is irreducible to that basis.
I think that's a myth, that such a thing cannot be.
If it emerge, as it emerges in nature in the weak sense, it does so because I think you
have to think in terms of something like formal and final causes as well.
Again, not as they were, I mean, let's be honest, in early modernity, all that Aristotelian
language was already so badly misunderstood that what was being rejected was just a rival
mechanical model.
They thought of final causes as sort of attraction,
as if these are extrinsic to one another,
and between them working out a phenomenon.
Whereas in fact, that's not what the Aristotelian tradition,
it's a completely different set of issues.
It's really just talking about the predictable structure
of something that is coherent,
materially identified substantially,
has some sort of intrinsic limit to or end of its potentiality.
So that a seed, an acorn isn't going to grow into a penguin.
So even though, but that's an excursus.
So excuse me.
I would say that my contention would be
that strong emergence is impossible for anything,
and strong emergence certainly will not explain
if life is real, if mind is real, if language is real.
If there is such a thing as intentionality,
and I think we have good reason to think there is, then the mechanical
materialist reductionist project will always fail ultimately to give a cogent answer to
the questions that torment us.
So we've been speaking about emergence and consciousness and for those who are interested
in more, you have a book called The Experience of God and that will be on screen.
Link in the description as well as all of your books.
And the more recent treatment, which is a larger excursion into these topics, is All
Things are Full of Gods.
Link on screen and in the description.
How do you see the relationship between consciousness, being, and God?
A small question, I know.
Well, ultimately, I would say that they're all one, you know, that to be conscious, to
exist, to be intentionally oriented towards transcendental ends. All of these are finite participation
in the one God who is being consciousness blessed.
They use the Satya Dhananda,
the Sanskrit terset, which were in Arabic,
which done washed, you know, that you've got in even Arabic, that you can live in Arabic, or analogously in Augustine's understanding
of the Trinity, perhaps, that ultimately these are all in God, one in the same. God is the being of all, the one source of all, mentality, the one end of all, of all longing,
desire and intention, and we experience it in a plural way. But ultimately what we experience
is and seek is one and the same.
So I have some questions from the audience I would like to get to actually. So one here
is you've recently embraced a public and explicit form of universalism, formulating
a convincing metaphysical argument for a type of full cosmic theosis. In this view, a finite will cannot
infinitely resist an infinite will or the infinite will of God.
Now simultaneously you've embraced a more explicit religious syncretism and according
to all reports it seems like you've ceased participating in Christian tradition. If there
are parts of this that you disagree with, you can also talk about that.
But the question is, in a world filled with these people who are saying, I'm spiritual
but I'm not religious, and there's a diminishing spiritual discipline and tradition, there's
relativizing, there's laxity, what makes your recent positions different than new age gurus? Do you still
consider yourself a Christian? Do you advocate that others follow your own religious path?
So feel free to disagree with some of the premises as well.
It's, it's, we have to wait, we have to wade through the confusions there. I don't know what these reports are that I cease to be observantly
Christian. I have been suffering health problems, I'll admit, so I don't get out of the house to church very often, or at all for the past few months.
But that's not a matter of apostasy or tergification or anything. I didn't say that finite will cannot resist an infinite will eternally.
That sounds like it's a contest between God willing salvation for all and humans trying
to resist it.
That's somewhat barbarizes the argument regarding the structure of freedom because I'm purely
classical in my understanding of what free
will for a rational being is. That's all. In fact, the arguments I make there could
have been made by Thomas Aquinas, for instance, but he was a double predestinarian. I know
some people don't like that term for him, but it's true. And for him, the reason that
he didn't have a free will defense of hell. He believed that certain persons were
predestined to be saved and the Lord rest had no hope of salvation, derelict by the
withholding of efficacious grace. So if that's your picture of God, that's fine. But for
Aquinas, there really would be an issue of finite will not being
able to resist an infinite will as though it was when El Sinander said something.
I said something very different.
I said that a will that resists God is not a free will by definition if you actually
look at what it would mean logically to say that something is a free will by definition if you actually look at what it would mean logically to say
that something is a free choice.
And again, I can only direct people to the book that all will be saved.
I'm not interested in people who say they're spiritual or not religious, but I'm not hostile
to them because I'm not my place to judge the spiritual state of others.
And I expect people to believe what they believe.
I've said already in this interview what I believe, and it may seem minimalist to some.
It's that the experience of the resurrected Christ described in 1 Corinthians 15 is very
hard not to believe for me. I mean, I find that there's a plausibility
there and a persuasiveness. And I find in the teachings of Christ something that I think
is an epochal shift in human culture that I see is nothing less than divine. Yeah, there were other schools of compassionate
thought such as Stoicism, but something really unprecedented is going on in the teaching
and in the person and the story of Christ that to me, it would be implausible not to call revelation.
From those two things, the belief that this resurrection experience was real and that
this man who was experienced is already an anomaly and one we've never fully adequately apprehended. I mean, it's how much of Christian
history is just institutional corruption and the politics of power and cruelty. When we
say we're Christians, we're probably making an unwarrantedly pretentious claim for ourselves.
But yeah, so I'm not really interested in New Age spirituality.
When I say syncretic, my thinking, I believe that all schools of human thought are open
to us in the same way that say Greek thought was assumed into Christian thought.
I would not be able to live religiously at all, not in terms of Christ. That's true.
I mean, I don't know if that's an emotional truth about me or an intellectual truth. I
like to think it's the latter and the former, but the latter as giving substance to the former. But I couldn't become a Vaishnav.
I have great respect for the piety of those who, and I believe that they're truly loving and worshiping and seeking God.
But I can't imagine not seeing God as revealed in the face of Christ and the form of Christ
and in this genuinely inexplicable historical enigma that the messianic movement of Jesus of Nazareth did not die out and that
this first generation of Christians, so numerously and so obstinately, and so in some cases self-destructively refuse to deny that experience.
That said, I don't have much patience for bigotry. I know this thing that if this is
simply a conflation of the notion of following Christ with absolutely
limiting yourself intellectually, spiritually, within the conceptual world of the institution,
as you know it, I think you're making a grave mistake intellectually and morally. Because, I think God speaks to all peoples.
What is perennialism and would you consider yourself a perennialist?
No, the name of those who called themselves that are people like Guénon and Chouin and
others, I don't like them very much at all. In part because of
their wretched politics, they're all very sort of arch-conservative believers in hierarchy
in the most pompous and I think degenerate way. but also because they weren't really, I mean, they made it
up as they went along. I mean, Shuhon created this sort of esoteric inner core that he said
is really there in all the religions. And so you should follow one of these paths, but
of course you should be one of the esoteric ones, which means that you're following Shuhon.
And his own practices were, you know, he made up these sort of these rather
pathetic sort of sexual games he played with, with, it's very, it's, that term perennialism
associated with them. But also, you know, I mean, I very much liked when I was young Aldous Huxley's perennial
philosophy, which was just an anthology of mystical texts, many of which weren't available.
I mean, you know, to be honest, much wasn't available to him that later became available. But no, I'm not a perennialist now. I don't
feel that I have to apologize when I see, say, a Vedantic text on the relationship of creation to God, say, let's say it's Vishishtadvaita
or something, that I think makes a good point that clarifies points of Christian thought.
I don't see any reason to remain aloof from it or deny my gratitude to this tradition.
And I certainly don't think that I have any right to claim that Vaishnavas or Shaivites
or Muslims or Jews or Sikhs or others,
obviously not with Jewish people, I mean, the others are somehow not genuinely seeking
and being guided by God and enfolded within revelation
and within divine love.
But perennialism, that was a fake system invented by very dubious men
that I find a bit silly and a bit distasteful, to be honest. You find people like Steve Bannon
are all on board with people like Evola and Gaynor. Interesting. Okay, I have a quote here from Ian McGilchrist, which you
agreed with. So, we are experiencing something real. We're not just experiencing a representation.
And that discrepancy is crucial. Many people think that they've overcome the Cartesian
problem by intensifying it, suggesting that we can only interpret reality through a bank of dials, a version of reality.
However, it's not just an instrument panel that we're seeing, as if we're closed off
in a windowless cell.
We are actually making contact with what we mean by reality.
Now, just for people who are wondering where is that from, you had a conversation with
Ian McGilchrist.
I'll put that on screen as well because it's fantastic to listen to. So given this,
what do you think about theories that purport to have consciousness first,
but then they still say that what we see is an illusion. It's not actually reality because in
some Kantian sense, we can never know ultimate reality. These theories suggest that what we see
is distorted. We interact with some watered down amorphous or anamorphic version of reality, as well
as by Donald Hoffman or Thomas Campbell in that we're living in a simulated reality,
although consciousness is first.
It's not actually reality that we experience.
It's not the same. I think, you know, as I am in a, in this case, now I put on my hat as writer of fiction,
in a novel I wrote called Kenegaiya, one of the characters is quoted as saying of orthodoxy
against small o and this should be understood as
sort of dogmatic scientific or philosophical orthodoxy, is the elevation of a humble half-truth
to the, or I don't remember exactly the phrase, the grand eminence of a total falsehood.
There's a half-truth in that, And of course we don't have a full grasp of
ultimate reality. And we started this conversation talking about, for instance, the problem of
evil. And there are all sorts of things about both the physical and the conceptual that
lie beyond us. But then to say it's all illusion and representation, of course the notion of representation and
again taken to a sort of hyper Kantian extreme, that begins to break down, I want to point
out, after Kant, even in Kant's less, opus postumum, it's already beginning in a sense
to break down, but then begins to break down at Fichtener and German idealists. And saying, in returning to this notion
that there is a commonality between mind and being,
rather than some sort of strange juxtaposition
of two qualitatively, immiscible realities.
The way this would have been put in an antique metaphysics, whether Platonic
or Aristotelian, for instance, or whatever, is that both what informs an object of knowledge
and the act of knowledge is one in the same form expressed in two distinct modes. So that
there's a real openness of mind to world and world to mind because
both are subsisting in the same formal principle, right? That's one way of putting it. But I
mean, I think what Ian was saying is true. And there's a kind of sickness in imagining
that our experience of reality is not an experience of, well, I want to say the semantic consistency of reality,
you know, its qualities, its dimensions, these aren't illusions superimposed on a bare mechanical
order that is, or even a ding anzig thing in itself to which we have no access. And
I think one of the great deconstructions of representationalism
of that sort, you'll find in Hegel. But another, I think in All Things Are Full of Gods, one of the
few theological thinkers, philosophers I quote, or at least cite, is Bernard Lonergan, who
understands that surfeit of the unknown over the known, not as something
qualitatively impenetrable and repugnant to the act of knowledge, but simply an as-yet
undisclosed, undiscovered more, a greater depth into which we can yet venture. And the greatest death of all, of course, would be venturing
into God, union with God.
Representationalism is, in a sense, the epistemology of the modern age. It fits within the mechanical
model. It fits within the model of the proper domain of the sciences after
Galileo, who is a faithful Catholic, right? But I mean, for him, you know, it's the mathematical
quantification of mass and velocity and things like that, which is in a sense the proper
realm of the sciences. And then after that time, we came to the habit of thinking of
the proper realm of the sciences as reality as such, so that there's an occult or numinal reality to which our only approach is one
of gratifying and comprehensible illusions imposed by the apparatus of perception.
And first of all, I don't think that such a consonance could actually be achieved by
material processes to begin with, you know.
But I also think it's just a phideism, it's just a dogma, it's, you know, it's, and a confining and a dangerous
one in some ways.
David, as we end, firstly, thank you so much for spending so long with me and persisting
through your pain.
What are you striving for?
Me? Today? Really, to be honest, sorry about that. To be honest, all I'm thinking about
these days is my health, so forgive me, I'm not able to give you
a more elevated answer than that.
Striving to continue to believe,
even when being forced to reflect on personal reasons for doubt.
Why is continuing to believe so important to you? Well, again, there's the intellectual conviction that I've got it right, but it's more, I think
we believe for the sake of others, isn't it?
I mean, those we love.
If it were only ourselves at stake, it really wouldn't matter very much.
But you know, I have a son, I have a wife,
I have people I love.
And in addition to the intellectual convictions,
there's the structure of hope that says that they
are not just momentary accidents in a process of material causation whose underlying basso
continuo is despair.
Would you say then what's more important than faith is hope?
Well, according to Paul, love is the most important of all, right? Faith, hope, and
love, these three, but love is the one that abides. So, yeah, I'd say that love is what makes hope and faith worth persisting in.
Thank you.
Thanks for everything.
Don't go anywhere just yet. Now I have a recap of today's episode brought to you by The Economist. Just as The Economist brings clarity to complex concepts, we're doing
the same with our new AI-powered episode recap. Here's a concise summary of the
key insights from today's podcast.
Okay, so we're diving into this conversation between Kurt Jammengall and
David Bentley Hart.
Oh, yeah, Kurt from Theories of Everything.
I've seen a few of those.
He really gets into it with his guests.
Especially.
He really does, yeah.
And I mean, in this one they talk about consciousness,
physics, you know, even God.
Wow.
That's a lot to unpack.
It is.
It is.
It's really something how Hart just goes right
into the problem of evil,
not like how you normally hear it discussed theologically.
I know what you mean.
He kind of throws those typical arguments
right out the window,
like about how a good God could allow
so much suffering, all that.
Yeah, exactly.
He even says the suffering of innocence is unanswerable
if you believe in a benevolent God.
Yeah, and he doesn't just talk about it abstractly.
He brings in his own experience with chronic pain. Oh, wow. Yeah, so it's really clear that suffering isn't just talk about it abstractly. He brings in his own experience with chronic pain.
Oh wow.
Yeah, so it's really clear that suffering isn't
just some theoretical concept for him.
He's lived it.
It definitely adds like a whole other level of depth
to what he's saying.
Yeah, for sure.
It's not sugar coated at all.
No, it's real.
Yeah.
Really makes you think there might not be easy answers
when it comes to suffering.
Nope.
And then just when you think he's gonna stay
in that heavy, heavy space,
he switches gears completely
and starts talking about Christ's resurrection.
What?
Really?
How does he even connect those two?
Well, he argues that early Christianity,
how it survived and even grew,
especially after, well, after Christ died,
it points to something really big happening,
like something truly remarkable.
Right, right.
He even brings up how other movements,
you know, with the messianic leader back then,
they usually just disappeared after some initial excitement.
Interesting.
Yeah, so it's like he's implying that those early Christians,
when they said they encountered the risen Christ,
it couldn't have just been wishful thinking
or anything like that.
It really focuses on 1 Corinthians 15,
specifically the accounts, the first hand ones,
of meeting Christ after the resurrection.
Yeah, okay.
He says they have this rawness to them,
almost like a historical document.
God, I can see what.
Yeah.
And then, get this, he ties it all back to stoic metaphysics
Whoa
Stoic metaphysics now, that's a curveball. I know right. I'm not super familiar with that to be honest
So basically the stoics believed that spirit was like a divine fire like a higher element, you know
And it's everywhere. Okay, I think I'm false
So is he using stoic thought to explain the resurrection? Not exactly explain it, but he's using it to help us understand how those early Christians, especially Paul, thought about
body composed entirely of spirit.
Okay, yeah, I can see that. So like instead of thinking of spirit as this this disembodied ghost thing,
we should think of it more like like fire.
Exactly. It's powerful, transformative, but still part of the physical world.
Wow, that's a completely different way of thinking about the afterlife. Like fire. Exactly. It's powerful, transformative, but still part of the physical world.
Wow. That's a completely different way of thinking about the afterlife.
Isn't it? Makes you wonder how much our modern understanding of all this spirit and all that
has been shaped by, well, by our own culture and philosophies.
That's a good point. We probably don't even realize how much we're projecting our own
assumptions onto those ancient texts.
Right. So we've got this honest talk about suffering, then a compelling argument about
the resurrection, and now a connection to Stoic metaphysics. It's a lot.
Yeah, and this is just the beginning. Hart's ideas get even more radical and mind-blowing from here.
It's amazing how he can, like, connect all these seemingly random ideas. Makes you rethink
everything you thought you knew about Christianity.
Yeah, and he's not afraid to challenge those really traditional interpretations.
I know, right?
Like with John 1.1, the logos.
Oh yeah, that part was wild.
Yeah, he's saying the usual translation, he kind of shoe horns it into the whole Trinity
doctrine, but the original Greek, it's way more open to interpretation than that.
It is, and he brings up this view subordinationism,
where the son's subordinate to the father,
and apparently that was a pretty common view
in early Christianity.
Wait, so are you telling me that Jesus being equal
to God the Father,
that wasn't always the view everyone had?
Nope, not at all.
Hart's point is that the shift to the Trinity doctrine
with that whole co-equality thing,
it was a long process and super complex historically.
It's like we've all been taught this,
like the super simple, cleaned up version
of Christian history. Exactly.
And he's pulling back the curtain
and showing us all the debates,
all the different ways people understood things.
It's a good reminder that these religious doctrines,
they don't just appear out of thin air.
They come from these messy historical
and intellectual processes.
It makes you wonder how many other things
we just accept as truth, you know?
Without realizing they have these really
complex origins too.
Oh, totally.
And speaking of complex origins,
that part where he talks about intentionality
and how it connects to life, consciousness,
and D language,
that's where things get super fascinating.
Okay, lay it on me.
Because intentionality is one of those things
I've always kind of struggled with, to be honest.
So think of it like the aboutness of your thoughts.
Like when you think about a tree, right?
Your thought has an object, it's about that tree.
Okay, I get that.
But how does that tie into life and language?
Well, Hart says intentionality isn't just limited
to consciousness.
Even living organisms, even simple ones,
like single-celled organisms,
they have a kind of intentionality
in how they strive to survive and reproduce.
So even at the most basic level of life,
there's this inherent direction like a purposefulness
Exactly and language he says it's inherently intentional to also words have meaning because they point to something beyond themselves
Okay, I see you're saying so there's this like this thread of intentionality running through life
Consciousness and language. Yeah precisely and here's the kicker, the really radical part.
He says this intentionality can't be explained
by just material processes.
So he's going up against that whole materialistic worldview,
the one that's dominant today.
He is.
He's basically saying that the directedness,
the aboutness of these fundamental parts of reality,
it points to something beyond the material world.
You know, that reminds me of what he said earlier about how scientific methods they rely on this
idea of purpose teleology. Right. But at the same time they claim to reject
purpose you know as an inherent part of reality. It's like they're trying to have
it both ways. It is. It's like he's saying maybe, just maybe, our current scientific
way of looking at things, it's not enough
to really understand what reality is.
And get this, he then goes on to say
that neoplatonism, this ancient philosophy,
it actually starts to make sense
when you grasp what intentionality really means.
Neoplatonism, I know the name,
but I couldn't really tell you much about it.
So basically they see reality as flowing
from this single divine source.
Okay.
It's often called the one.
The one. Yeah.
And it's the ultimate source of like everything, being, consciousness, goodness.
But everything that exists is like a reflection of this divine source.
That's the gist of it. And Hart argues that when you really think about intentionality,
this neoplatonic view, it starts to fit.
Wow. It's like he's saying that if we take intentionality seriously, we might have to rethink not just materialism,
but like our whole picture of the universe.
And are placed in it.
Exactly.
And that's what's so radical about Hart.
He's not just critiquing little ideas here and there.
He's going after the very foundations of how we think.
He is.
But even with all that, he's not saying
he has all the answers, right?
He's really humble intellectually.
Definitely. He's not afraid to say, I don't know. He's not But even with all that, you know, he's not saying he has all the answers, right?
He's really humble, intellectually.
Definitely, he's not afraid to say, I don't know.
Exactly, and he doesn't try to cram every mystery
into some neat philosophical box.
Yeah, he even talks about how his own religious views
have changed over time, how he's embraced this more,
what's the word, syncretic approach.
Oh, right, that's where he talks about finding wisdom in all sorts's the word, syncretic approach. Oh, right.
That's where he talks about finding wisdom
in all sorts of different traditions,
not just Christian ones.
Exactly, and he's against that whole rigid dogma
of perennialism.
So he's open to truth, coming from different places,
but he's still deeply rooted in his own Christian faith.
Yeah.
He says he can't imagine not seeing God
as revealed in Christ. There's a real reverence there,
like that story is, well, it's unique and powerful for him.
But he also seems to be pushing back against, like, the limits of organized religion, you know,
questioning doctrines and interpretations.
Like he's saying real faith isn't about blindly following dogma.
Yeah.
It's about constantly searching for truth
wherever it might lead.
And he's not just talking about it, he's living it.
He is, he's drawing inspiration
from all these different philosophies and religions.
It's really inspiring, honestly.
It's like so open and curious
and always learning and growing.
Totally different from that intellectual
and spiritual rigidity you see so much these days.
You know, as we're going through all this,
I keep thinking about what he said about love, you know,
how we believe for the sake of others, the people we love.
Oh yeah, that really stuck with me too.
It's like he's saying,
faith isn't just this thing you do by yourself
in your own head.
It's deeply connected to our relationships,
our connections with other people.
Yeah, like love is, I don't know, like the fuel, you know?
The thing that drives our belief.
And maybe faith and love are like intertwined
in a way we don't always see.
Makes you think maybe the deepest truths
aren't found in doctrines and all that,
but in like those messy, beautiful connections
we have with each other.
It's like he's saying faith isn't just about
what we believe, but how we live.
And how we treat each other.
Right. So, you know, as we wrap up this dive into hearts conversation,
I'm just left with this feeling of awe.
Me too.
Yeah.
I just want to keep exploring these ideas, you know.
It really has been an incredible journey through some tough thought-provoking concepts.
It has. And even though we might not have all the answers,
I think the biggest takeaway is that, you know,
we gotta stay curious.
Eep an open mind.
Yeah, and be willing to challenge our own assumptions,
even the ones we really hold dear.
Exactly.
Well, we hope this has inspired you to do just that.
Keep searching, keep asking questions,
and keep exploring the mysteries of, well, of everything.
As we wrap up this deep dive into heart
in this conversation with Kurt Jemmell-Gall,
I'm just, I don't know, I'm filled with a sense of awe
and I wanna keep exploring these ideas.
It has been quite a journey,
so many challenging, thought-provoking ideas.
It has.
And, you know, even though we might not have figured
it all out, the main thing I think is to stay curious,
open to new ideas.
Keep asking those questions. Yeah, and be is to stay curious, open to new ideas. Keep asking those questions.
Yeah, and be willing to question everything, even the things we think we know for sure.
We hope this deep dive has inspired you to do just that.
Keep searching, keep wondering, keep exploring.
Absolutely. Thanks for joining us on this incredible journey.
We'll see you next time for another deep dive into the fields of
theoretical physics, philosophy and consciousness, what are your thoughts? While I remain impartial
in interviews, this substack is a way to peer into my present deliberations on these topics. Also thank you to our partner, The Economist.
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